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ABSTRACT 
 
BEYOND BIOLOGY: BASES FOR A CHILD-CENTERED AND FUNCTIONAL 
ACCOUNT OF PARENTHOOD 
 
 
 
By 
Jacob M Kohlhaas 
December 2015 
 
Dissertation supervised by Darlene Fozard Weaver 
This dissertation argues that the presently influential Catholic theological account 
of parenthood is indebted to an essentialist theory of gender and the system of sexual 
ethical reasoning it produces. In consideration of the family, Catholicism tends to favor 
the differentiated gender roles of the father as the primary financial provider and the 
mother as the primary caregiver. Though such thinking is often justified as natural or 
traditional, it relies heavily upon a post-Victorian social context. This gender 
complementarity is often accompanied by an idealization of the autonomous biological-
nuclear family. This family is autonomous in granting parents alone direct responsibility 
for the household and certain rights to privacy; biological in assuming continuity among 
genetic, gestational, and social parenthood; and nuclear in centering on a married couple 
without essential bonds beyond the parent-parent and parent-child relationships.  
v 
 
Importantly, this theory of gender and human sexuality appears not only to reject 
voluntary participation in placing children with same-sex partners, but so privileges the 
biological family that it may undermine Catholic participation in, and theological 
reflection on, adoption more generally. This approach produces a constricted theology of 
parenthood which governs thought on childrearing, yet does not meaningfully engage the 
Catholic Church’s long and diverse history of orphan care and does little to integrate 
contemporary social scientific studies of child wellbeing. 
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Case Study: Catholic Charities v The State of Illinois et al. 
On June 7, 2011, Catholic Charities of the Illinois dioceses of Springfield, Peoria 
and Joliet filed suit against the state Attorney General and Department of Child and 
Family Services (DCFS). Their lawsuit sought to establish the agencies’ good standing 
under the Illinois Human Rights Act despite their practice of refusing children placements 
with cohabitating and unmarried heterosexual or homosexual couples.1 The suit came in 
response to both a March, 2011 complaint to the Attorney General’s office alleging 
discriminatory practices as well as the state’s interpretation of the Illinois Religious 
Freedom Protection and Civil Unions Act, which had taken effect on June 1, 2011.2 This 
act created a state-recognized civil institution for same-sex or different-sex partners very 
similar to marriage; though it avoided certain terms (spouse, marriage, etc.3) which had 
been defined by the federal Defense of Marriage Act of 1996.4 Under the DCFS’s 
interpretation, these civil unions, though not considered marriages, could not be subject 
to discrimination in preference for marriage. Catholic Charities’ distinguished between 
civil unions and marriage in its placements by refusing placements for partners in civil 
unions. 
                                                 
1 Cf. “Catholic Charities v State of Illinois et al,” The Thomas More Society, (June 7 – November 
14, 2011) https://www.thomasmoresociety.org/cases/closed-cases/catholic-charities-v-state-of-illinois-et-
al/press-releases/ This site contains chronological documentation of the developments of this lawsuit 
through press releases and relevant materials. 
2 “Illinois Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Unions Act,” Illinois General Assembly, (Jun. 
1, 2011) http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs3.asp?ActID=3294&ChapterID=59. 
3 Richard A. Wilson. “Family Law: A Guide to the New Illinois Civil Union Law,” Illinois State 
Bar Association, 99 no. 5 (May 2011), 232. 
4 “Defense of Marriage Act,” U.S. Government Printing Office, (Sept. 12, 1996) 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-104hr3396enr/pdf/BILLS-104hr3396enr.pdf. 
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 In letters to Catholic Charities on July 8, the Illinois Attorney General stated that, 
because these agencies had made clear their intention not to comply with the Civil Union 
Act, their state contracts would not be renewed and existing DCFS cases would be 
transitioned to other agencies.5 On July 12, a judge granted a preliminary injunction to 
allow a continuation of existing relations between the state and these agencies, including 
the referral of new cases. Shortly thereafter, Catholic Social Services of Southern Illinois, 
associated with the Diocese of Bellevue joined the lawsuit.6 
 On August 18, 2011 the court ruled that the state of Illinois was not obligated to 
renew its contracts with these agencies. Representatives of the agencies argued the case 
on the grounds of religious freedom and the Attorney General’s faulty interpretation of 
the Civil Unions Act in light of the Illinois Human Rights Act. However, the court did not 
consider the state’s motivation for withholding contracts to be centrally significant. 
Instead it focused on the obligations that might bind the state to contract with a specific 
party. Despite the DCFS’ own high rating of these agencies and more than forty years of 
partnership with the state,7 the court found that the plaintiffs could not claim the right to a 
government contract in the absence of a legally recognized property right.8 In response to 
                                                 
5 Erwin McEwen, “FY12 Foster Care and Adoption Contracts,” scribd.com 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/59782549/Catholic-Charities-Foster-Care-and-Adoption-Contracts-Illinois-
Department-of-Children-Family-Services-Letter. 
6 “Highly Ranked Catholic Adoption/Foster Care Agency Serving Southern Illinois Joins Catholic 
Charities Lawsuit to Continue to Serve Children’s Best Interests,” The Thomas More Society, (June 26, 
2011) https://www.thomasmoresociety.org/2011/07/26/highly-ranked-catholic-adoptionfoster-care-agency-
serving-southern-illinois-joins-catholic-charities-lawsuit-to-continue-to-serve-childrens-best-interests/. 
7 Maryann Medlin, “Illinois Bishops Announce Shutdown of Adoption Services,” Catholic News 
Agency. (15 Nov. 2011). 
8 In effect, because no formal agreement bound the state to future contracts, the relationship was 
on a year-to-year basis, though this was clearly not the informal understanding. To allow an informal 
understanding the standing to obligate future contracts would have set a potentially dangerous precedent for 
the state. John Schmidt, “Summary Court Order,” scribd.com  (August 18, 2011) 
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this ruling, Bishop Jenky of Peoria lamented that a compromise was not reached, 
especially as it was the state’s interpretation of the Civil Unions Act, not the wording of 
the act itself, which had forced the partnership to end.9 The plaintiffs sought to appeal the 
decision and stall the state’s reassignment of children to other providers. By November, 
after substantial transitions of cases away from the agencies had taken place, the outcome 
was inevitable. The Thomas More Society, representing the agencies, filed motion to 
dismiss the case.10 
 Catholic adoption agencies responded differently in the aftermath. In the dioceses 
Springfield and Joliet, adoption services by Catholic Charities ended, though other family 
services continued.11 By discontinuing adoption services the agencies avoided having to 
either operate without public contracts or comply with the new legislation. Adoption 
services in the dioceses of Peoria and Bellevue chose to disaffiliate with the Catholic 
Church in order to comply with the DCFS’s interpretation of state law. In the Diocese of 
Bellevue, Catholic Social Services of Southern Illinois became Christian Social Services 
                                                 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/62597962/Illinois-Circuit-Court-Summary-Judgment-Order-in-Catholic-
Charities-Foster-Care-Adoption-Services-Case. 
9 Daniel Jenky, “Statement by the Most Reverend Jenky, Bishop of the Diocese of Peoria, 
Regarding the Court Decision Made by Judge John Schmidt in Sangamon County,” The Thomas More 
Society , (August 18, 2011) https://www.thomasmoresociety.org/2011/08/22/statement-by-the-most-
reverend-jenky-bishop-of-the-diocese-of-peoria-regarding-the-court-decision-made-by-judge-john-
schmidt-in-sangamon-county/. 
10 “After 90 Years, Catholic Charities Foster Care Will Cease in Illinois,” The Thomas More 
Society, (November 14, 2011) https://www.thomasmoresociety.org/2011/11/14/after-90-years-catholic-
charities-foster-care-will-cease-in-illinois-states-action-to-remove-children-from-charities-care-forces-
cessation-of-lawsuit/. 
11 Cf. “Catholic Charities Programs.” Catholic Charities Diocese of Springfield 
http://www.cc.dio.org/programs.htm and “Programs and Services.” Catholic Charities Diocese of Joliet 
http://www.cc-doj.org/programs.htm. 
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of Illinois.12 In the Diocese of Peoria, the adoption arm of Catholic Charities separated 
from the larger organization and became the Center for Youth and Family Solutions.13 
Both of these new agencies operate under the state’s new guidelines and ceased ranking 
placements by marital and civil union status. Finally, the diocese of Rockford and 
Archdiocese of Chicago, which had ended adoption services prior to the Civil Unions Act 
in 201114 and 200715 respectively, both restarted adoption services.16 These agencies are 
inspected and licensed by the state of Illinois, but are not reliant upon state funding. 
Independence of state contracts allows these agencies to restrict placement applicants to 
heterosexual married couples alone; going beyond the previously accepted practice of 
admitting single applicants. Thus, three resolutions emerged; ending adoption services, 
disaffiliation from the Catholic Church, and financial independence from the state. 
 Other faith-based adoption services were also affected by the state’s application 
of the Civil Unions Act. Evangelical Child and Family Agency (ECFA) did not have its 
state contracts renewed, but continued independently. This new status allows ECFA to 
                                                 
12 Unlike in the other Illinois dioceses, Adoption was not run through Catholic Charities in 
Southern Illinois. Cf. “Adoption,” Christian Social Services of Illinois, 
http://www.cssil.org/programs/adoption.aspx. 
13 “Adoption Services,” Center for Youth and Family Solutions, 
http://cyfsolutions.org/services/adoption-services. 
14 The Diocese of Rockford had announced its discontinuation of adoption services prior to the 
Civil Unions Act taking effect. Manya A. Brachear, “Catholic Charities of Rockford Ends Foster Care, 
Adoption Services,” Chicago Tribune (May 26. 2011) http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-05-
26/news/ct-met-rockford-catholic-charities-st20110526_1_catholic-charities-adoption-services-care-and-
adoption. 
15 Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Chicago ended its services in 2007 for financial 
reasons. 
16 Cf. “Adoption Services Available,” Diocese of Rockford Catholic Charities, 
http://catholiccharities.rockforddiocese.org/adoptionservices and “Adoption,” The Catholic Charities of the 
Archdiocese of Chicago, http://www.catholiccharities.net/services/adoption/. 
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restrict applicants to active members in Evangelical congregations alone (it allows single 
applicants).17 Lutheran Family and Child Services (LFCS), which is recognized by the 
Lutheran Church Missouri Synod, formerly restricted applicants to married couples but 
chose to adjust its practice to retain state contracts.18 
 
Raising Questions 
 Numerous observations can be made from this case study, which suggest much 
larger questions about the family, the needs of children, and the role of parents are 
understood in Catholic tradition and American culture. In an ironic twist, the state of 
Illinois’ attempt to require broader placements led to an increased number of independent 
agencies with more restricted standards than before. Catholic agencies began to require 
marriage while the ECFA began to require a religious affiliation. Interestingly, the 
counter-arguments of the religious organizations appealed to faith commitments not only 
to reject the states’ new requirements but implicated practices in which they themselves 
had earlier participated.  
 
Relationship of Church and State 
 In 2012, a nationwide debate about religious freedom arose in response to the 
department of Health and Human Services’ decision to require health insurance coverage 
of contraceptives for most religiously affiliated employers under the Patient Protection 
                                                 
17 Cf. “Adoption Program Information, Policies and Fees,” Evangelical Child and Family Agency, 
http://www.evancfa.org/Adoption/adoprograminfo.htm#Basic_Eligibility_Criteria. 
18 Cf. “Adoption,” Lutheran Child and Family Services, http://www.lcfs.org/page.aspx?pid=186. 
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and Affordable Care Act of 2010. The debate was championed by the United States 
Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) and the fate of adoption services in Illinois 
became an important reference point for perceived state intervention and compulsion in 
religious matters.19 Documents from the USCCB suggest that the discontinuation of 
adoption services was the direct result of laws that forcefully intruded upon the 
conscience-bound beliefs of religious organizations.20 However, these documents do not 
mention Catholic Charities’ limited, but voluntary participation in same-sex adoptive 
placements throughout the preceding decades, as well as the very recent developments in 
Catholic teaching which had ended these practices. 
 In recent years, Catholic Charities of Boston and of San Francisco ended adoption 
services in response to legislation similar to that in Illinois. However, prior to 2006, 
Catholic Charities in both cities voluntarily placed a limited number of particularly 
challenging children with same-sex partners. In all, Catholic Charities of Boston placed 
thirteen children in the care of same-sex couples over a twenty year period.21 Catholic 
Charities of San Francisco placed five children with same-sex couples between 2000 and 
2006.22 Cardinal William Levada, former archbishop of San Francisco and former Prefect 
                                                 
19 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops Ad Hoc Committee for Religious Liberty, “Our 
First, Most Cherished Liberty: A Statement on Religious Liberty,” USCCB, (March, 2012) 
http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/upload/Our-First-Most-Cherished-Liberty-Apr12-
6-12-12.pdf. 
20 Ibid., Cf. United States Catholic Bishops, “Discrimination against Catholic Adoption Services,” 
USCCB, (Summer 2012) http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/fortnight-for-freedom/ 
upload/Catholic-Adoption-Services.pdf. 
21 Jerry Filteau, “Catholic Charities in Boston Archdiocese to End Adoption Services,” Catholic 
News Service, (March 13, 2006) http://www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/cns/0601456.htm. 
22 Wyatt Buchanan, “Catholic Charity Might Stop Adoptions / Vatican Prohibits Placement with 
Same-Sex Couples” SFGate, (March 11, 2006) http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/SAN-FRANCISCO-
Catholic-charity-might-stop-2539650.php. 
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of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF), had been aware of three of these 
placements. Describing these decisions, he explained that, at the time, these were 
considered exceptional circumstances in which prudential considerations of the children’s 
needs warranted such actions.23 
 That Catholic adoption agencies had earlier voluntarily placed children with 
same-sex partners suggests that new legislation was not the only cause for ending this 
public-private partnership; religious developments occurred as well. New legislation in 
Massachusetts, San Francisco, Illinois and Washington D.C. compelled Catholic agencies 
desiring state contracts to cease prioritizing married applicants over those in civil unions, 
including same-sex couples. Prior to this, Catholic agencies consistently held suitable 
married heterosexual couples as ideal candidates, but allowed for same-sex partners and 
single candidates as less preferable placement options. These lesser candidates were 
turned to, on occasion, with particularly hard to place children. This hierarchy reflected 
religious convictions about familial ideals and had been legally acceptable.24 Even after 
new legislation passed, Catholic adoption agencies’ religious affiliation could have 
provided grounds for exemption if this was not seen to conflict with other goods. In 
Illinois, it was the Attorney General’s interpretation of the law, not the law itself, which 
judged equal treatment of citizens as an overriding concern against religious exemptions.  
                                                 
23 Filteau, “Catholic Charities in Boston Archdiocese to End Adoption Services.” 
24 In 1992, the CDF expressed concern over legislative protections for non-discrimination of 
homosexual persons and raised concerns about the possible implications for adoption and foster care. Still 
the document did not directly prohibit Catholic participation in same-sex adoption placements. Cf. 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Some Considerations Concerning the Response to Legislative 
Proposals on the Non-Discrimination of Homosexual Persons,” Vatican, (July 24, 1992) 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19920724_homose
xual-persons_en.html. 
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 Religiously, Catholic involvement in adoptions by same-sex couples became 
more restricted after 2003 with the CDF’s, “Considerations Regarding Proposals to Give 
Legal Recognition to Unions between Homosexual Persons.” This document coupled its 
concern with legalization of same-sex marriage with unease that such couples would then 
be allowed to adopt children. The document asserts that placing children in the care of 
same-sex partners “creates obstacles in the normal development of children” and as such 
“would actually mean doing violence to these children.”25 This judgment did not 
explicitly prohibit all Catholic participation in same-sex adoption. It did, however, 
describe the action as “gravely immoral.”26 This indicates that it is a mortal sin, but does 
not clarify whether circumstances might ever permit the act either as a lesser evil or as an 
‘indirect’ consequence of attaining an immediate good. In some situations, prolonged 
foster care may leave children without many of the essential aspects of a stable family 
that have also been enumerated by Catholic leaders as lacking in same-sex relationships. 
Could this, under certain circumstances, warrant placements with same-sex couples? 
Such was the prudential judgment made by Archbishop William Levada in San 
Francisco. In a 2006 letter to the Archdiocese of San Francisco, the CDF clarified that the 
earlier statement did in fact prohibit all direct participation in same-sex adoption 
placements. Remarkably, this judgment was written by the newly appointed Prefect of the 
CDF and Cardinal-elect, William Levada.27 
                                                 
25 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Considerations Regarding Proposals to Give Legal 
Recognition to Unions between Homosexual Persons,” Vatican, (July 31, 2003) 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20030731_homose
xual-unions_en.html, 7.3. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Cardinal Levada sent a letter to his former diocese on March 11, 2006 stating that Catholic 
Charities of San Francisco should discontinue placing children with same-sex partners. Three such 
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Developments in Catholic Teaching 
 The case study above raises questions concerning the role of gender in a Catholic 
theology of parenthood, especially in terms of the importance of sexual complementary 
among caregivers for healthy child development,28 the relative scope of who can be 
properly considered a parent in Catholic thought, and what principle lies behind the 
current practice of accepting single-parent applicants but not same-sex partners. Related 
to this last point, it might also be asked what role the presumption of a sexual relationship 
has in evaluating fitness for parenthood. Questions could also be raised concerning how 
such developments have transformed Catholic conceptions of the family. Might 
opposition to same-sex adoption implicate other forms of non-biological parenthood? 
                                                 
placements had taken place with his knowledge while he was archbishop, but in light of the CDF’s teaching 
of 2003, he stated that all bishops were to follow this standard. Recently elected Archbishop George 
Niederauer confirmed this new approach a few days later. In August, 2006, Catholic Charities decided to 
continue adoption services by providing employees to staff California Kids Connection, a website that 
provided a database for matching children and adults in California’s adoption system. This allowed 
Catholic Charities to continue involvement in adoption placements, without undertaking placements itself. 
Interestingly this greatly expanded the number of adoption cases Catholic Charities was involved in, as 
well as the percentage involving same-sex couples. On October 12, 2008 the partnership was unexpectedly 
dissolved, following a budget shortfall in the San Francisco diocese and a campaign by Family Builders by 
Adoption, the owner of California Kids Connection, to increase adoptions by same-sex couples; which had 
recently hit 88%. Cf. “Catholic Charities in San Francisco Severs Links to Homosexual Adoptions,” 
Catholic News Agency, (October 5, 2008) 
http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/catholic_charities_in_san_francisco_severs_links_to_homosexu
al_adoptions/ and Valerie Schmalz, “SF Catholic Charities Cuts Ties to Homosexual Adoptions,” Our 
Sunday Visitor, (October 12, 2008) http://www.osv.com/tabid/7621/itemid/4093/Catholic-Charities-cuts-
homosexual-adoption-
ties.aspxhttp://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/catholic_charities_in_san_francisco_severs_links_to_h
omosexual_adoptions/. 
28 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Considerations Regarding Proposals to Give Legal 
Recognition to Unions between Homosexual Persons,” Vatican, (July 31, 2003) 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20030731_homose
xual-unions_en.html, 7.3. 
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And does a presumption of biological normativity restrict potential caregivers for 
children in need? 
 
The Best Interest of Children and Adult Capabilities 
 A final point to consider in relation to this case is the way in which it portrays 
both children’s needs and adult capabilities to provide care for children. Both sides 
represented in the case study above asserted that their position worked in the best 
interests of children. For example, from the state of Illinois’ perspective, implementing 
the law in the manner it did assured the maximum number of suitable placement families. 
From the Catholic perspective, refusal to abide by the new laws was founded on a 
commitment to privilege the family form most conducive to healthy child development. 
Still, neither side convincingly promoted children’s needs as their primary consideration. 
Proponents of Illinois’ legislation were clearly concerned with non-discrimination of 
adults29 while the Catholic agencies were concerned for religious freedom vis-à-vis 
developments in magisterial teaching.30 
 Closer consideration of the Catholic theological argument yields a number of 
concerns related to its method. For example, the CDF claims that “experience” attests to 
the deleterious effects of childrearing without parental complementarity, yet neither 
supports this claim further nor convincingly demonstrates interest in engaging scholarly 
research on the experience of parents and children in same-sex households. In addition, 
the magisterial position tends towards making categorical objections which can create 
                                                 
29 Cf. Brachear, “Catholic Charities of Rockford Ends Foster Care, Adoption Services.” 
30 Medlin, “Illinois Bishops Announce Shutdown of Adoption Services.” 
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challenges for application. For example, Adoption placements in the US have layers of 
processes and documentation designed to match children with specific needs to families 
with specific capabilities. Categorical dismissal of certain family forms appears to run 
contrary to a system that relies on references, home studies, and other case-by-case 
evaluations to determine fitness for placement. Interestingly, this case-by-case approach 
was also the method that characterized limited participation in adoption placements with 
same-sex couples by Catholic agencies prior to 2006. Moreover, further concerns 
include: what concepts of the child and children’s needs are being assumed by the 
magisterium? How does categorical denial of certain family forms affect adoption 
processes? What conception of parenthood is being assumed? What specific capabilities 
are required to parent? And are any individuals categorically unable to fulfill these? 
 
Introduction to the Research 
While speedy placement in permanent homes is a demonstrated benefit to the 
wellbeing of adoptees,31 placing children in the care of same-sex couples violates 
Catholic teaching, which asserts that every child has a right to a family that is founded on 
marriage.32 Recent developments have left Catholic agencies in between a legal 
understanding of family that supports equal protection for same-sex spouses on one hand 
                                                 
31 David M. Brodzinsky, Expanding Resources for Children III: Research-Based Best Practices In 
Adoption By Gays and Lesbians, (New York: Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute, 2011), 5., Cf. Kristin 
Anderson Moore, et al., “Research Brief: What is ‘Healthy Marriage’? Defining the Concept,” Child 
Trends (September 2004),1., and David M. Rubin, et al. “The Impact of Placement Stability on Behavioral 
Well-being for Children in Foster Care” Pediatrics Vol. 119 No. 2 (February 1, 2007).  
32 Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. “Instruction for Respect of Human Life in Its 
Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation: Replies to Certain Questions of the Day.” (Donum vitae) Vatican. 
(February 22, 1987), II.A.1. 
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and a theological understanding that contends that same-sex partnerships cannot form 
families on the other hand. Confronted with these opposing views, many agencies chose 
to uphold Catholic teaching and lost the substantial government funding needed to 
continue their adoption services.33 The end of the long-standing and biblically mandated 
practice of Catholic orphan care in these localities is a cause for concern and raises 
serious theological questions. 
These decisions to end Catholic adoption services in response to non-
discrimination legislation reflect deeper developments in the Catholic conception of 
parenthood. This dissertation will argue that the presently influential Catholic theological 
account of parenthood is indebted to an essentialist theory of gender and the system of 
sexual ethical reasoning it produces. This essentialist theory conceptualizes maleness and 
femaleness as discrete and complementary categories. In consideration of the family, 
Catholicism tends to favor the differentiated gender roles of the father as the primary 
financial provider and the mother as the primary caregiver.34 Though such thinking is 
often justified as natural or traditional, it relies heavily upon a post-Victorian social 
context.35 This gender complementarity is often accompanied by an idealization of the 
                                                 
33 Catholic Social Services of Southern Illinois chose to disaffiliate from the Catholic Church and 
continues under the name Christian Social Services of Illinois. Adoption agencies of the Missouri Synod 
Lutheran Church have continued in compliance with the legislation despite theological disagreements akin 
to those of Catholic agencies. All agencies had the option of continuing without state funding, however, 
subsisting on private donations was not a realistic alternative for most.  “In Illinois, Catholic Charities in 
five of the six state dioceses had grown dependent on foster care contracts, receiving 60% to 92% of their 
revenues from the state, according to affidavits by the charities’ directors.” Medlin, Par. 15. 
34 Lisa Sowle Cahill, “Notes on Moral Theology: 1989; Feminist Ethics,” Theological Studies 51 
(1990), 58. 
35 Rosemary Radford Reuther, Christianity and the Making of the Modern Family, (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 2000), 10. Cf. Frances Goldscheider, “Rescuing the Family from the Homophobes and 
Antifeminists: Analyzing the Recently Developed and Already Eroding “Traditional” Notions of Family 
and Gender,” Case Western Reserve Law Review 64 no. 3 (2014), 1029 – 1044. The article argues that the 
notion of the ‘traditional’ family and associated gender roles is a product of the industrial revolution; 
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autonomous biological-nuclear family. This family is autonomous in granting parents 
alone direct responsibility for the household and certain rights to privacy; biological in 
assuming continuity among genetic, gestational, and social parenthood; and nuclear in 
centering on a married couple without essential bonds beyond the parent-parent and 
parent-child relationships.  
Importantly, this theory of gender and human sexuality appears not only to reject 
voluntary participation in placing children with same-sex partners, but so privileges the 
biological family that it may undermine Catholic participation in, and theological 
reflection on, adoption more generally. This approach produces a constricted theology of 
parenthood which governs thought on childrearing, yet does not meaningfully engage the 
Catholic Church’s long and diverse history of orphan care and does little to integrate 
contemporary social scientific studies of child wellbeing. These underlying realities 
profoundly influenced the disagreements that arose as a result of non-discrimination 
legislation in adoption.  
This dissertation will critique magisterial teaching and revisionist theology in 
response to a common linear progression from human sexuality, to sexual ethics, to 
theology of marriage, to theology of parenthood, in light of the biases and limitations it 
presents. Like modern magisterial documents, revisionist Catholic theologians 
consistently access theology of parenthood through sexual ethics and, in doing so, tend to 
replicate the biological bias of magisterial thought. Treatment of adoption as a peripheral, 
                                                 
specifically the roughly century long interval between the majority of men shifting from agricultural to 
non-agricultural employment in the mid to late nineteenth century and the majority of women shifting from 
agricultural then domestic work to the pubic labor force in the mid to late twentieth century. 
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rather than integral, consideration of the meaning of Christian childrearing is 
symptomatic of this approach.  
 This dissertation contends that the approach common to the magisterium and 
revisionist theologians is neither sufficient to respond adequately to contemporary 
questions related to non-biological kinship, nor adequately representative of historical 
diversities in Christian childrearing. Further, this project will assess resources from 
multiple fields of study that intentionally account for non-biological familial 
relationships. These will be critically integrated into a more expansive theological 
framework from which a broader account of parenthood may be constructed. Such 
resources include social scientific studies of child wellbeing, historic resources that 
demonstrate contingency and social construction in family and caregiving, and secular 
sources that challenge the normativity of biological kinship. In concluding, this project 
will assess the extent to which these expanded resources for a theology of parenthood 
warrant prudential tolerance of non-discrimination legislation among Catholic adoption 
agencies. 
The case study above signals the intended scope of the project at hand which is 
concerned primarily with the theological nature of parenthood as presented by 
contemporary Catholic teaching and theology as well as by the historical evidence of the 
Christian tradition. It raises this concern directly in response to questions raised within 
the American social context regarding the nature of marriage, the family, and children’s 
needs. The reality of same-sex partnerships, marriages, and parenting, are the entry 
through which these questions are raised, but not the direct object of inquiry. For this 
reason, the research directly considers only those same-sex couples who have children or 
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desire to adopt children while many additional concerns found in queer literature and 
beyond related to same-sex couples and family formation will not addressed. In addition, 
the moral questions concerning the use of assisted reproductive technologies and 
surrogacy by same-sex couples, different-sex couples, and single individuals lie beyond 
the scope of this project’s concern. Finally, international adoption raises a host of moral 
concerns given its history and contemporary economic realities but will not be addressed 
in light of the project’s focus on the Western cultural tradition and present American 
context. In sum, the project centers on theological consideration of the nature of 
parenthood itself as it relates to parental function and children’s needs. For this reason, it 
cannot address a number of questions related to means of reproduction and family 
formation that are nonetheless important. 
 
Methodology, Extent and Limitations of Research 
The methodology of this dissertation will be characterized by a cross-disciplinary 
and dialogical approach that critically engages a variety of fields in order to draw upon 
expansive and diverse sources of contemporary research on the complex subjects of 
gender, family, and parenthood. Evaluations of each field will include both a critical 
deconstructive aspect as well as an integrative constructive aspect. The latter will be 
characterized by a historically-conscious, personalist, revisionist methodology  which 
will rest on a conviction that a contemporary theology of parenthood must carefully 
consider both the needs and wellbeing of children as well as the potentials and 
capabilities of adult caregivers. 
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This dialogical methodology will be employed with each of the fields noted above 
so as to facilitate a cross-disciplinary critical evaluation of the possibilities, limitations, 
strengths, and weaknesses presented by these resources. Historic and empirical research 
will be engaged as sources of descriptive information, yet acknowledged as requiring 
interpretation to serve a theological argument. Secular research will serve as a valuable 
resource for criticisms of biological bias and contemporary reconstructions of family and 
parenthood, but particular attention will be paid to ideological and anthropological 
foundations. Additionally, in recognition of human flourishing as the central concern of 
the Catholic moral tradition, this research proceeds from the conviction that God 
proscribes only what is truly not good for humans. This obliges establishing a mutually 
critical dialogue between the theological and non-theological sources in order to clarify 
and assess the claims of each as complementary contributions towards a suitable 
understanding of the human person fully alive. 
The critical deconstructive aspect of this research rests on the observation that 
both magisterial and revisionist theological accounts of parenthood tend to be drawn out 
of sexual-ethical convictions, focused on biological kinship, and lacking sufficient 
integration of adoption. It will evaluate assumptions and methodologies in light of these 
limitations and will articulate both the problematic and the potentially beneficial aspects 
of various theological resources. 
The integrative, constructive aspect of this research will place insights from 
various fields into conversation so as to suggest broader resources for constructing a 
theological account of parenthood. It will take historical variation, development and 
contingency as significant for theological reflection, will suggest expanded bases for an 
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account of parenthood through an broadened theological anthropology related to both the 
adult and child subjects, and will not take the authoritative judgment that homogenital 
acts are “objectively evil” as sufficient to end consideration of same-sex caregiving. 
Although a consistent methodology will be attempted, this project cannot be 
divorced from the specific this project will nonetheless reflect the concerns and context 
of its author. As a married, white, Catholic, heterosexual father and educator, my 
academic concern for a more adequate contemporary theological account of parenthood 
is not without personal interest. During much of the time in which this project was 
conceived and written, my wife and I more than once exchanged periods of being 
primary caregiver, primary income earner, and both working full-time. My personal 
experiences in these negotiated parental roles are not without consequence for the present 
study. This research will be presented with a level of academic objectivity and 
disinterestedness as well as a willingness to pursue the questions where they lead. 
However, much of the motivation behind completing this project stems from personal 
recognition of dissonance between Catholic teaching and theological literature and my 
own lived experience. As such, my intent is to write a theological exploration of the 
subject matter that is reasoned, thorough, and accurate, even as this work cannot be 
alienated from who I am as its author. 
This project intends to maintain a moderate and pragmatic approach to 
contemporary questions concerning diversity in childrearing. It attempts to respect the 
convictions of the magisterium in expressing strong concern for recent social 
developments, while also articulating resources for a more expansive and nuanced 
theology of parenthood that may challenge the bases of these beliefs. This approach is 
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informed largely by my own experiences in the classroom where students generally range 
from steadfast religious conservatives, to social progressives, to those who are 
disinterested or hostile towards organized religion. In my estimation, these young people, 
and broader trends within scholarship and American culture, are raising significant and 
challenging questions regarding the meaning of parenthood to which Catholic responses 
have often been inadequate. In large part, this is because the religious imagination and 
theological framework utilized to respond are too restricted and thereby inform responses 
that fail to adequately acknowledge the depth and significance of the questions. When 
research for this project first began, I asked a room full of peers why it was that gender 
complementarity now functions as a sin qua non for a healthy childrearing in arguments 
against same-sex parenthood despite the Catholic Church having maintained a long 
tradition of orphan care by women religious that does not arouse similar concern for 
sexually complementary. The passionate but disconnected responses I received were 
more than enough to convince me that at some point or points important shifts had taken 
place in modern Catholic conceptions of parenthood which were worthy of further study. 
From this insight this dissertation was born. 
 
Chapter Summaries 
Chapter 1: Magisterial Teaching 
The first chapter reviews modern magisterial teaching on the family and argues 
that the conceptions of parenthood offered are informed by an underlying theory of 
gender and human sexuality that promotes a biological bias and produces a constricted 
theology of parenthood. Evidence of this includes a tendency in considerations of 
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“responsible parenthood” to emphasize sexual ethical standards while directing little 
attention the task of childrearing beyond procreation. Moreover, the chapter contends that 
modern magisterial teaching is limited by a narrow vision of human adaptability in 
caregiving (e.g. no consideration of males as primary caregivers), an inattention to 
scientific evidence (e.g. the absence of reference to studies on child wellbeing), a limited 
attention to adoption, and a moral evaluation of same-sex parenting that does not 
integrate an thorough evaluation of caregiving potential. 
On the other hand, the first chapter also contends that many aspects of magisterial 
teaching are central for constructing a reappraised theological account of parenthood. For 
example, despite being the subject of criticism for his gender theory John Paul II also 
surmised that the true meaning of parenthood goes beyond biological kinship, a 
commitment that resonates throughout the tradition. Moreover, John Paul II’s 
understanding of the social vocation of the family is an important corrective to overly 
privatized conceptions. On the whole, the chapter argues that magisterial teaching itself 
contains numerous internal sources of correction for the criticisms being leveled, though 
these are often underemphasized. For example, conceptions of the family as a learning 
and evangelizing community suggest that families might also be evaluated by how they 
function over time, despite frequent magisterial emphases on family structure and sexual 
ethical norms. 
 
Chapter 2: Revisionist Resources 
The second chapter considers contemporary revisionist theological approaches to 
family and parenthood. It argues that revisionist theologians provide important 
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methodological guides for incorporating secular and empirical perspectives into 
theological arguments. However, these sources appear to share in the biological bias of 
magisterial teaching despite having more thoroughly incorporated experience as a 
resource in producing revised accounts of theological anthropology and sexual ethics. In 
this light, the chapter critiques a preoccupation with sexual morality among Catholic 
moral theologians. Even as revisionist arguments have challenged magisterial teaching an 
underlying approach shapes both which is manifest in a similar inattention to adoption. 
The revisionist authors considered tend to criticize magisterial teaching on the family for 
its idealism and narrow linking of the nuclear family to gendered parental roles. But 
revisionist responses are limited by the tendency to replicate certain lines of thought in 
the writings they criticize as well as to assert social scientific data without integrating this 
sufficiently into a theological account of parenthood as such. Despite certain limitations, 
several revisionist authors provide valuable insights for a theological reconsideration of 
parenthood. Drawing from these, the chapter will suggest a constructive understanding of 
the family and parenthood that is less attached to sexual ethics and can more adequately 
account for adoption, family function, and parental capabilities. 
 
Chapter 3: Historical Resources 
This chapter argues that numerous historical resources exist for expanding a 
theological conception of parenthood and childrearing. It will argue that the history of 
childrearing in the Christian tradition is diverse, complex, and has undergone significant 
development. Moreover, it has not always shared the biological bias prevalent in 
contemporary thought. This chapter will argue that historically, practices of childrearing 
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have often diverged from the complementary two-parent norm based on biological 
kinship. It pays particular attention to accepted forms of childrearing, such as orphan care 
by vowed religious, that have been viewed as a function of Christian virtue and yet have 
lacked parental sexual complementarity. Throughout Christian history, spiritual 
understandings of kinship have often served as a powerful resource to support practices 
of care, especially in the absence of biological ties. Consequently, the chapter argues that 
biological relatedness and the willingness to construct kinship based on other’s needs are 
both important to historical Christian conceptions of kinship. While admitting that many 
historical experiences in caregiving have been negative, this chapter problematizes overly 
simplistic ideals of family and parenthood. 
 
Chapter 4: Social Scientific Resources 
While acknowledging the limitations of present research, the fourth chapter will 
demonstrate how recent findings of social scientific research support, challenge, and 
expand various aspects of Catholic teaching on family function, parenthood and 
children’s wellbeing. It observes that, on factors that benefit child wellbeing, Catholic 
teaching and contemporary research find significant agreement and children raised by 
their biological married parents fair best on average. Likewise, the detriments to child 
wellbeing most cited in Catholic teaching largely agree with contemporary research. 
Poverty, racial discrimination (present and historical), gender discrimination, divorce and 
single-parent families are interconnected realities which have profound negative 
consequences for children. Viewing the family from a social perspective, magisterial 
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thought appears well supported by observation, yet this general consistency masks 
differences in nuance and interpretation. 
This chapter contends that, in the realm of moral theology, Catholic teaching is 
challenged by empirical research, especially as its underlying theory of essentialist 
gender complementarity is confronted with increasing knowledge of human adaptability. 
Moreover, its idealization of the nuclear family creates problems in adequately assessing 
how social and economic pressures influence family formation, fragmentation, and 
function. It is also significant that the only major risk factor for children in Catholic 
teaching that is not supported by present research is same-sex parenthood. Using these 
observations, the chapter argues that research on the needs and wellbeing of children as 
well as on the abilities of adults is a valuable resource for a constructive theological 
account of parenthood. 
 
Chapter 5: Resources from the Humanities 
The fifth chapter argues that significant resources for theological reflection on 
children and parenthood exist within the writings of feminist, philosophical and legal 
scholars and that these help address limitations in present theological discourse. The 
chapter considers the philosophical foundation for parental responsibilities and argues for 
a mixed approach which values both causation as well as voluntary choice. It then 
explores both the contributions and limitations of theories of human rights when applied 
directly the children and childhood. Further, the chapter considers the contributions 
writing on adoptive parenthood make in expanding the notion of parenthood more 
generally while also acknowledging significant disagreements within this literature. 
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Finally, the chapter considers Capabilities Theory as a means of understanding human 
potential and adaptability as related to the function of parenting. 
By bringing these sources into conversation with theological commitments, the 
chapter argues that parenthood is largely a voluntary as well as a dynamic reality that 
changes throughout the course of the parent-child relationship. Nonetheless, it contends 
that parenthood relies on both internal individual capabilities as well as external realities. 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
The final chapter reviews the arguments made and suggests the bases these may 
provide for a contemporary Catholic theological account of parenthood. It then returns to 
questions raised by the case study in this Introduction and considers how these bases for a 
conception of parenthood might help address present social realities. Here it contends that 
rigorous concern for the best interests of children in need of stable, permanent families is 
essential and that the importance of the Catholic Church’s involvement in adoption 
services for its own identity should not be ignored. Concerns regarding Catholic 
responses to mandated non-discrimination legislation for same-sex adopters are offered 
which attempt to be both mindful of children’s rights and needs, as well as the 
magisterium’s present objections and concerns. This reconsideration is based upon 
evaluation of the caregiving potential of same-sex partnerships in distinction from the 
moral evaluation of potential sexual acts within such partnerships. The final section of 
this chapter outlines potential trajectories for future research that would continue this 
project’s line of inquiry. Here it suggests further investigation into the relationship 
between conceptions of parenthood and gender, the relationship between sacramental 
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marriage and other intimate human partnerships, and the development of moral 
theologies that take children seriously as subjects of moral reflection.  
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Introduction 
This chapter surveys teachings of the Roman Catholic Magisterium on subjects 
pertaining to children, parenthood and the family. These documents span from Leo XIII’s 
first encyclical on marriage, Arcanum, to the papacy of Benedict XVI and are presented 
in three eras. This chapter seeks to demonstrate both consistent themes within this corpus, 
as well as developments through time. In particular, it will identify and assess the 
influence of an underlying theory of gender and human sexuality within the documents 
which promotes a bias towards biological kinship. This bias, in turn, produces a 
constricted theology of parenthood that may be insufficient to ground responses to 
contemporary challenges. This chapter will also suggest that magisterial teaching holds 
many answers to these very limitations, such that underemphasized resources could 
inform a more expansive and adequate Catholic theology of parenthood. 
 
Part I: The Modern Magisterium before Vatican II, 1880 – 1958 
 
Historical Overview 
Pope Leo XIII’s 1880 encyclical, Arcanum divinae sapientiae, marked the first 
papal encyclical devoted entirely to the subject of marriage and family.1 It recounts a 
Christian narrative about marriage that will be continually retold in successive teaching. 
Namely, the original form of marriage was good in accordance with the divine plan, but 
through human sin, suffered corruption; yet marriage was restored by Christ who raised 
                                                 
1 Pius XI, Casti connubii, Vatican. (December 31, 1930) http://www.vatican.va/ 
holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_31121930_casti-connubii_en.html, #4. 
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the institution to a sacrament.2 Arcanum’s major concerns include the divinely 
established hierarchical structure of the family, the church’s role as proclaimer and 
protector of divine truths, the benefits of love for marriage and spouses, the proper roles 
of church and state in regulating marriage, the contemporary corruption of morals, and 
the spread of divorce.3 
Half a decade later, Pope Pius XI’s encyclical Casti connubii built upon Arcanum 
and established Catholic teaching on marriage and family in a way that, with few 
exceptions, was not substantially altered until Vatican II.4 Casti connubii should not be 
considered apart from Pius XI’s earlier encyclical on education, Divini illius magistri, of 
1929.5 The latter encyclical presupposes and references the former while each relies 
heavily upon the same sources; scripture, St Augustine,6 the 1917 Code of Canon Law, 
                                                 
2 Leo XIII. Arcanum divinae sapientiae. Vatican. (February 10, 1880) 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/ leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-
xiii_enc_10021880_arcanum_en.html, #5 – 8. This corruption is observed most clearly in polygamy and 
divorce. 
3 See Arcanum, #1 – 2, 11 – 15, and 18 – 34. Two silences are notable. First, Arcanum does not 
view female subordination as a result of the fall; instead it is part of the divine plan. Second, Arcanum is 
silent about love expressed through sexual intercourse. On the latter, see Robert Obach, The Catholic 
Church on Marital Intercourse. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 119. 
4 The delay was not least due to World War I, reactions to which occupied much of Benedict XV’s 
papacy (1914 – 1922), as well as the relative newness of the subject for papal teaching. 
5 Pius XI’s first encyclical Ubi arcano (1922) also lamented the harm the social ills of World War 
I had done to Christian families. Quadragesimo anno (1931) and Caritate Christi (1932) consider the 
family in relation to social life. The constitution Deus scientiarum Dominus (1931) and the encyclical  Ad 
catholici sacerdotii (1935) consider the priesthood in relation to the family. Finally, Lux veritatis (1931) 
considers the Holy Family as a model for Christian families while the Apostolic Letter Con singular 
complacencia (1939) argues for the restoration of the family in light of Christ’s headship and the model 
provided by the Holy Family. 
6 Direct quotations of Augustine include Casti connubii #6, 17, 53, and 101 and Divini illius 
magistri #10, 11, 17, 23, 26, 33, 36, 41, 55, and 98. By comparison, Aquinas appears infrequently (Casti 
connubii #6, 70 and 94 and Divini illius magistri #33 and 31). The 15th centenary of Augustine’s death 
between the publications of these encyclicals, in 1930, appears to have encouraged this attention to his 
thought. 
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and the encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII.7 Of these, the Code of Canon Law supplies a 
juridical understanding of marriage and the obligations of parenthood, clarifies the rights 
and duties of the church, and supports existing ecclesial practices.8 Leo XIII’s Rerum 
novarum provides limits to the power of the state and helps define state obligations.9 
 The earlier encyclical, Divini illius magistri, opens with the assertion that the 
Church has a special affection for children.10 It then devotes much consideration to the 
proper relations of the family, the church and civil society; the three “societies” with 
interests in children’s education.11 The encyclical also responds to a number of 
contemporary concerns, including the dangers of sex education in schools, co-education, 
and Catholic children in non-Catholic schools.12 
                                                 
7 The encyclicals of Leo XIII that are referenced include Arcanum divinae sapientiae (1880), 
Nobilissima gallorum gens (1884), Immortale Dei (1885),  Libertas (1888), Sapientiae Christianae (1890), 
Rerum novarum (1891), and Militantis ecclesiae (1897). Casti connubii also makes frequent reference to 
teachings of the Council of Trent. These function similarly to its use of the Code of Canon Law.  
8 Pius XI, Divini illius magistri, Vatican. (December 31, 1939) 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/ encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_31121929_divini-illius-
magistri_en.html, #21, 23, 34, 36, 39, and 79. Casti connubii, #6, 17, 39, 82, and 89. Salzman and Lawler 
contend that the three descriptions of marriage codified in 1917; marriage as contract, marriage granting 
rights to bodies for procreative sexual intercourse, and the primacy of procreation for marriage, are not 
drawn explicitly from tradition, but from an influential contemporary book on the subject. “When Piero 
Cardinal Gasparri codified Catholic law in the 1917 Code of Canon Law, book 3, title VII, on marriage was 
heavily inspired by his influential book on marriage, Tractatus canonicus de matrimonio, published in 
1892.” Todd A. Salzman and Michael G. Lawler, The Sexual Person, Toward a Renewed Catholic 
Anthropology. (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 38. 
9 Divini illius magistri, #35. Casti connubii, #8, 117, and 118. 
10 Divini illius magistri, #1 and 9. After this, the encyclical contains few direct references to 
children. When it does (#57ff) it describes children in terms of their limitations, particularly as prone to 
vice and in need of discipline. 
11 Divini illius magistri, #11. 
12 Divini illius magistri, #65, 68, and 79 respectively.  
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 The first part of the companion encyclical, Casti connubii, is structured according 
to Augustine’s goods of marriage: procreation, fidelity and sacrament.13 The second part 
responds to challenges facing marriage, including the mass media’s spread of moral 
distortion and the growing belief that marriage is not a divinely established institution, 
but a human convention with mutable forms and purposes.14 Additionally, the moral 
problems of contraception, abortion, and state or personal intervention in the body’s 
procreative capabilities are condemned; as are ideologies favoring women’s 
emancipation from the domestic sphere and equal social rights with men.15 The 
encyclical concludes with a call to return to the divine intention for marriage as 
articulated by the Catholic Church. This includes accepting teaching on marriage in its 
fullness, improved marriage preparation, supporting family wages for fathers, and 
improved church-state cooperation; always in accord with their respective purposes.16 
 Pope Pius XII assumed the papacy in 1939 and, although he never devoted an 
encyclical to marriage and family, his many allocutions to newlyweds and other 
occasional speeches demonstrated his great concern for the subject. In these, Pius XII 
                                                 
13 Casti connubii, #11 – 18, 19 – 30, and 31 – 43 respectively. 
14 Casti connubii, #47 and 49 respectively. Puis XI was cautious towards then-present 
developments in marriage and argues that marriage’s form and purpose are fixed. Individual choice is free 
to determine whether and whom a person will marry; but “the nature of matrimony is entirely independent 
of the free will of man, so that if one has once contracted matrimony he is thereby subject to its divinely 
made laws and its essential properties.” Casti connubii, #6. In this light and reiterating concerns of 
Arcanum, marriage’s indissolubility is defended. Casti connubii, #78 – 92. 
15 Casti connubii, #53 – 62, 63 – 67, 68 – 71, and 74 – 77 respectively. #59 – 62 contains a 
defense of the Catholic Church’s right and ability to define intrinsically evil acts. 
16 Casti connubii, #94 – 111, 112 – 115, 117, and 116 – 129 respectively. The topic of family 
wages for fathers was reasserted in greater detail the following year in the encyclical Quadragesimo anno 
along with the importance of private property. See, Pius XI, Quadragesimo anno, Vatican, (May 15, 1931) 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-
anno_en.html, #59 – 76. 
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often reiterated the themes of preceding pontiffs. He affirmed the family as the basis for 
society with primary rights that oblige social respect and protection.17 Along with the 
nascent social encyclical tradition, Pius XII urged familial stability through secure 
housing and private property.18 And, like his predecessors, he disdained the increase and 
social acceptance of divorce and was critical of mass media’s moral influence. 19 
Yet, the frequency and style of Pius XII’s occasional addresses also facilitated 
expansions. For example, informed by the new field of genetics, Pius XII regarded the 
decision to refrain from biological parenthood due to the probability of passing hereditary 
disease as potentially licit, while reminding doctors not to infringe upon the individual 
right of procreation.20 
 
Sexual Ethics and Marriage 
 Casti connubii presumes a sexual ethic but does not develop a methodology in 
this regard; though its reliance upon Augustine’s conviction that procreation is the 
primary end of sexual intercourse is evident. Rather, Casti connubii is primarily 
concerned with correcting particular errors. The encyclical reminds that contraception is 
                                                 
17 Pius XII, “Allocution to Parish Priests and Lenten Preachers of Rome,” February 17, 1945, in 
Matrimony, trans. Michael J. Byrnes (Boston: Saint Paul Editions, 1963), 360. And Pius XII, “Radio 
Message to the World,” in Matrimony, 353. 
18 Pius XII, “Radio Message to the World,” in Matrimony, 330. And “Letter Testes obsequii,” in 
Matrimony, 385. 
19 Pius XII, “Allocution to Newlyweds,” in Matrimony, 346ff. and Pius XII, “Radio Message to 
French Families,” in Matrimony, 363. 
20 Pius XII, “Allocution to the International Congress of Catholic Doctors,” in Matrimony, 383. 
Pius XII also condemned artificial insemination regardless of donor, but with varying reasons. See, Pius 
XII “Allocution to the Members of the II World Congress of Fertility and Sterility,” in Matrimony, 482. 
And Pius II “Allocution to the Members of the Seventh Congress on Hematology,” in Matrimony, 513. 
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regarded by God as a “horrible crime and at times [God] has punished it with death.”21 
This condemnation of contraception further appropriates the “uninterrupted Christian 
tradition” to declare such acts an offenses against both divine and nature law.22 
Further reflecting its Augustinian foundations, Casti connubii presents sexual 
intercourse as the means of transmission for original sin with potential moral goodness 
only within marriage when directed towards the procreation and education of children.23 
The encyclical is wary of sexual pleasure; spiritualizing its description of spousal love 
and warning spouses against loving “as adulterers love.”24 
Pius XII did not substantially depart from his processor’s understanding of sexual 
intercourse, save for his historically significant judgment that periodic abstinence could 
be a licit means of regulating childbirth under strictly limited conditions.25 The relation of 
this judgment to Casti connubii is not entirely settled. Many view Casti connubii’s moral 
acceptance of spouses who “use their right in the proper manner although on account of 
natural reasons either of time or of certain defects, new life cannot be brought forth” as 
                                                 
21 Casti connubii, #55. This is in reference to “Onanism.” In subsequent decades the consensus 
among biblical scholars developed towards regarding Onan’s crime as his disobedience of his father and 
failure to honor his brother through his obligation to produce children as heirs. “Onanism” is now generally 
understood as the means by which Onan made himself the object of harsh divine judgment, but not the full 
moral content of his sin; although in moral methodologies that closely link act and intention, Onan’s 
contraceptive act remains sinful in itself even as it carries further moral implications given his obligations. 
22 Casti connubii, #56. Historically, contraception was viewed as a crime against marriage, 
whereas abortion was considered a crime against created life and therefore God. This notwithstanding, here 
Pius XI asserts contraception as an abrogation of natural law. 
23 Casti connubii, #14 and 17. 
24 Casti connubii, #23. “When taking into account the whole papal letter, the spiritual dimension of 
marital love seems to be placed in a relationship of opposition to the bodily expression of that same love.” 
Obach, 135. 
25 Pius XII, “Allocution to the Midwives,” in Matrimony, 424. This is reaffirmed in Pius XII, 
“Allocution to Associations of the Large Families,” in Matrimony, 440.  
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the basis of Pius XII’s development.26 Yet this passage seems evidently directed at the 
elderly and infertile who are allowed to contract marriage in the Church, a point of 
tradition defended by Augustine. Further Pius XI’s tendency to justify sex through 
procreation and Casti connubii’s later assertion, within an extended consideration of 
moral marriage preparation, that knowledge of physiology ought not be used for “sinning 
in a subtle way” suggest that he may not have been inclined to agree with his successor.27 
Pius XI identified procreation as the primary end of sexual intercourse but in 
Casti connubii surmised that procreation is the primary end of marriage only from a 
certain restricted perspective. From another perspective, the relationship of husband and 
wife may be taken as primary.28 While procreation and education remains the primary 
end of marriage, the mutual aid of spouses may be considered the “chief reason and 
                                                 
26 Casti connubii, 59. 
27 Casti connubii, 108. Obach takes this statement to be an allusion to the rhythm method 
consistent with Augustine’s rejection of periodic abstinence in his opposition to the Manichees; although 
until the twentieth century this was a theoretical debate only. (See Obach, 149., Cf. Augustine “On the 
Morals of the Manichees.” And Peter Hebblethwaite, Paul VI: The First Modern Pope (New York: Paulist 
Press) 298.) The clear majority both within the Magisterium and among theologians has been to posit 
continuity between Pius XI’s and Pius XII’s teachings and posit Casti connubii #59 as setting the 
foundation for Pius XII’s judgment. (Ramón García de Haro, Marriage and the Family in the Documents of 
the Magisterium, 2nd ed. trans. William E. May (San Francisco, Ignatius Press, 1993), 134. Margaret A. 
Farley, Just Love; A Framework for Christian Sexual Ethics. (New York: Continuum, 2010), 47.) This 
view is historically confirmed by moral approval of periodic abstinence as a method of birth control in 
seminary moral manuals such as Theologiae Moralis Summa of 1958 and popular marriage handbooks such 
as The Rhythm of Sterility and Fertility in Women, by Leo J. Latz, M.D. of 1932. Moreover, the Sacred 
Penitentiary approved of periodic abstinence in responses to confessors in both 1860 and 1932. The reason 
for Casti connubii’s avoidance of clear judgment on this topic is usually attributed to limited information, 
however, as the dates above make clear it was clearly a topic of discussion in the early 1930’s. I am 
grateful for the insight and patience of Bernard G. Prusak, Ph.D. in helping to clarify this history for me. 
28 Casti connubii, #24. This reflects the thought of Leo XIII in Arcanum “Not only, in strict truth, 
was marriage instituted for the propagation of the human race, but also that the lives of husbands and wives 
might be made better and happier.” Arcanum, #26. This non-hierarchical perspective follows from Aquinas 
who argues that love is the form of marriage while procreation is marriage’s end. Thomas Aquinas, Summa 
Theologiae, 3, q. 29, a. 2. Cf. de Haro, 116 – 117. Here the differentiation is described in terms of form and 
principle. 
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purpose of matrimony.”29 This coincides with Leo XIII’s perspective but stands in some 
tension with the 1917 Code of Canon Law where these goods are presented in a 
hierarchy.30 Later, in 1944, the Holy Office judged that all other ends are “essentially 
subordinate”31 to procreation and education; a judgment confirmed by Pius XII.32 The 
tension between these teachings appears largely indebted to differences in Augustine’s 
and Aquinas’ frameworks for marriage, even as it is also influenced by the legalism of 
Pre-Vatican II Catholic moral theology.33 
 
Gender and Family Structure 
 Throughout this period, an essentialist theory of gender, accompanied by a 
presumption of male normativity, underlies all teachings on marriage and family.34 All 
                                                 
29 Casti connubii, 24. Further relativizing the primacy of procreation for marriage is the 
encyclical’s reaffirmation that sterility cannot be the grounds for a divorce due to the indissolubility of 
marriage in accord with its sacramental nature. Casti connubii, #36. 
30 Canon 1013 states “The primary end of marriage is the procreation and nurture of children; its 
secondary end is mutual help and the remedying of concupiscence.” Obach, 119. 
31 The Rota asserted that marriage has both a primary and secondary end and this ordering is 
attested to by numerous popes, theologians, canonists and moralists as well as recorded in Canon Law. The 
primary end of marriage is the procreation and education of children, the secondary is mutual aid and a 
remedy for concupiscence. The Rota contends that, because the rights of mutual aid and common living are 
“intrinsically dependent” on the right to “acts of generation,” the ordering of the ends of marriage is certain 
in as much as the secondary is clearly dependent upon the primary. Holy Roman Rota, “The Order of the 
Purposes of Matrimony,” in Matrimony, 553. 
32 “Now, the truth is that matrimony… has not as a primary and intimate end the personal 
perfection of the married couple but the procreation and upbringing of a new life… This is true of every 
marriage, even if no offspring result.” Pius XII, “Allocution to Midwives,” in Matrimony, 424. 
33 Much of the debate surrounds the use of terms and the significance of what is and is not made 
explicit. Suffice to say, in the early to mid-twentieth century it was possible to describe the value of 
marriage both in terms of a hierarchy of ends and in terms of goods which allowed for different orderings 
in response to different ways of inquiring into marriage’s values and purposes. The legalist responses of 
Vatican officials were in no small part reactionary to perceived innovations in moral theology by authors 
such as Doms and Von Hildebrand. See Salzman and Lawler, 40. 
34 Bernard Cooke explains “The encyclical was promulgated at a time when the long-standing 
belief in the dominant role of the husband was generally taken for granted… With few exceptions, the 
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popes presented above were explicitly opposed to women’s social equality and 
participation in the public sphere. Casti connubii describes these movements as 
“unnatural,” in support of a “false liberty,” and failing to recognize the natural 
distinctions and complementarity of the sexes. Further, they are claimed to lead to 
women’s own harm, ultimately making them slaves and mere instruments of men. 
Instead, the domestic sphere is women’s proper place where, Casti connubii explains, she 
has been raised by the Gospel to a “truly regal throne” even as she still owes man 
“honorable and trusting obedience.”35 Casti connubii devotes a great deal of attention to 
the domestic realm of women in comparison to men’s public realm, which is only 
explicitly attended to in calling for a family wage.36 
Strong opposition to coeducation further demonstrates the era’s concern for 
distinct gendered spheres. Divini illius magistri argues that “there is not in nature itself… 
in temperament, in abilities, anything to suggest that there can be or ought to be 
promiscuity, and much less equality, in the training of the two sexes.” As each is destined 
for dichotomous vocations, coeducation is not only senseless, but potentially harmful in 
as much as the “perfect union of the sexes” rightly occurs only in matrimony. Special 
attention is given to the dangers coeducation poses for female modesty. 37  
                                                 
patriarchal structures and presuppositions of society in general and of the church in particular remained 
unrecognized and unchallenged.” Bernard Cooke, “Casti connubii to Gaudium et spes” in, Marriage in the 
Catholic Tradition, eds. Todd A. Salzman, Thomas M. Kelly and John J. O’Keefe (New York: Crossroad 
Publishing, 2004), 110. 
35 Casti connubii, #74 and 75. 
36 Ibid., #117. 
37 Divini illius magistri, #68. 
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 Within the home, a divinely established hierarchy is consistently defended.38 In 
Casti connubii, the analogous bond between Christ and the Church, which is presented so 
as to directly associate husbands with Christ and wives with the Church, serves as a basis 
for the husband’s primacy in authority.39 However, no wife is compelled to comply with 
her husband’s demands if they are not in accord with reason or her own dignity. Further, 
Casti connubii offers a complementarity of primacies; “For if the man is the head, the 
woman is the heart, and as he occupies the chief place in ruling, so she may and ought to 
claim for herself the chief place in love.”40 
 A presumption of the private, biological-nuclear family as normative also 
underlies teachings of the era.41 With the sole exception of Casti connubii’s affirmation 
of a woman’s right to head the family if a husband is lax or absent, neither of Pius XI’s 
encyclicals consider the family beyond this norm.42  
The ideal family is also large. Pius XII is most explicit on this and connected 
large families to the virtues of faith and generosity.43 Yet, Pius XII also relativized the 
                                                 
38 Pius XII, “Allocution to Fathers of Families,” in Matrimony, 397. 
39 Casti connubii, #23 and 26. 
40 Ibid., #27. 
41 By defending the family as an institution founded upon the partnership of a man and women, 
naturally directed towards procreation and education, and spiritually directed to the mutual benefit of 
spouses, Divini illius magistri gives grounds for this claim. The prevailing assumptions of the time likely 
provided no need to define of the family, although World War I certainly left many families without fathers 
throughout Europe. If Pius XI had any intent of including extended kinship or non-biological kinship 
within his conception of the family, he left little evidence. 
42 Despite the divinely ordained headship of the male in the family, this position may be forfeited 
through his actions. Thus there exists some flexibility in family structure relative to function, but only in 
restricted circumstances. 
43 Pius XII, “Allocution to the Associations of the Large Families,” in Matrimony, 440. 
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importance of biological kinship much more than his predecessors. For Pius XII, the 
primary bond between children and parents was the passing on of faith which “is a 
thousand times more precious” than biological parenthood.44 Further, he urged infertile 
couples, or those fearful of transmitting hereditary disease, to consider adoption. He 
described adoption as “usually crowned with happy results” and free of moral objections, 
while qualifying that “the children of Catholic parents be committed to Catholic foster 
parents.”45 Yet, Pius XII’s consideration of adoption is neither thorough nor entirely 
optimistic. Adding further ambiguity, Pius XII taught that “sterility is very often the 
punishment for the sinner.”46 
 
Children, Family and Parenthood 
Children, as such, are rarely an explicit consideration during this era.47 Children 
are positively described as gifts from God, who are entrusted to their parent’s care and 
                                                 
44 “Above all, remember that when you call your children heirs of your blood, you must refer to 
something which is much greater than corporal generation only. You are, and your children ought to be, the 
source of a race of saints… men sanctified and raised up to participate in the divine nature by means of 
supernatural grace… As a consequence, in baptized people, when one speaks of transmitting inherited 
blood to descendants… there is no need to limit the sense of those words to a purely biological and 
material element, but it may be extended to that which is, as it were, the nutriative liquid of the intellectual 
and spiritual life: the patrimony of faith, virtue, and honor transmitted by parents to their posterity is a 
thousand times more precious than the blood-be it ever so rich-infused into their veins.” Pius XII, 
“Allocution to Newlyweds,” in Matrimony, 312 – 313. (Italics added) 
45 Pius XII, “Allocution to the Members of the Seventh Congress on Hematology,” in Matrimony, 
520. 
46 Pius XII, “Allocution to Midwives,” in Matrimony, 408. This is likely an allusion to sexually 
transmitted disease. 
47 A significant exception is the concern shown for children as victims of war; particularly by 
Benedict XV during World War I. Outspoken concern to protect children in civil unrest is a continuing 
concern that has persisted into the present. See, Charles J. Reid jr, “The Right to Life and Its Application to 
the Welfare of Children in Canon Law and the Magisterium of the Catholic Church: 1878 to the Present,” 
In The Best Love of the Child: Being Loved and Being Taught to Love as the First Human Right. Ed. 
Timothy P. Jackson (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2011), 142 – 178. 
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who must never be considered burdens.48 Additionally, children require both spiritual and 
social education.49 More frequently, however, children serve an important conceptual 
function, especially in consideration of marital and sexual morality. Sexuality is directed 
towards procreation and marriage is largely defined as an institution for raising children; 
particularly in reference to children’s need for love and stability.50  
Attention to children also frequently assumes a negative tone. In Divini illius 
magistri education is connected to gaining control over “evil impulses” which highlights 
attention to original sin.51 The same encyclical also recounts the proverb, “Folly is bound 
up in the heart of a child and the rod of correction shall drive it away.” Later the 
encyclical characterizes children as adults in training who must be directed towards 
proper vocations.52 Pius XII paid more attention to the physical, emotional and 
intellectual needs of children, than did Pius XI, yet he generally made similar use of his 
observations.53 
                                                 
48 Casti connubii, #15 and 53. García de Haro positively summarizes the encyclical’s positions as 
follows: “These teachings are inspired by an attitude of concern: children are a gift of God and a precious 
good for the family; they strengthen the love and unity between the spouses and are for them a source of 
indissoluble joy and at the same time a marvelous way for them to make a generous gift of themselves. 
When children are refused because of egoism, the family destroys itself; we ought not forget that the divine 
laws regarding marriage are a protection and guide for attaining the goods God wills for the spouses.” 
García de Haro, 135. 
49 Divini illius magistri, #8. 
50 Casti connubii, #16 and 37. 
51 Divini illius magistri, #59. 
52 Ibid., #68. 
53 “[Children] need a happy atmosphere for their healthy development; and it is certain a serene 
youth, a harmonious formation and education, are inconceivable without the undoubted fidelity of the 
parents. Do not children nourish the bond of this married love?” Pius XII, “Allocution to Newlyweds,” in 
Matrimony, 351.  Cf. Pius XII, Summi Pontificatus, Vatican. (October 20, 1939) 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/ pius_xii/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xii_enc_20101939_summi-
pontificatus_en.html, #90. 
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Throughout this era, the family is described as the basis of society and an 
“imperfect society” in itself.54 Thus, the family has certain rights in respect to its natural 
priority, yet is dependent and directed outward to participation in the ecclesial and civil 
societies. 
Parents are defined by marriage and the sexually differentiated roles therein. 
Parenting itself is at least partially an act of caretaking,55 supervision56 and educating,57 
though the details of these functions are generally undeveloped. Pius XII offered high 
praise for the task of parenting, calling parenthood a “ministry of Christ” and speaking of 
parents as “priests” of their households.58 
Pius XII showed particular concern for instructing fathers. He asserted that the 
entire health and wellbeing of the family, not only physically, but intellectually and 
spiritually, rested upon the virtue and hard work of the father.59 He further likened 
fatherhood to God’s original act of creation and added that fatherhood communicates “the 
superior life of intelligence and love.”60 Moreover, he suggested that fathers not only 
                                                 
54 Divini illius magistri, #12. 
55 Ibid., #32. 
56 Casti connubii, #15. 
57 Divini illius magistri, #34. 
58 “You are, always under the guidance of the priest, the first and closest educators and teachers of 
the children of God entrusted and given to you… You are as it were the spiritual precursors, priests 
yourselves of the cradle, infancy and childhood, for you must point out to the children the way to heaven.” 
Pius XII, “Allocution to Newlyweds,” in Matrimony, 318. 
59 Pius XII, “Allocution to Fathers of Families,” in Matrimony, 398. 
60 Pius XII, “Allocution to Newlyweds,” in Matrimony, 325. 
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fulfilled the “priestly” role of parenting, but an “episcopal” role within the home.61 
Clearly Pius XII’s concern for fatherhood has implications for motherhood. As he exults 
fatherhood and calls men to greater commitment and involvement within their families, 
he simultaneously affirms familial hierarchy and female subservience. 
Both mothers and fathers are described as holding certain rights and duties in 
respect to their children; particularly as regards education, an aspect of marriage’s 
primary end.62 Divini illius magistri, upholds Aquinas’ view that a father’s rights over his 
children, including the duty to educate, are natural extensions from biological paternity.63 
Casti connubii clarifies that God “would have failed to make sufficient provision for 
children that had been born… if He had not given to those to whom He had entrusted the 
power and right to beget them, the power also and the right to educate them.”64 Thus, by 
God’s providence, the biological procreative capacity is said to assure both the right and 
capacity of parents to educate their children. Pius XII does not directly reject this notion, 
                                                 
61 Pius XII, Summi Pontificatus, #89. 
62 “The principle end of matrimony is not only to procreate children, but also to educate them, and 
have them grow in the fear of the Lord and in faith…” Pius XII, “Allocution to Newlyweds,” in 
Matrimony, 340. This concern to defend the primacy of parental rights does not extend to considerations of 
methods of domestic education. Divini illius magistri, simply refers readers instead to a classic book on the 
subject, Silvio Antoniano’s On the Christian Education of Youth of 1583. Divini illius magistri, #72. 
63 Divini illius magistri, #33. The document quotes from Aquinas’ Summa Theologica, 2-2, Q. CII, 
a. I which reads in part, “Now just as a carnal father partakes of the character of principle in a particular 
way, which character is found in God in a universal way, so too a person who, in some way, exercises 
providence in one respect, partakes of the character of father in a particular way, since a father is the 
principle of generation, of education, of learning and of whatever pertains to the perfection of human life: 
while a person who is in a position of dignity is as a principle of government with regard to certain things: 
for instance, the governor of a state in civil matters, the commander of an army in matters of warfare, a 
professor in matters of learning, and so forth.” Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theoligica, First American 
Edition. trans. Fathers of the Dominican English Provence (Cincinnati: Benziger,1947). 
64 Casti connubii, 16. 
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yet his support for adoption implicitly undermines the argument by suggesting that the 
capability to parent does not arise through biological procreation alone. 
 
Conclusions 
Leo XII’s Arcanum inaugurated a new genre of papal moral teaching focused 
specifically on marriage and the family. This occurred within an era, extending from the 
implementation of the Council of Trent through Vatican II, in which the Roman 
magisterium itself became ever more defensive, authoritarian, and centralized.  
Simultaneously, papal engagement in moral teaching significantly increased in scope, 
frequency, and detail.65 Each of the Pontiffs considered above presented the propositions 
of the magisterium as authoritative and authentic interpretations of God’s will for 
humanity with concomitant irreformability.66 Likewise, each claims their universal 
applicability; though circumstantial exceptions are occasionally acknowledged.67 
Yet the era is not entirely consistent in its developments of these themes. 
Certainly, an essentialist understanding of gender with its attendant differentiations in 
vocations underlies this teaching, as does a propensity for hierarchical ordering and 
                                                 
65 James F. Keenan, A History of Catholic Moral Theology in the Twentieth Century; From 
Confessing Sins to Liberating Consciences, (New York: Continuum, 2010), 30. Cf. Charles E. Curran, The 
Development of Catholic Moral Theology; Five Strands, (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 
2013), 176. 
66 Casti connubii, #1. Divini illius magistri, #2. Divini illius magistri is more reserved as it seeks 
to establish the legitimate cooperation of church, family and society. In contrast, Casti connubii is not 
concerned with cooperation but with asserting the divine vision for marriage and family against erroneous 
opinions. 
67 For example, Divini illius magistri states that, although baptism provides the entry into the 
church and salvation, children of non-Christians are not to be baptized, save for rare circumstances. Thus, 
despite baptism being a universal good, it is also occasionally withheld in light of the natural rights of 
parents. Divini illius magistri, #39. 
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assumptions of male normativity. Yet the different methods of articulating marriage’s 
values and Pius XII’s acceptance of birth-regulation through periodic abstinence and 
relativizing of biological kinship do not fit seamlessly within the tradition. 
 
Part II: Vatican II, 1958 – 1978 
Historical Overview 
 Vatican II’s teaching on marriage and family is largely continuous with earlier 
documents and frequently references Pius XI and Pius XII. Several earlier themes are 
consistently upheld throughout the period. These include the family as the foundation of 
society, the duties required of society by that fact, the primary rights of parents in their 
children’s education, and the importance of familial stability.68 The most pronounced 
exception to this continuity is a greater appreciation of gender equality within markedly 
widened spheres, though this remains framed and conditioned by persistent gender 
essentialism. 
Pope John XXIII’s most significant contributions were his calling of the council 
and significant divergence from his predecessors on the topic of women’s social rights. 
Pope Paul VI oversaw the majority of the council as well as the papal birth control 
                                                 
68 John XXIII, Pacem in terris, Vatican, (April 11, 1963) 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_xxiii/ encyclicals/documents/hf_j-
xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem_en.html, 16, 17. John XXIII, Mater et magistra, Vatican, (May 15, 1961) 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/ john_xxiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-
xxiii_enc_15051961_mater_en.html, 195. Vatican II, Gaudium et spes, Vatican, (December 7, 1965) 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_cons_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html,  #52. The importance of private property is also consistently 
upheld in this regard, yet Gaudium et spes adds goods and “immaterial things such as professional 
capacities.” Gaudium et spes, 13.  Repeated threats include polygamy, divorce and non-exclusive sexual 
partnerships. See Casti connubii, 73, 78 – 92. and Arcanum, 27 – 34. 
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commission in 1963.69 After the council he invested heavily in implementing and guiding 
Vatican II’s reforms. 
 
Sexual Ethics and Marriage 
The 1960s witnessed growing anxieties over human population growth. Pope 
John XXIII responded to these with concern as well as insistence that acceptable 
solutions must neither do “violence to man’s essential dignity” nor depend upon “an 
utterly materialistic conception of man himself and his life.” Further, he affirmed that 
divine laws govern the transmission of human life and must be respected.70 This pattern 
of concern for the growing importance of birth regulation balanced against the dictates of 
divine law persisted throughout the era and became increasingly linked to the 
magisterium’s authority in articulating specific moral norms.71 
                                                 
69 In his oversight of the council, Paul VI habitually intervened in support of the conservative 
minority and provided their concerns with additional chances at incorporation into the documents. Yet he 
ultimately left the manner of incorporation open to the judgments of the drafting commission. In the 
commissions, these suggestions were reinterpreted in light of the existing documents and substantially 
softened. Paul VI’s interventions in the council are well documented, as is the circuitous path Father 
Ermenegildo Lio’s De Castitate took from a rejected draft document, through its first return as papal modi 
in 1965, to finding its expression in Humanae vitae; a connection Lio would celebrate in articles claiming 
he had written the “rough draft” of Humanae vitae. See Hebblethwaite, 298 – 300, 444, 470 – 471, 526. 
70 Those who disregard this fact “not only offend the divine majesty and degrade themselves and 
humanity, they also sap the vitality of the political community of which they are members.” John XXIII, 
Mater et magistra, #191 and 194. 
71 Not all at Vatican II shared the view that married couples ought to intentionally regulate 
childbirths. Cardinal Ottaviani criticized the 1964 draft of what would become Gaudium et spes for 
rejecting Catholic spouses’ subservience to “blind instinct” in reproduction. Some also sought to add an 
explicit condemnation of sexual intercourse absent a specifically procreative intent into Gaudium et spes. 
See John T. Noonan, The Church and Contraception: The Issues at Stake. (New York: Paulist Press, 1967), 
18 and 31. 
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Gaudium et spes confirmed the rights of spouses to responsibly plan childbirths in 
light of familial, social, and ecclesial considerations.72 But, it added, this decision 
requires proper moral training, especially as illicit forms of contraception threaten 
marriage.73 Thus couples’ rights were framed by the seriousness of the matter and the 
potential harm of its misuse. Nonetheless, the document assures, “a true contradiction 
cannot exist between the divine laws pertaining to the transmission of life and those 
pertaining to authentic conjugal love.”74 Though some of the council fathers attempted to 
insert a general condemnation of contraception into Gaudium et spes, the document 
reserves this question for a papal decision.  
After the council, and a lengthy delay following the commission’s report, Paul 
VI’s Humanae vitae defined Catholic teaching on contraception.75 The task of making a 
judgment on the question of artificial birth control was neither one Paul VI desired nor 
one to which he was naturally well suited.76 Still, Humanae vitae went beyond its 
                                                 
72 Gaudium et spes, #50. Here there is an implicit rejection of the intervention of priests or other 
authorities, secular or religious, in this decision. The assumption of priestly guidance in such decisions was 
common prior to Vatican II. Cf. Noonan, 34. And Pius XII, “Allocution to Newlyweds,” Matrimony, 318. 
73 Gaudium et spes, #47. This line was added in response to the papal modi of Paul VI during the 
final drafting stages of the document. The modi condemned “contraceptive arts”, but was generalized in its 
incorporation into the document. Cf. Hebblethwaite, 299., de Haro, 262. And Noonan, 25. 
74 Gaudium et spes, 51. Gaudium et spes avoids an explicit affirmation of previous teaching on 
contraception but clarifies that both the intentions as well as objective standards “based on the nature of the 
human person and his acts” must inform moral decisions, while Catholics are obliged to follow the 
magisterium’s interpretation of divine law. Footnote 14 notes that the topic is under consideration and 
awaits the judgment of the pope. 
75 Humanae vitae is Paul VI’s most direct teaching on marriage and family. The Spiritual 
motherhood of Mary is certainly a major theme of Mense maio and Christi matri, yet neither draws a clear 
connection to Christian families. The extent to which Humanae vitae led to a polemic that effectively 
blocked constructive dialogue concerning marriage and family should not be forgotten. Paul VI had desired 
to make family the subject of a synod, but was hesitant for fear of reopening the “old wounds just as they 
were beginning to heal.” Hebblethwaite, 597. 
76 Among the principle influences on Paul VI’s decision, was a concern for the role of science in 
ethics and a fear of the dangers of “scientism.” Cf. Hebblethwaite, 453 – 478.  This was particularly 
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immediate task to judge on contraception and offered a broad vision of marital morality 
which was informed by concerns of personalist moral methodology such as spousal love 
and the dignity of the human person.77 Paul VI amended the final draft of Humanae vitae 
by removing references to “mortal sin” and inserting a passage urging compassion for 
sinners.78 Yet, the encyclical retained its central conviction that just as intercourse 
without consideration of a partner’s will violates the unitive end of marriage, Humanae 
vitae teaches, so too does contraceptive intercourse contradict the will of God.79 In the 
latter years of his papacy, Paul VI stood behind the judgment of Humanae vitae while its 
method was largely echoed in the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith’s (CDF) 
clarification on human sexuality, Persona humana. 
Two observations about Paul VI’s publication of Humanae vitae are pertinent. 
First it was an exercise in papal authority that was knowingly at odds with widely held 
opinions among the Catholic faithful, and, in fact, at various points in direct opposition to 
the opinion of the commission’s majority report. Thus, in as much as the encyclical 
became a center of controversy, it welded magisterial authority to a particular aspect of 
                                                 
problematic for contraception because the older argument was based on the idea that people do not have 
absolute dominion of their bodies. The discovery of fertility cycles decidedly removed conception from an 
act of God’s will, to a physical process that could be understood. Thus the argument against dominion had 
to be revised in a way that both acknowledged the achievements of human reason while limiting their licit 
applications. 
77 The question is often regarded as concerning the use of artificial methods of contraception by 
married Catholics. Some contend it concerned only if the pill was to be regarded as “artificial means.” This 
approach carries the assumption that the prohibition of contraception has been historically established as 
irreformable but is difficult to sustain against the refusal of the council fathers to incorporate a general 
condemnation of contraception into Gaudium et spes. 
78 Paul VI always refused to qualify the encyclical as infallible. Hebblethwaite, 517. 
79 Ibid., #13. Notably, Humanae vitae extends the prohibition to include acts intended to impede 
procreation “either before, at the moment of, or after sexual intercourse.” The addition of “before” includes 
the pill as a contraceptive despite it not directly altering the act of intercourse itself. 
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sexual ethics. Second, Paul VI’s decision to go beyond a mere judgment on the matter of 
contraception80 united Catholic perspectives on marriage to an idea of ‘responsible 
parenthood’ inextricably linked to the morality of contraception. Paul VI’s intentions 
notwithstanding, the publication of Humanae vitae marks a watershed moment in 
Catholic conceptualizations of the family in which biological reproduction and 
magisterial authority provide central planks in the conceptual framework. 
Seven years after Humanae vitae, the CDF’s Persona humana reiterated several 
traditional prohibitions of Catholic sexual morality. With more clarity than Humanae 
vitae, the document asserts that its teachings rely upon immutable and timeless principles 
common to all humanity; adding that these “in no way owe their origin to a certain type 
of culture, but rather to knowledge of the Divine Law and of human nature.”81 Further, it 
reaffirmed the tradition that all moral matters in the realm of sexuality are of objective 
seriousness.82   
The Vatican II era never repeated Pius XI’s epistemologically brazen assertion 
that the Vatican observes the world “as from a watchtower” but nonetheless defends the 
certainty and objectivity of magisterial teaching; especially in matters of sexual ethics. 
And despite Humanae vitae’s claim that the magisterium has always taught concerning 
marriage, it cites only one source prior to Arcanum. Throughout this era, the relatively 
                                                 
80 “The Church, nevertheless, in urging men to the observance of the precepts of the natural law, 
which it interprets by its constant doctrine, teaches that each and every marital act must of necessity retain 
its intrinsic relationship to the procreation of human life.” Humanae vitae, #12. 
81 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Persona Humana: Declaration on Certain 
Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics,” Vatican, (December 29, 1975) http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/ 
congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19751229_persona-humana_en.html, #3 and 5. 
82 Ibid., #11. Here citing both Humanae vitae and a 17th century decree. 
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new phenomenon of consistent magisterial teaching on marital morality delved into 
increasingly controversial subject matters. Simultaneously, the assertion that magisterial 
judgments on such matters are derived with certainty from divine law was firmly upheld. 
These repeated affirmations implicated the nature of the magisterium’s teaching authority 
with the doubts and rebuttals this genre of teaching generated. 
 
The Vatican II era attests to a number of other significant developments as well. 
Sex itself is recognized as good and sexual ethics are increasingly framed by the 
personalist goods of love, dignity, and human relationship. Meanwhile, the earlier 
tendency to judge spousal virtue by the number of children in their care is reformed, yet 
persistent. 
Both Gaudium et spes and Humanae vitae assert the essential goodness of sexual 
intercourse, particularly as it expresses love and strengthens spousal fidelity.83 Gaudium 
et spes turns this towards a recognition of the potential harm done by counseling celibacy 
within marriage,84 whereas, Humanae vitae considers the harm of the spread of 
contraception. The earlier document urges against fear of sex itself, whereas the latter 
concerns its proper use.  
Humanae vitae’s presentation of responsible parenthood includes the need to 
control one’s “innate drives and emotions” as these relate to the “procreative biological 
faculties.”85 It teaches that periodic abstinence may help couples grow in self-discipline, 
                                                 
83 Humanae vitae, #16. 
84 Cf. Casti connubii, #53. 
85 Humanae vitae, #10. 
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personal enrichment, mutual respect, awareness of responsibilities, and spiritual 
blessings.86 Persona humana also urges a greater appreciation of chastity, which is said 
to have particular benefits for marriage as it “increases the human person’s dignity and 
enables him to love truly, disinterestedly, unselfishly and with respect for others.”87 
Despite the advent of a greater appreciation for the goodness of sex, with Persona 
humana the tradition of linking chastity to generosity and lust to selfishness clearly 
reemerges within post-Vatican II sexual ethics. 
Gaudium et spes also sparked greater attention to the importance of spousal love 
in the emerging personalist approach to sexual morality.88 Building upon this, Humanae 
vitae explains, through marital love, spouses “perfect one another” and cooperate with 
God in producing and raising children.89 Echoing Gaudium et spes, Humanae vitae 
describes this love as fully human, an act of free will aimed at human fulfillment, a total 
love directed at the beloved for their own sake as a self-gift, and fecund.90 Nonetheless, 
the validity of the marriages of infertile couples is clearly and consistently upheld.91 
The importance of fecundity for conjugal love is also a repeated point of 
emphasis. Gaudium et spes teaches that true conjugal love and “the whole meaning of the 
                                                 
86 Ibid., #21. 
87 Persona humana, #12. 
88 This attention may be viewed as a development on Pius XII’s earlier praise for love within 
marriage. The theologian Dietrich Von Hildebrand’s work was also influential in this regard. See. Dietrich 
Von Hildebrand, “The Encyclical Humanae vitae: A Sign of Contradiction,” in Why Humanae Vitae was 
Right: A Reader, ed Janet E. Smith (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), 47 – 82. 
89 Humanae vitae, #8. It is unclear if procreation is an aspect of that perfection or something 
additional. 
90 Ibid., #9. 
91 Gaudium et spes, #50. 
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family life which results from it” is the willingness of spouses to “cooperate with the love 
of the Creator and the Savior.”92 Like earlier teachings, Gaudium et spes links 
procreation to generosity and praises those who raise large families “suitably.”93 The 
inclusion of the modifier is not inconsequential as it suggests that generosity, and by 
implication, the quality of spousal love itself, cannot be directly correlated to the number 
of children within a family. In a 1960 address to the Roman Rota, John XXIII had earlier 
rejected this view by prioritizing parents’ role of educating as a “more noble office” 
which “perfects” their role of procreation. This assertion followed a lavish description of 
procreation as cooperation with God in which humans give life “to new beings in whom 
the life-giving Spirit infuses the powerful principle of immortal life.” And John XXIII 
asserted that it is because of the greater nobility of the task of education that marriage 
requires stability.94 These views appear to echo Pius XII, but they were not shared among 
all bishops before or at Vatican II. Upholding education alongside, and potentially 
against, procreation retrieves a traditional but frequently neglected balance between these 
goods.95 Moving further in this direction, the severity of conditions that may warrant the 
regulation of conception listed by Gaudium et spes is notably softened compared to Pius 
XII’s allocution, and includes broader sources of concern. 
                                                 
92 Ibid. Cf. Humanae vitae, #1. 
93 Ibid. Cf. Pius XII, “Allocution to the Associations of the Large Families,” In Matrimony, 440. 
More recently, de Haro makes the connection between procreation and generosity explicit. “[Gaudium et 
spes] does not encourage selfishness on the part of the parents; thus having a large family is the way of 
exercising responsible parenthood most praised by the Council: generosity is always a condition of human 
and Christian responsibility.” de Haro, 273. 
94 John XXIII, “Importance of the Institution of the Family,” Matrimony, 535. 
95 Noonan, 12, 18 and 31. 
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Humanae vitae teaches that spouses must respect a hierarchy of obligations to 
“God, themselves, their families and human society” in making decisions of family 
planning.96 Of these, the first has a unique place in establishing guides and parameters for 
a couple’s options. In Humanae vitae, the decision for procreation is cast more positively 
than that to delay or not pursue childbirth while large families function as the ideal.97 In 
light of the previous and existing disagreements on whether or not the good of education 
could alone relativize the good of procreation, the encyclical served to shift greater 
concern towards the procreative aspect of parenthood. At the same time, Humanae vitae’s 
personalism holds these goods closely together.98 Thus, the emergence of a prioritization 
of procreation over education is largely a matter of nuance. But significant factors in this 
regard include the extent to which collaboration with the Creator through procreation 
becomes an interpretive lens for responsible parenthood as well as the association of 
procreation with generosity. 
 
On the topic of marriage, Gaudium et spes repeats a central theme of Casti 
connubii; namely, that the institution of marriage was established by the Creator, is based 
upon “irrevocable personal consent,” is “unbreakable,” and has been endowed by God 
                                                 
96 Humanae vitae, #10. These sources of obligation were earlier listed in Populorum progressio. 
Cf. Paul VI, Populorum progressio, Vatican, (March 26, 1967) http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/ 
encyclicals/documents/hf_p-vi_enc_26031967_populorum_en.html, #37. 
97 Ibid., #2 and 10. 
98 A major challenge for Paul VI in Humanae vitae’s argument was upholding the traditional 
prohibition while disassociating it from positions rejected at Vatican II. Paul Quay’s influential 1961 article 
foreshadowed aspects of Paul VI personalist argument, but also placed much emphasis on male dominance 
and displayed a decidedly physicalist concern for where sperm (euphemistically termed “substance”) would 
end up in the sexual act. See Paul M. Quay, “Contraception and Conjugal Love,” Theological Studies, 22.1, 
(1961) 32ff. 
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“with various benefits and purposes.”99 Likewise, Gaudium et spes praises the shared 
love of spouses and describes spouses as mutual helpers who grow in perfection together 
and strive for “total fidelity.”100 Marriage is described as a distinct form of friendship, 
holy, and a vocation.101 And, diverging from the juridical language of the 1917 Code of 
Canon Law, Gaudium et spes describes marriage as ‘covenant’ founded in mutual love.102 
Additionally, the document is silent on the hierarchy of the ends of marriage, repeatedly 
mentions love before procreation, and asserts that both marriage and conjugal love are 
ordered towards procreation. 103 
                                                 
99 Gaudium et spes, #48. Cf. Casti connubii,# 48. 
100 Ibid., #48 and 49. Cf. Casti connubii, #23. “With respect to love, [Gaudium et spes] takes its 
inspiration from the classic doctrine that sees in it the form of marriage, particularly in the thomistic 
tradition… This tradition was accepted by the Council of Trent and was taken up again by Casti connubii.” 
De Haro, 253. Von Hildebrand, whose writing was influential in shaping the document, later wrote, “But 
let it be stated emphatically: to stress the meaning and value of marriage as the most intimate, indissoluble 
union of love does not contradict the doctrine that procreation is the primary end of marriage. The 
distinction we have made between meaning and end… in no way diminishes the importance of the link 
between marriage and procreation…” Von Hildebrand, in Why Humanae Vitae was Right: A Reader, 70. 
101 Ibid., “Although now no one would question the vocational character of marriage… before the 
council this was not so. Holiness was seen by many as a path reserved for a small portion of the people of 
God… the call to perfection was seen as a privilege of the religious state.” This is a further development of 
the “universal call to holiness” expressed by Lumen gentium; the “mother truth that guides the treatment of 
marriage.” De Haro, 216 and 219.  
102 Ibid., “Gasparri’s word contract is replaced by the biblical word covenant, which has the same 
juridical outcomes as contract but also situates marriage in a biblical-theological and interpersonal context 
rather than in an exclusively juridical one.” Salzman and Lawler, 42. The commentary given to the Council 
Fathers also explained that the wording was changed according to the sensibilities of the Eastern Churches. 
De Haro, 235. 
103 Ibid., #48 and 50. There is considerable debate about how Vatican II developed teaching on the 
hierarchy of ends. De Haro argues that conjugal love and children are considered goods of marriage, but 
that there is no indication that the primary end of marriage has been revised.  “Here there is no change in 
the hierarchy of ends, which, we must stress, the Council did not expressly take up, considering this 
question too technical.” And, the texts of Vatican II “never speak of conjugal love as an end of marriage; 
they do not even conceive of it as a property of marriage; on the contrary, they predicate of love the same 
ends and same properties that they predicate of the whole institution of marriage.” Yet, Salzman and 
Lawler contend that the Council’s refusal to incorporate the hierarchy of ends, “In the face of strident 
demands to relegate the conjugal love of spouses to its customary secondary place in marriage” constitutes 
“a clear rejection of an exclusively judicial approach.” And, “despite insistent voices to the contrary, the 
council Fathers rejected the primary end-secondary end dichotomy… the Preparatory Commission was 
careful to explain that the text… ‘does not suggest [a hierarchy of ends] in any way.’” See Salzman and 
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As in pre-Vatican teaching, marital stability remains centrally important, 
particularly as it benefits children.104 Yet the goods offered to spouses themselves receive 
greater emphasis. For example, Persona humana teaches that human dignity itself 
compels sexual intercourse to be limited to the stability of marriage “which establishes a 
state of life of capital importance both for the exclusive union of the man and the woman 
and for the good of their family and of the human community.”105 Intercourse outside of 
marriage can only offer a false conjugal love that is unable “to develop into paternal and 
maternal love.” If pregnancy does result, “it will be detrimental to the children, who will 
be deprived of the stable environment in which they ought to develop in order to find in it 
the way and the means of their insertion into society as a whole.”106 
 
Gender and Family Structure 
John XXIII’s 1961 encyclical, Mater et magistra, did not challenge the 
hierarchical ordering of the family posited by earlier pontiffs and assumed an all-male 
workforce.107 Yet, just two years later and after the opening of the council, Pacem in 
                                                 
Lawler, 42 – 43. And de Haro, 235 and 247.  Cf. Vatican II, Lumen gentium, Vatican. (November 21, 1964) 
www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19641121_lumen-
gentium_en.html, #11. 
104 John XXIII, “Importance of the Institution of the Family,” in Matrimony, 535. 
105 Persona humana, #7. 
106 Ibid. Sex before marriage does not preclude sex after marriage, nor is the nature of the 
relationship between sexual partners considered. Marriage after pregnancy, but before childbirth, is 
certainly not a new phenomenon, but is not considered here. Instead, the emphasis is on discrete sex acts 
and the rational appears to parallel Thomas Aquinas’ argument against fornication, which presumes no 
ongoing relationship or future marriage. For a similar reason, but with reference to the nature of the act 
itself, Persona humana judges homosexual sex acts immoral for lacking “an indispensable finality”; 
masturbation is rejected on similar grounds. Persona humana, #8 & 9. 
107 John XXIII, Mater et magistra, #20, 22 and 71 et al. 
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terris optimistically considers the changes in social and family life brought about by 
women’s progress; even judging these to have stemmed from women’s recognition of 
their own human dignity.108 This claim is remarkable given that both Leo XIII and Pius 
XI had argued against women’s participation in the public sphere precisely as a means of 
protecting women’s unique dignity.109 Moreover, John XXIII wrote favorably of 
women’s increasing claims to social rights and abandonment of contentment with a 
“purely passive role.”110  
To be sure, John XXIII still conceived of women primarily as wives and mothers 
and did not envision their participation in all types or fields of public employment.111 
Nonetheless, Pacem in terris laid the foundation for one of this era’s most significant 
developments wherein hierarchical conceptions of female subservience are increasingly 
replaced by ideals of both public and private equity.112 Of these, women’s role in the 
public sphere shows greater signs of conflict, as new assertions of women’s rights to 
public participation are balanced against a continuing insistence on women’s primarily 
domestic vocation. For example, while women’s participation in public life is 
                                                 
108 John XXIII, Pacem in terris, #41. 
109 See Leo XIII, Rerum novarum, Vatican, (May 15, 1891) 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/ encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-
novarum_en.html, #42. And Casti connubii, #75. 
110 Pacem in terris, #41. 
111 Ibid., 19. Here the encyclical cites Rerum novarum, despite the fact that the earlier document 
can hardly imagine a place for women in the workforce and argues for women’s natural fitness for life in 
the home. See Rerum novarum, #42.  
112 Pacem in terris, #12. 
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encouraged, Gravissimum educationis grants that the universal right to education may be 
conditioned by gender.113 
Gaudium et spes affirmed women’s right to take a more active role in cultural life, 
but cautioned that this must be “in accordance with their own nature.”114 In calling for 
reforms in the labor force, it assumes women’s presence yet identifies the “new social 
relationships between men and women” as a source of familial conflict.115 Likewise, Paul 
VI’s apostolic letter, Octogesima adveniens, also looked favorably upon growing social 
recognition of women’s “rights to participate in cultural, economic, social and political 
life,” while warning against “that false equality which would deny the distinction with 
woman’s proper role, which is of such capital importance, at the heart of the family as 
well as within society.”116  
Within the home, concern to protect men’s and women’s unique vocations is 
comparably muted. Gaudium et spes unseats the analogy between the marital bond and 
Christ and the Church by affirming the participation of marriage partners in the very 
                                                 
113 Vatican II, Gravissimum Educationis, Vatican, (October 28, 1965) 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/ hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_decl_19651028_gravissimum-educationis_en.html, #1. 
114 Gaudium et spes, #60. This approval of women’s social progress is utilized in Apostolicum 
actuositatem to assert that women’s expanded social spheres of influence create obligations for more 
diverse female roles in the apostolate of the laity. See Vatican II, Apostolicum actuositatem, Vatican, 
(November 18, 1965) http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_decree_19651118_ apostolicam-actuositatem_en.html, #9. 
115 Gaudium et spes, #8, 67. 
116 Paul VI, Octogesima adveniens, Vatican, (May 14, 1971) 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/ apost_letters/documents/hf_p-vi_apl_19710514_octogesima-
adveniens_en.html,  #13. 
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unity of Christ and the Church.117 Additionally, the former identification of husbands 
with Christ and wives with the Church is absent, as are other means of hierarchically 
ordering husband over wife.118 Instead, Gaudium et spes repeatedly affirms spousal 
equality, which is extended into a condemnation of all discrimination “with respect to the 
fundamental rights of the person.”119 Still, an assumption of dichotomous parental roles 
persists. Gaudium et spes encourages fathers to be active in their children’s lives, while 
children, especially young children, “need the care of their mother at home.” Motherhood 
has a “domestic role” that “must be safely preserved, though the legitimate social 
progress of women should not be underrated on that account.”120 
Persona humana’s articulation of the importance of sexual difference makes 
explicit some of the tensions that underlie the era’s attempt to embrace gender equity. 
Here, gender is said to condition an individual’s development in numerous ways. In light 
of this, justice is served when men and women are treated with equal dignity but also 
with respect to their essential differences.121 The document’s insistence on unchanging 
norms, as described above, clearly colors how these differences are articulated.  
  
Children, Family and Parenthood 
                                                 
117 “Thus the Christian family, which springs from marriage as a reflection of the loving covenant 
uniting Christ with the Church, and as a participation in that covenant, will manifest to all men Christ’s 
living presence in the world, and the genuine nature of the Church.” Gaudium et spes, #48. 
118 Gaudium et spes, #9. Cf. Arcanum, #11 – 17 and Casti connubii, #74 – 77. 
119 Gaudium et spes, #21. 
120 Ibid., #52. 
121 Persona humana, #1 and 5. Citing Gravissimum educationis and Gaudium et spes. 
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Gaudium et spes, describes parenthood as a “dignity” and “office” and asserts that 
through the “faithfulness and harmony” of their love, married couples can bring about 
renewal in society’s appreciation of marriage as well as instruct their own children on the 
“dignity, duty and work of married love.”122 Realizing the full potential of the family is 
said to depend upon “kindly communion of minds and the joint deliberation of spouses, 
as well as the painstaking cooperation of parents in the education of their children.”123  
 Gravissimum educationis provides more developed teaching on education and 
asserts an inalienable human right to education. Notably, earlier adversity to co-education 
is absent and a prudent sexual education is now described as appropriate at a certain 
age.124 Additionally, the right to a moral education and growth in conscience is upheld as 
well as the right of all the baptized to a Christian education. Though the family has the 
primary right to educate, help from the whole of society is required.125 Yet the priority of 
the family is so strongly affirmed that schools are described as optional “tools” at the 
service of the family.126 
                                                 
122 Gaudium et spes, #48 – 49. 
123 Ibid., #52. 
124 Gravissimum educationis, #1. The development is remarkable, from a near total condemnation 
of sexual education by Pius XI, to a tightly restricted approval by Pius XII, to approval, within a 
consideration of rights to education, with only the qualification of prudence in Gravissimum educationis. 
125 Ibid., #2. Gravissium educationis further argues that the state has an obligation to support 
children’s education by assuring the efficacy of its schools. Gravissium educationis, #8. Dignitatis 
humanae, adds that governments must assure parental freedom in choice of education, and opposes 
burdensome or religious limitations. Vatican II, Dignitatis humanae, Vatican, (December 7, 1965) 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/ hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html, 5.  
126 Gravissimum educationis, #5. Ad gentes, offers a more positive conception of schools which 
are “not only as the most excellent means of forming and developing Christian youth, but also as a valuable 
public service, especially in the developing nations, working toward the uplifting of human dignity, and 
toward better living conditions.” Vatican II, Ad gentes, Vatican, (December 7, 1965), 
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 The decree Apostolicum actuositatem further explicates the role of the family and 
Christian educators in preparing children for vocations. It describes parents as 
“cooperators in grace and witnesses of faith for each other, their children, and all others 
in their household.” They are the primary evangelizers and role models for their children 
who help children discern their vocation.127 Additionally, parents “have the task of 
training their children from childhood on to recognize God’s love for all men.”128 The 
family is described as both a source of spiritual growth as well as a means for exercising 
the apostolate.129 The family fulfills its God-given purpose when, through love and 
prayer, it acts as a domestic church, participates in liturgical worship, promotes 
hospitality and justice, and undertakes works of service.130 
One of Vatican II’s most notable developments is its application of various terms 
to describe the family. In lieu of earlier language of a hierarchy and “imperfect 
society,”131 the council describes the family as a “school of deeper humanity,”132 “the 
primary mother and nurse of [cultural] education,”133 “the first school of the social virtues 
                                                 
http://www.vatican.va/ archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decree_19651207_ad-
gentes_en.html, #12. 
127 Apostolicum actuositatem, #11. 
128 Ibid., #30. 
129 Ibid., #4. Cf. Lumen gentium, #31. 
130 Apostolicum actuositatem, #11. 
131 Cf. Arcanum, #11 – 15, Casti connubii, #26., Divini illius magistri, #12. 
132 Gaudium et spes, #52. 
133 Ibid., #62. 
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that every society needs,”134 the “foundation of all society”135 an “apprenticeship for the 
apostolate,”136 the “domestic church,”137 an “initial seminary”138 and a proclaimer of 
“both the present virtues of the Kingdom of God and the hope of a blessed life to 
come.”139 
In contrast to the many documents of Vatican II which touch on parental and 
familial duties, particularly as related to education, Paul VI rarely engaged the subject. 
Populorum progressio, for example, is repeatedly silent on the role of the family where 
explicit references might be expected. Its concern centers on the individual who is the 
“chief architect of his own success or failure” and who may be “helped, and sometimes 
hindered, by his teachers and those around him.”140 In fact, it employs the terms “father”, 
“mother” and “family” metaphorically (for God, Mary and the Church or the human 
community) more often than literally. A single paragraph titled, “The Role of the 
Family”, repeats many traditional concerns.141 Even here, the encyclical objects to 
excessive familial influence over individuals. In contrast, Humanae vitae contains a more 
                                                 
134 Gravissimum educationis, #2. 
135 Gaudium et spes, #52. 
136 Apostolicum actuositatem, #30. Also “training for the apostolate” and in Lumen gentium, #35. 
“school of the lay apostolate” 
137 Lumen gentium, #11. 
138 Vatican II, Optatem totius, Vatican, (October 28, 1965) 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_decree_19651028_optatam-totius_en.html, #2.  
139 Lumen gentium, #35. 
140 Populorum progressio, #15. This is especially striking as “formal education” is included. 
141 Ibid., #36. 
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sustained and positive reflection on the family. Most notably, it describes the family 
apostolate as allowing married couples to “become apostles to other married couples.”142 
Paul VI’s general silence on issues related to the family may have contributed to greater 
emphasis on Humanae vitae; the only major document where he gave sustained attention 
to the subject. 
 
On a few occasions, the documents of Vatican II consider children directly. 
Gaudium et spes describes children as contributors to their parent’s holiness; a sentiment 
later repeated by Paul VI in Evangelii nuntiandi.143 Apostolicum actuositatem contends 
that children may undertake “their own apostolic work” in accordance with their abilities 
as “true living witnesses of Christ among their companions.”144 However, children are 
primarily considered in regards to the vocations they will undertake in adulthood with 
special concern for nurturing and encouraging those who may be called to ordained or 
religious life.145 
                                                 
142 Humanae vitae, #26. In the closing paragraph, Paul VI reminds that such moral teaching is 
ultimately directed at the attainment of happiness, for which a person “yearns with all the strength of his 
spirit, unless he keeps the laws which the Most High God has engraved in his very nature. These laws must 
be wisely and lovingly observed.” Humanae vitae, #31. 
143 Gaudium et spes, #48. “The parents not only communicate the Gospel to their children, but 
from their children they can themselves receive the same Gospel as deeply lived by them.” Paul VI, 
Evangelii nuntiandi, Vatican, (December 8, 1975) 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/apost_exhortations/ documents/hf_p-
vi_exh_19751208_evangelii-nuntiandi_en.html,  #71. 
144 Apostolicum actuositatem, #13. 
145 Cf. Gaudium et spes, #52., Apostolicum actuositatem, #11., Lumen gentium, #11., See also 
Vatican II, Perfectae caritatis, Vatican, (October 28, 1965) http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ 
ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decree_19651028_perfectae-caritatis_en.html, #24., and Vatican II, 
Presbyterium ordinis, Vatican, (December 7, 1965) http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ 
ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decree_19651207_presbyterorum-ordinis_en.html, #11. 
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A few documents also give brief attention to non-biological kinship, but the 
subject is not consistently developed. Gaudium et spes asserts that Christians must be 
willing to assist children who have been born outside of marriage and suffer for other’s 
sins.146 The same document entrusts society with the care of children “who unhappily 
lack the blessing of a family” and who require legal protections necessary to assure their 
wellbeing.147 And in Apostolicum actuositatem the first item in a list of possible activities 
of the family apostolate is “the adoption of abandoned infants.”148 
 
Conclusions 
 In its considerations of marriage and family, the Vatican II era shows a great deal 
of consistency with earlier magisterial teaching. The most significant contrast is the 
development in women’s standing within society and the family. These developments are 
initiated by John XXIII’s identification of women’s social progress as stemming from 
women’s own recognition of their dignity, which stands in stark relief against earlier 
protectionist claims that associated female dignity with home life. This development 
informed a more optimistic view of women’s place in the workforce and influenced 
greater acceptance of coeducation. Within the family, hierarchical language was replaced 
by ideals of spiritually enriching spousal partnerships. Yet, these developments are at 
times awkwardly balanced against continuing insistence on women’s primarily domestic 
                                                 
146 Gaudium et spes, #28. 
147 Ibid., #52. It may be notable that Gaudium et spes uses “parents or guardians” which suggests a 
recognition of a distinction between biological and social parenthood. Gaudium et spes, #52. 
148 Apostolicum actuositatem, #11. 
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vocation. In this era of developing teaching on women’s roles, the conditioned term 
“legitimate progress” often bears the weight of holding these disparate concerns together. 
 Humanae vitae’s judgment on artificial contraception is an important component 
of this era’s teaching for a number of reasons. With John XXIII and Vatican II a growing 
awareness that education of children must be a privileged good in matters of birth 
regulation was beginning to displace an emphasis on procreation as primary. While Paul 
VI’s personalism closely associated these goods, the encyclical turned attention towards 
sexual intercourse and biological procreation and framed procreation unambiguously as 
an exercise in the virtue of generosity. The tradition’s appeal to divine providence to 
assure a parent’s capability to educate well further supports an emphasis on procreation 
without serious moral attention to adult educational capabilities prior to conception.149 An 
emphasis on faith in the sufficiency of providence to provide further undermines 
considerations which might make procreation less than an unambiguous good. In 
addition, as the decision against conceiving a child, or more children, is only cautiously 
accepted with repeated warnings about potential sinfulness, the importance of serious 
attention to educating children well is only further obstructed. For a brief moment, 
recognition that the duty to educate is both a more complex and more important 
obligation of the Christian parent began to emerge. Humanae vitae largely ended this 
trajectory and complicated matters by associating its moral teaching strongly with 
magisterial authority, a theme later repeated by the CDF. 
                                                 
149 Parents are certainly clearly exhorted to educate their children in moral, practical, spiritual and 
other matters. The question bears more on the extent to which these obligations ought to be a factor when 
considering avoiding conception. 
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 Finally, the conception of children themselves underwent development. As in 
earlier writings, children take on the dual identities of being gifts when considered in 
terms of procreation and adults-in-training when considered in terms of education. Yet 
the era gave greater credence to the idea that children can fulfill a Christian vocation 
within childhood itself. This assertion that children are not only Christians in the making, 
but potential exemplars of the faith, is rarely acknowledged previously beyond 
hagiographic writings. Still, children are situated within an ideal of the biological nuclear 
family. And, although their parents have now become co-equal partners, the familial 
hierarchy remained largely unchanged from the child’s perspective, though the potential 
aspirations of girls have expanded. 
 
Part III: John Paul II, 1978 – 2012 
Historical Overview 
 Prior to his papacy, Cardinal Karol Wojtyla participated in every session of 
Vatican II and was a member of the papal birth control commission.150 Throughout his 
papacy, he repeatedly presented Gaudium et spes and Humanae vitae as harmonious 
documents and sought to guide the authentic interpretation of Vatican II. Because his 
pastoral and academic concerns correlate with emphases of his papacy, particularly 
concerning family life, an assessment of his magisterial contributions must also 
acknowledge these. The 1960 book Love and Responsibility provides significant 
                                                 
150 As a member of the commission, Wojtyla did not attend any meetings (which had persuaded 
like-minded members to change their views) and missed crucial final votes. Wojtyla did, however write a 
critical response to the commission’s report. His book Love and Responsibility may also have been 
influential for Paul VI. Cf. Hebblethwaite, 468ff and 597. And Smith, 229. 
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background to John Paul II’s teaching.151 Here Wojtyla articulates a philosophical-ethical 
project defined by the personalist norm; to respect people as subjects in themselves and 
never use them as a means to an end.152 This universal is based upon the uniqueness of 
human reason and the existence of an “inner self.”153 For Wojtyla, therefore, the task of 
ethics, especially sexual ethics, is to carefully differentiate acts of “loving kindness” from 
acts which intend to use a person.154 
Soon after ascending to the papacy, John Paul II gave a series of addresses which 
built upon themes articulated in Love and Responsibility and set the foundations of his 
“theology of the body.”155 Here, John Paul II takes Jesus’ response to divorce in Matthew 
19, which he regards as normative teaching, as a basis for constructing a theological 
anthropology rooted in the creation narrative.156 Genesis’ account of prelapsarion 
humanity, including the creation of human sexual differentiation, provides a resource to 
which John Paul II applies his phenomenological method to expound the meaning of 
                                                 
151 Karol Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1993). 
152 Positively stated, the norm requires that all people be treated with love. Wojtyla, Love and 
Responsibility, 25. Cf. 41. In Memory and Identity (34ff), In a later work, John Paul II gives a succinct 
account of his understanding of the fundamental nature of moral acts. See John Paul II, Memory and 
Identity; Conversations at the Dawn of a Millennium (New York: Rizzoli, 2005), 34ff. 
153 Wojtyla, 22. 
154 Wojtyla, 34. Love and Responsibility strongly critiques systems that are particularly prone to 
this latter option. Utilitarianism is a central object of criticism. Also included are “reductive” systems, 
including Freudian psychoanalytic theory, Manicheanism, and the views of numerous philosophers. 
Throughout his papacy, John Paul II was concerned with ideologies and movements that stem from 
reductive anthropologies, are destructive, or require violence for their propagation. This concern is 
understandable in light of the twentieth-century European experiences of Nazism, Fascism and 
Communism. Yet, for John Paul II it also gave rise to a tendency to describe a wide range of disagreements 
with Catholic teaching as rooted in harmful ideologies; often with the implication that these are 
intentionally orchestrated. Cf. John Paul II, Memory and Identity, 165 – 166. 
155 John Paul II, Original Unity of Man and Woman. (Boston: Saint Paul Books and Media, 1981). 
156 Matthew 19: 3 – 12. Cf. Mark 10: 1 – 10. John Paul II, Original Unity, 15, 17, 28, 31, et al. 
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embodied sexuality.157 The addresses culminate with an indication of Christ’s response to 
contemporary questions concerning marriage and sexuality and a defense of Humanae 
vitae.158 A subsequent series of addresses began with the Beatitudes, particularly Jesus’ 
teaching on adultery, and moved towards greater considerations of postlapsarian 
humanity. Again, Genesis remains a critical point of inquiry and the project leads to a 
defense of Humanae vitae; though the second series concludes with considerations of 
artistic portrayals of the human body. 
 Following the 1980 Synod of Bishops, John Paul II wrote the apostolic 
exhortation, Familiaris consortio. This he described as “a summa of the teaching of the 
Church on the life, the tasks, the responsibilities, and the mission of marriage and of the 
family in the world today.”159 Familiaris consortio begins by assessing the state of 
marriage and the family globally. Despite occasional pessimism, John Paul presents 
contemporary challenges as a mix of positive and negative developments that require 
careful discernment.160 The remainder of the comprehensive document clarifies the 
Catholic Church’s understanding of marriage and family and their mission in the world. 
                                                 
157 John Paul II interprets the original human as non-gendered prior to the creation of Eve. The 
original human, Adam becomes male only in relation to the female, Eve. Adam is cast into a deep sleep 
prior to this differentiation which, John Paul II claims, contains an element of “annihilation.” Thus, despite 
the continuity between the original Adam and the male Adam, and the creation of Eve out of Adam, John 
Paul II emphasizes that this event suggests a recreation of humanity. The problem of the solitude of the 
original human is overcome by the creation of new humanity now expressed in the duality of male and 
female. John Paul II, Original Unity, 64ff. 
158 John Paul II, Original Unity, 171ff. 
159 Quoted in De Haro, 333. 
160 The positive developments include greater appreciation for individual freedom and 
attentiveness to interpersonal relationships, support for women’s dignity, responsible procreation and 
education of children, and attention to “the development of interfamily relationships, for reciprocal spiritual 
and material assistance, the rediscovery of the ecclesial mission proper to the family and its responsibility 
for the building of a more just society.” The negative developments include erroneous conceptions of 
spousal independence, “the relationship of authority between parents and children,” difficulty in 
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Numerous significant writings beyond these include John Paul II’s encyclicals 
Evangelium vitae, Centesimus annus, Sollicitudo rei socialis and Laborem exercens; his 
apostolic exhortation Christifideles laici; his apostolic letters Mulieris dignitatem and 
Dilecti amici; and his letters to women, to children, and to families. In addition, John 
Paul II considered marriage and family in numerous audiences, speeches and homilies, 
and authored several books.161 
Although the expansive writings of John Paul II clearly dominate the post-Vatican 
II era, the CDF also produced significant documents which compliment John Paul II’s 
papal teaching on marriage and family. Notably, the CDF’s writings often took on the 
“dirty work” of clarifying moral prohibitions. Other dicasteries, particularly the Pontifical 
Council for the Family, contributed to this growing corpus as well. And the United States 
Catholic Bishops have collectively issued a number of documents on marriage and 
family. Much of the content repeats or paraphrases teachings already expounded by the 
Vatican, but the US Bishops make specific contributions by contextualizing the message 
to an American audience. Finally, John Paul II’s successor, Benedict XVI162 emphasized 
moral responsibility and the inter-connectivity of society and the human person.163 For 
                                                 
transmitting values, divorce, abortion, sterilization, a contraceptive mentality. John Paul II, Familiaris 
consortio, #6. 
161 Many of these are collected in the most recent edition of Enchiridion on the Family: A 
Compendium of Church Teaching on the Family and Life Issues from Vatican. II to the Present by the 
Pontifical Council on the Family. An updated edition was released in 2011 but is not yet available in 
English 
162 Cardinal Ratzinger’s 1986 book, In the Beginning considers Genesis and the human condition 
and is a helpful resource for comparing his thought to that of John Paul II. I have included the first 
encyclical of Pope Francis I, Lumen fidei, which was acknowledged have been largely written by Benedict 
prior to his retirement. 
163 Like John Paul II, Benedict XVI tended to insinuate that disagreements with Catholic teaching 
were the result of ideologies; although his concerns centered on relativism, individualism and “absolute 
freedom.” Unlike John Paul II, Benedict XVI articulated a developed environmental ethic which he situated 
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example, he argued that Humanae vitae “indicates the strong links between life ethics and 
social ethics,” and ushered in “a new area of magisterial teaching that has gradually been 
articulated in a series of documents, most recently John Paul II's Encyclical Evangelium 
vitae.”164 
   
Sexual Ethics and Marriage 
 Unlike his predecessor, John Paul II was equipped with an academic training in 
philosophy and deep interest in sexual ethics, especially in the context of spousal love 
and the human person. Love and Responsibility argues that the sexual urge has both the 
capacity to develop into love and an orientation towards reproduction. Clashes between 
this potential and purpose harm love.165 Instead, morality rests on the “synthesis of 
nature’s purpose with the personalistic norm.”166 The body, with its sexual urge, provides 
the material for true conjugal love, but also requires respect for the ends to which it is 
directed. That is, the person must be respected in his or her fullness while the will must 
                                                 
within his overarching theological project through the phrase “integral human development.” Cf. Benedict 
XVI, Spei salvi, Vatican, (November 30, 2007) 
http://www.Vatican..va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/ documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20071130_spe-
salvi_en.html, #13 – 16., and Benedict XVI, Caritas in veritate, Vatican, (June 29, 2009) 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/ hf_ben-
xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate_en.html, #51. 
164 Caritas in veritate, #15. 
165 Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, 53. 
166 Ibid., 67. 
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govern the passions.167 Concupiscence is the propensity for this synthesis to go awry; to 
tend towards lesser ends.168 
Lust acquires a central importance in Blessed are the Pure of Heart’s account of 
the postlapsarian human, who has become “the man of lust.”169 A primary effect of the 
fall was that the differentiation between man and woman, particularly in reference to 
physicality, became a source of shame which persists through the inability of fallen 
humanity to realize authentic communion or satisfy lust.170 Thus, the heart “has become a 
battlefield between love and lust.”171 The great harm caused by this condition, is the 
capability to objectify and seek possession of other human beings.172 Nuptial love and 
lust are incompatible and competing forces.173 Thus, John Paul II asserts that wrongful 
desire may lead to adultery even among spouses; the criteria being objectification, not the 
marital bond. 174  
                                                 
167 Ibid., 128. Likewise, emotions must be controlled lest subjectivism of emotion lead to 
subjectivism of values which ultimately leads to Utilitarian calculations and Hedonism. Wojtyla, Love and 
Responsibility, 154 – 165. 
168 Ibid., 148. Cf. 159. 
169 John Paul II, Blessed Are the Pure of Heart (Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 1988), 36. 
170 Ibid., 57, 63 – 65, et al. John Paul II acknowledges that lust seems associated primarily with the 
male, but asserts that the consequent shame is experienced deeply by both genders, though differently. John 
Paul II, Blessed are the Pure of Heart, 69. 
171 Ibid., 75. 
172 Ibid., 79. “When we state that ‘lust,’ when compared with the original mutual attraction of 
masculinity and femininity represents a ‘reduction,’ we have in mind an intentional ‘reduction,’ almost a 
restriction of closing down of the horizon of mind and heart. In fact, it is one thing to be conscious that the 
value of sex is part of all the rich storehouse of values with which the female appears to the man; it is 
another to ‘reduce’ all the personal riches of femininity to that single value, that is, of sex, as a suitable 
object of the gratification of sexuality itself.” John Paul II, Blessed Are the Pure of Heart, 126. 
173 Ibid., 75. 
174 Ibid., 110. 
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Reflecting this earlier thought, Familiaris consortio, argues that conjugal love 
requires a total self-giving, both spiritually and physically, as any reservation makes such 
giving a lie.175  John Paul II’s successor, Benedict XVI also located the foundations of 
marriage in Genesis. But as he was more conversant with Greek philosophy and Patristic 
theology, the place of John Paul II’s “sexual urge” is largely assumed by “eros.” Because 
the latter is a multivalent term, Benedict’s development added ambiguity to the role of 
desire in human sexuality.176 
According to John Paul II’s anthropology, the human body has a “nuptial 
meaning” which finds it proper expression in marriage where sexual intercourse may 
speak to the fullness of the human person as both subject and gift. 177 True conjugal love 
requires a conscious decision to “participate in the whole natural order of existence” 
through begetting children.178 John Paul II describes procreation as the “greatest possible 
gift” and laments that conception is often needlessly thwarted in the contemporary 
world.179 Especially in wealthy countries, married couples are deprived of “the generosity 
                                                 
175 Familiaris consortio, #11. 
176 Benedict XVI, Deus caritas est, Vatican, (December 25, 2005) 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/ benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20051225_deus-
caritas-est_en.html, #11. 
177 John Paul II does consider children directly, but views them as the product of the two-in-one 
sexual act, not the direct object of the metaphor. He does imply that a spiritual unity is also being 
suggested, but his method is to hold the spiritual and bodily closely together so that the latter speaks the 
language of the former. Therefore his considerations are routed through the physical act by which a 
spiritual reality is being expressed. 
178 Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, 53. 
179 Familiaris consortio, #14. Here it may be asked whether life or faith is really conceived of as 
the greatest gift. Traditionally the value of life is held very high, but relativized in light of faith. This is 
most dramatically evidenced by traditional reverence for martyrs and more subtly through balancing 
procreation and education. On the other hand, life is the condition for faith and in a sense holds a natural, 
but not ultimate primacy. 
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and courage needed for raising up new human life: thus life is often perceived not as a 
blessing, but as a danger from which to defend oneself.”180  
Familiaris consortio provides an extensive review and defense of Humanae vitae. 
Here John Paul II declares that artificial contraception and Natural Family Planning 
(NFP) embody “two irreconcilable concepts of the human person and of human 
sexuality.”181 Only NFP encourages actions and dispositions compatible with the 
church’s vision of marriage. Therefore, “husbands and wives should first of all recognize 
clearly the teaching of Humanae vitae as indicating the norm for the exercise of their 
sexuality” then they should seek the means to observe this norm.182  
Two decades earlier, Wojtyla had argued that “Sexual relations between a man 
and a woman in marriage have their full value as a union of persons only when they go 
with conscious acceptance of the possibility of parenthood.”183 If the possibility of 
parenthood is rejected, especially by interference with the “naturalness” of the sexual act, 
the entire sexual act is reduced to mere pleasure seeking; that is, the greatness of nuptial 
love becomes mere lust.184 
In spite of Familiaris consortio’s support for NFP, John Paul II was suspicious of 
all methods of regulating birth. At least two reasons underlie his apprehension. First, as 
had Paul VI, John Paul II viewed birth regulation as serious moral decision fraught with 
                                                 
180 Ibid., #6. 
181 Ibid., #32. 
182 Ibid., #35. 
183 Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, 227. 
184 Ibid., 235 and 239. 
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potential for error. Had Catholicism remained content with the physicalism of earlier 
times, distinctions in method would have retained clear ethical implications. But with the 
embrace of personalism, even the best method could be put to sinful use. Second, John 
Paul II’s early opposition to contraception did not seamlessly ally with later 
developments in NFP. Unlike some bishops of the 1960s, Wojtyla recognized the 
legitimacy of the need for family planning and did not believe a specifically procreative 
intent was required of licit sexual acts. Yet his rejection of contraception was directed 
against acts which make pregnancy impossible or virtually impossible. Thus, he initially 
supported NFP specifically for its fallibility.185 Though he would later advocate for 
scientific assistance in perfecting the method, this required development in his reasons 
for supporting NFP. 
Like John Paul II, Benedict XVI, saw artificial contraception as feeding numerous 
global social ills and Caritas in veritate specifically implicated artificial contraception 
within modern societies’ destructive “anti-birth mentality.”186 In response to the problems 
of forced contraception, sterilization and abortion in international aid, as well as the 
spread of an “anti-birth” mentality, he wrote, “Openness to life is at the centre of true 
                                                 
185 The mention of “Onanism” is a better source of physicalist criticism in Wojtyla. Love and 
Responsibility repeats the traditional identification of coitus interruptus with sin after scholarly consensus 
had shifted to judging the act as merely the means by which Onan committed his real sin of disobedience; a 
perspective shared by scholars at the Papal Birth Control Commission. 
186 Caritas in veritate, #2, 28. 
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development.”187 Elsewhere Benedict XVI argued that an absolute witness against 
artificial birth control is “crucial for humanity's future.”188  
 
Though John Paul II’s approach to sexual ethics is remarkably innovative, it was 
nevertheless closely connected with Paul VI’s moral reasoning. John Paul II continued 
and in some ways intensified the link between specific negative moral norms and 
magisterial authority; a controversy largely centered on Humanae vitae.189 This became 
most explicit in John Paul II’s encyclical on fundamental moral theology, Veritatis 
splendor, which defended both absolute negative moral norms and the magisterial 
authority to clarify these.190 Throughout John Paul II’s lengthy papacy, the CDF 
produced documents in support of this trend, while individual bishops and national 
bishops’ conferences became increasingly differential to papal prerogatives.191 
 
For John Paul II, ethical sexual expression requires marriage because it is the only 
context that allows and safeguards the total offering required.192 Citing Humanae vitae, 
Familiaris consortio recalls that marriage is directed towards the total unity of heart and 
                                                 
187 Ibid., #28, Cf. #44. 
188 Benedict XVI, “The Human Person, The Heart of Peace,” Vatican, (January 1, 2007) 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/messages/peace/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_mes_20061208_xl-world-day-peace_en.html, #1. 
189 Citing Humanae vitae #6, Charles Curran concludes, “Thus, the encyclical itself manifestly 
makes clear that it is primarily the teaching authority of the Church that makes artificial contraception 
morally wrong. Curran, The Development of Moral Theology, 131. 
190 Veritatis splendor, #56. 
191 Curran, The Development of Moral Theology, 273. 
192 Familiaris consortio, #11. 
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soul, demands fidelity and indissolubility, and is open to procreation. Correspondingly, it 
identifies selfishness as a primary cause of marital troubles.193 Familiaris consortio also 
contrasts support for life against contra-life mentalities; which indicate God’s absence 
and are driven by fear and selfishness. This culminates in a reaffirmation of opposition to 
contraception, sterilization and abortion; especially when political power is involved.194 
Unlike earlier eras, Familiaris consortio’s primary analogue for the love of 
spouses is God’s love for humanity. This is expressed first by the Hebrew Scriptures’ use 
of nuptial language to describe the covenant, second by the love of Christ for his 
followers, and third by the bond of Christ and the Church.195  Familiaris consortio 
describes the fundamental task of marriage as communicating love. Four additional tasks 
of marriage are related to this; to form a community of persons, serve life, build society, 
and share in the Church.196 
The fruits of the sacramental grace of marriage ascend to a more prominent place 
in John Paul II’s thought than in earlier teachings. In particular, this attention clarifies the 
origins of the parental capacity to provide religious education. Through the grace of 
sacramental marriage couples become participants in and witnesses to salvation equipped 
to mentor and guide others.197 Although the basic capability to educate children remains 
rooted in biological procreation, recalling Aquinas, the duty to educate is described as 
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fortified by matrimony in which it becomes a ‘ministry.’198 For John Paul II, procreation 
is conceptually bound to education because the true expression of conjugal love entails 
not only openness to procreation, but preparedness to accept a new human life and ensure 
the child’s full physical and spiritual development.199  
This period again recognizes the primary authority of spouses in planning the 
number and spacing of their children, while setting the context for such decisions within 
the teaching of Humae vitae.200 As in earlier times, the choice to have more children is 
described as generous. A decision not to have a child, or more children, falls under 
suspicion of faithless fear and selfishness while the means to achieve that end are morally 
precarious.  John Paul II made the point quite explicitly; “the church encourages couples 
to be generous and hopeful, to realize that parenthood is a privilege in that each child 
bears witness to the couple’s own love for each other, to their generosity and to their 
openness to God.”201 The US Bishops repeated this association of procreation with the 
virtues of gratitude and openness while adding that these both make a marriage fit for 
children and allow people to respect life and reach out to the poor.202 In as much as this 
makes virtuous generosity a precondition for willful procreation, the link between spousal 
virtue and number of children remained strong. 
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Throughout this era there was an increasing concern for “false alternatives” to the 
“irreplaceable value of the family based on marriage.”203 These primarily included 
various forms of cohabitation, same-sex relationships, and civil unions which all lack the 
social commitments of marriage. There non-marital sexual partnerships are each 
considered harmful in themselves even as they also undermine the true meaning of 
marriage. When persons inhabiting these marriage alternatives seek legal protection or 
the right to adopt children they become cause for particular alarm.204 Same-sex 
relationships, in particular, are a “deplorable distortion of what should be a communion 
of love and life between a man and a woman in a reciprocal gift open to life.”205 One 
document from the Vatican protests, 
It is in no way acceptable for children to be subjected, forced and basically obliged to undergo the 
discrimination of being entrusted to such unions made up of their very lives. Impeding them from 
being part of a family – in the proper and original sense – involves serious, negative and even 
irreparable consequences for [these children].206 
 
 
Gender and Family Structure 
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John Paul II directed attention to the human meaning of sexual difference in a 
manner distinct from his predecessors.207 This was influenced both by the creativity of his 
moral theology as well as changing gender roles in Western society. Preceding periods 
attest to a rejection, then a progressive albeit cautious, acceptance of women’s place in 
the social sphere. This progression was fueled largely by recognition of the importance of 
equal social rights and non-hierarchical spousal partnerships. John Paul II, however, is 
concerned to articulate why and how sexual differentiation still matters in a world where 
the fluidity and cultural construction of gender roles has become widely recognized. Such 
theoretical developments are not seen as stemming from basic human dignity, but from 
an ideology of “gender” being promoted on a global scale.208 In response, John Paul II 
upholds a set of universal and fundamental human attributes, especially related to human 
desires and capacities, while arguing strongly for essentialist gender differentiation and 
its implications for the individual and social good. 209 These implications are reified by 
the essentially exclusive yet complimentarily concepts “masculinity” and “femininity”; 
each of which embodies a range of assertions. For John Paul II masculinity and 
femininity are “two ways of ‘being a body’” that speak to and complete each other.210 
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They are dual incarnations of humanity, both in the image of God, but distinct.211 And 
they are complementary such that each, in a sense “finds itself” in the other.212 
At the same time, women occupy a unique place of concern in John Paul II’s 
thought. He was the first pope to address an apostolic letter directly to women, he 
repeatedly affirmed women’s essential dignity and equality with men, he rebuked the 
objectification of women, and he was even conversant to some extent with feminist 
scholarship.213 Yet, John Paul II also strongly supported distinction in gendered 
vocations. Like his predecessors, he contended that authentic respect for equality must 
not obscure the basic reality of gendered difference.214 Although John Paul II embraced a 
somewhat larger vision of women’s social and economic participation than many of his 
forebears, women remained characterized by an essential femininity conceptually bound 
to passive receptivity and motherhood.215 The vocation of women to being wives and 
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mothers is women’s “main” and “irreplaceable role” which corresponds to “the very 
essence of her womanhood.”216 In the social arena, John Paul II argued for the 
importance of including women and women’s perspectives as sources of reform.217 Still 
the “fundamental contribution” of women to society is conditioned by their experience of 
motherhood in which they accept and love life for its own sake.218 
In the labor force, Women have a legitimate place but this employment must give 
due regard for women’s roles as wives and mothers if social advancement is to be “truly 
and fully human.”219 John Paul II consistently repudiated social structures that compel 
married women to enter the workforce and viewed occupations that can be undertaken 
from the home as particularly appropriate.220 He also urged deeper study of the 
relationship between work and family.221 Notably, there is a relative absence of 
corresponding calls to study men’s relation to work and home. And John Paul II 
suggested that respect for domestic labor, the education of children, may rightly lead to 
societies providing “family allowances or the remuneration of the work in the home.”222 
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Benedict XVI’s direct attention to women is not comparable to John Paul II’s. 
Yet, he also upheld the importance of respect for human dignity and decried the violence 
done against women in situations where they are “still firmly subordinated to the 
arbitrary decisions of men, with grave consequences for their personal dignity and for the 
exercise of their fundamental freedoms.”223 Furthermore, he argued that women’s 
employment should be freely chosen and effective in meeting the economic needs of 
families.224 
Likewise, the US Bishops view unequal pay for women as a major source of 
injustice which, along with over-involvement in the workforce by either or both parents, 
has negative consequences for children.225 As in Vatican documents, mothers’ inability to 
provide fulltime care for young children is seen as particularly problematic.226 
Consistent calls for a ‘family wage’ trace back to Leo XIII and appear to function 
as the male corollary to concern for women in the workforce. Despite, and perhaps in 
opposition to, significant social change, the post-conciliar era has remained largely 
committed to an ideal of the male single-earner household. This dichotomy is muted 
somewhat in the writings of the US bishops where blame is spread more generally to 
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American society’s failure respect the importance of childcare while spouses are forced 
to negotiate the difficult balance between work and family.227 
 
For John Paul II, the family is a community founded upon the bond of spouses 
which is rooted in their natural complementarity.228 This view of gender’s significance 
results in an emphasis on family structure. Familiaris consortio begins with structural 
and conceptual aspects of the family and moves to considerations of function. Just as the 
physical act and the personalist significance are linked in his sexual ethics, so too are 
essential aspects of the family required to fulfill its human purpose. For John Paul II, the 
private nuclear family is no historic accident; it is the necessary outcome of theological 
reflection on the meaning of the family.229 In this, the Holy Family is paradigmatic, 
though he clearly interprets the Holy Family through a post-industrial ideal.230 Although 
John Paul II’s basic criterion for the family appears to include only the biological parental 
and sibling relationships, John Paul II’s occasional inclusion of grandparents and the 
extended family is significant even if relatively undeveloped. Each of these are clearly 
presented favorably, especially as aids to the nuclear family, but are also directed to 
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respect the privacy of the nuclear family and its members.231 The inclusion of 
grandparents is connected to a concerted effort in John Paul II’s papacy to consider the 
needs of the elderly in relation to family life. This includes common living, or when not 
possible, frequent visitation and contact.232 Unfortunately, Benedict XVI did not employ 
his well-developed notion of spiritual kinship to further develop this trajectory.233 The US 
Bishops, however, take great account of the extended family and family networks, most 
notably as these have beneficial potential for cooperative childrearing.234 
 
Throughout this period, an essentialist theory of gender persists even as social 
roles for women are extended in comparison to earlier teaching. At the same time, 
hierarchical images of family structure subside in favor or language of mutuality between 
spouses. Continuing commitment to gender essentialism becomes most evident in the 
rising importance of the idea of complementarity. The magisterial defense of the validity 
of marriages of infertile couples and rejection of same-sex partnerships offers a useful 
reference point for understanding the importance of complementary in the family. 
Magisterial affirmations of the validity of marriages of the infertile are seldom 
supported by theological argument and usually arise as tangential topics within larger 
arguments. John Paul II teaches that infertility does not devalue marriage; instead, it 
affords the opportunity to serve life in other ways, including “adoption, various forms of 
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educational work, and assistance to other families and to poor or handicapped 
children.”235 And John Paul II presents marriage and family as distinctly different, but 
related realities. Marriage is an institution of self-giving between a man and a woman. 
Family is a society created by the birth of a child. Both are founded in love and the 
former rightfully and naturally leads to the latter. But marriage precedes and is not 
absorbed by the formation of a family.236 Therefore, the dignity and value of marriage is 
not contingent upon the creation of a family and marital sexual acts remain licit even 
apart from the possibility of biological procreation. Infertility becomes the focus of moral 
concern primarily as it may dispose couple’s towards unethical forms of reproductive 
technologies.237 
Unlike biologically childless marriages, homosexual relationships occupy a 
central moral concern of three pertinent documents issued by the CDF under John Paul II. 
Throughout this period, the moral question took on new dimensions as family formation 
by same-sex partners became a growing public phenomenon. 
In 1986, “Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Pastoral Care of 
Homosexual Persons” sought to clarify Persona humana’s judgment on homogenital 
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acts; particularly in response to perceived laxist pastoral applications.238 Its most 
significant claim is that, although the homosexual inclination itself is not a sin, “it is a 
more or less strong tendency ordered toward an intrinsic moral evil; and thus the 
inclination itself must be seen as an objective disorder.”239 This is supported by the claim 
that creation displays a clear, God-given complementarity.240  
In 1992, “Some Considerations Concerning the Response to Legislative Proposals 
on the Non-Discrimination of Homosexual Persons” followed a similar method to assert 
that sexual orientation cannot be considered as a form human diversity protected from 
discrimination; akin to race or gender. Instead, anyone who has made his or her 
homosexuality a matter of public knowledge implies a willingness to engage in 
homogenital acts and may rightly be subject to discrimination in areas such as 
employment and housing.241 
“Considerations Regarding Proposals to give Legal Recognitions to Unions 
between Homosexual Persons” of 2003 argues that, because procreation is impossible for 
homosexual couples, they cannot contribute in a proper way to the survival of the human 
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race. And, because same-sex partnerships lack sexual complementarity, adoption cannot 
be allowed as this absence would cause developmental problems for the children.242 
Because of this, “Not even in a remote analogous sense do homosexual unions fulfil [sic] 
the purpose for which marriage and family deserve specific categorical recognition.” 
Instead, legal recognition of same-sex unions poses an inherent threat to heterosexual 
marriage, children, and society.243 
These differentiated responses to infertility in heterosexual marriages and to 
same-sex partnerships reveal a single factor as paramount; via the significance of sexual 
complementarity, the former can bear witness to authentic plan for the family while the 
latter cannot. 
 
Children, Family and Parenthood 
Familiaris consortio describes parents as “heralds of the Gospel” for their 
children who fulfill their vocation as both physical and spiritual progenitors.244 Parental 
authority is described as both “unrenounceable” and a “true and proper ‘ministry.’”245 
Concerning the evangelical tasks of parenthood, John Paul II posits much more common 
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ground between male and female experiences than in other tasks.246 Yet, John Paul II also 
stresses differences in these vocations; frequently using ‘fatherhood and motherhood’ in 
place of general references to ‘parenthood.’247  
In his early work, Wojtyla discerned a basic asymmetry in male and female 
experiences of parenthood. Women are powerfully and instinctually driven towards 
desiring child. Men have to cultivate paternal feelings as they tend to lack this drive and 
do not share the physical experience of pregnancy.248 These observations are confirmed 
by John Paul II’s preferred theological analogues. He had a strong devotion to Mary, and, 
especially in Mulieris dignitatem, presents her as the model for motherhood and 
femininity.249 On the other hand, John Paul II’s apostolic exhortation dedicated to St. 
Joseph, Redemptoris custos, linked Jesus’ use of ‘Abba’ to the significance of the 
vocation of fatherhood.250 God, St. Joseph, priesthood, and fatherhood are all closely 
associated in John Paul II’s conception of masculinity. Earthly fatherhood is identified as 
an imitation of “the very fatherhood of God.”251 Yet, Familiaris consortio also names the 
replication of God’s fatherhood as a function of parenthood generally. As such, John Paul 
II’s thought includes some flexibility in gendered motifs, though his insistence on the 
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essential differences between the parental roles of motherhood and fatherhood is often 
more prevalent.252 
In the daily activities of parenthood, John Paul II assumes and supports gendered 
differentiations. He argues for the importance of women’s role in nurturing children, and 
gives no indication that a father might also fulfill this task.253 The duties of fatherhood 
relate to men’s economic contributions, loving one’s wife and children, and involvement 
in the life of the family.254 Thus, fathers are more than income earners, but generally play 
a secondary role in childrearing. Fatherhood is also frequently associated with education, 
though the task is properly shared by both parents.255 And, although hierarchical language 
was largely avoided at Vatican II, Laborem exercens once again identifies men as the 
“head” of the household.256 
Like John Paul II, the US Bishops urge fathers to take a greater role in their 
family’s lives, particularly around the task of education. Distinctively, they acknowledge 
fathers’ capability to nurture their children and identify growing awareness of this as a 
hopeful and beneficial trend.257 
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Considering the mutual task of education, John Paul II teaches that love 
conditions this obligation and perfects parenthood’s “service to life.” The love of parents 
is “the animating principle and therefore the norm inspiring and guiding all concrete 
educational activity, enriching it with the values of kindness, constancy, goodness, 
service, disinterestedness and self-sacrifice that are the most precious fruit of love.”258 
Further, Familiaris consortio encourages parents to educate in ways that reduce 
materialism and emphasize the goodness of the human person.259 Additionally, parents 
are encouraged to acknowledge the educational value of their actions and expressions of 
love.260 
 
Consistent with earlier eras, both John Paul II and Benedict XVI link biological 
procreation to generosity and favor large families.261  Yet, in Love and Responsibility, 
Wojtyla had gone beyond mere preference to suggest that families require a certain 
number of children to be true families at all. His rational is based on the idea that the 
family is a society wherein peer relationships are essential. Wojtyla is doubtful as to if 
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only a single child or two children could truly constitute a family, because the family 
must arise “within the framework of a community of children, a collective of siblings.”262 
As pope, John Paul II argued that parents ought to remind themselves that it is “certainly 
less serious to deny their children certain comforts or material advantages than to deprive 
them of the presence of brothers and sisters, who could help them to grow in humanity to 
realize the beauty of life and all its ages and all its variety.”263 Relatedly, Benedict XVI 
questioned if small families could be beneficial for society. Such families, he wrote, “run 
the risk of impoverishing social relations, and failing to ensure effective forms of 
solidarity.”264 
The admonition to “serve life” is an often repeated mutual task. Procreation and 
education are the “most immediate, specific and irreplaceable” meanings of this good. It 
is not entirely clear how a true family might be formed aside from biological procreation 
as the procreative act is centralized and biological kinship is assumed. John Paul II 
acknowledges the superiority of spiritual bonds, yet within the family these deepen and 
enrich “the natural bonds of flesh and blood.”265 Still a potential avenue is presented, 
though undeveloped, in the assertion that serving life may take forms beyond biological 
procreation.266 John Paul II contends that, because all people are children of God, the 
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bounds of the family rightfully extend to universal concern for children in need. Families 
may serve life by their willingness to “adopt and foster children who have lost their 
parents or have been abandoned by them.” This benefits children, who rediscover the 
“warmth and affection of a family,” as well as the family, via its expansion.267 Elsewhere, 
John Paul II writes, “True parental love is ready to go beyond the bounds of flesh and 
blood in order to accept children from other families, offering them whatever is necessary 
for their well-being and full development.”268 But these recognitions of a deeper meaning 
of serving life are clearly secondary to the repeated emphasis on biological 
procreation.269  
 
John Paul II never tired of emphasizing the importance of the family. In the 
concluding remarks of Familiaris consortio he writes simply, “The future of humanity 
passes by way of the family.”270 Later, he taught that the family is both the source of a 
person’s individuality and every individual’s “existential horizon.”271 Considering the 
social dimensions of family life, John Paul II upheld the family as a powerful resource for 
overcoming social ills and transforming society. This obligation is expressed in raising 
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children properly, but also through hospitality and political engagement.272 Moreover, 
John Paul II displayed unique concern for children.273 Children are the “crowning” of 
marriage and the “living reflection” of their parents’ love. Children are a “permanent sign 
of conjugal unity and a living and inseparable synthesis” of their mother and father.274 
John Paul frequently emphasized the need to respect the full human dignity of 
children.275 He urged parents to see their children as ends in themselves, willed by God 
for their own sake. John Paul II also taught that children have a right to be the result of a 
sexual act between loving spouses and to be desired and respected from conception.276 
And he argued that children are to be respected as individuals and understood as gifts 
from God such that no one can claim a positive right to a child.277 Orphans or children 
who are deprived of the assistance of their parents or guardians must receive particular 
protection on the part of society. The State, with regard to foster-care or adoption, must 
provide legislation which assists suitable families to welcome into their homes children 
who are in need of permanent or temporary care while also respecting the natural rights 
of parents.278 
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Within the US context, the bishops encouraged inclusive forms of familial decision 
making. Citing St. Benedict, they write, “the abbot is to consult with all members of the 
monastery, even the youngest (who often were children), when their lives were likely to 
be affected. Rather than undermining authority, this strengthens it in love.”279 
 
Conclusions 
 Clearly John Paul II’s influence on post-conciliar magisterial teaching on 
marriage and the family is monumental. The major marks of his contributions are his 
articulations of the meaning and significance of gendered human embodiment, a 
personalist ethics that holds spiritual and bodily existence closely together, and a strident 
opposition to contraception, abortion, and homosexual partnerships. He also developed 
numerous aspects of Catholic teaching which includes a limited recognition of the good 
of adoption and the importance of bonds beyond the nuclear family. 
Aside from specific teachings, John Paul II’s thought is significant for the original 
the manner in which he framed questions of morality. Several oppositional dichotomies 
underlie his thought, including nuptial love and lust, respect and objectification, and the 
sexual urge and the will. These and other categories give John Paul II’s thought a 
propensity for dualism which often reduces the complexity of human experience to stark 
contrasts between good and evil.280 For example, if a sex act is not open to the possibility 
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of conception, an act that could attest to greatness of nuptial love becomes an act of mere 
lust.281 Further the lack of sexual complementarity in homosexual relationships turns 
these into the antithesis of marriage; not life giving as well as morally and socially 
destructive. At times, the positive halves of these dichotomies drift into romanticized and 
unrealistic claims. Thus women have a rightful place in the public sphere but are also 
singularly identified with the nurture of children within the home. Similarly, children are 
gifts of God with a right to be desired from conception, yet sex does not require an 
explicit procreative intent. To what extent can a woman assume an influential social 
vocation while also identifying herself as the single nurturer of her children? And how 
can sex be excused of an explicit intent to procreate if this would violate the right of any 
child conceived in as much as his or her existence would not be known for some time? 
These are not insurmountable contradictions so much as examples of the way John Paul 
II’s rhetoric could become quite distanced from practical realities. 
This propensity also appears to have influenced John Paul II clear and strong 
distinctions between good and evil which led to criticisms of legalism in his thought. On 
the matter of contraception in particular, John Paul argued that there can be no 
“graduality of the law”; truth must be either embraced or denied.282 Thus, sexual acts are 
either a pure communication of free self-giving or a form of domination that disrespects 
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the body with mere utilitarian intent. No room is allowed for uncertainty in the potential 
meaning of each and every sexual act.283 
As a result of these tendencies, the ample possibilities for individual moral growth 
suggested by John Paul II’s ethical perspective are complimented by only a limited vision 
of human adaptability in familial and social relations. That is, women and men actualize 
their moral growth in distinct manners that seem restrictively bound to their gendered 
identity. To posit that a husband may find authentic fulfillment as his children’s primary 
caregiver, or a wife do so as her family’s primary economic earner, pushes human 
adaptability further than John Paul II’s gendered framework allows. 
By comparison, the contributions of Benedict XVI and the US Bishops are 
limited. Most significantly, Benedict reframes some of John Paul II’s teachings with both 
more classical theological language and concern for expressing the unity of Catholic 
teaching. The US Bishops diverge most significantly in expressions of gender equality 
within the family, where they give much greater emphasis to parental cooperation in 
discerning how to provide for and nurture their children. 
 
Part IV: Critical Appraisal 
The remainder of this chapter offers a brief assessment of magisterial teaching on 
sex, marriage and family with specific attention to developments and emphases. This is 
not intended to provide a thoroughgoing appraisal, but only to raise concerns about this 
body of teaching to guide the considerations of subsequent chapters. These concerns 
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center around the role of normative sexual ethics tied to gender essentialism as these have 
developed within modern magisterial teaching and influenced conceptions of parenthood. 
In particular, the intimate links between sexual ethics and teaching on marriage and 
family appear to have produced a consistent tendency to conceive of parenthood in a 
restricted sense, centered on biological kinship. This tendency appears to have been 
exacerbated following Humanae vitae. Consequently, recent magisterial teaching retains 
the conviction that spiritual education marks Christian parenthood in its fullest. Yet the 
magisterium undermines this conviction through repeated emphasis on contraception (to 
which the concept of ‘responsible parenthood’ is inseparably tied) and gendered parental 
roles. This narrowing of concern it most clearly illustrated in the limited attention 
adoptive parenthood receives since the papacy of Pius XII. 
This assessment begins by considering the extent to which an underlying theory 
of gender and human sexuality influences magisterial teaching on marriage and family. It 
then considers the concepts of children and parenthood in magisterial thought. It 
concludes with a consideration of magisterial thought on the functional aspects of 
parenthood and other resources useful for a fuller account of parenthood. 
 
Gender 
The magisterial teaching presented above is consistently supported by a strong 
essentialist theory of gender.284 From Leo XIII through Benedict XVI, male and female 
have been conceptualized as exclusive and differentiated categories. These teachings 
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suggest no acceptance of the common academic distinction between “sex” and 
“gender.”285 Rather, concern centers on feminism and other movements that utilize 
ideologies of gender which only confuse and complicate differentiated parental roles.286 
In this account of gender, embodied human sexuality seamlessly yields the discrete 
categories of male and female, each with its own innate characteristics. 
At the same time, however, interpretations of appropriate gender roles have 
developed. In fact, the changing role of women may be the most significant development 
within the era. All the documents are characterized by a post-industrial ideal that 
separates the male public sphere from the female domestic sphere.287 But even Arcanum 
is aware of shifting gendered barriers, particularly concerning the role of women in 
public life. Yet, whereas Pius XI read these developments as unnatural and opposed to 
women’s essential character,288 John XXIII interpreted them as signs of women 
embracing their own dignity.289 As both centrally claim the dignity of women, a clearer 
opposition is hard to imagine. Still, this transition came gradually and the conviction that 
women are first and foremost wives and mothers was consistently upheld. Holding these 
claims together gives rise to tensions which become particularly evident with John Paul II 
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whose support for women’s rights to public participation is framed by his alarm that 
women have come to neglect, and even fear, their primary obligations to their family. 
Gender essentialism functions within magisterial teaching to support demarcated 
gender roles within an overarching framework of the natural complementarity of the 
genders.290 This permits universal claims about the propensities of the sexes while 
relegating complex cultural considerations to secondary importance. This framework 
conforms, to an extent,291 to patterns of gendered behavior in post-industrial Western 
society but rests on a relatively weak conceptual foundation.  
Discerning essential from socially-constructed gendered attributes is immensely 
challenging in real-time anthropological observations because the rate of change in social 
constructions can be very slow.292 That is, a socially constructed ideology that influences 
gendered behavior may prevail within a culture for centuries. Thus, the differentiation 
between essential and socially-constructed differences is of less practical significance 
than that between long-held and observably-changing differences.293 Confronted with 
observable changes in women’s roles, magisterial teaching shows a double mindedness 
that attempts both to affirm women’s freedom and dignity while articulating normative 
patterns for behavior. The latter counsel is articulated as normative, but shows little 
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evidence of significant historical or cross-cultural scrutiny. This allows a uniquely post-
industrial feminine ideal to inform magisterial articulations of women’s vocations. 
The role of gender essentialism in magisterial thought raises two further 
problems. First, it tends to obscure individual diversity, human adaptability, and cultural 
capacities for change. Here, essentialism’s appeal is also its greatest pitfall. Clear 
categorization and collective directives allows little room for individual experience; 
especially for those whose experience is at odds with aspects of the prevailing gender 
narrative. One clear outcome of this limitation is the almost wholesale inattention to 
men’s capacity to fulfill certain traditionally feminine roles, such as the nurture of young 
children. Certainly magisterial thought has begun to emphasize the importance of 
paternal involvement in family life; but this is consistently presented as a secondary and 
supporting role. Quite simply, there is no suggestion that a male could be a child’s 
primary caregiver and little indication that men have any share in women’s capacity to 
nurture.294 
 Second, human gender itself, in terms of potential diversities, is simply too 
complex to be neatly fit within essentialist frameworks without admitting many 
exceptions to dichotomous gendered categories. To capture the complexity of human 
gender, these exceptions themselves would be numerous enough as to seriously 
undermine the categories themselves. Such exceptions may occur at any of the levels at 
which sexual difference is admitted to influence the human person. For magisterial 
teaching, this includes the physical, psychological, and spiritual aspects of the human 
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person. Although many such exceptions are simply passed over without notice,295 
homosexuality has been the source of significant magisterial attention. The challenge of 
nuancing gendered categories sufficiently enough to capture the complexity of human 
gender while retaining credibility in the fundamental gendered distinction itself poses a 
significant challenge. Unfortunately, magisterial teaching has largely failed to 
acknowledge the generalist nature of its own gendered framework. A significant outcome 
of this approach is that it has allowed teachings based on general categories to be 
presented as universally binding.296 
The hierarchical aspects of the magisterium’s concept of gender should also not 
go overlooked. Within the earlier documents, the family is clearly understood as a 
hierarchical society wherein men hold the highest authority. Both social observation and 
appeals to divine law supported this view. With Vatican II, however, gender hierarchy 
within the family was apparently disavowed as the language of mutuality and partnership 
prevailed.  
John Paul II placed great emphasis on both equality and sexual difference. 
However, the imagery he employs is often suggestive of female subordination. This is 
among the most significant critiques leveled against recent magisterial conceptions of 
gender. Namely, that the emphasis on gender complementarity does not support equality 
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so much as it covertly continues female subordination. This criticism gains greater 
credibility in light of the fact that complementarity for John Paul II is plainly not always 
an egalitarian concept. On the concepts of marriage and virginity, John Paul II explicitly 
frames them as complementary while asserting virginity’s preeminence.297 
 
Sexual Ethics 
 Post-Vatican II magisterial teaching on sex, marriage, and family is characterized 
by an appreciation of the personalist moral methodology embraced at the council. 
Ironically, Humanae vitae more than any other document has obscured the significance 
of this methodological renewal and yet is the first papal encyclical to frame its 
consideration of marriage explicitly in the terms of personalist moral concerns. It is 
important to recognize the fact of the magisterium’s embrace of personalist moral 
methodology before considering the nature and extent of its application within particular 
teachings. 
Paul VI’s encyclical united personalist concerns with a prohibition of 
contraception and tied its argument closely to magisterial authority and the objective 
precepts of the moral law. The encyclical disappointed reform-minded Catholics, many 
bishops included, yet Paul VI was reserved in commenting on the encyclical throughout 
the remainder of his papacy. John Paul II’s defense of Humanae vitae elevated the 
encyclical’s importance and widened the gap between magisterial and revisionist moral 
perspectives. In the hands of John Paul II, Humanae vitae came to epitomize a struggle 
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over the value of the human person and the very meaning of human existence.298 The full 
context behind these assertions is too complex to adequately summarize here, though a 
few salient features deserve attention. 
Humanae vitae immediately sparked controversy concerning its application of 
personalist moral methodology. The document’s supporters saw its approach as rightfully 
linking the physical and metaphysical realities of the human person while bringing these 
to bear in its moral teaching. Its critics saw an importation of outdated physicalist 
methodology under the cloak of personalist language, with moral conclusions ultimately 
based on the physical structure of the act. Apart from Paul VI’s controversial judgment 
on the moral matter of contraception, the encyclical’s positive vision of marriage has 
provided far more common ground. 
John Paul II’s strident defense of Humanae vitae raised corollary concerns of 
physicalism within his methodology.299 John Paul II’s approach claims to unify the 
physical and spiritual aspects of the person against dualist anthropologies, though his 
anthropology appears itself to be based in the dualities of lust and reason, body and 
spirit.300 With John Paul II, the debate over Humanae vitae grew in complexity and 
importance as his central concern for truth, particularly “the truth about man”, provided 
human sexual differentiation with metaphysical significance. More significant than his 
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clear conviction that truth fundamentally grounds morality was the clarity and precision 
with which John Paul II believed moral truths could be expressed. This perspective 
removed ambiguity from the actions of those who practiced contraception despite the 
Church’s teaching, as their bodies enacted intentions known to be contradictory to moral 
truth. For Paul VI, Humanae vitae spoke to Catholic spouses of a better way. For John 
Paul II, the moral judgment differentiated truth tellers from liars.301  
Most significantly, John Paul II’s approach gave clear and stark voice to the 
fundamental stakes of the contraception debate. Inasmuch as Humanae vitae promoted a 
positive vision of marriage and encouraged ‘responsible parenthood’, John Paul II 
clarified that both marriage and parenthood were essentially misunderstood by those who 
enacted the lie of contraception which spoke at a fundamental level against the dignity of 
love, marriage, and the sexual act. This attention to the sexual act itself, in relation to the 
nature of marriage and parenthood, clearly influences considerations of family in John 
Paul II’s thought. Perhaps more significantly, his attention to the body in response to 
perceived dualisms, tended to downplay the traditional conviction that the particularly 
Christian aspects of parenthood are contained in its spiritual ends. Paul VI’s assertion of 
the importance of biological procreation already set Pius XII’s emphasis on spiritual 
education in a new context. With John Paul II, Pius’s conviction is not lost, but it is 
dramatically overshadowed by concerns related to biological procreation. 
 
Family Structure 
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Commitments to gender essentialism and sexual ethical norms appear to support a 
particular family structure as ideal. First, this family is large. Having many children is 
consistently associated with faith and generosity. In contrast, avoidance of pregnancy is 
reserved for grave reasons while the means of doing so are fraught with potential 
immorality. Additionally, social support for large families is repeatedly encouraged while 
the social value of small families was questioned by Benedict XVI. Second, and 
seemingly related, the ideal family is biologically related. An assumption of continuity 
among genetic, gestational, and social parenthood is consistent throughout and assure 
biological kinship a primary place. In contrast, considerations of adoption are rare and, 
while adoption is usually presented positively, it is most often offered as an alternative to 
abortion or as an option for infertile spouses in preference to artificial reproductive 
technologies. Adoption gives rise to praise as a testament to the true nature of 
parenthood, though, as presented above, this is set within a context largely focused on 
biological procreation. 
Finally, this ideal family is nuclear and autonomous, though each of these admits 
to greater exceptions than the previous two. Repeated affirmations that marriage founds 
the family, coupled with emphases on procreation, clearly support the nuclear norm, as 
do assertions of male and female roles in parenting. Yet, John Paul II taught that 
grandparents and the elderly, particularly in light of their vulnerability, have a claim to a 
place within the family. Autonomy is supported through affirmations of the authority of 
spouses in matters concerning their household and family. The extended family, 
associations, and society at large serve as useful, but non-essential supports. Yet, these 
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arguments are largely framed by concerns of state infringement on familial rights while 
the family is encouraged to open itself outward in service to the Church and community. 
Until the mid-twentieth century, the ideal family structure also explicitly included 
a hierarchical ordering centered on male headship.302 The relatively quick transition away 
from an overtly hierarchical model is significant, particularly as is was held to be an 
unchangeable aspect of divine law. Since Vatican II, the magisterium has, at times, 
suggested aspects of the earlier hierarchical ideal but has largely stood behind the 
equality model. 
The importance of outlining the operative ideal of the family lies in marriage’s 
unique position as both a natural institution and a Catholic sacrament. Conceptually, 
sacramental marriage is natural marriage brought to its fullness. As such, natural law 
plays a significant role in the sacramentology of marriage such that articulating 
marriage’s “authentic natural requirements” is essential for understanding its sacramental 
nature. 303 As such, family structure often takes a prominent place in magisterial teaching. 
In light of this, a parallel might be drawn between John Paul II’s approach to sexual 
ethics and the family. In both instances, while the spiritual significance of actions is 
important, the physical embodiment that makes those actions possible is fundamental for 
moral reflection. In John Paul II’s thought, the nuclear family plays an analogous role in 
the family’s vocation as the gendered human body plays in authentic sexual expression. 
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Hence it is no surprise that John Paul II’s teaching on the family is largely repetitious of 
his teaching on meaning of marriage and the dual roles of husband and wife.304 
In terms of the concerns at hand, it must be asked to what extent “natural” aspects 
of marriage should determine Catholic reflection on the sacrament. While it might be 
argued that the natural and sacramental aspects of marriage need not conflict, the 
evidence from modern magisterial teaching appears to suggest that emphasis on one 
aspect often comes at the expense of the other. Though there is not space to provide a 
thorough reflection here, the rather convoluted history of Christian perspectives on 
marriage also bears on this consideration. Aside from Biblical resources and the 
pronouncements of past councils and popes, Augustine and Aquinas provide the most 
frequent historical resources within modern magisterial teaching on marriage. Yet even 
within this relatively limited historical-theological engagement variations emerge. 
Documents that rely more upon Augustine are different in significant ways from those 
that utilize Aquinas. Indeed, the differences in conceptions is an underlying factor in the 
‘ends or marriage’ debate that has characterized post-Vatican II theology of marriage. 
Even admitting a complex theological history, it must be acknowledged that 
Catholic sacramentology of marriage is based upon a theory of natural marriage which 
resonates with certain rather undisputable human experiences. Fuller discussion will be 
reserved for later chapters but this is nonetheless a significant point. Heterosexual sexual 
relationships, biological procreation, and the need for stable social structures to support 
the rearing of offspring are basic experiences of humanity which rightfully have import 
within natural law moral systems. The central moral question, however, is to what extent 
                                                 
304 Curran, 196. 
79 
 
the natural order of marriage intelligible and to what extent this should inform a 
sacrament that is defined by its reflection of super-natural realities. Magisterial reactions 
to families formed through adoption and families headed by same-sex partners help 
clarify how this question is presently answered. 
 
Contemporary Catholic teaching views same-sex unions as a direct threat to 
healthy families as they constitute a social recognition of something as, or similar to 
marriage, which cannot “even in an analogous or remote sense” fulfill the meaning of 
marriage.305 Furthermore, same-sex parenting is said to be harmful to children.306 These 
strong condemnations are based on two premises; same-sex couples are naturally 
incapable of procreation, which is essential to marriage, and same-sex couples lack 
sexual complementarity, which is the foundation of marital love and ultimately the 
family.307 The first of these concerns is elsewhere is relativized, such as in marriages of 
the elderly or the knowingly infertile, making the second essentially decisive. Thus, the 
rejection of same-sex parenthood comes down to one decisive factor; sexual 
complementarity. This line of argument ultimately asserts that no true family can result 
without the foundational relationship between a man and woman; no other human 
relationship can found a family.308 Yet a significant challenge in relating this argument 
convincingly to a changing culture is the apparent lack of reference to actual parental 
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capacity in the condemnation. It rests not only a sexual ethical judgment, but also on a 
supposition that fatherhood and motherhood are essentially distinct functions. Neither can 
replace nor even suitably replicate the other; they are dual incarnations of parenthood.309 
 
Because the decision to have children is an act of love and generosity, married 
couples who cannot conceive, yet desire children, may still enact these virtues through 
other means, including adoption.310 Adoption and foster care are considered acts of love 
and generosity that reflect an understanding of the meaning of true parenthood as 
transcending biological kinship.311 And they enact a virtuous commitment to society to 
which genetically related families should aspire.312 While the magisterium is generally 
positive towards adoption, it is critical of certain adoption practices. International 
adoption is presented as seemingly fraught with difficultly as the practice is considered 
fueled by anti-life mentalities in wealthy nations and social inequalities in poor 
nations.313 Private adoptions are also problematic, largely because oversight of adoption 
is considered a proper duty of the state, such that these might circumvent proper 
authority.314 Finally, John Paul II’s praises “adoption at a distance,” where wealthier 
families commit to financially supporting families in need. Yet, John Paul II’s framework 
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seems largely international. From the national perspective of the US, we might ask if a 
teenage mother could morally chose to place her child for adoption if her decision is 
based more upon her personal and professional aspirations than absolute necessity. It is 
unclear if John Paul II could support such a decision, due to his relatively limited 
attention to adoption, his stress on the responsibilities of parents, and his strong 
association of women with motherhood. 
Further, although magisterial teaching takes pains to assert that infertile couples 
are nonetheless truly married, it is less clear if true families can be formed through 
adoption.315 This is because it is unclear whether infertile couples who adopt children 
simply realize the procreative end in a non-biological way or if adoption is a somewhat 
lesser form of the procreative end. On the one hand, the praise offered for adoption and 
concepts of spiritual parenthood suggest adoption as an authentic basis for the family. On 
the other, the fact that adoption is primarily presented as an alternative to artificial 
reproductive technologies and occurs among lists of other expressions of generosity 
implies that it may not be a true alternative to procreation’s primary meaning. If adoption 
is an authentic method of family formation, its presentation within magisterial writing 
would suggest that fertile couples may fulfill the procreative end of marriage by means 
other than biological procreation as well. 
 
                                                 
315 Despite other means of family formation that are not based upon monogamous heterosexual 
marriage being rejected as false and harmful distortions of the family, within institutional foster care a 
family-like setting is encouraged. See, International Symposium on Adoption, “The Rights of Children,” in 
Enchiridion on the Family, 933. 
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Modern magisterial teaching is strongly influenced by an essentialist theory of 
gender and its attendant assumptions about the roles of women and men in the family and 
in society. This further implicates considerations of sex, marriage, and the family. In 
particular, these underlying commitments promote bias favoring biological kinship and 
tend to produce a constricted theology of parenthood which may be insufficient to ground 
responses to contemporary challenges. The primacy of gender complementarity and 
sexual ethical norms in magisterial teaching appear to not only reject family formation by 
same-sex partners, but so privileges the biological family that it distracts from adequate 
theological attention to adoption. Moreover, the centrality of gender essentialism informs 
a theory of parenthood in which capacities for childrearing are largely dictated by sexual 
difference. These distinct and complementary visions of motherhood and fatherhood pay 
little attention to human adaptability, diversity, and the lived experiences of many parents 
who have assumed nontraditional gender roles. Most significantly, the recent focus on 
sexual complementarity, biological procreation, and gendered parental roles, has created 
an account of marriage and the family that emphasizes natural foundations at the expense 
of supernatural convictions. For example, even as John Paul II affirms that through 
teaching the gospel, spouses become ‘fully parents’, the same document repeatedly 
associates ‘responsible parenthood’ with rejection of artificial contraception.316 
 
Family Function 
Magisterial writings frequently discuss how the family functions, especially the 
family’s benefits to its members, society, and the Church. Contemporary magisterial 
                                                 
316 Familiaris consortio, #39., Cf. #21, 32 – 35, 37, 66, 72, 74, and 77. 
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teaching has reclaimed the idea of the family as the “domestic church” and asserts that 
daily life in the family is a true expression of Church.317 Just as the wellbeing of society 
rests in the family, so too does the wellbeing of the Church.318 Within the family, all 
members exercise their baptismal priesthood in a special way.319 Parents are the first to 
evangelize their children and lead their children to maturity, salvation, and holiness.320 
Further, the family is described as a learning and evangelizing community, a “domestic 
church”, a “school of virtue”, and a “school of deeper humanity.”321  
These functional descriptions suggest broad possibilities for conceptualizing the 
family that go well beyond narrow emphases on gender, complementarity, and sexual 
ethics. These affirmations have been obscured by methodological commitments that 
privilege family structure over family function. As suggested above, this ordering has 
much to do with a theory of gender and human sexuality and is amply indebted to John 
Paul II’s particular form of personalism. That is, in John Paul II’s linkage of the physical 
and meta-physical, spiritual realities tend to be routed through the natural order. For 
example, the body serves as a conduit for divine love. To borrow a concept from 
Christology, this amounts to doing theology of the family ‘from below’ such that the 
natural and structural elements of the family precede considerations of supernatural and 
elements. But the necessity of prioritizing the natural order can be questioned. That is, if 
                                                 
317 USCCB, “Follow the Way of Life” 
318 Vatican II, Gaudium et spes 
319 Catechism of the Catholic Church 
320 Vatican II, Gaudium et spes 
321 John Paul II, Familiaris consortio, Cf. “Letter to Families” 
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a group functions like a family and appears to enjoy the spiritual benefits of a family, do 
Catholic resources exist for claiming it as a family? A fuller consideration of this 
question will be reserved for later chapters; however, an initial response is that such 
resources do appear to exist within modern magisterial teaching. Moreover, these appear 
to operate quite freely from the gendered and sexual preoccupations discussed above. For 
example, despite the primary roles biological reproduction and kinship play, popes have 
repeatedly suggested that the true meaning of parenthood goes beyond biological 
relatedness. Most often this is located in spiritual education and service to the common 
good. Additionally, conceptions of the family as a learning and evangelizing community 
suggest that moral evaluations of the family must consider function over time. In other 
words, structural assessments alone appear inadequate means of evaluating any particular 
family’s ability to learn and evangelize.  
Beyond the possibilities of reassessment offered by viewing magisterial teaching 
through a functional lens, numerous biblical and traditional assertions endure in 
magisterial teaching which may be beneficial to reconsiderations of Christian parenthood. 
For example, long-held assertions concerning the primacy of discipleship in Christian 
life, the primacy of spiritual identity over biological kinship, the identity of all baptized 
believers as ‘adopted’ children of God, and the conviction that the Great Commission322 
supersedes the command to “be fruitful and multiply”,323 all suggest significant potential 
in this regard. As such, the concerns expressed above relate much more significantly to 
                                                 
322 Matthew 28: 16 – 20. 
323 Genesis 1:28. 
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how present Catholic magisterial teaching tends to present the wealth of the Church’s 
theological heritage than to interminable limitations. 
Beyond the positive potential of these functional and conceptual resources, a 
number of specific developments within magisterial teaching also deserve attention. The 
shift away from hierarchical language to describe the family, coupled with acceptance of 
women’s place in public life (conditioned as it is), has placed the modern family in a new 
and historically unique context.  Additionally, modern magisterial tradition holds 
significant resources for conceptions of children. Respect for the child as deserving of 
unique rights and a place of participation within the family is an aspect of this recent 
thought that is well worth attention. 
 
Conclusion 
To briefly review, significant challenges in the relatively recent history of 
magisterial thought relate to how the goods of procreation and education are balanced: 
namely, the effect of Humanae vitae in forefronting sexual ethics and magisterial 
authority in subsequent reflections on marriage and family, the effect of persistent 
preferences for large families and celibacy, the changing status of women as conditioned 
by gender essentialism, and recent inattention to both adoption and notions of spiritual 
kinship. More generally, this chapter raised concern for how present magisterial accounts 
of parenthood appear to be significantly shaped by sexual ethical norms and gender 
essentialism and consequently struggle to speak to significant aspects of contemporary 
parenthood. The following chapter will consider how revisionist Catholic moral theology 
has utilized a greater variety of resources which have led to important responses to 
86 
 
certain limitations in magisterial thought, even while remaining vexed by a similar set of 
challenges. 
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Introduction 
In recent history, Catholic theologians have generally followed methodologies 
marked by the personalist turn, informed by historical-consciousness and congenial to 
experience as a source of moral knowledge.1 These trends have produced several 
revisionist proposals for Catholic sexual ethics (including ethics of same-sex 
partnerships) and theology of marriage and family. This chapter begins by introducing 
general tendencies that characterize ‘revisionist’ Catholic theological methods. It then 
considers three contemporary revisionist theological approaches to sexual morality; with 
particular attention to depictions of parenthood in each. After this, it turns attention to 
contemporary theological perspectives on marriage and family with similar concerns. 
Having considered these resources, this chapter argues that revisionist moral 
theology offers a more developed and sustained commitment to historical consciousness 
than may be found in magisterial documents. Additionally, revisionists tend to challenge 
gender essentialism and offer a more nuanced approach to sexual anthropology that is 
shaped by a sustained engagement with contemporary experience as source of moral 
knowledge. However, these writings are also insufficient to found a robust theological 
account of parenthood because they tend to replicate the biological bias found in 
magisterial moral teaching. This is largely due to a tendency to follow a similar method 
of extracting principles of parenthood from sexual ethics. That is, despite significant 
                                                 
1 Many contemporary theologians have explained the divide that exists between the majority of 
academic theologians and the views of the magisterium. Among others see James Keenan, A History of 
Catholic Moral Theology in the Twentieth Century: From Confessing Sins to Liberating Consciences 
(London: Continuum, 2010)., David F. Kelly, Contemporary Catholic Health Care Ethics (Washington 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004), Chapter 10, Todd A. Salzmann and Michael G. Lawler, The 
Sexual Person: Towards a Renewed Catholic Anthropology (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press, 2008), Chapters 2 and 3, and Charles Curran, The Development of Moral Theology: Five Strands 
(Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2013), Chapter 3. 
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disagreement between revisionist and magisterial perspectives on the subject of sexual 
ethics, the presumed nature of the relationship between sexual ethics and conceptions of 
parenthood remains remarkably similar. This chapter also reviews accounts of the family 
that appear particularly helpful in moving beyond such limitations and concludes by 
appraising the conceptual similarities and differences among revisionist and magisterial 
perspectives. It calls attention directly to features of revisionist thought that provide 
positive resources for a more comprehensive theological account of parenthood. 
 
Part I: Revisionists Moral Theology 
Defining “Revisionist” 
A number of mid-twentieth century theologians (Louis Janssens, Joseph Fuchs, 
Bernard Häring, Bernard Lonergan, et al.) gave shape to contemporary revisionist moral 
theology. Each believed that the twentieth-century called for a renewal of Catholic moral 
theology that would include greater attention to historical development and subjective 
aspects of the Christian moral life.2 Although revisionism has been explained in several 
ways, the features most pertinent to this project include the following: 
 Consensus that sexual ethics have been historically overemphasized in moral 
reflection 
 Commitment to historicism and the possibilities for change in magisterial 
teaching 
 Criticism of present magisterial sexual ethics as overly idealized, physicalist, 
and procreationist 
 Commitment to experience as a source of moral knowledge 
 Rejection of strong gender essentialism 
 
                                                 
2 See. James F Keenan, A History of Catholic Moral Theology in the Twentieth Century (London: 
Continuum, 2010). 
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Historical Emphasis on Sexual Ethics 
A long legacy of Christian fixation with the norms of sexual behavior appears to 
remain influential in the content of Catholic moral theology in both magisterial and 
revisionist thought.3 The persistence of this historic emphasis, in which the minutia of 
sexual anxieties were treated with utmost seriousness,4 is exacerbated by magisterial 
claims that sexual norms are unalterable due their intimate relation to theological 
anthropology and/or divine law.5 At the same time, and for similar reasons, all sexual 
norms are categorically claimed to be grave moral matter.6 Such assertions entangle 
contested points in sexual ethics with contested issues of ecclesial authority to further 
compound existing disagreements over moral methodology.  
Numerous revisionists have expressed concern over this persistent emphasis on 
sexual sin.7 Farley suggests that this legacy results from the “inexhaustible power” sex 
appears have in cultures where sexual drives are repressed and sexuality is not well 
understood.8 Lisa Sowle Cahill argues that the imbalance directs “disproportionate 
                                                 
3 See Peter Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women and Sexual Renunciation in Early 
Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). The book does a commendable job of parsing 
the doctrinal implications associated with developing understandings of human sexuality. 
4 See James Keenan, A History of Catholic Moral Theology in the Twentieth Century, Chapter 2. 
5 See Humanae vitae, #4, Persona humana, #3, and Veritatis splendor, #47 – 54. 
6 Catechism of the Catholic Church, #2331 – 2400. This assertion has been challenged and 
reaffirmed repeatedly in recent history. For example, see Persona humana #9 and Charles Curran, 
“Masturbation and Objectively Grave Matter: An Exploratory Discussion,” Catholic Theological Society of 
America Proceedings 21 (1966): 95-109. 
7 Todd Salzman and Michael Lawler, Sexual Ethics: A Theological Introduction (Washington 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 50. 
8 Margaret A. Farley. Just Love: A Framework for Christian Sexual Ethics (New York: 
Continuum, 2010), 223. 
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energy” to sexual moral issues while ignoring more pervasive sins, “which lurk closer to 
the tradition’s heterosexual, marital, and procreative heart.”9 She mentions domestic 
violence, abuse, and various forms of manipulation within the family. Cahill is further 
concerned that preoccupation with these subjects in the form of a “regulatory mentality, 
infected by fear and ignorance of the sexual lives of its audience” threatens the reception 
of Vatican II’s vision of the family as the domestic church.10 But Cahill is also concerned 
that the concept of the ‘domestic church’ itself not be used to sanctify families at the 
expense of Christianity’ eschatological vision, which critiques all social structures.11 
 
Idealism, Physicalism, and Procreationism 
The idyllic nature of magisterial sexual norms is another frequent point of 
concern. Many teachings appear to leave only a very narrow conceptual distance to 
separate a moral ideal from its practical implementations. This is related to a classicist 
conception of moral teaching which insists upon both objectivity and clarity in the moral 
law. John Paul II, for example, accepted the legitimacy of gradual growth in moral life, 
but rejected the “gradualness of the law” itself.12 Yet, the insistence that each and every 
act must be evaluated by very high standards of morality has raised concern. Cahill 
                                                 
9 Lisa Sowle Cahill, Sex, Gender & Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 160. 
10 Ibid., 210. 
11 Lisa Sowle Cahill, Family: A Christian Social Perspective (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000), 
4. 
12 John Paul II, Familiaris consortio, Vatican, (November 22, 1981) 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/ john_paul_ii/apost_exhortations/ documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_19811122_ 
familiaris-consortio_en.html, #34. 
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argues, for example, that John Paul II’s understanding of sex as a ‘total self-gift’ 
“depends upon a very romanticized depiction of sex.”13 Todd Salzman and Michael 
Lawler state more bluntly, “the requirement of ‘total personal self-giving’ in each and 
every sexual act… is nothing but ideology posing as reality.”14 Such idealism not only 
leaves little room for the ambiguities of lived human experience but also tends towards 
dualistic ethical discourse. For example, Cahill observes that in John Paul II’s thought, all 
sexual acts that fall short of the moral ideal are themselves insidious. Such reasoning, she 
surmises, results from misunderstanding the eschatological dimension of the spousal 
relationship.15 
The charge that magisterial teaching suffers from an implicit physicalist bias, 
even as it has explicitly articulated moral norms from a personalist perspective since 
Vatican II, is common within revisionist critiques.16 Specifically, the magisterial 
determination that certain acts are always and everywhere illicit by the nature of their 
object (a determination made apart from, or at least prior to, explicit attention to the 
                                                 
13 Cahill, Sex, Gender & Christian Ethics, 203. 
14 Todd A. Salzman and Michael Lawler, Sexual Ethics: A Theological Introduction (Washington 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 79. 
15 Cahill, Sex, Gender & Christian Ethics, 203. 
16 Salzman and Lawler, Sexual Ethics, 52. By contrast, William E May has been a strong supporter 
of the “personalism” of recent popes. The disagreement centers largely on how narrowly the “object” of 
and act is rightfully conceived. May charges that revisionists (particularly McCormick, “proportionalists”, 
and the drafters of the Papal Birth Control Commission’s Majority Report) have reconceived the object of 
the act too broadly; such that their arguments are distortions of the Catholic moral tradition. In contrast, 
revisionists claim that in Humanae vitae and the writings of John Paul II the object of the act, while paying 
lip-service to personalism, remains narrowly bound to physical acts. See William E. May, “Moral 
Theologians and ‘Veritatis Splendor,’” The Homiletic and Pastoral Review December 1994. Reprinted 
online by EWTN, https://www.ewtn.com/library/THEOLOGY/MORALVS.HTM. 
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context or subjective intentions of the moral agent) has prompted revisionist criticisms of 
this form of personalist reasoning.17 
A comparable line of concern is voiced by revisionists who detect a procreationist 
bias within magisterial thought. From this perspective, biological procreation is assumed 
to be the natural orientation of the sexual act.18 Christine Gudorf argues that this 
assumption produces the beliefs that coitus is the only ‘real’ form of fulfilling sexual 
expression, that sexual relationships without coitus are inferior or inherently nonsexual, 
and that children are the ‘cost’ of sexual relationships among the unwed. In her 
perspective, procreationism too often comes at the cost of pleasurable and emotionally 
gratifying sexual relationships.19 
 
Historicism and Potential for Adaptation 
 Revisionism presumes that moral theology is subject to continual adaptation in 
response to changing contexts and growing human experience.20 One enduring revisionist 
criticism of the former manualist tradition, which remains influential in foundations of 
present magisterial teaching, is its reliance upon a ‘classicist’ worldview in which 
                                                 
17 John Paul II, Veritatis splendor, Vatican, (August 6, 1993) http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/ 
john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_06081993_veritatis-splendor_en.html, #80. 
18 Salzman and Lawler, Sexual Ethics, 52. Cf. Christine Gudorf, Body, Sex and Pleasure, 29 – 50. 
19 Gudorf, Bodies, Sex and Pleasure, 30. In the context of this chapter it may be notable to 
acknowledge that Gudorf is both a biological and adoptive mother. 
20 “Revisionism has made historical consciousness a foundational point of its ethical theory. It is, 
in a sense, the sine qua non of revisionism… As an ethical theory grounded in historical consciousness, 
revisionism, by definition, is somewhat contingent.” Todd A. Salzmann, What Are They Saying About 
Catholic Ethical Method? (New York: Paulist Press, 2003), 58 – 59. 
102 
 
“natural law is static, necessary, fixed and universal.”21 Consequently, moral judgments 
based in natural law are considered definitive and immutable. In contrast, ‘historical 
consciousness,’ regards reality as “dynamic, evolving, changing, and particular.”22 This 
more recently developed worldview reconceives natural law and looks with suspicion on 
absolute moral prohibitions; especially when posited in terms of discrete physical acts.23 
The implications for authoritative moral teaching are clear. In Margaret Farley’s words, 
“if the rationales behind longstanding beliefs and practices are no longer persuasive in 
the context of the tradition as a whole, then the practices and beliefs will be challenged, 
and they may need to change.”24 Revisionists have indeed argued for change on number 
of moral teachings related to human sexuality, while the magisterium has remained wary 
of admitting the need for, or even the possibility of, those very changes.25 
 
Experience as a Source of Ethics 
The methodological orientation of revisionist moral theology establishes a 
commitment to an explicit and sustained use of ‘experience’ as a source of Christian 
ethics.26 Revisionism is sensitive to the interpreted nature of all human experience, yet 
                                                 
21 Cahill, Sex, Gender & Christian Ethics, 54. 
22 Todd A. Salzman, ed. Method and Catholic Moral Theology: The Ongoing Reconstruction. 
(Omaha, NE: Creighton University Press, 1999), xii. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Farley, Just Love, 187. 
25 Lisa Sowle Cahill, “Same-Sex Marriage and Catholicism,” in Inquiry, Thought, and Expression, 
vol. 2 of More than a Monologue: Sexual Diversity in the Roman Catholic Church, eds. J. Patrick 
Hornbeck II and Michael Norko (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014) 148. 
26 Ibid., 144. 
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values it as a source that keeps morality connected to lived realities and provides grounds 
for reasonable dialogue across religious divides.27 While the magisterium tends to 
recognize some role for experience, it has criticized its role in revisionist methodology. 
The USCCB’s Committee on Doctrine’s response to The Sexual Person, for example, 
criticized the authors for making experience the “primary source” of moral theology.28 At 
the same time, the committee rejects experience as a legitimate resource for positing 
moral norms that would challenge magisterial teaching.29 Likewise, the CDF criticized 
Farley’s ambiguous use of magisterial teaching as an authentic guide for interpreting 
scripture and tradition in her book Just Love, but offered no other potential moral guides. 
Both responses give the impression that magisterial teaching stands alone as the resource 
and hermeneutical norm for Catholic moral theology. Such posturing, without 
explanations of experience’s proper role as a resource for moral reflection, fuels 
revisionist criticisms of deficiencies in magisterial self-understanding and moral 
method.30 
                                                 
27 Cahill, Sex, Gender & Christian Ethics, 69. 
28 Committee on Doctrine, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, “Inadequacies in the 
Theological Methodology and Conclusions of The Sexual Person: Toward a Renewed Catholic 
Anthropology by Todd A. Salzman and Michael G. Lawler,” USCCB, (September 15, 2010) 
www.usccb.org/doctrine/ Sexual_Person_2010-09-15.pdf. Cf. James Alison’s argument that religious 
explanations often function as excuses for not engaging with advancing knowledge. James Alison, On 
Being Liked. (New York: Crossroad Publishing Co., 2004) Chapter 4. 
29 Cahill, “Same-Sex Marriage and Catholicism,” 148. 
30 Similar lines of criticism have been advanced by numerous scholars. For example, Ann Patrick 
Ware has proposed that the methodology at work in some magisterial teachings suffers from modern day 
Docetism, characterized by a presentation of “the Church” “as a disembodied concept, speaking an eternal 
truth arrived at in some mysterious and infallible way.” David Kelly identified a similar pattern which he 
termed “ecclesiastical positivism.” Cf. Ann Patrick Ware. “The Vatican Letter: Presuppositions and 
Objections,” in The Vatican and Homosexuality: Reactions to the ‘Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic 
Church on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons,’ eds. Jeannine Gramick and Pat Fury (New York, 
NY: Crossroad Publishing Co., 1988), 28. And Kelly, Contemporary Catholic Health Care Ethics, 97. 
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Gender 
Despite previous attempts to justify women’s subordination to men as a matter of 
divine law, such as found in Arcanum31 and Casti connubii,32 Catholic teaching regarding 
gendered familial and social roles has developed in recent decades. While strong 
affirmations of traditional gender roles have waned in some aspects of magisterial 
thought, they remain influential in others. Revisionist theologians disavow gender 
essentialism more thoroughly by presuming a greater role for social construction in 
gender identities. Their critique of gender essentialism is also related to their embrace of 
historical consciousness, their use of experience as a source of moral knowledge, and the 
influence of feminist insights.  
Theologically, gender essentialism tends to produce theories of complementarity, 
which may be conceived ontologically, as well as prescriptively for gender roles. Yet, 
complementarity remains historically linked with hierarchical assumptions and 
patriarchal applications.33 Whether gender complementarity can serve as a viable 
theological ideal despite this heritage remains a point of dispute. John Paul II’s ‘Theology 
of the Body’ and ‘New Feminism’ rest on the conviction that truly equitable 
complementarity is possible. Farley, however, surveys prominent advocates of 
                                                 
31 Leo XIII. Arcanum divinae sapientiae. Vatican, (February 10, 1880) 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_lxiii_enc_10021880_arcanum_en.ht
ml, #11 – 15. 
32 Pius XI, Casti connubii, Vatican, (December 31, 1930) 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/ encyclicals/ documents/hf_p-xi_enc_31121930_casti-
connubii_en.html, #23 and 26. 
33 Salzman and Lawler, Sexual Ethics, 63. 
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complementarian thinking (including Barth, von Balthasar, and John Paul II), and 
concludes that the concept is irretrievably patriarchal. She argues that complementarian 
characterizations serve as “social and cultural stereotypes that promote hierarchical 
relations.” These do not ultimately “succeed in making us complements across a gender 
divide.”34 Salzman and Lawler, respond to similar concerns by offering a revised notion 
of ‘human complementarity’ that is not reliant upon gender.35  
Further disparity exists between magisterial and revisionist perspectives on the 
value of distinguishing ‘sex’ (the biological fact of sexual differentiation) from ‘gender’ 
(a collective interpretation of that fact).36 This approach gained wide acceptance in 
academic circles for a time and remains influential, though it has more recently been 
criticized as overly simplistic. Magisterial documents show little appreciation for the 
value of such a conceptual differentiation and, at times, question its validity.37 
Differentiating sex from gender helps to illumine the role of cultural construction in 
                                                 
34 Farley, Just Love, 1. Christine Gudorf argues that John Paul II largely avoided social stereotypes 
which would have proved unconvincing in light of social experience. She considers why such an empty 
category would be retained and offers her suspicion that “together with the principle that every sexual act 
must be open to procreation, it constitutes the moral bulwark against homosexuality.” Christine Gudorf, “A 
New Moral Discourse on Sexuality,” in Human Sexuality in the Catholic Tradition (New York: Rowman 
and Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 54. 
35 Salzman and Lawler, Sexual Ethics, 63. 
36 Susan Frank Parsons traces the concept of ‘gender’ in modern academic parlance from its 
origins in the emerging field of biology in the nineteenth-century. Biology offered to explain the 
fundamentals of life, thus grounding gender “in the realities of the physical world.” This perspective 
appears to still resonant in magisterial thought. Yet, Parsons adds, gender became a “self-critical category” 
which offered challenges to the ‘natural’ foundations being uncovered. Susan Frank Parsons, The Ethics of 
Gender (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 19. 
37 USCCB, Human Sexuality: A Catholic Perspective for Education and Lifelong Learning 
(Washington D.C.: USCCB, 1991), 9. Cf. Pontifical Council for the Family, “Family, Marriage and ‘De 
Facto’ Unions,” Vatican, (November 9, 2000) 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/family/documents/rc_pc_family 
_doc_20001109_de-facto-unions_en.html, #8. And Presidents of the Episcopal Commissions for the 
Family, “The Family: Gift and Commitment, Hope for Humanity,” in Enchiridion on the Family, 1028.  
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conceptions and interpretations of sexual difference. This works against a magisterial 
approach that, focusing on natural law, tends to suggest that authentic interpretations of 
sexual difference can be drawn directly from the order of creation properly considered. 
Throughout the last century, gender has also been associated with understanding one’s 
own human dignity.38 Revisionists, however, tend to find the differentiation useful, 
particularly as it gives greater attention to diversities in gendered experience.39  
 
Part II: Sexual Ethics 
Introduction 
 This section considers the work of revisionist Catholic moral theologians within 
the field of sexual ethics by considering the thought of Lisa Sowell Cahill, Margaret 
Farley, and Todd Salzman and Michael Lawler. Cahill’s Sex, Gender & Christian Ethics 
is a formative attempt to bring the insights of feminism to bear on traditional Catholic 
moral theology. It takes a comparatively broad perspective on moral theology in its 
attempt to unite concern for justice with a restrained moral objectivism and includes 
direct considerations of family and parenthood. Farley’s Just Love applies norms for 
justice to interpersonal relationships and explores the ethical implications. Her work 
parallels a methodology characteristic of Catholic Social Teaching in applying ethical 
                                                 
38 “The late twentieth-century popes, at least Pius XII through John Paul II, have strongly argued 
that one’s maleness or femaleness is an essential part of who one is. The characteristic form of expressing 
this belief has been instructions to women that they are essentially different from men, and they must take 
care not to become like men, which would be a betrayal of their creator and his plan of creation. This is a 
relatively new teaching that develops in the 19th and 20th centuries within modernism. There’s a certain 
irony here, that the same church that condemn modernism changed its own teaching, which had long 
followed Augustine’s (and Jerome’s and others’) dictate that sexuality do not touch the core of the person.” 
Gudorf, “A New Moral Discourse on Sexuality,” 54. 
39 Cahill, Sex, Gender & Christian Ethics, 84. 
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principles to suggest grounds for appropriate moral deliberation while allowing ample 
room for contemporary experience as a source of moral knowledge.40 Salzman and 
Lawler’s The Sexual Person and its simplified revision, Sexual Ethics, are based most 
clearly within the traditional frameworks of Catholic sexual ethics but utilize a revisionist 
natural law methodology to reconstruct significant anthropological foundations. Both Just 
Love and The Sexual Person received criticism from the magisterium; primarily 
regarding deviations from official Catholic teaching.41 Salzman and Lawler, for example, 
contend that contemporary Catholic sexual ethics ought to be acknowledged as in a state 
of uncertainty.42 Their ecclesiastical critics affirm the clarity and conclusiveness of 
official Catholic teachings. Cahill’s centrist approach largely avoids such direct 
confrontation while enabling her to make critical observations of both Catholic teaching 
and prevalent liberal ideals. 
 
Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics 
   
Sex Ethics and Marriage 
Cahill offers relatively brief reflections on sexual ethics and marriage specifically. 
She is chiefly concerned with gender and human sexuality. For example, she offers the 
opinions of numerous authors but does not commit to a normative interpretation of sexual 
orientation.43 Instead, she identifies fundamental questions raised by these opinions; such 
                                                 
40 Farley, Just Love, 15 – 16. 
41 Committee on Doctrine, USCCB. “Inadequacies in the Theological Methodology and 
Conclusions of The Sexual Person.” 
42 Salzman and Lawler, Sexual Ethics, xviii. 
43 Cahill, Sex, Gender & Christian Ethics, 75. 
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as what moral implications the human potential to distinguish between the desire for 
sexual intimacy and the possibility of procreation. Likewise, she considers potential 
malleability in human sexuality and suggests that if “sexual orientation is in fact pliable, 
then the question returns of the moral warrants which would make sexual object choice 
commendable, condemnable, tolerable, or neutral.” She adds that both gender 
complementarity and reproductive potential in partnerships still invariably arise as 
challenging questions.44 
Cahill’s moderation opens her to criticism from both sides. In staking this ground, 
she neither explicitly supports magisterial teaching on specific sexual acts, nor advocates 
strongly for the specific implications of the experience she proffers in revising Catholic 
teaching. For example, while magisterial teaching proceeds from a heteronormative 
conception of the nature of human sexuality, Cahill presents potentially conflictual 
evidence. Yet, she refrains from advocating for specific revisions to Catholic teaching in 
light of the implications of this evidence. 
 Cahill is less reserved in her considerations of marriage and points to clear 
tensions in the 1983 Code of Cannon Law. She argues that these result from its attempt to 
set conclusions “derived from the notion of marriage as a contract” beside Vatican II’s 
“covenant and partnership language.”45 Cahill further asserts that present ambiguities are 
symptomatic “of the lasting influence of the perspective on sexual danger that has given 
form to most of the tradition.”46 In contrast, she presents marriage as a Christian vocation 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 101. 
45 Ibid., 196. 
46 Ibid., 199. 
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while contending that “from primitive Christian times, marriage was respected as a realm 
in which a disciple could give practical expression to faith, and whose internal order 
could even be transformed by agape.”47 
 
Family, Children, and Parenthood 
 Cahill’s primary concern in her consideration of the family involves the “relative 
importance and possible interdependence of intentional commitment and biological 
kinship in forming families.”48 She notes that the majority of authors “see culture and 
choice as taking precedence over ‘merely’ biological relations.” Still, her sources differ 
on how biological relations should remain significant in “defining the family and its 
moral relationships.”49 Cahill rejects the argument that ‘kinship’ itself is a western 
anthropological construction that cannot be applied across cultures.50 Yet, she argues that 
feminists are also right in resisting idealizations of the private-nuclear family. These 
perpetuate “the post-industrial, capitalist public-private split, and the confinement of 
women in the domestic sphere.”51 What Western society lacks, Cahill contends, is 
significant attention to the family’s social goals. It is not biological kinship itself that 
raises concern, but rather the consistent institutionalization of biological kinship in terms 
of “the organization of labor, exchange of goods, and inheritance of property.” In this 
                                                 
47 Ibid., 184. 
48 Ibid., 81. 
49 Ibid., 82. 
50 Ibid., 103. 
51 Ibid., 105. 
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framework, childrearing is generally “subsidiary to these purposes, rather than an end in 
itself.”52 Such a perspective stands in tension to aspects of the tradition that have 
emphasized the goodness of parenthood itself and the social goals of the family. 
In Cahill’s perspective, “the family is a set of alliances which is in its genesis 
dependent at least as much on biological linkage as on self-commitment and contract.” 
She explains further that kinship ties can be conceived more or less extensively, may 
have uncertain boundaries, or may be fictive.53 “But” she writes “‘family’ has a basic and 
constitutive relation to biological relationship… for which other relations, however valid, 
are analogues, not replacements.”54 She continues, 
“The ideal family is not necessarily the nuclear family. But it is in the family that both biological 
parents nurture children physically and emotionally, and educate them by example for larger social 
roles… In the Christian perspective in particular, the ‘successful’ family does not ensure only its 
own welfare… but is able to extend altruistic identification with, and sacrifice for, kin to include 
neighbors, more distant community members, and even strangers… The New Testament 
household churches and the metaphor of the family as the ‘domestic church’ in patristic writings 
and in Roman Catholic teaching, are examples of the power of Christian commitment to transform 
body-based family sympathies without eradicating them.”55 
 
The tension Cahill posits between the importance of biological kinship and that of 
individual choice and desire becomes more pronounced in her considerations of assisted 
reproductive technologies (ARTs). Cahill acknowledges the goodness of desiring to share 
genetic parenthood with one’s spouse and, for women, gestational motherhood with one’s 
child.56 She is concerned with the present ability to disassociate genetic, gestational, and 
                                                 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid., 106. It is notable that Cahill herself is both a biological and adoptive mother. 
55 Ibid., 107. 
56 Ibid., 219. 
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social parenthood.57 And she criticizes public discourse on ARTs for subjecting “the 
embodied relationality of sex and parenthood… almost entirely… to the primacy of 
choice.”58 But Cahill also identifies a contrary and problematic reductionism in 
magisterial teaching on this matter. This tends toward equating parenthood with 
procreation; especially when procreation is conceived narrowly as a condition of 
openness within individual sexual acts.59 In response, Cahill asserts that the “meaning of 
parenthood, cross-culturally, historically, and experientially, is more social than either 
alternative.” Procreation needs to be reinterpreted as parenthood; “a social relationship 
over time in which the emotional bonding of parents and child is as important as the 
physical realities of conception, birth, and kinship and the socioeconomic functions of the 
intergenerational family.”60  
To understand procreation as parenthood rectifies poorly integrated concepts 
within Catholic theology of marriage; including procreation, love and union.61 Cahill 
writes, “Parenthood joins the relation to one’s mate with the relation to one’s children, 
through co-parenting.”62 Later she adds, “Parenthood makes sex (the couple’s sexual 
                                                 
57 Ibid., 217. 
58 Ibid., 220. In a later book, Cahill argues that ARTs are “parasitic on continuing gender norms in 
which parenthood is seen as indispensable to social adulthood, especially for women, in which women’s 
fulfillment and flourishing are closely tied to maternity. Although motherhood is a “profoundly 
meaningful” experience, and a desirable one for many, it should not be portrayed as an ideal that 
completely fulfills or exhausts the meaning of life.” Lisa Sowell Cahill, Theological Bio-Ethics: 
Participation, Justice, Change (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 193. 
59 Ibid., 112. 
60 Ibid., 199. 
61 Ibid., 113. 
62 Ibid.,115. 
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relation) fully accountable for, and contributory to, human well-being and 
interdependence in communities beyond the couple.” That is, “their union in parenthood 
is a specifically sexual mode of social participation.”63 For Cahill, ‘parenthood,’ succeeds 
where ‘procreation’ fails because it redirects the physicalist-personalist polarity to 
essentially social meanings. Further, Cahill suggests love as the guiding moral condition 
of marriage, sex, and parenthood. This love-dimension of spousal relationships can be 
“understood to extend to their domestic, social, and parental partnership.”64 
 
Critical Appraisal 
 In Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics, Cahill’s methodology offers a valuable 
precedent for bringing both feminist convictions and experiential evidence into 
productive dialogue with magisterial teaching. Cahill’s skillful navigation of the terrain 
between divergent perspectives, on topics replete with difficulty, is impressive. Still, the 
book raises points of concern. Why, for example, does Cahill’s concern for the embodied 
importance of gender and sexuality not lead her to offer a more assertive position in 
relation to homosexuality? That is, the seriousness with which Cahill takes human 
embodiedness joined with her disillusionment with procreation as an effective norm for 
the marital sexual relationship, suggests potential for a Catholic reappraisal of 
homosexuality. This potential, when joined with her emphasis on the social goals of the 
marital relationship, opens clear possibilities for a more thorough going reappraisal of the 
potential theological goods of same-sex relationships. The answer appears to reside in 
                                                 
63 Ibid., 201. 
64 Ibid., 232. 
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Cahill’s methodology, which retrieves an Artistolian-Thomistic framework and, through 
this, shares certain similarities with magisterial thought. 
Cahill’s vision of the family is based around a core of biological kinship. She 
argues that her position can be supported with sociological evidence. It also has 
agreements with magisterial thought, and the opinion of Aquinas; who derived parental 
responsibility from biological parenthood.65 On the other hand, Cahill is quite explicit in 
articulating a framework in which both biological and fictive kinship play important 
roles. And she makes clear, fictive kinship has significance, and may open the family to 
greater social contribution. Positing fictive kinship as an important dimension of familial 
relations allows Cahill to call attention to the social mission of the family.  
However, the centrality of biological kinship in Cahill’s vision suggests that these 
two forms of kinship form a duality between real-biological kinship and false-fictive 
kinship. In this framework, fictive kinship remains good, but derives its meaning from 
being analogous to biological kinship. This appears to be the same ordering that grounds 
the question posed to magisterial teaching in the last chapter – whether adoptive families 
can be said, unambiguously, to be ‘real’ families. The same tension would explain 
Cahill’s hesitancy on the topic of homosexuality. That is, assessing the potential value of 
false-fictive kinship for sexual partnerships that are naturally incapable for producing 
real-biological kinship becomes a complex matter. That such a framework is at least 
implicitly operative in Cahill’s thought is more evident in her perspective on adoption. 
                                                 
65 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 2-2, Q. CII, a. I 
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Cahill’s brief and realist comments on adoption stand in rather stark contrast to a 
much more extensive and creative engagement with biological kinship.66 There is no 
romanticism in her account of adoption in which she presents adoption as form of “crisis 
management.”67 Cahill cautions that all parties involved must “come to terms with their 
‘loss’ of a unified bio-social child-parent relation.”68 Granting that serious problems do 
indeed exist for claiming adoption as an unambiguous good, the absence in Cahill of an 
explicitly theological vision of adoption is notable. While she considers the sociological 
and personal turmoil often linked to adoption, theological motivations and commitments 
are peripheral. In fact, she appears to define adoptive kinship precisely by its distance 
from biological kinship.  
Cahill’s perspective on adoption takes seriously the natural good of biological 
kinship and its relation to social parenthood. However, from a theological perspective it 
may be asked if kinship can or ought to be so singularly linked to biological foundations. 
Like magisterial perspectives, Cahill’s vision of the family derives its social meaning 
secondarily from its natural structure; though the similarity exists in relation to biological 
kinship not specific sexual acts.69 Yet, the Christian tradition may warrant a deeper 
appreciation of the value of ‘fictive’ kinship than Cahill is willing offer. For example, 
early Christian martyrs staked their lives on “fictive” kinship often over an against the 
                                                 
66 In other books and articles Cahill treats the topic more thoroughly, yet she remains committed to 
the importance of biological kinship and concerned about the social influences that create the need for 
adoption. In Theological Bio-Ethics her positive theological supports for adoption are all cited from other 
authors. See, Cahill. Theological Bio-Ethics, Chapter 6. 
67 Cahill, Sex, Gender & Christian Ethics, 244. 
68 Ibid., 247. 
69 Ibid., 210. 
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will of biological kin. There are many more Biblical and traditional warrants that suggest 
“fictive” kinship plays a greater role that either Cahill of the magisterium suggest, but 
these will be addressed more thoroughly in later chapters. 
The scant attention Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics Cahill’s pays to children or 
childhood as subjects in their own right is also noteworthy. Cahill’s remarks on children 
generally refer to parental duties. Several factors are associated with children’s 
wellbeing; including inter-personal commitment and familial stability. While Cahill 
skillfully brings sociological data to bear on other topics, the opportunity to utilize such 
resources in developing an account of children’s needs is regrettably missed. 
Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics intentionally leaves many lines of inquiry 
unresolved as it claims a middle ground precisely by questioning oppositional views. 
Cahill’s centrist position, however, appears to lean strongly towards an approach 
characteristic of magisterial thought in its conceptualization of parenthood. This produces 
similar limitations as it derives its conception of parenthood via biological procreation. 
 
Just Love 
Sexual Ethics and Marriage 
Margaret Farley’s Just Love approaches sexual ethical questions through 
principles of justice. Farley writes, “love is true and just, right and good, insofar as it is a 
true response to the reality of the beloved, a genuine union between the one who loves 
and the one loved, and an accurate and adequate affective affirmation of the beloved.”70 
Conversely, “love is false or mistaken when it does not accord with the nature of the 
                                                 
70 Farley, Just Love, 198. 
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relationship between lover and loved.”71 These observations serve as the “formal 
principle of justice in loving.” The ‘material’ principles rely upon interpretations of 
human realities, including “their needs, capacities, relational claims, vulnerabilities, 
possibilities.”72 Farley explains, “what I propose is an inductive understanding of the 
shared concrete reality of human persons that includes the following: Each person is 
constituted with a complex structure… Human persons are essentially relational… 
Persons exist in the world.”73 The last point includes institutional relationships, present 
actualities and potentials, and individual uniqueness. In her assessment of basic human 
realities, Farley remains cognizant of “the partiality of our knowledge, the historical 
changeability of knowledge and the variations of human self-understandings from culture 
to culture and across time.”74 
Farley’s methodology for considering sexual ethics is unique among Catholic 
theologians. Still, she supports several revisionist claims and commits to the possibility of 
moral approval of specific sexual acts considered illicit in official teaching (masturbation, 
pre-marital sex, homosexual sex, etc.). Yet, Farley is unwilling to jettison tradition 
entirely; instead her criticisms are primarily driven by a commitment to forefront 
principles of justice even in opposition to authoritative teaching that is said to be based 
upon the objective moral order. Farley contends that the three classic Christian norms for 
marriage remain valuable guides, namely: monogamy, sexual exclusivity, and 
                                                 
71 Ibid., 201. 
72 Ibid., 209. 
73 Ibid., 211. 
74 Ibid. 
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permanence. She also argues that marriage and love share similar goals;  “embodied and 
inspirited union, companionship, communion, fruitfulness, caring and being cared for, 
opening to the world of others, and lives made sacred in faithfulness to one another and 
to God.”75  
Farley’s ethics are directed by the principles of ‘fruitfulness’ and ‘social justice.’ 
These suggest that ethical sexual relationships tend toward growth and the common good. 
‘Fruitfulness’ is related to the traditional good of ‘procreation,’ though Farley posits a 
much wider meaning that includes growth in loving relationships, care, and justice.76 She 
acknowledges that biological reproduction is a good that is not accessible in all sexual 
relationships but emphasizes that non-reproductive sex acts may still be fruitful in ways 
other, but not lesser than, biological procreation.77 
Like Cahill, Farley affords significantly greater attention to ARTs than to 
adoption as an alternative means of family formation. To her credit, Farley does not 
follow a common tendency to insert praise for adoption as a means of contrasting the 
moral challenges of ARTs, which commonly presents adoption as a licit alternative rather 
than a positive moral good in its own right. Given her understanding of ‘fruitfulness,’ 
adoption might be considered implicit within Farley’s argument. 
 
Family, Children, and Parenthood 
                                                 
75 Ibid., 268. 
76 Ibid., 290. 
77 Ibid., 227. 
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Considering normative family forms, Farley argues that there are great, though 
perhaps not unlimited, possibilities for producing human happiness and flourishing. Like 
Cahill, Farley rejects strict familial gender roles, but is significantly less concerned to 
champion traditional structures based on kinship as inherently valuable. Farley argues 
that it is mistaken to consider the family as a “natural ‘given,’ interior to society and with 
an internal meaning that needs no critiquing as to its justice or injustice.” She further 
criticizes the “almost insatiable desire” for biological children that drives a billion-dollar 
ART industry.78 Instead, determinations of the ‘good family’ are not about preferences or 
idealizations of a ‘best’ model so much as they are about the “justice and love that a 
model makes possible.”79 For this reason, Farley is hesitant to define the family in terms 
of structure or define outer boundaries. She writes, “every configuration that ‘works,’ that 
functions reasonably well in facilitating and undergirding a life for people together in 
mutual affection and flourishing, perhaps especially when it comes to the rearing of 
children” ought to be celebrated.80 
Children and parenthood are occasional points of reflection for Farley, but not 
primary considerations. Yet, because Farley’s methodology moves from broad principles 
toward increasingly specific applications, the inability to engage every specific topic is a 
defensible limitation. The framework Farley is primarily intending to develop is easily 
stretched to subjects not included in scope of the book itself.  
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79 Ibid., 262. 
80 Ibid. 
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The most direct considerations of children and parenthood are largely limited to a 
chapter on relationships.81 It is notable that despite Farley’s reframing of ‘procreation’ 
into the much broader concept of ‘fruitfulness,’ children and parenthood remain 
conceptually significant within her sexual ethics. She argues that, as an ethical principle, 
no child should be conceived who will not be born into a context conducive to his or her 
growth. Though she admits this is an unenforceable standard, the principle links 
parenthood and sexual ethics such that these “can be assessed in terms of whether or not a 
child will be affirmed in her relationality and her development of a capacity for self-
determination – whether or not she will be respected and nurtured in the features of her 
being that constitutes the core of her humanity.”82 Additionally, Farley’s articulation of 
love appears inclusive enough to embrace an understanding of parenthood, though she 
focuses on ethics between sexual partners. In the context of parent-child love, the mutual 
reciprocity around which Farley frames her concept of love would require revision.83 
 
Critical Appraisal 
While Farley’s effort has produced an insightful look at Christian ethics from a 
consistent commitment to social justice, it also tends toward oversight of specific issues. 
This cannot be totally avoided given her method of moving from broad principles toward 
increasingly specific applications. On the whole, however, there is reason to desire more 
balanced attention to certain areas. Children and parenthood, for example, are only 
                                                 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 See Timothy P. Jackson, The Best Love of a Child: Being Loved and Being Taught to Love as 
the First Human Right (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011). 
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occasional points of reflection for Farley and rarely do these become primary 
considerations even at times when she has appeared to raise legitimate questions. At the 
same time, Farley offers fodder for criticizing contemporary conceptualizations of 
parenthood and its relation to sexual ethics. Nonetheless the specific implications of 
Farley’s opinions and criticisms remain somewhat ambiguous in relation to children and 
parenthood. 
For instance, Farley offers grounds for supporting same-sex partnerships, and 
suggests support for same-sex parenthood, but does not connect this to an integrated 
understanding of parenthood. Farley argues that heterosexual and homosexual sexual 
relationships can be evaluated on the same standards.84 She asserts that objections on the 
grounds of the possibility of procreation “represent either a failure of imagination or a 
narrowness of experience that disallows an appreciation of all the ways in which humans 
bring life into the world, and all the ways that the world needs new life from those to 
whom the gift of love has been given.”85 And she suggests that arguments in support of 
same-sex marriage are stronger than those that cite possible negative implications for 
‘traditional marriage’.86 Yet, Farley stops short of urging support for same-sex marriage 
and instead argues that same-sex couples should be allowed to determine the suitable 
institutional form of their own relationships.87  
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Farley’s reservation on the institutionalization of same-sex relationships leaves 
the question of same-sex parenthood resting in a conceptual gap. Farley gives no reason 
why same-sex partners could not raise children, yet she does not consider how the 
existence of children might legitimately impact the both nature of that relationship itself. 
The presence of children in a relationship certainly alters the stakes of moral evaluation. 
If same-sex relationships are governed by the same principles as heterosexual 
relationships they ought to embody both fruitfulness and social justice, which could be 
expressed in parenthood. Yet Farley’s justification goes no further than sexual ethics, 
even as it opens the door to parenthood. In so doing, she fails to take the existence of 
children themselves seriously and connect this to the known benefits for children offered 
in her reflections on marriage. Instead, Farley ends with the self-determinations of adults. 
Farley’s oversight in not recognizing the need to integrate same-sex parenthood 
within some sort of stable, socially structured context, in the same manner as her 
argument for the value of heterosexual marriage, belies a general inconsistency in 
applying children’s needs as an evaluative condition for adult relationships. While Farley 
suggests adult capacities that may be required of parenthood and employs the possibility 
of parenthood as an evaluative tool, her ethic remains centered in adult sexual 
relationships and does not consistently connect all the social, familial, and relational 
points that she herself raises. This is not to say that Farley, a Catholic nun, is somehow 
obligated to argue for same-sex unions or marriage. Instead it is to point out that even as 
Farley proceeds from a vastly different methodology and comes to a very different moral 
evaluation of same-sex relationships than does the magisterium, she too arrives at 
122 
 
parenthood through sexual ethics while appearing to presume that adequate justifications 
for sexual behavior somehow serve as sufficient grounds for parenthood.  
 
The Sexual Person and Sexual Ethics 
Sex Ethics and Marriage 
Salzman and Lawler’s books critique aspects of official Catholic teaching on 
sexual moral theology and deconstruct the methodological and anthropological 
commitments it is based upon. In response to these criticisms, they offer a revised 
theological anthropology and articulate its implications for sexual ethics. Their method 
takes Catholic moral tradition seriously and centers on a Thomistic natural law 
framework. Salzman and Lawler’s primary contention with modern developments in 
Catholic moral theology, especially in the twentieth century, relates to its classicist 
underpinnings. As such, they scrutinize official teaching in light of both internal 
inconsistencies and new knowledge. Their own method relies upon historical 
consciousness and offers a different model of appropriating tradition for the present, 
which is more engaged with experience as a source of ethics. 
 Salzman and Lawler acknowledge that sexual ethics and marital ethics are largely 
synonymous within Catholicism and, despite a few reservations, accept the wisdom of 
this association.88 The revisions they do propose result primarily from founding 
traditional forms of reasoning on “a more adequately considered unitive sexual 
anthropology.”89 Their “renewed Catholic anthropology” holds two basic commitments, 
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fully integrating personalist insights into official teaching and revising the overly 
procreationist and acts-centered magisterial approach.90 These commitments arise out of 
modern theological developments related to the ends of sexuality and marriage.91 
 Salzman and Lawler argue that important figures throughout the tradition have 
recognized the relational bond of the spouses as the most definitive aspect of Christian 
marriage. With Aquinas, however, the hierarchy of ends, which places procreation as 
primary and companionship as secondary, become firmly instantiated within the tradition. 
The authors take issue with Aquinas’ definition of the primary purpose of the human 
institution of marriage by a generically animal capacity.92 In addition, they draw attention 
to the significance of the shift in twentieth century considerations of the hierarchy of ends 
from an earlier view of marriage to an emphasis on sexual intercourse specifically.93 
 Like Cahill and Farley, Salzman and Lawler advocate a more expansive 
understanding of ‘procreation’ that can encompass broad meanings of ‘new life.’94 In 
reference to Gaudium et spes they write, “The marital relationship finds an essentially 
nurturing component in just and loving sexual acts that procreate, occasionally in a 
                                                 
90 Ibid., 52. 
91 “The procreation and education of children and the union between the spouses are equal ends in 
marriage; there is no longer a Catholic hierarchy of ends. The magisterium now defines the “finality of the 
faculty” of the sexual organ in terms of both the procreation and education of children and the union 
between the spouses in every sexual act.” Ibid., 77. 
92 Salzman and Lawler, The Sexual Person, 35. 
93 Ibid., 37. 
94 Salzman and Lawler, Sexual Ethics, 58. 
124 
 
biological sense, always in the sense of creating life for the couple, their bonded 
relationship, their family, and their wider community.”95  
A central objection of the authors is to the manner in which official Catholic 
teaching has employed personalist ideals following Vatican II. They argue that the 
council had set the stage for renewal, yet traditional prohibitions grounded in physicalist, 
act-centered reasoning have not only persevered, but have been roundly defended.96 The 
Sexual Person devotes two chapters to exploring the fundamental divides in 
contemporary Catholic moral theology on which this objection rests. A critique of the 
idea of ‘complementarity’ as employed in magisterial and traditionalist sources emerges 
from this effort. 
The authors identify several forms of complementarity within magisterial 
teaching and organize these as forms of ‘biological’ or ‘personal’ complementarity. 
Biological complementarity includes ‘heterogenital’ and ‘reproductive’ complementarity. 
Personal complementarity includes ‘communion’, ‘affective’, and ‘parental’ 
complementarity.97 They argue that, in magisterial sources, communion complementarity 
is central to the expression of conjugal love and relies essentially upon heterogenital 
complementarity.  
Salzman and Lawler identify affective complementarity as “the crux of 
magisterial teaching on sexual complementarity, because it intrinsically links biological 
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and personal complementarity.”98 Aside from external genitalia, they inquire, what 
essential attributes divide the genders? They identify biological maternity and paternity 
as another differentiating feature (though these are dependent upon genitalia and 
reproductive organs) and argue that gendered stereotypes bear the weight of the 
remaining case for complementarity. “Femaleness is defined primarily in terms of 
motherhood, receptivity, and nurturing and maleness is defined primarily in terms of 
fatherhood, initiation, and activity.” They contend that this “does not adequately reflect 
the complexity of the human person and relationships.”99 Salzman and Lawler conclude 
that the concept of complementarity in magisterial teaching “is entirely unsubstantiated 
by any scientific evidence.”100 In response, Salzman and Lawler argue that personal 
goods must be privileged over physical realities and, on this basis, advance a revised 
account of sexual ethics based upon a more nuanced anthropology.101 
Salzman and Lawler argue that this conception of complementarity rests on weak 
foundations when human sexuality is considered comprehensively. They argue that, when 
genital complementarity ceases to be decisive, the difference between homogenital 
intercourse and knowingly infertile heterogenital intercourse becomes obscure. In 
addition, evidence suggests same-sex partners can experience affective complementarity. 
                                                 
98 Ibid., 67. 
99 Ibid., 69. 
100 Ibid., 70. 
101 Patricia Beattie Jung, follows Salzman and Lawler’s criticism of magisterial use of 
complementarity and concludes that such an account is too weak in light of present knowledge about sexual 
diversity. Patricia Beattie Jung, “God Sets the Lonely in Families,” in Inquiry, Thought, and Expression, 
vol. 2 of More than a Monologue: Sexual Diversity in the Roman Catholic Church, eds. J. Patrick 
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126 
 
From their perspective of ‘wholistic complementarity’ homogenital sexual acts, like 
heterogenital sexual acts, are potentially morally justifiable.102 
 
Family, Children, and Parenthood 
Salzman and Lawler consistently utilize children’s wellbeing as an evaluative tool 
for sexual ethics; specifically as a means of critiquing magisterial teaching. For example, 
the authors criticize the CDF for arguing that children’s wellbeing rests upon parental 
complementarity (subject to heterogenital complementarity) as a reason for rejecting 
same-sex parenting. In response, Salzman and Lawler cite a growing body of evidence to 
suggest children’s wellbeing is not, in fact, closely associated with the heterogenital 
complementarity of their parents.103 Salzman and Lawler appeal to children’s needs again 
to refute the hierarchy of ends. They write,  
The union of the spouses tends naturally to the birth and nurture of new persons, their children, 
who focus the fulfillment of their parents, both as individuals and as a two-in-oneness… social 
scientific data demonstrates that the well-being of the child is a function of the well-being of its 
parents, suggesting that the relationship between the spouses is the primary natural result of 
marriage, since all other relationships in the family depend on it.104 
 
Similarly, children’s wellbeing is used to critique assertions of the inseparability of the 
procreative and unitive meanings of intercourse. “The genuine procreation of children, 
which always intended and continues to intend their education and nurture beyond mere 
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biological generation… depends on the happiness and stability of the relationship 
between the spouses/parents.”105 Further they argue,  
The demands of the good of marriage, the good not only of the couple but also of their existent 
children, can on occasion take priority over the good of procreation. A compromise may be 
needed between the good of the spouses and the good of procreation… Not every married couple 
need procreate, or even be open to procreation, every time they have intercourse; indeed, as Pius 
XII taught, not every couple need procreate at all.106 
 
Although Salzman and Lawler’s books are too centered on anthropology and 
sexual ethics to include significant considerations of family, children, and parenthood, 
they frequently acknowledge the implications of their argument for these realities and 
employ social-scientific research to substantiate their claims. 
 
Critical Appraisal 
Salzman and Lawler express agreement with other authors regarding the 
idealization of sexual intercourse in magisterial thought, yet they occasionally tend 
toward this themselves. While emphasis on the importance of sexual acts may be 
expected in books on sexual ethics, at times the authors’ valuation appears to distort sex’s 
place within a matrix of concerns that includes marriage, children, and parenthood. For 
example, Salzman and Lawler express agreement with Gaudium et spes’ teaching that the 
act of intercourse is the “perfection of conjugal love.”107 Yet this seems at odds with their 
criticism of John Paul II for idealizing the potential of sexual acts and with their concern 
that Aquinas defines an animal capacity as the primary end of marriage. In so doing the 
                                                 
105 Ibid., 138. 
106 Ibid., 115. 
107 Salzman and Lawler, The Sexual Person, 126. 
128 
 
authors misrepresent Gaudium et spes, which implies that sex serves the perfection of 
conjugal love, not that sex itself embodies that perfection.108 Salzman and Lawler appear 
to be attempting to support a positive evaluation of the sexual act (which at times seems a 
rather fragile newcomer to Catholic thought) but in so doing replicate another recent 
trend of idealizing sexual intercourse. The problem with this idealization is that the praise 
offered can distract from more problematic underlying assumptions. In this case, Salzman 
and Lawler suggest that the Christian vocation of marriage might be embodied in good 
sex; a sentiment that runs parallel to statements of John Paul II criticized above. If 
marriage, including the conjugal love that defines it, is a Christian vocation, its 
‘perfection’ should be tied to a supernatural end, while sexual expression would be a 
service to that end. This simply parallels the criticism the authors make of Aquinas’ 
ordering of the ends of marriage. Gaudium et spes itself suggests that such perfection 
may be found in the perseverance of this love in “bright days or dark.”109  
A similar tendency may also be surmised from Salzman and Lawler’s 
prioritization of good sex as foundational to family formation (by conception or adoption) 
and to sustaining the health of the marriage, family, and children’s wellbeing. Again, 
while sexual acts may well play an important role, the centralization is misplaced and 
replicates problematic traditional preoccupations. A limited theological vision of 
parenthood may be a factor in Salzman and Lawler’s admittance of certain superlative 
                                                 
108 “[Conjugal love] is uniquely expressed and perfected” through the intimacy appropriate to 
matrimony. Vatican II, Gaudium et spes, Vatican, (December 7, 1965) 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
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claims about sex. More explicit attention to the specifically Christian vocation of 
parenthood could have served to reduce the centralization of sexual expression. 
Further limitations in a theological vision of parenthood may be at work in their 
presentation of adoption and same-sex parenthood. The relationship between adoptive 
and biological parenthood is not clarified. This ambiguity joined with their high valuation 
of sexual intercourse, once again leaves the authors open to the criticism made of Cahill 
above. Namely, that through a Thomistic natural law framework, they have replicated a 
tendency to base their concept of parenthood essentially on biological kinship to the 
exclusion of other forms. 
Their limited vision of parenthood becomes more evident when their argument for 
the moral acceptance of homogenital sexual acts is compared to their argument for same-
sex parenthood. While the former utilizes a thorough rethinking of complementarity and 
the human person, the latter is exclusively based upon experiential evidence. In effect, 
their  justification for same-sex sexual relationships functions as theologically sufficient 
to justify same-sex parenting; while social-scientific data bear the weight of this second 
claim.110 Like Cahill and Farley, Salzman and Lawler’s project is not primarily concerned 
with same-sex parenthood. Nonetheless, their arguments lead them to justify same sex 
parenthood even as their grasp of the further theological implications of that justification 
appears insufficient as it relates to theological conceptions of parenthood. 
 
Conclusion 
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 Each of the books above offers points of contention with magisterial teaching and 
utilizes revisionist methodological commitments. However, each author demonstrates 
certain points of limitation that reflect those identified in modern magisterial teaching by 
the previous chapter. Specifically, thin theological accounts of parenthood appear to 
compliment much more substantial sexual ethical arguments while the former in many 
ways functions definitively for the latter. As with magisterial sources, this tendency 
suggests that the Christian vocation of parenthood is contingent upon, and primarily a 
function of, sexual morality. Interestingly, though the authors disagree to varying degrees 
with magisterial teaching on same-sex relationships, it is in their considerations of these 
where the connection between sexual ethics and parenthood often becomes most obvious. 
While sexual ethical norms are well-developed, thin theological accounts of parenthood 
limit reflections on how same-sex parenthood may contribute or distract from the 
Christian vocation of parenthood. Farley and Salzman and Lawler differ significantly 
from the magisterium in utilizing sociological data to support same-sex partnerships yet 
the evidence is not integrated into a theological account of parenthood itself. Perhaps 
relatedly, adoptive parenthood remains a peripheral subject which receives little direct 
attention and few theological arguments to substantiate its place within the Christian 
tradition. 
Each author grapples with the implications of contemporary experience for 
Catholic sexual moral theology and each tends to refute strong gender essentialism as a 
result. In doing so, they allow contemporary experience to function as a more centralized 
source of moral knowledge than found in magisterial teaching. However, these writings 
also tend to replicate magisterial thought by drawing conceptions of parenthood primarily 
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from sexual ethical norms and some level of commitment to biological kinship as the 
presumptive normative form of kinship. 
Though it has been argued above that the specific contexts often call for a more 
thorough engagement with the theological concept of parenthood, the emphasis on sexual 
ethics found throughout these books may seemingly be a consequence their primary 
subject matter. That is, books on sexual ethics reasonably focus on sexual rather than 
more peripheral considerations, such as parenthood. Therefore, to substantiate these 
concerns more fully, the second half of this chapter turns to writing on marriage and 
family. Here again, it will be argued that although many useful insights are available, 
remarkably little research describes parenthood as a subject of theological concern in its 
own right. 
 
Part III: Marriage and Family 
Overview 
In recent decades, Catholic theological writings on marriage have focused on the 
sacramental theology of marriage (especially in relation to cohabitation), the bond of 
marriage, annulment, and divorce.111 Several theologians have proposed revised 
theologies of marriage to counter the impact that patriarchy and the ideal of celibacy have 
had historically in shaping Catholic theology of marriage.112 In this task, recoveries of 
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biblical perspectives as well as awareness of the historical diversities and developments 
within Christian views on marriage are prevalent.113 This preoccupation may have 
distracted from reflection on the theological identity of parenthood within the field.  
A survey of nine recent Catholic scholarly books on marriage and family reveals 
that sacramental theology of marriage and sexual ethics each receive significantly more 
direct attention than considerations of the family, parenthood, or children (“fatherhood” 
does not even appear in all indices).114 Though this perusal of recent writing is not 
comprehensive and cannot speak to the relative influence of each book, it does seem to 
suggest the tendencies of established scholars within this field. Parenthood receives less 
than half the total pages devoted to sexual ethics and less than a quarter compared to 
sacramentology of marriage. Notably, spirituality of parenthood is the most common 
approach to the topic within the texts surveyed. Direct consideration of children reveals 
even greater paucity, despite the growing academic field of childhood studies (a subject 
of a later chapter). This is remarkable given the significant attention sexual ethics 
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continues to receive. Catholic moral tradition tends strongly towards a ‘natalist’ bias115 
which is evidenced by greater concern for how children are made than how they are 
raised. Such a bias naturally leads to neglecting adoptive parenthood which falls beyond 
its center of concern. 
Despite revisionist inclinations to expand and reconfigure the concerns of sexual 
ethics, revisionist moral theology remains centered on relatively narrow concerns. Still, 
several recent publications have begun to reshape the conversation by turning attention 
more directly to the operation of family systems and the theological convictions that 
ground the Christian family. In this respect, Vatican II’s reassertion of the family as the 
domestic church has played a significant role.116 
The first part of this chapter critically discussed the way various revisionist texts 
treat parenthood. The veracity of this critique depends upon sex, marriage, and family 
being closely connected in Catholic thought such that texts on sexual ethics can be 
assumed to bear on conceptions of parenthood. This linkage is not only evident 
throughout magisterial and revisionist sources, but concretely shapes Catholic sexual 
ethics. Importantly, however these connections also display an inner hierarchy which 
proceeds from sexual ethics and is shaped by a normative conception of biological 
kinship. By structuring the relationships in this way, moral commitments are skewed 
towards sexual ethics which permits the continuation of underdeveloped conceptions of 
parenthood. Counteracting this pervasive tendency, so as to theologically consider 
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parenthood in its own right, requires careful delineation of concepts within the subjects of 
sex, marriage, and family, while affirming their fundamental relatedness. Present 
theological writing has not sufficiently attended to this task. 
Todd Whitmore has argued that contemporary Catholic thought has tended to 
assume a common anthropology of the child without explicit consideration of what this 
might be.117 The limited attention recently given to the study of children as subjects in 
their own right, not subsumed within reflections on the family or motherhood, is a 
hopeful sign.118 Recent works have begun to fill this void in contemporary theological 
concern while arguing that such a void is out-of-step with the greater Christian 
tradition.119 The Child in Christian Thought, edited by Marcia J. Bunge, surveys 
theological conceptions of childhood in Christian history through the writings of major 
theologians and movements.120 David H. Jenson argues that children provide an essential 
vantage point into Christian faith.121 And Bonnie Miller-McLemore considers the 
theological meaning of childhood and parenthood for Christians today.122 This hopeful 
trend will be addressed more clearly in the following chapter. At present, it is enough to 
suggest that just as ‘children’ can be treated as viable subjects of theological inquiry 
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without necessarily negatively influencing the related ideas of family, parenthood, or 
procreation, so too parenthood deserves greater direct theological attention as a subject 
related to sex, marriage, and family that is not absorbed by these. Furthermore, this 
perspective already finds some support in contemporary magisterial and revisionist 
thought. 
The remainder of this chapter considers works within the theology of marriage 
and family that offer particularly helpful contributions to a more adequate theology of 
parenthood. First among these is Lisa Sowle Cahill’s Family a Christian Social 
Perspective. While her earlier work, considered above, focused on sexual ethics and 
gender, this text offers more substantial resources for understanding the Christian family 
as a unique community within the broader social context. This is followed by Julie 
Hanlon Rubio’s A Christian Theology of Marriage and Family and Family Ethics, both 
valuable contributions to the field which advance the author’s efforts to move 
Catholicism beyond the divisiveness fostered in the wake of Humanae vitae. Lastly, 
Richard Gaillardetz’s appropriation of the Eastern Orthodox concept of ‘generativity’ 
receives brief attention as a helpful concept for advancing the present conversation. 
 
Family a Christian Social Perspective 
Lisa Sowle Cahill’s Family; A Christian Social Perspective presents a Christian 
account of parenthood by framing theologically considered parental functions within the 
Christian family’s social obligations. She observes that, historically and cross-culturally, 
kinship and the body are important for grounding the family in material needs, yet 
marriage also introduces “the importance of affiliation through free choice in defining 
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family ties.”123 Likewise, observations of continuity are balanced against disruption and 
difference. She writes, 
Although family as created by kinship and marriage is the most basic family form or definition of 
family, it is not the only or exclusively legitimate form. It is basic in that it prevails across cultures 
as an important social institution and provides the fundamental working concept of the family for 
most individuals and societies. There are other types of human alliance, however, for mutual 
economic and domestic support, as for reproduction and childrearing, that are analogous to the 
basic kin- and marriage-based family. 
 
Cultural practices of adoption are illustrative of these diversities, even as adoption by 
near kin is often preferred. Cahill concludes that absolute clarity on the definition of the 
family is both difficult and unwise. Instead, she advances an “inclusive and supportive 
approach to family life, one that can hold up ideals such as male-female coparenting and 
sexual fidelity without thereby berating and excluding single-parent families, divorced 
families, gay and lesbian families, blended families, or adoptive families.”124 
Three convictions frame Cahill’s argument. The first concerns human nature and 
the goals of civil society. She writes, “Humans have a natural capacity for intimacy, 
empathy, compassion, and altruism that can be learned and fostered in close associations 
like the family...”125 Through proper socialization, these innate human capacities can be 
developed to serve Christian goals by extending towards the larger community. Thus, 
“The moral task of families and of civil society in general is to enhance these capacities 
and to discourage their opposites.” Her second conviction is that sin, specifically in the 
form of collective egotism, constitutes “a dark side of all human associations that family 
theorists do well to keep in mind, so as to counteract it more effectively.” Her third 
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conviction relates to the transformative influence of Christian faith in human relations. 
Yet, the Christian family and its vocation to embody discipleship nonetheless remains 
grounded in the ambiguities of earthly existence.126 In articulating these three 
convictions, Cahill addresses the classic features of a Christian anthropology (nature, sin, 
and grace) in the context of the family. She suggests that humans, by nature, are both 
relational and capable of growth while human nature is further contextualized by the 
realities of both sin and grace. 
Cahill recognizes that Christian discipleship is possible only within the highly 
complex terrain of earthly existence. As such, she acknowledges Jesus’ ambiguity toward 
the family and presents the mixed messages of the early Christian witness. In so doing, 
she pays close attention to the complex, and perhaps conflicting, obligations of Christian 
faith and familial commitments.127 Cahill surmises, “Although it is probably true that 
Jesus did not repudiate family simply as family, it is not enough to say that he only 
wanted his followers to put family claims in perspective. Jesus as remembered by the 
early Christian movement presents family life with a deep and momentous challenge.” 
For Cahill, this challenge is a call to “radical transformation.”128 
Following this biblical precedent, Cahill stays closely attuned to the potentially 
negative moral dimensions of the family. She argues that legitimate concern for family 
well-being can easily lead to justifying and supporting existing hierarchies.129 And she 
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notes, “family belonging is potentially idolatrous, a socially acceptable form of arrogance 
and greed.”130 This idolatry is evidenced by the insularity of families who exercise a form 
of collective individualism and fail to fulfill the obligations of their Christian identity. 
Rather, a Christian family reaches beyond its own social and economic sphere.131 She 
explains, “The primary values defining the Christian family are the same values that 
define the ‘new family and Christ’: other-concern and compassionate love that overlooks 
socially normative boundaries and is willing to sacrifice to meet the needs of others.”132  
Considering these tensions further she writes, 
To overcome the perils that family identity presents, it is necessary for Christian identity to 
transform the family’s self-promoting and exclusionary tendencies and to enhance the abilities to 
teach affection, empathy, and altruism. On the basis of these dispositions, Christian families will 
be able to cultivate reciprocity and equality internally and to foster the compassionate sharing of 
goods with outsiders.133 
 
Despite Cahill’s concern that the Christian family recognize its own Christian 
vocation, she is also keenly aware of the potential dangers of closely associating the 
family and the church. For instance, Cahill highlights the social orientation of the 
“domestic church” in magisterial teaching, yet argues that neither patriarchy nor the 
negative effects of global capitalism have been sufficiently critiqued.134 She asserts, 
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naming the family as ‘church’ can just as easily lead to domesticating the eschatological 
edge of Christianity as to sanctifying families; and likely will lead to both.135 
She further argues that the family’s mission as an inter-generational association of 
Christians underwrites its Christian identity. That is, structural definitions of the family 
are less significant than assessments of family function in light of Christian 
commitments.136 Cahill writes, “if the socially radical meaning of Christianity is taken 
seriously, Christian families can become vehicles of social justice, even as they 
strengthen and build upon their bonds of kinship, affection, and faithfulness.”137 This 
conviction finds a contemporary exemplar in African-American families that have 
provided mutual support and maintained a marital and parental ideal while remaining 
broadly inclusive of diverse family structures.138 While the contexts that have provided 
the need for these responses within black Christian communities raise concern, the 
communal means of support and acceptance provides a valuable framework for a broader 
Christian perspective on the family.  
Cahill’s understanding of the family does not make all family structures equal; 
some are apt to produce greater human happiness and social betterment, especially those 
that tend towards fidelity and commitment. Still her perspective “opens up the possibility 
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that even ‘nontraditional’ families may exhibit the most important Christian family 
values, and for that reason be authentic domestic churches.”139  
Cahill makes a qualified acceptance of the appraisal that the modern family is in 
crisis but is careful to avoid to identifying this crisis narrowly with demographic shifts 
within the domestic sphere. Instead, she argues that the crisis must be addressed with 
respect to both personal-moral and social-economic concerns.140 Likewise, Cahill 
partially accepts the view that the ascendency of ‘individualism’ is responsible for 
dissolving family structures, but also calls attention to the destructive effects poor 
education and joblessness have on the families of the urban poor.141 Cahill writes 
“certainly poverty correlates with unwed motherhood” and argues further, on the basis of 
sociological data, that “poverty is the cause of single-parent families. Poor education and 
joblessness are disincentives to marriage.”142 
Considering children, Cahill observes that the uniqueness of the Christian 
family’s vocation centers on its duty of committing children “to Christian purposes, 
mainly, worship of the God revealed in Jesus Christ and to love for neighbor and 
enemy.”143 Through the Christian family, children are embedded in the Christian life 
established by their parents and other family members and learn to participate in broader 
communities specifically as Christians. Cahill writes, “The child grows to share the larger 
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community of religious experience and moral service that the family represents in 
miniature.”144 
Characteristically, Cahill’s work is also concerned with gender. Within the family 
and society, gender can function as a “line of division marking access to social benefits.” 
Such a demarcation tends to produce dichotomous gender roles which generally result in 
preferential roles for men. These roles are reinforced “by ideology and by physical force, 
both direct and indirect.”145  
Considering John Paul II, Cahill observes his emphases on the fair distribution of 
wealth and his introduction of the historically novel concept of the family as “a sphere of 
relative gender equity.”146 Yet, Cahill observes, “an irreducible ambivalence of the papal 
approach to gender owes to John Paul II’s firm espousal of a complementarity model of 
equality.”147 But from Cahill’s perspective, “Christian interpretation of family life must 
confront the possibility that traditional family structures should be replaced, not 
reinforced, in the domestic church.”148  
Cahill’s argument in relation to gender roles is especially significant in its 
permission to allow Christian ideals to challenge and reconstruct long-accepted norms of 
family structure and function. She argues, 
[A]n important task for the church’s mission to Christian families today is to discover or create a 
family identity that is genuinely countercultural. While examples from the tradition carry 
liabilities, they also manifest certain strengths.… Christian family evangelization today, however, 
must improve upon these models by refusing to capitulate to any hierarchies of sex, class, and 
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wealth that contradict the essence of Christian social ethics: to embody the reign of God in human 
society by including the neighbor, stranger, and enemy in a new family of sisters and brothers in 
Christ.149 
 
The final chapter of this project will make further use of the precedent offered 
here by Cahill, framed within the specific terms of Christian parenthood. For now, it is 
worth noting that Cahill’s attention to the transformative potential of Christian 
commitments, even within aspects of family life that have been long considered natural, 
and therefore normative, affords a valuable precedent. In addition, Cahill offers a vision 
of the family that is not bound to a particular structure, but instead evaluated on the basis 
of function in relation to the family’s Christian vocation. Although she focuses on social 
practices, specifically in the political and economic realms, her assessment of the family 
is also framed by a specifically Christian anthropological commitment to addressing the 
complex interplay of nature, sin, and grace. Each of these insights may contribute to a 
broader theological vision of parenthood. 
 
 
Family Ethics and A Christian Theology of Marriage and Family 
Like Cahill, Julie Hanlon Rubio identifies the family as a point of convergence 
between private and social spheres and employs a method that is both appreciative and 
critical of the tradition.150 Throughout both books, Rubio is often in dialogue with John 
Paul II but rarely finds total agreement. Her earlier book, A Christian Theology of 
Marriage and Family, offers more direct criticisms of John Paul II, who she portrays as a 
moderate standing between modernist conservatives and postmodernist liberals. Perhaps 
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her most piercing criticism is directed at the late pontiff’s portrayal of the family, which 
she argues, “never steps out of the ideal realm to touch the reality of individual 
families.”151 In Family Ethics, Rubio is likewise concerned with the idealism of John 
Paul II as well as the disproportionate emphasis he placed on sexuality and sexual love in 
comparison to lived experience.152 She argues that the imagined harmony of the holy 
family, “Mary, submissive and nurturing; Joseph quietly protective, a good provider; and 
Jesus, the holy obedient child” and the idealization of large, pious families create 
obstacles for many families to hear the church’s message.153 She writes, “In short, images 
of holy families often stand in the way of right hearing and impair right response.”154 
These idyllic visions must be replaced with theologies that recognize the limitations and 
challenges of real families and do not treat these realities as aberrations. Thus, Rubio 
centers concern explicitly in the daily lives of families and utilizes Bernard Cooke’s 
vision of marriage as the ‘sacrament of friendship’ to bring balance to the late pontiff’s 
idealism.155 
John Paul II’s application of complementarity is another point of concern.156 
Rubio draws upon Cahill to consider both the reality of gender differentiation as well as 
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ambiguities in gender roles as found in biblical and experiential evidence.157 In her earlier 
work, Rubio is particularly assertive about the inconsequential nature of gender in 
relation to Christian discipleship.158 
Beyond these specific disagreements with John Paul II, Rubio also objects to 
those who find unambiguous support for the family in the New Testament. She writes, 
“Despite traditional theological claims to the contrary, family values are hardly prevalent 
in the New Testament. Jesus himself locates his vocation outside of his family.”159 Later 
she adds, “Jesus poses troubling questions about the compatibility of discipleship with 
family duties.”160 Rubio observes that the decreased importance of ‘family values’ results 
from the pride-of-place held by discipleship in the early Christian perspective on family 
life. Christian marriage not only founds the family, Christian marriage is discipleship. As 
a result, discipleship is not a natural outcome of family life but a hard-fought and often 
conflictive negotiation of values.161 She writes, “The public nature of discipleship is 
evident in the life of Jesus. Jesus himself acknowledges the conflict between serving God 
(in his public preaching) and serving his family.”162 
The implication of Rubio’s argument is near at hand; the roles of non-biological 
kinship and discipleship in the New Testament undermine absolute assertions centered on 
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‘natural’ family patterns. In her earlier book, Rubio writes, “The kinship bond and all the 
ethical priority that comes with it are called into question, because the Jesus of the 
Gospels preaches that family, like money and power, can be dangerous to the person who 
wants to live a holy life.”163  Rubio asserts that these realities do not imply that the New 
Testament is anti-family, but that contemporary readings must be nuanced. Later, citing 
Ted Peters, she takes the argument further. He writes, 
Jesus stressed beyond-kin altruism. When he enjoined us to love our neighbor, he frequently 
illustrated that teaching with stories of foreigners such as the Good Samaritan. He told us to love 
our enemies. He gave no priority to one’s biological kin, family, tribe, or nation. Applied 
internally to families, this translates into love of social kin even when they are not biological kin. 
Sociobiology may be illuminating but, in my judgment, it certainly is insufficient for such an 
ethical foundation a Christian could embrace.”164  
 
Peters’ research demonstrates that “Christians love children not because children belong 
to them, but because children belong to God. Their commitment to their children is 
rooted primarily in love, not biology.”165 
Like early Christians, Rubio argues, contemporary Christians are called to 
recognize the tensions between discipleship and family obligations and to respond to 
these with a ‘radical reprioritization’ of commitments.166 She explains, common to 
Christian perspectives, “we find a strong valuing of marriage rooted not in kin but in faith 
and a challenge to bring family outside of its own concerns to embrace a larger mission 
using its unique strengths.”167 Thus, Rubio posits that Christian parents are called to a 
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‘dual vocation’ which is both inwardly directed to the wellbeing of the family and 
outwardly directed to the betterment of society.168 She adds that this commitment applies 
equally across genders. “Jesus did not ask different things of male and female followers. 
Does not ask different things of mothers and fathers, beyond pregnancy and nursing. 
Rather, the dual vocation of parenthood belongs to everyone.”169 
 This perspective helps Rubio expand her understanding of family commitments as 
existing both within and beyond the bonds of biological kinship. She writes, “it is natural 
for parents to have a desire to form their children and John Paul II certainly affirms 
parents place is primary educators of their children. Still, it seems possible and perhaps 
more traditional to allow for parents’ primary interest in combination with the influence 
of other adults.” Not only might this approach better reflect historical Christian 
commitments, it also finds parallels in cultural realities. Citing African-American 
experience, Rubio writes, “children are seen not as private property, but is vulnerable 
human beings who need the care not only of blood mothers, but of grandmothers, sisters, 
aunts, cousins, and neighbors, the other mothers who share in the project of child 
raising.”170 John Paul II strongly asserted the need not to view children as private 
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property, yet his emphasis stayed with the objectification of the child as human person 
and as such directed more attention the aspect of property than privacy. Rubio takes aim 
at the second implication to this thought; not being private implies an ability to be shared. 
Rubio’s concern with the privatization of the modern family finds ample support 
in the distinctive place the family holds as a source of social change in Catholic Social 
Teaching (CST). Rubio observes CST’s emphasis on the importance of developing 
individual virtue within a community as well as the fact that families, not labor unions 
alone, are counted among the ‘intermediate associations’ that can promote dramatic 
social change.171 Rubio identifies four primary roles proposed for family in CST; “work 
as vocation, personal responsibility for social change, the social mission of the family, 
and the transformation of culture.”172 She writes, “The genius of Catholic teaching on the 
family is its refusal to limit families by telling them to simply focus on themselves. 
Christian families, from this perspective, are to grow in self-giving love within and 
outside the bonds of kinship.”173 In contrast, some would suggest that the family lies 
beyond the scope of CST, but this mistaken notion itself, Rubio argues, arises from an 
overly privatized view of the family and a limited conception of the family as a 
community.174 Rather, “family is a fundamental part of the Catholic social tradition’s 
vision of social reform.”175 
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Throughout her books, Rubio joins a commitment to exploring the breadth of the 
tradition with a refusal to allow idealizations of family life to obscure the practical 
implications of Christian discipleship. In her earlier work, she insightfully explores 
diversities in Christian conceptions of marriage, family, and parenthood that stand in 
some tension with contemporary discourse. Most notably, she argues that contemporary 
accounts of the family are more private and parent-centered than the tradition demands. 
In her later work, Rubio helpfully shifts considerations of parenthood and the family 
away from sexual ethics and structure. Furthermore she offers a rich critique of the 
consequences of idealism as well as insightful articulations of what the Christian call to 
discipleship might look like within the realm of parenthood as a contemporary Christian 
vocation. When taken together, Rubio’s books offer a thorough rejection the ideal of a 
private, autonomous, biological nuclear family as insufficient in itself. Instead Christian 
families should aspire to be socially engaged, open communities that are grounded in 
practices of discipleship and set within a broader Christian community. In this context, 
parenthood is framed by discipleship and requires communal support. 
 
Gaillardetz on Generativity  
Richard Gaillardetz’s book on marriage, A Daring Promise, appropriates the 
notion of ‘generativity,’ drawn from Orthodox thought. Generativity is similar to the 
expanded notions of procreation often adopted by revisionist theologians; however 
generativity as explained by Gaillardetz is also clearly connected to Christian 
discipleship. Differences in interpretations of ‘procreation’ tend to relate to how closely 
or loosely it ought to be associated with biological reproduction. As such, whether 
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adoption, social outreach, and other commitments directly fulfill the procreative end of 
sex and marriage for all couples, only for couples who cannot biologically procreate, or 
only analogously for all couples, remains a continuing point of ambiguity within Catholic 
theology. Generativity, however, begins from a much broader perspective that suggests a 
greater capacity to encompass the complex, and possibly conflictual, Christian calls to 
discipleship and parenthood. 
According to Gaillardetz, the Orthodox tradition understands that the love of the 
married couple replicates the love of the Trinity. In the Trinity, “the love between two 
(the Father and the Son) is not self-contained but ‘spills over,’ as it were, as Spirit. The 
triune life of God is characterized not only by a profound mutuality of love between the 
Trinitarian persons, but also by a fecundity, a superabundance in which God’s love 
overflows outward into the world.” Following from this perspective, the love of Christian 
couples should not be self-contained but should be expected to similarly overflow in life-
giving ways; biological procreation being one example. From this perspective, 
“childbearing is not seen as an obligation of married life… but as a ‘felicitous outcome’ 
of the nuptial union.” Gaillardetz continues, 
For most married couples the generative power of their love will indeed be expressed in 
childbearing and childrearing… But generativity, the drive to see our love bear fruit in the world, 
can be expressed in innumerable ways. This is the aspect of Christian mission which is so strong 
in the Orthodox view of marriage and relatively undeveloped in most other Christian traditions.176 
 
This concept appears to hold significant potential for transforming the Catholic concept 
of procreation. First, its theological foundation provides a clear account of children as 
both gifts and a natural result of marital love. Second, it avoids objectifying children as 
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an obligation or a form of legitimization for marriage and human sexuality. And third, it 
clearly encompasses adoption, social service, and other expressions of social commitment 
as belonging authentically to marriage without raising the question of if these qualify in 
fulfilling marriage’s legitimate end. 
 
Conclusion 
The commitments that characterize revisionist Catholic theological methods both 
define these scholars in distinction from magisterial teaching and represent important 
contributions to contemporary theology. Each source presented above demonstrates intent 
to operate within the context of the Catholic tradition while addressing perceived 
shortcomings in official teaching. This commitment has produced a number of insights 
that are helpful to the task of developing a broader theological account of parenthood. 
The revisionist authors above express concern that magisterial teaching on the family is 
too tightly linked to the nuclear family, especially as this is accompanied by implied or 
explicit parental roles based on gender. Likewise, they express concern that the 
commitments of magisterial teaching are idealistic and do not speak adequately to the 
complexity of contemporary familial realities.  
These observations are important, yet the responses offered by revisionists are 
themselves limited and tend to replicate biases also present in magisterial writing, 
especially when moving from considerations of sexual ethics to conceptions of 
parenthood. For example, with the magisterium, the authors above agree that openness to 
adoption is a positive expression of Christian parenthood. Yet theological explanations of 
why this is so and how adoptive parenthood relates to biological parenthood and marriage 
151 
 
are under-developed. The support appears to follow from both their emphasis on 
Christian social commitments and broad interpretations of the ‘procreative’ end of sex 
and marriage.177 Neither option, however, provides a sufficient account of why adoption 
is a specific good in relation to Christian parenthood theologically considered.  
A second example, this one in opposition to the magisterial teaching, is the 
support for the potential morality of same-sex parenthood. Here the defense moves from 
a rational for justifying same-sex sexual acts, to parenthood. Yet theological defenses of 
same-sex childrearing tend to rely on sociological evidence with little theological 
argument from the nature of parenthood itself. The introduction to this project suggested 
that magisterial opposition to same-sex adoptive parenthood centers on sexual ethical 
concerns rather than parental capacities. Revisionist arguments, though disagreeing in 
their conclusions, tend to replicate this very pattern. In both instances, moral 
justifications of sexual relationships appear to validate or invalidate parental capacities. 
Still, revisionist authors contribute a number of valuable insights for advancing 
conceptions of parenthood. These include incorporating experience (particularly in the 
form of social-scientific findings), historical consciousness, and broadened 
anthropological frameworks with more nuanced conceptions of human gender into moral 
methodology. Moreover, attempts to redefine and expand the theological notion of 
‘procreation’, commitment to justice as a norm for human relationships, and gestures 
towards the significance of human capacities also offer useful grounds for a broadened 
theological anthropological account of parenthood. 
                                                 
177 Farley. Just Love, 290. Farley suggests ‘fruitfulness’ as a concept that helps expand the 
traditional understanding of ‘procreation,’ and includes growth in loving relationships, care and justice 
within her meaning. 
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Moreover, books by Rubio and Cahill also offer significant grounds for 
advancement. This includes a concept of familial Christian discipleship that is not 
contingent upon a specific family structure, but is linked to the vocation of the family 
itself. Making this argument, however, requires both Cahill and Rubio to acknowledge 
that the call to Christian discipleship does not always fit neatly with family commitments. 
This tension runs throughout the tradition and is first attested to in a complex and often 
ambiguous New Testament attitude toward the family. The authors also seek to open 
privatized conceptions of the family to more broadly social understandings. This includes 
familial commitment to social service and welcoming more communal notions of 
childrearing. 
Rubio is more explicit in de-centering biological kinship within her theological 
vision of the family. Christian families are grounded in love and discipleship. Biological 
kinship, although it retains significance, is a lesser good in relation to these central 
convictions. Rubio’s work also offers significant theological reasons for questioning the 
idealizations of the family prevalent in recent thought in terms of the practical 
implications for modern families. 
Cahill’s contribution is nearer to the anthropological question. Though she does 
not express it in these terms, her convictions in Family center around the complex 
interrelation of nature, sin, and grace; concepts at the heart of Christian anthropology. In 
addition, her approach is framed by relational anthropological commitments, as well as 
basic human capabilities which must flow from an anthropological vision. Cahill’s 
concern, however, is directed towards the family more generally than it is to parenthood 
in particular. Yet, even as she retains biological kinship as a locus for defining the family, 
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she emphasizes the importance of functional evaluations of how various domestic 
arrangements evidence Christian virtues. 
The expanded notions of ‘procreation’ offered by revisionists – variously 
described as parenthood, fruitfulness, and generativity – build upon suggestions within 
magisterial documents that procreation includes meanings well beyond biological 
reproduction. Yet, Gaillardetz’s notion of generativity offers a more promising approach 
as it goes beyond simply adjusting the scope and priorities of ‘procreation.’ Generativity 
speaks to a theological reality about the very nature of Christian love. As such it is able to 
place biological reproduction as well as social commitments as its authentic outcomes 
without these appearing as potentially rival commitments. Moreover, generativity 
distances a theological account of parenthood from sexual ethics by both grounding 
parenthood in a theological reality and decentering sexual reproduction. 
Having surveyed these resources, it is now evident that the major disagreements 
between magisterial and revisionist accounts are primarily methodological and largely 
influenced by differing frameworks for understanding the significance of human gender. 
These disagreements are most pronounced in matters of sexual ethics but diminish as 
considerations move toward family function; specifically the Christian family’s role in 
society. Concerning these matters, authors tend to criticize inadequate reception of 
Catholic Social Teaching as it concerns the family while the major disagreement 
concerns the level of idealization within magisterial thinking of the biological-nuclear 
norm as well as pious and harmonious family life. As such, a more firm and 
comprehensive vision of parenthood, that is allowed a degree of distinction from sexual 
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ethics, has the potential to unite insights from Catholic sources that are often oppositional 
while speaking more coherently to present realities. 
The following chapters now turn to considering how these pieces might be fit 
together fruitfully to begin to construct an expanded theological understanding of 
parenthood by drawing on resources found in history, the social sciences, and the 
humanities. 
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Introduction 
 Many of the authors cited in previous chapters provide historical surveys to 
support their argument, which testifies to the importance of historical evidence for 
theological considerations of sexuality, marriage and family. Magisterial documents tend 
to reference historical figures, ideas, or events primarily to demonstrate continuity and do 
not generally rely upon extensive critical research. Revisionist theologians employ 
critical research to demonstrate historical developments, diversities, and the cultural roots 
of religious ideals.1 Theologians who are more inclined to defend magisterial teaching 
employ similar methods but emphasize continuity and consistency throughout these 
developments. Feminist theologians tend to center historical criticism on gendered 
hierarchies and ideologies which have left women’s voices silent, lost, or muted.2 Each of 
these approaches offers insight into how parenthood has been understood throughout 
Christian history, yet, each also tends to replicate the concerns of its authors who have 
been inclined to undervalue parenthood as a theological consideration in its own right.  
This chapter is an effort to redress some of this oversight by revisiting the 
historical data with attention to diversities in Christian conceptions of the family, 
children, and parenthood. The first part of this chapter considers New Testament and 
Early Christian sources. The second part explores conceptions of the child throughout 
Christian history and the relation of these to historical and ideological developments.  
                                                 
1 Cf. Rosemary Radford Ruether, Christianity and the Making of the Modern Family (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 2000). The greatest forces of change appear to be cultural and religious ideals as well as 
social and economic pressures. Theological commitments are only one among many forces of change or 
preservation in family systems. 
2 Ruether, Christianity and the Making of the Modern Family, 5. 
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The third part turns attention to forms of Christian childrearing beyond the biological 
family in order to establish greater diversities in historical contexts for childrearing than 
is often acknowledged.3 Throughout, this chapter intends to demonstrate that presently 
influential notions of kinship within Catholicism require significant reconsideration in 
light of the historical evidence. Specifically, the assumption of biological kinship’s 
fundamental place within Christian conceptions of parenthood will be called into 
question in light the historical diversities of Christian caregiving practices and the 
theological motivations behind these. This investigation is not intended to negate the 
value of the biologically-based family unit, but only to call into question the central place 
the fact of biological kinship itself often occupies in theological conceptions of 
parenthood.  
 
Part I: Early Christianity 
New Testament Perspectives 
Assessing the New Testament’s perspectives on children and parenthood is 
complicated at several levels. First, the New Testament itself is the work of many hands 
which provide different perspectives. Second, the New Testament is shaped by both first 
century Greco-Roman society as well as Jewish culture, neither of which held simple or 
entirely consistent perspectives on children and parenthood. Third, the New Testament 
neither wholly accepts nor wholly rejects these prevailing cultural and religious 
                                                 
3 This perspective responds to the observation of Annelies van Heijst in her study of orphan care 
by women religious that “Theologians, philosophers, psychologists and sociologists” have been generally 
inattentive to practices of providing care, especially when these are found beyond the family unit. See, 
Annelies van Heijst, Models of Charitable Care: Catholic Nuns and Children in their Care in Amsterdam, 
1852-2002 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2008), 13. 
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assumptions.4 Thus the New Testament is a collection of perspectives from writers, each 
influenced by regional variations in composite socio-religious identities, who respond to 
complex and somewhat contradictory socio-religious ideals with varying levels of 
acceptance and criticism. The following section attempts to clarify components of these 
perspectives with attention to conceptions of children and parenthood. 
  
Greco-Roman Context 
Among the Greco-Roman upper class,5 the ideal household was built around a 
single, two-parent family with their children, possibly their children’s families, and their 
slaves and slaves’ families.6 Yet circumstances and customs created significant diversity 
in actual household forms. Substantial differences in age at marriage produced much 
younger wives who might outlive their husbands by decades. Alternately, childbirth 
posed a substantial risk to the lives of women and would have produced many widowers 
and subsequent remarriages. Infant and child mortality rates were high while low life 
expectancies probably left few grandparents.7 Thus, mortality at all ages would have 
                                                 
4 Judtih M Gundry-Volf, “The Least and the Greatest: Children in the New Testament,” in The 
Child in Christian Thought, ed. Marcia J. Bunge (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001), 36. 
5 The historical record best attests to conditions of the affluent. It is uncertain the extent to which 
these practices and ideals were shared by the majority of society. 
6 Beryl Rawson, “The Roman Family in Recent Research: State of the Question.” Biblical 
Interpretation 11 no. 3 (2003), 121. 
7 “Saller’s work has shown that mortality rates were such that by early adulthood most young men 
and women had lost their paterfamilias and were sui iuris. Many children were deprived of a close 
relationship with a parent by a parent’s early death. At the age of five, the probability of having a father 
alive was perhaps 88 per cent, but by the age of ten this had reduced to about 75 per cent, and by the age of 
fifteen it was about 63 per cent. Corresponding figures for mothers were 91, 81 and 72 per cent.” Ibid. 127. 
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assured variations in family forms.8 In addition, age differences among children were 
probably much greater than in modern times such that even a relatively large family 
would not necessarily imply siblings of close ages.9 
 The Roman household was also ordered hierarchically based on gender, age, and 
class.10 The eldest patrilineal male, the paterfamilias, stood as lord and insurer of good 
order over all within the household. Wives were subservient to husbands and children to 
their parents; but first and foremost to their fathers. But while authority flowed from the 
top down, shame moved in both directions. This added greater importance to the 
supervision of those of lower status (i.e. women and children) as their misconduct would 
be a mark on the honor of patrilineal male kin.11 Theoretically, the authority of the 
paterfamilias extended even to life and death, but circumstances tended to limit the 
exercise of this power. Short life expectancies and late ages at marriage left relatively few 
years for most men as paterfamilias. For those who did live to advanced age, adult sons, 
while still technically under their father’s rule, often held separate residences. In practice, 
newborn infants alone had their lives’ in their father’s hands. Unwanted infants were 
generally exposed (i.e. abandoned in a public space). Exposure could result in the infant’s 
death, but many exposed infants were probably claimed. This could lead to lives of 
                                                 
8 Suzanne Dixon, The Roman Mother (London: Croom Helm, 1988), 32. 
9 The reasons for this spacing include infant mortality as well as social and economic factors, thus 
Roman mothers tended to bear children throughout the entirety of their fertile years. Rawson, 128. 
10 Dixon, 13. 
11 The importance of hierarchy in Greco-Roman family leads Cahill to conclude that it was (and 
may remain) “the nexus of relationships of social inequalities maintained by structures of precedence and 
subjugation.” Lisa Sowle Cahill, Family: A Christian Social Perspective (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
2000), 20. 
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slavery, physical labor, prostitution, or even intentional mutilation for begging. But 
exposed children were also adopted and raised by families, apparently even those of 
higher classes. To complicate matters, in some cases the biological parents of exposed 
children who were subsequently adopted petitioned later to have them returned.12 
Wives, though second in status to husbands, could hold positions of considerable 
authority within the family; especially when they controlled a portion of the household’s 
wealth, which a widow might administer for decades after her husband’s death.13 
Although physical separations in public and private spaces served to shelter female 
family members, the division did not include a separation of genders within the 
household, nor did it reflect a conceptual differentiation between public-economic and 
private-familial spheres.14 Women’s space was central to the household’s economic 
production.15 In addition, Roman mothers were not primarily associated with nurturing 
small children as domestic servants and wet nurses assumed most of these tasks.16 With 
age children grew in status and responsibility for their direct oversight transitioned from 
household servants, to teachers, to custodians.17 Roman moralists often protested the 
evidently common practice of assigning the care of infants to the lowest rung on the 
domestic hierarchy. However, there is ample reason to believe that such arrangements 
                                                 
12 Hugh Cunningham, Children and Childhood in Western Society Since 1500, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Routledge, 2005), 22. 
13 Dixon, 28. 
14 Rawson, 123. Cf. Carolyn Osiek, “Pietas In and Out of the Frying Pan,” Biblical Interpretation 
11, no. 3 (2003), 166 – 172. 
15 Cahill, Family, 22. 
16 Dixon, 105. 
17 Ibid., 142. 
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were retained as much in response to maternal mortality as by cultural convention.18 
Mothers, though not usually the direct caregiver, consistently held a center relational role 
within the family that helped solidify kin relationships and familial cohesion.19 
Children, especially infants, held a marginal status in Greco-Roman society where 
undesired infants of any class might be exposed and the children of slaves were sold 
freely. Burial customs suggest that infants and young children, whose deaths were 
common, were regarded with much less emotional attachment than adolescents.20 The 
strongest lament appears to have been for children who died on the cusp of adulthood. 
Still, Roman parents also formed strong emotional bonds with the children they did raise, 
and the deaths of young children were occasionally mourned deeply by parents.21 
Children were valued as objects of affection, heirs who would assure their father’s 
memory, and often as economic assets. But the value of any individual child depended 
upon conditions within the household, the effort and assets parents were willing to invest 
in childrearing, and the child’s gender. 22 The overarching view was that children were a 
thing to be developed and only through diligent and strict parenting might they be shaped 
into respectable adult citizens.23 As such, choosing to raise a child was recognized as a 
considerable investment.  
                                                 
18 Ibid., 17. 
19 Ibid., 35. 
20 Cunningham, 23. 
21 Dixon, 26. 
22 Cahill, 30. 
23 Gundry-Volf, 31 – 34. 
166 
 
Although marriage was understood as being for children, family limitation was 
widely practiced. As Suzanne Dixon writes, there are many “sober, casual references to 
the economic and emotional burdens of child-rearing” which indicate “that parenthood 
was not universally viewed as desirable.” Family limitation was probably common 
among poor families but was also a concern among the wealthy who may have viewed 
children as “a source of anxiety and long-term expense to their parents.”24 The inverse 
correlation between prosperity and family size held as true for first century Romans as in 
modern times. Family limitation, in itself, does not imply a low valuation of children, but 
tends to be associated with “strong sentimental attachment to children and a serious view 
of the parental role.”25 Among the upper classes, increased economic and social 
obligations as well as the costs of educating and preparing heirs increased parental 
obligations perhaps even beyond correspondence with their resources.26 
Within the specifically Jewish culture of this era, the obligation to have children 
was very strong. First century Jewish males could be legally compelled to marry after 
their eighteenth year.27 The status of Jewish wives was tied to the number and gender of 
their children while childlessness was considered a tragedy; even an act of divine 
punishment.28 Children were a central factor in the Abrahamic covenant which may have 
                                                 
24 Dixon, 23. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., 21. Low fertility rates near the turn of the first century CE motivated legislation aimed at 
reducing celibacy, childlessness, and adultery with the intention of creating more legitimate heirs among 
the upper class. 
27 Theodore Mackin, S.J., “The Primitive Christian Understanding of Marriage” ” in Perspectives 
on Marriage: A Reader, eds. Kieran Scott and Michael Warren (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 23. 
28 Ibid., 27. 
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encouraged greater religious significance to childbearing and better treatment of children 
generally.29 Yet, Jewish conceptions of children were not far afield from Greco-Roman 
ideals. Throughout the Old Testament, “children are viewed as ignorant, capricious, and 
in need of strict discipline.”30 However, the idea of children as gifts from God provided 
children with an inherent value that was not found in the surrounding culture. This 
recognition of inherent worth proved pivotal in Christianity’s reappraisal of childhood.31 
 
The New Testament 
As seen in the previous chapter, both Julie Hanlon Rubio and Lisa Sowle Cahill 
have observed that New Testament perspectives on the family can appear inconsistent 
and conflictual. According to Cahill, two distinct views informed early Christianity’s 
understanding of the family. The first is a general acceptance of prevailing hierarchal and 
patriarchal family structures conditioned by Christian convictions. This 
accommodationist trend is exemplified most clearly in the household codes of Ephesians 
and Colossians and was the dominant influence as the tradition developed. The second 
perspective, which lost influence over time, is often hostile to familial obligations and 
finds clearest support in the words of Jesus as recorded by the synoptic gospels. At its 
greatest extent, Cahill claims, Jesus’ dichotomy of discipleship and family demands “that 
family relations be completely repudiated and abandoned.”32 Rubio adds that Mark 3: 31 
                                                 
29 Gundry-Volf, 35. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Marie A. Failinger, “Co-Creating Adoption Law: A Lutheran Perspective” Dialog: A Journal of 
Theology 51, no. 4 (Winter 2012): 267. 
32 Cahill, 29. 
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– 35 “proposes a new radical moral standard that threatens the most basic family loyalties 
and engenders the most difficult conflicts between family and religious commitment.”33 
Moreover, Christine Gudorf writes, 
Jesus opposed the generally accepted primacy of familial duty, especially filial duty, in his refusal 
to interrupt his teaching to see his mother and brothers (Mk 3:31-35), in his refusal to sanction 
burying one’s father before taking up the duties of discipleship (Lk 9:59-62), and in rebutting the 
woman who blessed his mother for having birthed him (‘Blessed rather are those who hear the 
word of God and keep it!’ Lk 11:27-28).34 
 
However, elsewhere Jesus appears more amenable to the family. For example, Jesus 
indicates support for marriage in his firm rejection of divorce.35  
Rubio and Cahill offer differing resolutions to the New Testament tensions they 
identify.36 For Rubio, these tensions represent an ongoing dynamic between familial 
obligations and the demands of the Gospel. She describes these as ‘dual vocations’ which 
Christian parents inhabit. For Cahill, the conflicting voices of the New Testament are 
reconcilable when understood as a critique of power structures and a call to reprioritize 
commitments. Cahill’s reasoning is based on her observation that the New Testament 
consistently seeks to decenter hierarchical relationships and to subvert self-interested 
                                                 
33 Julie Hanlon Rubio, A Christian Theology of Marriage and Family (New York: Paulist Press, 
2003), 48. Rubio also finds Luke 2:41-52 significant for the child Jesus’ dismissal of his parent’s concerns. 
34 Christine E. Gudorf, “Western Religion and the Patriarchal Family,” in Perspectives on 
Marriage: A Reader, eds. Kieran Scott and Michael Warren (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
286. 
35 Matthew 19: 1 – 9, Mark 10: 11 – 12  
36 A significant facet of the New Testament’s apparent ambiguity towards the family is the fact 
that the organization of the New Testament canon suggests a false chronology in which the harsher words 
of Jesus in the Gospel are later resolved by the epistles. Carolyn Osiek observes, “If we are correct about 
the time of writing of the Synoptic Gospels, these subversive texts that advocate abandonment of family in 
favor of the new grouping of disciples are more or less contemporary with the first Christian manifestations 
of imperial ‘family values’ in Colossian and Ephesians, with the Pastorals falling not far behind.” Osiek, 
171. 
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concepts of family.37 According to Cahill, even Jesus’ use of the term abba was 
essentially anti-patriarchal.38 By calling God ‘father,’ Jesus challenged the role of the 
paterfamilias, the center of familial honor and obligation.39 Key to her interpretation is 
Mark 10:29-30, in which Jesus includes fathers among those left behind for the sake of 
the Gospel, yet does not again include fathers among those who will be received back in 
the kingdom (as are brothers, sisters, mothers, children, houses and fields).40 
If Jesus’ words are taken to indicate a subversion of the power culturally 
associated with fathers, as Cahill claims, Jesus’ perspective on mothers remains more 
complex. Mothers were subordinate to fathers but could still exercise relatively strong 
influence within the family. This requires that Jesus’ attitude towards motherhood, which 
could also be a source of power in conflict with the Gospel, be viewed in light of his 
relatively high regard for women. Christine Gudorf observes,  
While Jesus never directly contravened the dominant/subordinate relationship prescribed for 
husbands and wives in patriarchy, he did give many examples extraordinary in his time of respect 
for women, and he demonstrated support for breaking the stereotypically servant role of women in 
the home (Mary and Martha, Lk 10:38 – 42). Perhaps the strongest evidence for a New Testament 
tendency to contravene patriarchy comes from Gal. 3:28 and the examples of Paul’s epistles of the 
leadership roles given to women in the early church, some of whom, like Prisca, shared authority 
in the church with their husbands ([12], Ch. 5).41 
 
Furthermore, Jesus distanced himself from the Jewish tendency to value women for their 
procreative maternal roles. Rubio notes, “[Jesus] places the work of the gospel above this 
                                                 
37 Cahill, 29. 
38 Cf. Matthew 23:9 
39 Cahill, 31. Whether Jesus’ use of abba was distinctive or had cultural precedent is a topic of 
scholarly debate.  
40 On this point, Rubio agrees that the absence indicates that the power culturally associated with 
fatherhood has no place in the coming kingdom. Rubio, A Christian Theology of Marriage and Family, 51. 
41 Gudorf, “Western Religion and the Patriarchal Family,” 286. 
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nurturing work, suggesting that nurturing is not to be the primary form of God’s word for 
women who follow him.”42 
Decentering filial obligations to fathers and mothers relativizes the importance of 
biological kinship itself.43 In response to Mark 3: 31 – 35, Rubio suggests that a more 
gracious possibility existed for Jesus to have halted his family’s intervention by 
acknowledging the importance of his work. Yet, Jesus used the opportunity “to call the 
whole nature of the kinship bond into question. He says very plainly that those he has 
gathered round him are his new family, and he seems to deny all loyalty or duty to his 
family of origin.”44  
Jesus’ attitude toward children also diverged from cultural trends. Cicero had 
written that childhood itself was a condition unworthy of praise and that being childlike 
was entirely undesirable in adults.45 Even among Jews, Jesus’ assertion that the kingdom 
belongs only to those who receive it like a child was extraordinary. Rubio observes, “To 
those who thought of children as objects requiring care and formation, Jesus suggests 
quite plainly that children have qualities adults ought to develop.”46 Moreover, Jesus’ 
                                                 
42 Rubio, A Christian Theology of Marriage and Family, 50. 1 Timothy 2: 8-15 appears to stand in 
significant tension with this perspective. 
43 Cahill, 18. 
44 Rubio, A Christian Theology of Marriage and Family, 48. 
45 Gundry-Volf, 32. 
46 Rubio, A Christian Theology of Marriage and Family, 151. 
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holding children in his arms47 may have been a demonstration of the service required of 
disciples while subverting cultural expectations of children’s value.48  
Judith Gundry-Volf argues, that Jesus “cast judgment on the adult world because 
it is not the child’s world… He invited the children to come to him not so that he might 
initiate them in the adult realm but that they might receive what is properly theirs — the 
reign of God.” The radical aspect of Jesus’ teaching, Gundry-Volf contends, is the 
seriousness with which he took children’s faith. She writes, “they are not only to be 
formed but to be imitated; they are not only ignorant but capable of receiving spiritual 
insight; they are not ‘just’ children but representatives of Christ.”49 
However, critical responses to this interpretation of Jesus’ actions may also be 
raised. For example, Jesus uses children primarily as teaching tools for his adult audience 
such that his actual interactions with children are secondary to a message that is being 
directed to adults. Additionally, Jesus’ interactions with children usually come at the 
request of adults (particularly parents requesting healing for children) or are used within 
the Gospel narratives to reveal and clarify Jesus’ own identity.50 Finally, Jesus’ apparent 
prioritization of children may not relate to any essential quality of childhood or children 
                                                 
47 Mark 10:16. 
48 “Children in Jesus’ social world are not generally regarded as having value in their own right; 
hence the common practice of exposing infants, which the early Christians reject. Jesus’ saying that one 
must become ‘like a child’ to enter the rain of heaven has impact precisely because of children’s negligible 
status. Childlikeness can symbolize the transformation of priorities and radical countercultural lifestyle 
required of disciples.” Cahill, 30. 
49 Gundry-Volf, 60. 
50 Matthew 21:16, “And Jesus said to them, ‘Yes; have you never read, 'Out of the mouth of 
infants and nursing babies you have prepared praise for yourself’?’” 
172 
 
themselves, but could be connected primarily to their low social status whereby they are 
exemplars of powerlessness. 
The New Testament calls into question basic familial allegiances centered on 
biological kinship and offers perspectives on women and children that stood in significant 
discontinuity with prevailing cultural trends. These perspectives appear to support 
Cahill’s argument that Jesus’ primary critique is directed at centers of earthly power; 
which included fathers, mothers, and kin. Still, it is the obligations understood to arise 
from kinship that are given greater scrutiny than the existence of the family itself. It is 
also difficult to ascertain the degree to which position itself (i.e. fatherhood, motherhood, 
childhood) or cultural interpretations of that position are being addressed. Still, the extent 
of egalitarian ideals in both Jesus’ ministry as well as early Christianity is a matter of 
dispute.51 As Adrian Thatcher contends, if Jesus’ apparently pejorative views of kinship 
can be explained as criticisms of centers of authority; why is there not more explicit 
criticism of the highest level of Greco-Roman allegiance; the state.52 If a critique of 
power structures lies at the heart of the New Testament’s criticisms of the family, a more 
sustained critique of imperial authority should be evident as well.53 Additionally, Cahill’s 
                                                 
51 One example is John H. Elliot’s thorough criticism of the argument for Jesus and Early 
Christianity’s egalitarianism espoused by John Dominic Crossan, Gerd Theissen, and Elisabeth Schüssler 
Fiorenza. See, John H. Elliott, “The Jesus Movement Was Not Egalitarian but Family-Oriented,” Biblical 
Interpretation 11, no. 3 (2003): 173 – 210. 
52 For example, whereas Jesus can be entirely dismissive of allegiance owed to biological kin 
(Mark 3: 31 – 35), he offers a compromise view of what is owed to the state and to God. (Mark 12:17, Luke 
20:25 and Matthew 22:15). 
53 This is not to say that criticisms of imperial authority do not exist and are not pervasive but that, 
comparatively, they would seem to require greater emphasis if authority is the central concern. 
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perspective does not thoroughly account for Jewish trends prior to Jesus which had 
already privileged allegiance to God above familial obligations. 
Whatever resolution one finds preferable, consistency throughout the New 
Testament appears difficult to maintain while Jesus’ apparent rejection of familial 
obligations complicates any attempt to read the New Testament as unilaterally pro-
family. Yet, as Elliot argues, the tensions present in the Gospels do not indicate that Jesus 
or early Christians were ‘anti-family’, “Their point is rather that the new primary 
allegiance of followers of Jesus is ‘the new solidarity which consists of the eschatological 
family of God.’”54 The New Testament perspective recognizes potential conflict between 
familial obligations and faith commitments yet affirms marriage and the dignity of each 
family member.55 Jesus’ ministry was also reliant upon households as places of public 
gathering and teaching as well as centers for hospitality and rest. In addition, there is a 
prevailing positive attitude towards children, as children, throughout the New Testament, 
even as these references are relatively sparse. 
 
Early Christian Sources 
Following the composition of the New Testament texts, Christians continued a 
complex relationship with the idea of the family in both adopting and rejecting aspects of 
                                                 
54 Elliott, 200. 
55 Adriana Destro and Mauro Pesce claim that even the application of the term ‘family’ to the 
period is problematic in so much as it is a temptation for anachronism. They write, “in the first century 
Galilee, as described in the Gospels, we do not find the ‘family’ but the household (οίκος),  a group that 
lives together and makes a ‘living together’… The focus on households implies attention not only to 
primary kinship ties but also to communal existence and work, property and power that bind kin and non-
kin people.” Adriana Destro and Mauro Pesce, “Fathers and Householders in the Jesus Movement: The 
Perspective of the Gospel of Luke,” Biblical Interpretation 11, no. 3 (2003): 212.  
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prevailing cultural perspectives within Christian practice. One telling sign of 
Christianity’s divergence from its surrounding culture is the new evaluation Christians 
made of adoption.56 Stephen Post argues that Christianity prioritized love over biological 
kinship which is evidence in early Christian’s willingness to allow children to be raised 
by non-biological kin when this suited the children’s best interest. In fact, Post argues, 
the rationale for claiming adoption as a good came from Christians’ own theological self-
understanding as having been adopted by God in baptism. For Post, a remarkable feature 
of the early Christian understanding of the family is the willingness to extend love 
beyond biological kinship.57 
Julie Hanlon Rubio adds that this willingness is at the heart of what separates 
Christian families from their Roman and Jewish counterparts. She writes,  
We know that Jesus’ message included the claim that his real family was a Christian community 
not his mother and his brothers. We know that others noticed that the Christians sometimes left 
their biological families for their new Christian families. And we know that the Christians were 
often seen as unpatriotic and immoral, as family-wreckers, because they sometimes refused to give 
into what was expected of them. 
 
This does not indicate that Christians held the family in low regard. Instead it suggests 
that the early Christian theological framework committed them to an interpretation of kin 
obligations that was not centered on biological kinship which in turn committed early 
Christians to a conception of the family that stood in tension with cultural norms. Rubio 
explains, “All of this means that family to the first Christians was an expansive term that 
                                                 
56 Rubio, A Christian Theology of Marriage and Family, 54. 
57 Stephen Post, “Adoption Theologically Considered,” Journal of Religious Ethics 25, no. 1 
(Spring 1997): 152. 
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references not just the household, but, more importantly, the community of disciples of 
Christ.”58 
Unique evidence for the conceptual distance between the biological family and 
the new family of Christians comes from early Christian martyriologies. These also 
heighten the New Testament tension between Christian faith and family obligations to an 
extent rarely appreciated in contemporary writing on the family.59 
 In the early third century account of the Passion of Perpetua and Felicity, the 
young mother and future martyr, Perpetua, listens to the pleas of her father that she avoid 
death for the sake of her family; especially for his own sake and that of her infant son. 
Perpetua remains resolute in seeking martyrdom.60 Meanwhile, a pregnant companion, 
Felicity, rejoices at her early labor which enables her to be martyred alongside the fellow 
Christian prisoners.61 The narratives suggest tension between motherhood and 
martyrdom, with martyrdom clearly presented as the more desirable Christian calling. 
The accounts of both mother-martyrs describe their children primarily as impediments 
and burdens during the approach to martyrdom. Neither suggests significant attachment 
between mother and child. Arrangements for the future care of the children are explicitly 
recounted in each narrative but no evident moral concern (aside from that expressed by 
Perpetua’s non-Christian father) arises over the children being raised without their 
                                                 
58 Rubio, A Christian Theology of Marriage and Family, 60. 
59 Dawn Llewellyn and Paul Middleton, “Motherhood, Martyrdom, and the Threat to Christian 
Identity: Voicing a Modern and Ancient Taboo,” Paper given at American Academy of Religions, 
Baltimore, 2013. 
60 Perpetua, “The Martyrdom of Perpetua,” in In Her Words; Women’s Writing in the History of 
Christian Thought, ed. Amy Oden (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1994), 28 – 29. 
61 Ibid., 33. 
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biological mothers.62 For both Perpetua and Felicity the opportunity to confess the faith, 
and the martyrdom that followed, clearly superseded any obligation to provide direct care 
for biological children.  
In the Acts of the Martyrs Carpus, Papylus and Agathonicê,63 both Papylus and 
Agathonicê claim to have children, though it is revealed that Papylus is referring to 
fellow Christians as ‘spiritual children.’64 Agathonicê, however, has biological children 
and is urged by the crowd of non-Christian onlookers to take pity on her children and not 
go through with her martyrdom. Agathonicê replies that her children have God to watch 
over them. She then leaps to her death atop the fire that has already consumed her 
companions.65 
Minimally, these narratives demonstrate that Christianity’s strand of skepticism 
towards familial obligations did not end with the Pastoral Epistles’ apparent counsel for 
greater cultural conformity in domestic affairs.66 Instead, biblical support for orderly 
                                                 
62 Ibid., 28. 
63 The account is dated to either the late second or mid-third century. It also exists in both a Latin 
and Greek form which differ in length and some details, such as the particularities of Agathonicê’s death. 
In the Greek text Agathonicê leaps to her own death, in the Latin text she is likewise spared some of the 
suffering of her male counterparts, but is put to death in the fire. 
64 Carolyn Osiek writes, “We know from Christian literary sources that the church was considered 
more and more to be a family, a ‘family of families’ that claimed the absolute allegiance that the family of 
origin had previously commanded.” (Osiek, 168.)  The Roman emperor Augustus assumed the title Pater 
Patriae in 2 BCE in honor of his achievements. This supported the Roman use of the empire as a 
metaphorical family. (Mary R. D’Angelo, “Roman Imperial Family Values and Sexual Politics of 4 
Maccabees and the Pastorals,” Biblical Interpretation 11, no. 3 (2003): 142.) Finally, Elliot argues that the 
Roman Empire itself was built upon families. Thus, which ‘family’ one identified with had significant 
implications. (Elliott, 200.) 
65 “Martyrs,” in Women in Early Christianity; Translations from Greek Texts, ed. Patricia Cox 
Miller (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 45. 
66 Mary D’Angelo writes that the pastorals reflect the virtues of good Roman citizenship. “The 
communal assembly is the household of God (1 Tim. 3:15), and within it and its individual households, 
moral rectitude is displayed by the appropriate governance of women, children, unemancipated sons, and 
slaves under the authority of the patres familias. Thus the ability to preside over a household is a central 
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domestic life, such as 1 Timothy’s counsel that women “be saved through childbearing—
if they continue in faith, love and holiness with propriety,” stand in tension with 
martyriologies in which articulate, determined women abandon motherhood and yet serve 
as models of faith.67  
From the perspective of these female martyrs, the fact of motherhood appears to 
have been a relatively minor consideration in comparison to their commitment to the 
Christian faith. That these women were recognized as examples of faith whose stories 
were recorded to inspire latter Christian readers further calls into question Christianity’s 
relation to familial obligations. No moral concern is voiced within these narratives by a 
Christian concerning the obligations of biological mother to raise her own child. In the 
case of Agathanicê even basic arrangements for her children’s care are absent while, as 
with Perpetua, it is non-Christians who express concern for the children. 
The second century apocryphal text, The Acts of Paul and Thecla, provides 
another example of a female Christian heroine choosing faith over familial commitments 
as Thecla leaves a fiancé behind to join Paul’s missionary journeys.68 The Acts of Paul 
and Thecla also provides evidence of the growing influence of an idealization of virginity 
                                                 
qualification for leadership in the community (3:5-6, 12 ).” D’Angelo, “Roman Imperial Family Values,” 
159. 
67 1 Timothy almost certainly predates both martyriologies, though the dating of the epistle and the 
martyrdom of Agathonicê are each disputed. 1 Timothy’s admonition that women are to be quiet, 
submissive and should not teach men stands in direct oppositions the martyr narratives in which women are 
central figures whose words and actions are intended to inform and inspire their Christian readers 
(presumable men among them). 
68 “The Acts of Paul and Thecla,” in In Her Words; Women’s Writing in the History of Christian 
Thought, ed. Amy Oden (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1994), 21 – 25. Rosemary Radford Ruether writes, 
The Acts of Paul and Thecla “exalt the woman of faith who repudiates her family, rejects her subordination, 
rejects the will of her parents, rejects her fiancé and the right of her family to betroth her to a husband, and 
leaves home to evangelize, baptize, and preach.” Rosemary Radford Ruether, “Christianity and the Family: 
Ancient Challenge, Modern Crisis,” The Conrad Grebel Review (March 9, 2001): 85. 
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which shaped early Christianity.69 If Cahill’s analysis of two distinct trends within 
Christianity is correct, the rise of one over the other was likely influenced by 
developments in vocations for celibate women. These vocations afforded Christian 
women a means of valuation distinct from their procreative abilities and freed them from 
familial obligations. However, they may have also helped reshape early ambiguities in 
Christian thought into a divisive framework between women who lived in sexual purity 
and those who married.  
Thecla’s decision foreshadows the rise of consecrated virgins and women 
religious which grew out of both an admiration for virginity and the complications 
created by familial commitments. Yet, this development was conditioned by a distrust of 
human sexuality and may have encouraged a “two-path” view of Christian vocations 
which at times denigrated marriage as the inferior of the two Christian options. Rosemary 
Radford Ruether observes that the early centuries of Christianity saw “a gradual synthesis 
between patriarchy and celibacy.”70 Bearing children not only complicated total 
commitment to the faith, but, in a religious culture increasingly enamored with celibacy, 
was also a clear sign of having given into the body’s sexual appetites. Peter Brown 
writes, “When Simplicia, a Roman nun, died in middle age, all that needed to be said of 
her was that ‘she took no heed to produce children, treading beneath her feet the body’s 
snares.’”71 In the centuries immediately following the New Testament’s composition, the 
                                                 
69 Rubio, A Christian Theology of Marriage and Family, 53. 
70 Ruether, “Christianity and the Family,” 86. 
71 Peter Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early 
Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 343. 
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pendulum had swung far to the side of celibacy,72 and it took effort for Christianity to 
reclaim a life that included sexual reproduction as legitimately Christian and possibly 
even holy. 
 
Patristics 
For Ambrose of Milan (340 - 397), sexuality was evidence of human sinfulness 
which stood in glaring contrast to Christ’s purity. Christian sanctification was dependent 
upon suppressing sensuality, which itself had no redemptive value.73 Ambrose’s 
contemporary, Siricius (334 – 399), bishop of Rome, was likewise concerned with human 
sexuality and advocated for a celibate clergy. Even starker expression was found in the 
asceticism of Jerome (347 – 420) for whom sexuality constituted men and women as 
perpetual and mutual sources of temptation.74 Among his generation, Jerome’s disdain 
for all things sexual, which led him to question if even martyrdom could remove the “dirt 
of marriage,”75 marked an outer edge that was not embraced by his co-religionists, even 
in an era shaped by fascination with virginal purity.76 
                                                 
72 Ruether argues that one important transition within this period was the shift in perspective from 
celibacy as anticipatory of the eschaton to celibacy as cultic purity. This fueled a greater divide between the 
married and the celibate. Ruether, “Christianity and the Family,” 87. 
73 In Ambrose’s words, “how can sensuality recall us to Paradise, when it alone robbed us of its 
delights?” Brown, 361. 
74 Ibid., 376. 
75 Ibid., 398. 
76 Jerome shocked many Christians with his perspective that “even first marriages were 
regrettable, if pardonable, capitulations to the flesh, and that second marriages were only one step away 
from the brothel.” Ibid., 377. 
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When considered with these near-contemporaries, Augustine of Hippo’s (354 – 
430) apprehensive view of human sexuality and limited affirmation of Christian marriage 
appears a significant achievement in moderation. What separated Augustine’s approach 
was a fundamental conviction that human bodies and sexual reproduction were aspects of 
God’s created order, not consequences of humanity’s fall. Whereas earlier authors had 
written of Adam and Eve as nearly angelic beings, Peter Brown writes, “Augustine 
invariably wrote of Adam and Eve as physical human beings, endowed with the same 
bodies and sexual characteristics as ourselves.” God had commanded Adam and Eve to 
procreate before the fall, clearly implying a place for sexual intercourse and reproduction 
prior to rebellion.77  
Before Augustine, Christians wrestled with uncertainty about the continuation of 
the human race; Augustine’s perspective removed the apparent conflict between 
procreation and salvation. Still, as Brown observes, Augustine salvaged the inherent 
goodness of sexuality and procreation at the expense of transferring anxiety inwardly. It 
was no longer humanity as such that required explanation but the deeply distorted human 
will. “The twisted human will, not marriage, not even the sexual drive, was what was 
new in the human condition after Adam’s fall.”78 For Augustine, sexuality itself is a 
created good, but fallen humanity’s experience of sexual desire is immensely distorted by 
a weakened and rebellious will. Brown writes,  
“[The body] remained, for Augustine, a source of unrelieved disquiet. In order to convince the 
learned readers of his City of God and of his tracts against Julian, Augustine appealed to the 
authority of the ancients. He opened the sluice-gates of Latin Christian literature, quite as 
drastically as had Jerome, to let in the hard male puritanism the Romans relished in their ancestors 
and their favorite authors. An ancient Romans’ harsh distrust of sensual delight and a fear that the 
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body’s pleasures might weaken the resolve of the public man added a peculiarly rigid note to 
Augustine’s evocation of human beings forever exposed to a merciless concupiscence. 79 
 
Augustine’s approach at once explained the place of human sexuality in the 
created order and Christian participation in the continuation of the human race. This 
removed one layer of the complexity but the hermeneutic question of the New Testament 
concerning how the mutual obligations of faith and family are to be worked out remained. 
In this regard, it is significant that procreation was assumed to be a duty owed to the 
empire as well as a divine injunction. Children for God and for empire become the central 
means by which sexual intercourse was justified.  
Augustine’s contemporary in the East, John Chrysostom (347 – 407), provides a 
more developed perspective on the life of the Christian family. Chrysostom had once 
been persuaded that a Christian child’s best interest was to be raised in a monastery, but 
through pastoral experiences became convinced of the family’s principal responsibility in 
forming children for faith and morality.80 Despite the concerns of his western 
contemporaries, Chrysostom indicates no desire to justify the existence of sexuality or 
marriage. Instead, he gave these broadly positive interpretations and devoted his greatest 
concern to the moral problem of greed.81 
Chrysostom understood the family as a center of charity with a Christian 
obligation to proclaim the Gospel and serve the poor. In recognition of its parallel 
mission with the Church, Chrysostom described the family as the ‘domestic church.’ This 
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‘domestic church’ was not based in biological kinship, but upon the communal nature of 
salvation which made children in the home the nearest of social relations. Chrysostom 
was also acutely aware of the tendency for families to become self-serving and for 
parents to neglect their Christian duties.82 Chrysostom afforded such weight to the 
parental obligation, which he viewed as parallel to Christ’s own task for all humanity, 
that he tied parents’ own salvation to the virtue evident in their children.83 For 
Chrysostom, parents are artists who carefully sculpt their children. In so doing, Marcia 
Bunge writes, “they are helping to restore the image of God in their offspring and thereby 
forming them into ‘wondrous statues of God.’”84 
In the Patristic writings of the mid-fourth to early-fifth century, anxiety over 
sexuality became increasingly pronounced in Christian thought. Augustine was able to 
reconcile the existence of sexuality with the goodness of creation and posit marriage as a 
form of friendship fit for the communion of the redeemed.85 But, Augustine provided 
only a thin explanation of the goods of marriage, did little to develop a Christian 
understanding of family life, and was not able to affirm sexual intercourse as good in 
itself.86 Peter Brown concludes that, from Ambrose and to Augustine, anxiety of human 
                                                 
82 Vigen Guroian, “The Ecclesial Family; John Chrysostom on Parenthood and Children,” in The 
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sexuality injected “a powerful and toxic theme into medieval theology.”87 In the East, 
Chrysostom developed a more thorough account of the Christian family than did 
Augustine, but was not directly concerned with the same issues as his contemporaries in 
the West. 
 
Summary 
A survey of the historical evidence shows that there is no single New Testament 
or early Christian perspective on children, parenthood or the family. Though there are 
some strains of continuity, the New Testament is characterized by its recognition of 
tension and potential conflict between familial obligations and faith commitment. In the 
second and third centuries, martyriologies and apocryphal texts give evidence that this 
tension shaped the lives and aspirations of Christians. In these texts, the tension is firmly 
resolved in favor of faith and at the expense of biological kin, with only non-Christians 
raising moral concern a the maternal obligation to rear children. Still, such texts were 
inspirational narratives and may not have reflected the more domestic commitments of a 
majority of Christians. In the Patristic era, praise of virginity and anxiety over human 
sexuality raised doubts of if marriage could ever be a Christian vocation. Augustine, 
while embodying many of the concerns of his contemporaries, was able provide a 
moderate resolution, even as he gave definitive shape to a Western Christian 
understanding of sin and its connection to sexual reproduction. Chrysostom spoke 
directly to the concerns of family life and gave the Christian family an explicit task of 
charity while describing the parental task in parallel terms to the work of Christ. 
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Part II: Historical Developments 
Conceptions of Childhood 
 Contemporary scholarship has renewed appreciation for the diversity of historical 
Christian perspectives on children and childhood. Among the most noteworthy of recent 
projects is The Child in Christian Thought, edited by Marcia Bunge, a collection of 
essays that considers the perspectives on children and childhood of a number of 
theologians and movements throughout history. Perhaps the most significant claim made 
by the collection is that attention to the child as a legitimate subject of theological 
reflection is not a new trend, but a long tradition. The book is extremely valuable for the 
task at hand because conceptions of parenthood are intimately linked with conceptions of 
childhood. And these have enjoyed considerable diversity throughout Western Christian 
history. 
 Recent theological interest in childhood was spurred largely by sociological and 
historical research. Phillip Ariès’ thesis that “childhood” is a relatively recent innovation 
has become a requisite subject for subsequent research on the history of childhood.88 
Other scholars have agreed that attitudes and treatment of children have varied 
considerably across time and place and have often identified the eighteenth century as a 
pivotal period of change that has shaped the modern era.89 Among the most common 
criticisms leveled against Ariès’ thesis is the contention that, while Ariès claims to 
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identify the origin of the concept of childhood, he in fact identifies only the origin of its 
particular modern variation.90 David Archard helpfully employs John Rawl’s distinction 
between concept and conception to clarify. A concept is basic and distinguishes one thing 
from another (e.g. children from adults). A conception is a construction of principles 
related to that concept (e.g. the age at which children become adults). In these terms, the 
critique argues that Ariès misidentifies a conception as a concept. Thus, while all times 
and cultures have held some concept of childhood, conceptions are diverse and subject to 
change. Such changes may be profound and can offer valuable insight into the conditions 
and ideals of an era.91 
In addition, Archard identifies three paradigmatic models in historical conceptions 
of childhood, which usually admit degrees of admixture. The ‘developmental model’ is 
the most recent and is heavily influenced by modern scientific insight. This model may 
emphasize psychology and focuses on the process by which a normative status is attained 
(e.g. healthy, mature adulthood). As a potential weakness, however, this model can 
devalue childhood as merely a stage on the path to adulthood.92 The remaining two 
models are defined by emphasis on either innocence or sinfulness. Archard offers early-
modern Puritans and Calvinists as the strongest proponents of the ‘child as corrupt’ 
model. This view takes the moral lives of children seriously but can also stress constant 
oversight and harsh correction to restrain or break children’s unruly wills. Conversely, 
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the Romantics most clearly embraced the ‘child as innocent’ model. This perspective 
fears the corrupting influence of adult society on children’s natural innocence, but tends 
to associate children with powerlessness and can undermine their moral agency. Though 
the extremes of these last two models are mutually contradictory, Archard argues that 
they have been tenuously held together throughout much of Christian history.93  
Archard is correct in recognizing that significant Christian figures have wrestled 
with both the sinfulness and the innocence of children. Yet, from a theological 
perspective, his assessment is limited. Archard relies heavily on philosophical sources 
and his use of theological sources tends to lack nuance as it focuses on traditionally 
Protestant concerns. For example, while he emphasizes Christian conceptions of 
childhood innocence as directly connected to children’s powerlessness to sin, recognition 
of children’s limited abilities to sin or to enact virtue is more characteristic of Catholic 
perspectives.94 As a consequence, Archard’s application of the developmental model 
appears limited. Instead of having arisen with modern science, the developmental 
approach can be found in theologians who concern themselves with growth in virtue, 
sanctification, or theosis and have taken children seriously as moral agents. 
 
Christian Thought 
 In briefly revisiting Augustine and Chrysotom with attention to their conceptions 
of childhood and Archard’s models, it appears that Chyrsostom’s conception relies on an 
innocence model while Augustine is far more attentive to children’s sinfulness. 
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Parenthood and childhood are so closely linked in Chrysostom’s opinion that 
whenever there is a crisis of childhood, a crisis of the parenthood surely also exists. Thus, 
Chrysostom’s conception of childhood is most directly gleaned from his advice to 
parents.95 Chrysostom’s association of parenthood with the work of Christ and the 
Church signals his teleological perspective. Observing the importance of parenthood in 
Chrysostom’s thought, Vigen Guroian writes, “parents hold not only an ecclesial office 
but also a soteriological one, a salvific one. God has put parents in care of their children’s 
souls, and whether a child inherits the kingdom of heaven relies upon the care he or she 
receives from parents.”96 From this view, Chrysostom appears to understand children, as 
a tabula rasa yielding totally to their parent’s efforts. In Archard’s words, this amounts to 
an ‘empty’ innocence as it rests primarily on inability.97 
The soteriological perspectives of Chrysostom’s place and time did not encourage 
great concern for inherent sinfulness. Among Chrysostom’s theological forebears, 
Irenaeus was convinced that the fulfillment of perishable humanity awaited in 
reconciliation with and transformation into the imperishable98 and Athanasius reflected 
on the Image of God and the problems of freedom and materiality.99 However, in the 
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West, among Christians in Africa and Italy, the idea of inherited sinfulness was emerging 
and Augustine’s thought on the matter inaugurated distinctly Western anthropological 
and soteriological trajectories.100  
Although Augustine wrote little about his own experience of parenthood, he was 
an astute observer of humanity and saw both “beauty and terror” in the behavior of 
children.101 For Augustine, childhood provided a powerful metaphor with which to 
explain human nature. Infants in particular, “revealed a non-innocence that phased into 
increasing accountability as children matured into adulthood.”102 These observations, 
coupled with his theological account of inherent human sinfulness, informed Augustine’s 
belief that children were not born innocent but lacked only the ability to sin. He held that 
children possessed a corrupt will bent toward sin and were culpable for the 
consequences.103 Augustine once held that children who died before baptism were to be 
counted as martyrs but later became committed to the necessity of baptism for salvation. 
Augustine’s legacy is very much influenced by his struggle with the question of the 
unbaptized innocents. Cristina Traina writes, “The history of the theology of childhood 
might well be cast as the history of the struggle to preserve and express Augustine’s 
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doctrine of original sin without eroding beliefs in both divine justice and divine mercy 
toward the weak and vulnerable.”104 
For Augustine, children are only non-innocent; they still lack the power to 
actualize this disposition in any substantive way and therefore their condition itself does 
not justify harsh treatment. Instead, in the physical punishments of children Augustine 
was inclined to see the sinfulness of adults who were greater only in power.105 For 
Augustine, Martha Ellen Stortz writes, “An adult merely replicated and amplified the sins 
of the child.”106 Thus, Augustine’s use of a ‘child as corrupt’ model must be understood 
within his anthropological approach which viewed all humanity as fundamentally corrupt 
and in need of the grace of baptism.107 From this perspective, the primary duty of 
Christian parents is to baptize their children. Beyond this, Augustine’s approach adds a 
powerfully egalitarian perspective to the human condition. Even as he imagines adults as 
grown-children, he gives credibility to the moral lives of children.108 This introduces a 
degree of ambiguity to the relations of adults to children in as much as adults may be 
equally inclined to act sinfully and may do so more skillfully.109 Stortz concludes that 
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childhood, human nature, and baptism are tightly interwoven elements of Augustine’s 
theological conception of childhood which founded a “highly ambiguous legacy” of 
Western Christian views of childhood.110 
In the middle ages, the notion of family emerged more clearly as households 
across social strata became more uniform and increasingly centered on kin relations.111 
Fluctuation in Christian conceptions of childhood continued. Augustinian notions of 
original sin joined with admiration of virginity to inform a low religious valuation of 
procreation. And, as with earlier martyrs, the willingness to renounce one’s children for 
the sake of faith was thematic in medieval hagiographies.112 Furthermore, the wisdom of 
old age tended to be prized above the innocence of the young. However, Christian society 
in general maintained a higher valuation of young children than had been common in 
Greco-Roman society.113 And medieval literature offered images of pure and innocent 
children with “an ability to seize on truths hidden from adults…”114  
In the eleventh century, Anselm of Canterbury (c. 1033 – 1109) “emphasized a 
child’s need ‘of loving-kindness from others, of gentleness, mercy, cheerful address, 
charitable patients, and many such-like comforts.’” By the thirteenth century, Anselm 
was a favored source in preaching manuals which offered sample sermons covering 
issues related to childhood. These “recognized stages in childhood, urge the importance 
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of encouraging learning, and stress the desirability of moderation in punishment” and 
became incredibly popular into the fifteenth century.115 The high middle ages also 
initiated a new appreciation of individual freedom over and against family intentions.116 
Medieval hagiographic literature attests to this tension as it alternately “praises absolute 
filial obedience and rewards independent mindedness.”117 
Parenthood was likewise a subject of some ambiguity. Medieval Christians saw 
the position of the commandment to honor mother and father as the first on the second 
tablet as a clear sign of its foundational importance in the divine plan for society. Indeed, 
this command came before such basic social principles as the prohibition of stealing and 
killing.118 John of La Rochelle (c. 1200 – 1245) argued that the positive phrasing of this 
commandment demonstrates that giving honor to parents is never wrong.119 However, the 
tension between this commandment and a vocation to religious life arose repeatedly. John 
of La Rochelle argued that greater goods, such as entry into a religious order, could 
mitigate this duty and were not true conflicts anyhow since “the prayers of a vowed 
religious will, in the long run, do parents more good than providing them with food 
drink.”120 Aquinas disagreed, arguing that care for one’s ailing parents should prohibit 
acceptance into religious life. 
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Thomas Aquinas (c. 1224 – 1274) added a new dimension to Augustine’s legacy 
by uniting the divergent anthropologies of Augustine and Aristotle; the first characterized 
by original sin and a corrupt will, the second by rational capacity and potential for 
virtuous growth.121 Additionally, Aquinas was encouraged by a medieval trust in the 
actual innocence of creatures incapable of committing sin. Nonetheless, he affirmed 
Augustine’s conviction that original sin itself prohibits salvation. Thus, for Aquinas the 
unbaptized child is underserving of salvation, yet incapable of either intending sin or 
desiring baptism. Aquinas’ solution was to create a middle ground in the stark choice 
between salvation and condemnation; limbus puerorum. Limbo is a destination fitting the 
conditions: union with God is denied, but torment is spared.122 
Despite having spent most of his young life away from home, Aquinas believed 
that parents, especially fathers, deserve full credit for their children’s success or failure. 
He supported sweeping parental rights, including the rights to betroth or commit a child 
to a religious order; though these were limited by the child’s consent at maturity.123 
Foundational to these claims, was Aquinas’ belief that the work of procreation establishes 
natural rights of parents. Just as the craftsman rightfully owns that which he creates, so 
too does the parent.124 Parental rights based on creation alone might suggest that mothers 
hold greater rights than fathers, in proportion to reproductive roles, yet for Aquinas 
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paternal authority was central.125 The idea of “shared substance,” which was linked to a 
father’s desire to see his own legacy continue, buttressed Aquinas’ argument from labor 
and solidified a father’s priority.126 Within an Aristotelean theory of fetal development, 
the father’s seed was the substance from which new human life developed, requiring only 
the protection of a mother’s womb.127 This made progeny a literal extension of their 
father, and, Aquinas argued, the reasonable man will recognize this and will attend to his 
children as if they were his own body.128 
The argument from shared substance did more than reinforce Aquinas’ patriarchal 
views, it also solidified parental duties in response to social conditions. During Aquinas’ 
lifetime, child mortality may have reached 50% and was driven by not only by 
unsophisticated sanitary and medical practices, but by “high rates of abandonment, 
exposure, infanticide, overly harsh beatings, fatal ‘trials’ of suspected changelings, and 
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suspicious overlaying of children in bed.”129 Aquinas’ argument “encouraged 
strengthening the natural bonds of love” while grounding parenthood in natural facts 
which parental duties more difficult to disavow.130 Moreover, Aquinas believed that 
parental rights were both natural and rational, and therefore, universal. As a consequence, 
Aquinas twice argued that to baptize a Jewish child against parental will is a greater sin 
than allowing the child to die unbaptized.131 Further, he asserted that the primary evil of 
fornication was not sexual sin but the failure to assure the wellbeing of potential future 
children.132  
 Aquinas’ argument for the natural rights of parents leaves parental rights of 
adoptive parents with uncertain origins. From a soteriological perspective, Aquinas 
employed adoption metaphorically to differentiate the divine adoptive sonship of 
Christians from the divine substantial sonship of Christ. Aquinas does assert that God’s 
adoptive fatherhood gives rise to duties on God’s part. However, these duties are based 
on the human identity as ‘image of God’ and thus the duties once again run through 
created origin and shared qualities.133 
Aquinas’ understanding of nature and grace as cooperative, emphasis on 
education, and teleological outlook all suggest a developmental view of childhood. For 
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Aquinas the child is both corrupt and innocent; but most importantly, incomplete. He 
measured the developmental process primarily as a growth in capacity to reason, showed 
little interest in the particularities of child rearing,134 and placed the rational adult male 
Christian as the normative end.135 In Aquinas’ perspective, childhood is truly good in as 
much as it reflects divine wisdom and therefore “is an appropriate and necessary stage 
within the lifelong journey toward perfection in which adults too are engaged.”136 Yet 
childhood is not to be admired in as much as Children lack wisdom and active virtue.137 
In fact, Aquinas compares the child under the age of reason to an irrational animal.138 
Aquinas represents the clearest developmentalist encountered so far as he values the 
process, but does not admire any stage prior to the normative end. 
Throughout the late middle ages, Christian piety turned increasing attention to the 
needs of children. By the Reformation era, interest in Christian childrearing had united 
with a general concern for morality and discipline. This outlook, to some extent, came at 
the expense of individual liberty as communal obligations assumed primary moral 
significance.139 As a result, three of the Reformation’s most prominent figures, 
Desiderius Erasmus (1466 – 1536), Martin Luther (1483 – 1546), and Jon Calvin (1509 – 
1564), held most clearly to a ‘child as corrupt’ model that stressed the importance of 
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parental involvement. This perspective assumed unique form in each, yet is united by the 
conviction that the child contained both wonderful and monstrous possibilities and only 
through diligent supervision and education might a respectable adult be formed. As 
Erasmus writes, 
The child that nature has given you is nothing but a shapeless lump, the material is still pliable, 
capable of assuming any form, and you must so mould it that it takes on the best possible 
character. If you are negligent, you will rear an animal; but if you apply yourself, you will fashion, 
if I may use such a bold term, a godlike creature.140 
 
The reformers expressed similar attitudes and idealized the “pious, disciplined, 
obedient, and teachable child.” To rear such children required great effort; metaphors of 
horticulture and animal husbandry abounded. Left alone, like a field or animal, a child’s 
natural trajectory was towards wildness and rebellion; thus the parental duty was to 
domesticate and Christianize. These beliefs were underwritten with scriptural support. In 
the mid-sixteenth the English philosopher Thomas Beccon wrote, “a child in Scripture is 
a wicked man, as he that is ignorant and not exercised in godliness.’” Contemporaries 
imagined all manner of evil desires lurking within the hearts of children; even the unborn. 
Although the Reformation era shared similarities with medieval concerns for education 
and childcare, it was marked by this growing fear of the child’s inner corruption.141 
Erasmus, like other Renaissance humanists, called attention to “the importance of 
infancy and early childhood in the development of good Christians and good citizens.”142 
He published a series of books and essays on the topic which drew heavily from classical 
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sources.143 Erasmus’ greatest concern was that early education not be postponed by either 
the coddling of female caregivers or the negligence of fathers. This emphasis stemmed 
from his belief that the young child had an innate desire to learn and was capable of 
absorbing information at a greater rate than in subsequent ages. Erasmus encouraged 
parents to take control of their children’s education and saw rationality and self-control as 
instilled in children by the hard work of parents and educators.144 However, he clearly 
distinguished himself from those who emphasized original sin, arguing instead that adults 
are often culpable for corrupting young minds.145 And Erasmus was horrified by the 
practice of beating children, either at home or in schools. He greatly lamented the 
existence of schools which were supposed centers of education but were in reality centers 
of “brutal abuse.”146 
Martin Luther vociferously disagreed with Erasmus on the freedom of the human 
will and expounded a radical understanding of grace that founded a distinctly Protestant 
soteriological perspective. Despite the dramatic religious, social, and political changes 
brought about by the Lutheran Reformation, domestic life underwent relatively little 
change.147 Luther and his Protestant colleagues tended to replicate concerns for good 
order, community, and education that also characterized their Catholic counterparts. Jane 
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Strohl observes, Lutheranism “allied itself with the status quo and may well have proven 
more successful at the task of socialization than evangelization.”148 Moreover, Luther 
viewed the home as a safe haven for the formation of children in the faith apart from the 
dangers of the world, flesh, and devil.149  
Luther’s apparent social conformity should not distract from the extent to which 
his theological opinions reinterpreted the significance of domestic life. For example 
Luther writes, 
Now you tell me, when a father goes ahead and washes diapers or performs some other mean task 
for his child, and someone ridicules him as an effeminate fool…my dear fellow you tell me, which 
of the two is more keenly ridiculing the other? God, with all his angels and creatures, is smiling — 
not because that father’s washing diapers, but because he is doing so in Christian faith. Those who 
sneer at him and see only the task but not the faith are ridiculing God with all his creatures, is the 
biggest fool on earth.150 
 
Luther accepts that washing diapers is a particularly demeaning task for a man, yet 
upholds such service as exemplary evidence of Christian faith. Thus, while he generally 
accepted cultural standards, Luther opened possibilities to subvert cultural logic. 
Like his contemporaries, Luther was also a strong supporter of broad parental 
rights. He writes, “there is no greater or nobler authority on earth than that of parents over 
their children, for this authority is both spiritual and temporal.”151 Luther even asserted 
that a lack of parental consent could be grounds for the dissolution of a marriage.152 
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In agreement with Augustine, Luther held that the very first duty of Christian 
parents is to have children baptized quickly. Luther further described parents as “apostles 
and bishops” of their children. Yet, he also described all Christians who teach the Gospel 
as apostles and bishops of their neighbors.153 Like Chrysostom, proximity differentiates 
the parental vocation inasmuch as children are their parent’s nearest neighbors in need.154 
Thus, Luther views the family through the paradigm of neighbor love, such that the 
demands of parenthood extend to all Christians who are equally compelled by faith to 
attend to those in need. It may not be inconsequential that Luther’s own experience of 
parenthood included raising several children from among his kin. 
Luther’s primary view of children appears to be as Christian disciples, which is 
marked by corruption as well as grace. Children are inherent and culpable sinners who 
are incapable of seeking salvation by their own power but offered salvific grace through 
baptism.155 The baptized child shares in the conditions necessary for salvation and 
faithful discipleship and, as a result, has a duty to bear witness, through Christian service 
and love, to the grace already received.156 In Luther’s theology the child is vulnerable, 
but not incomplete. In fact, Luther supported infant baptism precisely on the grounds that 
                                                 
Resnick, “Marriage in Medieval Culture”) It is also interesting that both Luther and Aquinas chose their 
vocations to religious life against the wishes of their fathers. 
153 Luther quoted in Cahill, 66. 
154 Strohl, 158. 
155 Ibid., 141. Barbara Pitkin observes the many times Luther rejected biblical references to 
children as referring to actual children rather than as metaphors for adult faith. Barbara Pitkin, “’The 
Heritage of the Lord’: Children in the Theology of John Calvin,” in The Child in Christian Thought, ed. 
Marcia J. Bunge (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001), footnote 16. 
156 Strohl, 134. 
200 
 
children are incapable of reason and therefore free of the uncertainties that come with 
rationality.157  
In comparison to Luther, Calvin held a more pessimistic theological 
anthropology, a more developed commitment to predestination, and a greater confidence 
in the civil authority’s duty to promote the faith and intervene in domestic matters.158 
Calvin’s emphasis on the depravity of the human condition led him to argue that “even 
infants bear their condemnation with them from their mother’s womb.” Despite not 
having yet sinned, “they have the seed enclosed within themselves. Indeed, their whole 
nature is a seed of sin; thus it cannot be but hateful and abominable to God.”159 And yet, 
Calvin believed that children have active spiritual lives and that even infants can 
proclaim God’s goodness.160 Furthermore, he disagreed with Luther and Augustine, and 
urged Christian parents to trust that salvation would be extended to their children.161 
Though his understanding of the depth of sin seems contrary to this conclusion, Calvin’s 
confidence in God’s mercy rested not in his anthropology, but in his commitment to 
double-predestination. In this view, salvation resides entirely in the eternal decrees of 
God who has absolute freedom to choose the elect.”162 All Calvin asked was that 
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Christian parents who were certain of their own salvation have confidence that God 
would extend salvation to their children as well. 
 The Protestant Reformation, despite its domestically conservative bent, did 
initiate some reappraisal of the Christian home and education. Protestants came to see the 
family “as a microcosm of the church and the state, both in the sense that in its internal 
government it should marry those larger institutions, and in the sense that the family 
should be a nursery of both the church and state.”163 The consequence of placing this 
importance on the family was an increased emphasis on paternal responsibility. 
Fatherhood assumed central importance in managing the family, while mothers were to 
be virtuous and honorable.164 The identification of patriarchal marriage with an “order of 
nature” further cemented this framework in Protestant imagination. 
By the seventeenth century, the ideal Protestant family was a ‘little 
commonwealth’ governed by paternal authority and populated with obedient, submissive 
children. Catholicism generally lagged behind, but followed similar developments. 
Catholic religious literature gave increased attention to parental duties and 
encouragement of paternal authority grew; though this was supported by the traditions of 
Roman law. Catholic thinking increasingly recognized the domestic sphere as a place of 
affection which required a pious mother.165 
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Protestants also led in advocating for public education. Martin Luther had viewed 
education as the responsibility of parents, but added the condition that, should parents fail 
in their duty, competent authorities were obligated to intervene.166 Later in his life, Luther 
began to support compulsory public education. Other reformers went much further and 
argued that children belong first to the community, and secondarily to their parents. Still, 
government provided education did not become common until the eighteenth century.167 
 The eighteenth century, identified by Ariès as the origin of modern childhood, 
was indeed a significant period of philosophical and theological development. As a 
preeminent figure in the Enlightenment, John Locke (1632 – 1704) emphasized teaching 
children to learn to submit to authority, so that as adults, they would learn to submit to 
the authority of their own reason.168 Locke was among the first to approach childrearing 
from a principally secular perspective and argued chiefly from ‘natural rights’ with little 
reference to Christian scripture.169 In eighteenth century America, the influence of such 
thought was met with ambivalence while Jonathan Edwards (1703 – 1758) arose as a 
powerful conservative Protestant voice during this era of social change. 
Edwards’ religious convictions were partially fueled by fear that traditional 
Puritan society was collapsing. Not only did paternal authority appear to be in decline but 
the increasingly industrial economy now allowed children to relocate far from home and 
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find employment.170 In response, Edwards vigorously reclaimed traditional Protestant 
doctrines. But, unlike the reticence characteristic of earlier theologians, Edwards reveled 
in his descriptions of hellfire and described God’s damnation of infants as “exceedingly 
just.”171 Edwards wrote, “As innocent as children seem to us… if they are out of Christ, 
they are not so in God’s sight, but are young vipers, and are infinitely more hateful than 
vipers…”172 Yet, the possibility of salvation created a double-image of children within 
Edwards’ thought. Having gone from full of sin to full of grace, the born-again child 
gained the upper-hand if his or her parents were not similarly redeemed.173 By 
centralizing God as an ultimate and central authority, Edwards relativized the authority of 
parents, even as he lamented the breakdown of the patriarchal family. 
 While Edwards resisted social change in America, the Romantics welcomed 
transformation in Europe. In direct opposition to Edwards’ defense of paternal authority, 
John-Jacques Rousseau (1712 – 1778) promoted the priority of mothers within the 
family. As the eighteenth century progressed, romantic ideals mixed with changing social 
and economic circumstances to solidify childrearing as dimension of women’s authority. 
Hugh Cunningham writes, “The consequences were striking. In the third quarter of the 
eighteenth century the death rate of English aristocratic children under the age of five 
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dropped by 30%.”174 In the early nineteenth century, men and women alike were assumed 
capable of caring for children, at least in a basic sense. But by the mid-nineteenth 
century, the qualities fitted for childcare “were declared to be natural to the female 
sex.”175 Yet even as the qualities of womanhood became increasingly associated with 
domestic caregiving, ordinary mothers’ capacities as educators, which had been 
presumed, now fell into question.176 
Prevalent conceptions of children also underwent significant development during 
this period. Nearly to the end of the eighteenth century, popular Christian writing 
portrayed children as filled with evil intentions which could only be curbed by severe 
discipline.177  
By the nineteenth century, children had transitioned from economic asset to 
liability, but had gained sentimental value as the innocence of childhood was increasingly 
accentuated. Christians now described children as having recently come from the hands 
of God, as the future Cardinal Newman wrote, “with all the lessons and thoughts of 
heaven freshly marked upon him.”178 This revolution in the conception childhood was 
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also influenced by increasing rigidity in male and female social roles which placed 
greater emphasis on the proper socialization of children.179 
 Amidst these changes, Horace Bushnell (1802 – 1876) offered a Protestant 
developmental approach to childhood that has had lasting influence. Famously Bushnell 
advised, “the child is to grow up a Christian, never knowing himself as being 
otherwise.”180 He placed emphasis on parental involvement and trust in the “near salvific 
power of a godly mother.”181 Bushnell also stressed children’s pliability and helplessness 
in the face of negative adult influences more than their innate sinfulness, though he 
accepted this as well.182 Theologically he declared, Christ is not “‘the Savior of adults 
only!’… but ‘a savior for infants, and children, and youth, as truly as for the adult 
age.’”183 Bushnell’s views were initially dismissed among more conservative 
evangelicals but by the end of the nineteenth century most American churches had 
“settled into a regular package of weekly Sunday school instruction and family devotions, 
not dire warnings about infants being consumed by the fires of hell.”184 In the twentieth 
century, the social sciences offered new support for Bushnell’s views. Insistence on good 
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order had been superseded by emphasis on “companionship, play, and emotional 
intimacy between parents and children.”185 
 
Summary 
 The Western Christian tradition contains diverse and competing conceptions of 
children and childhood. Archard’s three-part paradigm paired with contemporary 
research on the theology of childhood help to clarify this legacy. In general, the ‘child as 
corrupt’ model exercised greatest influence in Augustine, Edwards, and theologians of 
the Reformation era. The ‘child as innocent’ model characterized Chrysostom, the 
Romantics, and perhaps Anselm. Aquinas and Bushnell are the clearest exponents of the 
developmental model, which has gained dominance in the contemporary period; though it 
has also been significantly transformed by the social sciences. 
Reconciling the doctrine of original sin, which creates sinners of even the smallest 
children, with the belief that God’s compassion resides with the weak and vulnerable has 
been a central challenge throughout the Christian tradition. After Aquinas, the Catholic 
tradition held a negotiated view in which Limbo functioned as a necessary theological 
compromise. Yet Limbo’s existence rests on weak biblical support and was primarily 
speculative. As such, Limbo remained a theological opinion within Catholicism that was 
not appropriated by Protestants, who instead continued the unsettled trajectory of 
Augustine’s struggle with the possibility of salvation for unbaptized infants. Yet, 
Protestant responses have varied and cannot be simplistically correlated to the depth of 
sin a theologian ascribes to the fallen human condition. Notably, it is John Calvin, not 
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Luther or even Erasmus, who placed greatest confidence in the possibility of salvation for 
unbaptized children.186 
 Conceptions of parenthood have also developed alongside these diverse 
conceptions of childhood. Some stress the importance of parental involvement; others the 
involvement of all society. The strongest advocates of parental authority tend to be those 
who embrace either a ‘child as corrupt’ or a ‘development’ model of childhood; though 
the form of involvement varies with each. After the Reformation, the question of whether 
parents or civil or ecclesial authorities were primarily responsible for education became 
pronounced. Moreover, gender-based roles within the family changed. At times paternal 
authority was stressed, at others, maternal nurture. Jonathan Edwards seems to have 
accidentally backed into the problem, known already in the New Testament, that 
emphasizing submission to God alone also relativizes centers of earthly power, such as 
fathers in the patriarchal family. 
 Finally, Christian tradition provides different accounts regarding the source of 
family unity and grounds for parental rights and obligations. For both Chrysostom and 
Luther, Christian charity and the obligation to serve neighbors in need are important 
features of the family’s cohesion. Aquinas emphasized that the family is grounded in the 
natural bonds of kinship and the obligations arising from procreation.187 None of these 
thinkers, however, centered the opinion on only one view. Aquinas employed a non-
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biologically based argument that parents were obliged to care for children because they 
embodied God’s goodness and are made in God’s image.188 And Luther saw the family as 
a “critical order of creation within God’s temporal governance.”189 Because this 
particular question is pertinent to the project at hand, this chapter now concludes with a 
brief historical sketch of Christianity’s history of care for children beyond the context of 
the biological family. 
 
Part III: Christian Practices in Adoption and Orphan Care 
Introduction 
An adequate consideration of the Christian history of adoption must first 
recognize that present forms of adoption bear little resemblance to earlier historical 
practices. Modern legal adoption, for example, finds its Western precedent in Roman 
hereditary law, which was primarily concerned with making heirs for the transfer of 
property. In Roman practice, only the Roman father could adopt and he typically adopted 
a consenting adult male heir.190 These origins stand across an enormous conceptual 
divide from the popular American idea of a young, presumably infertile, couple seeking 
an unrelated infant to raise as their child. This modern ideal arose rather suddenly in the 
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late nineteenth century but was carried forward with remarkable force, not least due to its 
support within the growing and increasingly influential field of social work.191 
Between Ancient Rome and contemporary America, lies a complex history that is 
characterized most often by private, informal, and non-legal arrangements for the care of 
orphaned or abandoned children. Because of the significant differences in past and 
present practices, it is helpful to conceptualize pre-modern adoption more broadly as 
practices of guardianship and caregiving for non-biological kin. Legal guardianship has a 
formal history in western society but often tells us little about the arrangements and 
conditions of a child’s upbringing. Caregiving, on the other hand, has often been based 
on reciprocal economic relationships and has varied considerably for children who found 
care beyond their extended kin group.192  
The following section attempts to clarify some of this diverse heritage by 
identifying major lines of historical practice. It then turns to recent scholarship on two 
practices that are particularly informative for understanding contemporary conceptions of 
adoption and orphan care. First, however, a brief note about the biblical and theological 
foundations of adoption and non-kin care is in order.  
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In the Hebrew Scriptures, God is often identified with care for the orphan193 and 
Deuteronomy arranges for the just treatment and financial assistance of orphans.194 In the 
New Testament, care for the orphan remains an important act of piety,195 Jesus relativizes 
kin allegiances, and a metaphor of adoption functions as an important concept within 
Pauline soteriology.196 During the time of the New Testament’s composition, a growing 
identity as a family united by faith through baptism made theological orphans and 
adopted siblings out of the entire Christian community. Drawing upon this heritage, 
Herbert Anderson has observed that, in baptism, parents recognize that “their children are 
not their children, for they belong to God who has called them into existence and calls 
them into service of the world.”197 From a theological perspective, baptism abrogates 
biological parenthood in two important ways, by redefining both ‘ownership’ of the child 
and the child’s ‘family.’ These biblical and theological ideals of care for the orphan and 
the new kin relations of the Christian faithful were not developed seamlessly or always 
with great care throughout Christian history. Changing conceptions of the family, the 
child, and religious and secular obligations, gave rise to responses to orphaned or 
abandoned children. Nonetheless, Christians have largely identified care for these 
children as an act of faith. 
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Transfer of Care and Care Practices 
Throughout most of Western Christian history, the majority of children whose 
parents were unable to provide for them found care among kin. In a practice inherited 
from Roman law, members of the extended family were legally bound to assume 
responsibility for orphaned children. The extensive mapping of kin relations, which 
increased with stricter consanguinity laws in medieval Europe, generally assured that 
some obligated party would be found.198  
Beyond kin groups, religious orders served as another resource for care. The 
sixth-century Rule of Saint Benedict offers several directions for proper childcare (most 
often concessions made for the young) and gives no indication of this being an 
exceptional practice.199 The rules of some other medieval religious communities even 
required the community to maintain a set minimum of orphans in their midst.200 In the 
East, Byzantium established public institutions for care, such as the Orphanotropheion, in 
the early medieval period.201 Until the fifteenth century, however, Western Christian 
society remained far more agrarian and did not feel the same need for such institutions as 
the more urbanized East. 
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The practice of exposure was predominantly accepted as a fact of life during 
Roman times and Christian society retained the practice with relatively little comment.202 
Christians did, however, lament the conditions that drove parents to abandon their 
children203 and took a decidedly stronger stance against infanticide.204 The reason behind 
this general acceptance may correspond to John Boswell’s argument that exposure 
functioned primarily as an informal means of adoption and most often resulted in new 
guardians for abandoned children.205 Ẻcole Française de Rome adds that, with the 
fifteenth century expansion of institutionalized care in the West, greater anonymity 
encouraged abandonment. Eventually this resulted in overcrowding within institutions of 
care and dramatically increased mortality rates.206 By the mid-eighteenth century, “death 
rates at the Milan asylum and in the newer infant orphanages in Paris and Vienna were 
approaching 80 percent of the babies left in their care.”207  
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 Beyond the orphaned and abandoned, many children were provided for by 
caregivers other than their biological parents, even while their biological parents 
remained responsible for them. This reflects the realities of family life and the need for 
all adults to participate in the family economy. Historically, mothers and fathers worked 
fields, tended livestock, slaughtered, harvested, prepared food, produced essential and 
saleable goods, and operated businesses to support their family. Because sustenance often 
required female work, female work was not associated narrowly with childcare. Instead, 
these myriad obligations supported the assumption that any capable adult could provide 
care for children if needed. This was experientially proven by the often central role 
grandparents, siblings, and wet-nurses played in childcare.208 In addition to non-maternal 
care within the home children were often sent away for schooling or apprenticeships. In 
both instances care providers were selected based on their functional capabilities and the 
needs of the family and child without being essentially bound to biological or gendered 
constraints. 
 
Institutional Care by Women Religious 
In Models of Charitable Care, Annelies van Heijst studies the care practices and 
spiritual self-understandings of the Ursuline sisters who operated an asylum in 
Amsterdam throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. She contends that while 
the care services of Catholic religious societies have been an unparalleled social 
contribution throughout recent centuries, historical and popular interest has tended to 
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focus on abuses and maltreatment.209 Her primary rebuttal to such criticisms is that the 
Catholic religious who ran these institutions responded out of charity, not duty, to answer 
and alleviate a legitimate social need. Because they voluntarily shouldered a share of a 
social problem with good intentions, they should not be criticized for having done so 
imperfectly. Therefore, within the critical literature, blame is misdirected when the 
people and institutions who were helping to alleviate the problem, not the people and 
institutions that were fueling the problem, receive greatest scrutiny. Heijst clarifies, “A 
discussion about the mode of care is not legitimate unless the basic need for care has been 
acknowledged.” In addition, the complications and challenges children already endured, 
and which surely left impressions on the rest of their childhood, are rarely sources of 
scrutiny. Heijst observes, one author blames the nuns for her mother’s lifelong ineptitude 
in dealing with men but passes over the absence of the author’s biological grandfather 
without criticism.210 
In Heijst’s analysis, the Ursulines assumed a dual self-identification as both 
mothers and children. In relation to the children in their care, the nuns imagined 
themselves as mothers, but within the framework of ‘true’ motherhood based on spiritual 
love routed through Christ. This ‘true’ motherhood experienced all the joys and sorrows 
of biological motherhood but remained unstained by biological or personal attachment. 
One advertisement to attract new members to congregation read,  
And now it is precisely the love of God, to whom the religious dedicates her entire life and all her 
works, that gives you the power to do this beautiful and abundant work. In this work of charity she 
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can make use of her female skills, which are aimed at motherhood, to be used to the child and yet 
keep her entire heart free for God.211  
 
The sisters’ self-understanding relied upon recognition of spiritual kinship as well as a 
conception of charity as unidirectional, from giver to receiver.212 This spiritualized 
motherhood produced practices of care which left the sisters both physically and 
emotionally distant from the children in their care. Heijst adds, “It should also be noticed 
that the ascetic anti-worldly dualism provoked a certain indifference with regard to 
experience of pain in the care receivers, since in the sisters’ philosophy of life suffering 
was qualified as ‘good’.”213 In addition, the sisters were instructed not to favor individual 
children, nor to allow special friendships among children. Only small children were 
allowed close physical contact; with older children, even combing hair was prohibited. 
Both physical and emotional closeness were generally regarded suspiciously as sources 
of evil and were often sexualized.214 Heijst writes, “the object of care was primarily the 
human soul, and the soul is conceptualized, in the dualistic theology of the time, as a 
nonphysical, or even anti-corporeal, entity.”215 
While the Ursulines imagined themselves as spiritual mothers, they 
simultaneously imagined themselves as children as well; especially in relation to the male 
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clergy.216 Yet, the child metaphor was not only evidence of hierarchical gender and 
clerical relations, it permeated the entire spirituality of the sisters. Heijst concludes that 
the self-representation as children reinforced practices of care based on religious kinship 
that “constructed solidarity between strangers. Kinship on the level of faith resulted in a 
practice of responsibility; Catholic adults begin to take care of neglected children that 
they did not know.”217 In the modern era, therefore, examples once again exist of care 
practices being based on functional requirements and non-biological kinship. However, in 
this context of institutionalized care by women religious, caregivers were not chosen 
based on children’s needs. Instead, these women self-selected into care giving practices 
driven by a religious commitment to alleviate social needs and for the sake of the 
children themselves, for whom the women would become spiritual mothers.  
 
American Orphan Trains 
Colonial America made much freer use and recognition of adoption and 
apprenticeship than did England, from which most laws had derived.218 With 
industrialization, immigration, and urbanization, Eastern cities grew and became 
increasingly crowded. This transformation created high rates of poverty in both urban and 
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rural areas.219 Religious and secular aid organizations responded by creating and 
expanding orphan asylums.220  
Near the time of the civil war, major shifts also occurred in American conceptions 
of children and the family. These were influenced by thinkers, like Bushnell, who 
extolled the natural virtues of the family for childrearing and labeled all other 
environments ‘artificial.’ Simultaneously, paternal authority over children was reduced as 
judicial discretion became an increasingly important component of custody rulings; 
largely influenced by the growing view that women had a natural capacity for 
childrearing.221 
In post-bellum American cities, overcrowding in asylums, partially due to their 
success in reducing child mortality, became a major problem. Charles Loring Brace, 
influenced by the English practice of ‘transportation’ which was designed to relocate 
needy children away from urban centers, devised a solution that would place children in 
Christian homes while responding to the economic needs of his time.222 This system, 
known as ‘placing out,’ was organized by The Children’s Aid Society of New York and 
utilized the rapidly growing railway system to transport children from eastern urban 
centers to the western frontier.223 From the mid-nineteenth to the early twentieth century 
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the orphan trains, as they came to be called, placed out more than 200,000 children.224 
The system was encouraged by the widespread belief that institutional care and cities 
themselves were detrimental to children’s development.225 
Though Brace’s system was most influential, other Protestant organizations soon 
replicated the practice.226 Such groups accepted children from Catholic parents but would 
not place them with Catholics. And, as a consequence of biases of the time, Italian and 
Slavonic children were generally not accepted for placement. These realities caused 
alarm among Catholic bishops who, gathered in Baltimore in 1866, lamented that 
Catholic children were being transported to western homes were they would be “brought 
up in ignorance of, and most commonly in hostility to, the religion in which they had 
been baptized.”227 Self-segregation from the dominantly Protestant culture constituted an 
important aspect of the American Catholic identity. But it also required Catholics to be 
self-sufficient in responding quickly to the needs of their coreligionists brought on with 
each new wave of immigration.228 In 1969 the New York Foundlings Hospital operated 
by the Sisters of Charity of St. Vincent de Paul began what became the most prominent 
Catholic placing out program.229 
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Brace’s model reflected a marriage of the Protestant work ethic with social charity 
which answered social and economic needs out of religious commitments.230 The 
Children’s Aid Society worked with city asylums and placed older children, especially 
boys, with willing rural families who would provide for their care and education but who 
were also in need of additional laborers. Especially for adolescent boys, indenturing was 
a common and legally permissible practice in many western states.231 As a matter of 
commitment, the Children’s Aid Society did not participate in indenturing, as did some 
other agencies, but because its contracts were primarily verbal, foster parents could 
simply obtain indenture on their own.232 
Brace’s system resettled a large number of children, but was not free of problems. 
Placed children deserted their homes with relative frequency such that re-placing children 
was a common task. In addition, because receiving parents were not arranged beforehand, 
the children were set on display at destination towns for public evaluation by potential 
parents. The children could be asked to perform, farmers in need of laborers were 
allowed to scrutinize children’s physical features, and children had their nationality, 
background, and other personal information read aloud to the gathered crowd.233 
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In contrast to Brace’s system, which did not generally place babies due to the 
challenges of their transport (including their potential to cause a ruckus with eager 
parents at train platforms), the Foundling Hospital generally placed infants and young 
children. To facilitate this, the Sisters of Charity relied upon local clergy to arrange 
homes prior to the children’s transport. An identifying number was then sent to the new 
parents and stitched to the children’s collars.234 Yet, even among the Foundlings 
placements, life included a good deal of labor and not all placements could be sustained. 
Both organizations maintained contact with children and dealt with many challenges in 
securing lasting homes.235 Correspondences with adoptees reveal that they were often 
treated unequally with biological children and frequently subject to criticism.236 
A good deal of uncertainty surrounds what information was being shared by the 
institutions with those on either end. It is unclear, for example, if receiving parents were 
aware that the majority of children being relocated had at least one living parent and had 
been surrendered as a result of poverty, inability, unwed mothers, or broken marriages.237 
Back in New York, the institutions avoided acknowledging the true perils of rural farm 
life, which was instead liberally idealized.238 
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The orphan train system was predominantly a white phenomenon. Records from 
the Foundling and the Children’s Aid Society indicate that children of African, Chinese, 
Slavonic or Spanish descent were placed at dismally low rates.239 An infamous episode 
unfolded in 1904 when a French Catholic priest in Arizona arranged for a placement of 
about forty children of Irish descent (the most desired ethnic group at that time).240 The 
Foundling sisters evidently did not realize that working class Hispanic families had been 
arranged to receive the children. This placement so agitated the European Protestant 
townspeople that within days a mob was formed which then abducted the children. When 
the Foundling intervened in an attempt to reclaim the children, local residents refused to 
cooperate. The ensuing legal battle ended in the Supreme Court which upheld the 
confiscation of the children and overrode the Foundling’s claim to guardianship.241 
 Both the primary Protestant and Catholic systems of placing out relied upon a 
religious responses to the social need caused by overcrowded city asylums. Each system 
took unique form in part due to the ideological commitments of their administrators, yet 
both operated under the assumption that placing children with Christian strangers served 
the best interest of the child, even while many of their parents were known to be living. 
Denominational and racial divisions, however, reveal the operative limitations of non-
biological kinship within American Christian thought patterns of the time. Protestants 
would accept children from, but not place children with Catholic guardians while 
Catholics quickly recognized that they themselves would have to actively protect their 
                                                 
239 Ibid., 206. Cf. Holt, 73. 
240 See Linda Gordon, The Great Arizona Orphan Abduction (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2001). 
241 Creagh, 206. 
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insular Catholic self-identity. Race, however, united the judgments of both groups. Both 
systems were directed towards white children and families, and when a French priest 
placed Irish children with Hispanic families, both immediately recognized the “mistake.” 
Interestingly, Irish children themselves were held as most desirable because their features 
often allowed them to be passed off as the same nationality as their adopting families. 
Thus, even as the system itself operated on religiously motivated commitments to non-
biological kinship, the appearance of biological kinship remained important. 
 
African American Kinship Patterns 
While African Americans have not been a large demographic segment of 
American Catholics and Catholics have not been a large proportion of African 
Americans, historic US black family patterns provide a unique and noteworthy variation 
on conceptions of kinship within Christian history. Historical responses by African 
Americans to family fragmentation cause by to weighty and intrusive external forces 
gave rise to concepts of kinship that resemble early Christian convictions in intriguing 
ways.  
Throughout US history, African Americans have suffered unique challenges in 
their efforts to sustain biological family networks. Enslaved individuals held no control 
over their family’s future within a system that denied rights to marriage and citizenship in 
addition to degrading their very status as human persons. Slaves were often bought and 
sold without serious regard for family units. Sexual contact with female slaves could be 
coerced by white male slaveholders who rendered sexual exclusivity beyond a slave’s 
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control.242 Such liaisons gave rise to many mixed race children who inherited the social 
status of their mothers.243  
In West African cultures, knowledge of one’s kinship and lineage had been highly 
valued, but in response to the frequent disruption of family units, uncertainty of lasting 
contact among biological relations, and coerced sexual acts leading to children born into 
slavery, American slaves redefined kinship as feature of the enslaved community itself.244 
In doing so, blacks found themselves within a family network even despite conditions 
that undermined the permanence and stability of bonds among biological kin. Unlike 
early Christians, American slaves did not voluntarily disavow biological kin, but in the 
absence of these bonds they similarly responded by utilizing a non-biological concept of 
kinship to redefine and sustain kin networks. 
When the institution of slavery’s direct assault on biological kin groups was 
ended, kin networks among African Americans took on new form in light of the 
possibility of stable family units. During the Reconstruction Era and into the twentieth 
century, black women’s experience differed markedly from that of the leaders of the 
nascent feminist movement growing among upper and middle-class white women. 
                                                 
242 Historians are in some disagreement about the existence, extent, and direct intervention 
involved in coercive ‘slave breeding’ by slave owners. Suggestions of such realities are clearly an 
important aspect of northern abolitionist rhetoric, but verification is controversial. See, Gregory D. 
Smithers, “American Abolitionism and Slave-Breeding Discourse: A Re-evaluation,” Slavery & Abolition 
33, no. 4 (December 2012): 551 – 570. 
243 Individual’s inherited the race of their mother which kept them in slavery until they were less 
than 1/8 African descent. Under this system ‘quadroons’ and ‘octoroons’ were especially prized as slave 
mistresses because of their white appearance. Prior to emancipation these individuals served as valuable 
public advocates against slavery in the north as white audiences saw ‘African slaves’ who were 
indistinguishable from themselves. Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, 
Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2000), 135 – 136, 144. 
244 Ibid., 49. 
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Instead of seeking freedom from domesticity, African American women sought to 
withdraw from the workforce in order to support their families. Unlike whites, black 
women had always worked fulltime and had no social experience of a clear separation 
between the public-economic and private-domestic spheres. Instead, paid employment for 
black men provided the new possibility of motherhood without fulltime participation in 
the workforce. 245 However, “while many women tried to leave the paid labor force, the 
limited opportunities available to African American men made it virtually impossible for 
the majority of Black families to survive on Black male wages alone.”246 Employment for 
black males often paid a salary sufficient to sustain a family, yet opportunities were 
limited and blacks were much more vulnerable to lay-offs and unemployment than their 
white counterparts. Because of this instability the majority of African American mothers 
were compelled to take low paying but steady jobs in service work.247 As such, the 
majority African American mothers from slavery through the dawn of the Civil Rights 
Movement worked fulltime outside the home. Once again, African Americans relied 
upon extended networks of kin, biological or not, to provide means of support for 
childrearing and to sustain kin networks given the pressures of the social context. At 
times, temporary arrangements for childcare even led to long-term informal adoption.248 
Markers of a history of extended kinship patterns remain embedded in 
contemporary African American society. Grandmothers, aunts and other women within 
                                                 
245 Ibid., 50. 
246 Ibid., 54. 
247 Ibid., 55. 
248 Ibid., 179. 
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the community are frequently referred to by maternal names such as ‘momma.’249 
Patricia Hill Collins explains,  
Fluid and changing boundaries often distinguish biological mothers from other women who care 
for children. Biological mothers, or bloodmothers, are expected to care for their children. But 
African and African-American communities have also recognized that vesting one person with full 
responsibility for mothering a child may not be wise or possible. As a result, othermothers—
women who assist bloodmothers by sharing mothering responsibilities—traditionally have been 
central to the institution of Black motherhood.250  
 
Throughout this history, African American conceptions of kinship have been 
resilient and adaptive in response to oppressive social conditions which challenged and 
often destroyed the autonomy and privacy of biological families as well as forced the 
majority of adult parents into fulltime work whenever available. This is not to suggest 
that biological kinship was devalued. The fact that many former slaves invested great 
effort into locating biological kin251 and that African American mothers in following 
centuries sought to free themselves from employment in order to be present in the home 
both demonstrate the value of biological kinship. And yet, communal forms of kinship 
that were not defined by biological relatedness took root within the social context and 
sustained individuals throughout difficult circumstances. 
Conclusion 
 Care for children has been negotiated in myriad ways throughout Western 
Christian history and has included forms of kin guardianship, non-maternally centered 
domestic caregiving, spiritual interpretations of ‘true’ motherhood, and a diversity of 
adoption practices. Throughout, kinship based on biological ties has often been central, 
                                                 
249 Ann Schwartz, “Connective Complexity: African American Adolescents and the Relational 
Context of Kinship Foster Care,” Child Welfare 87, no. 2 (2008): 91. 
250 Collins, 178. 
251 Ibid., 152. 
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but faith based kinship has also served as a powerful resource to support practices of care. 
Biblical and theological resources offer numerous precedents for the implications of 
religious kinship, especially the importance of the metaphor of adoption in Christian self-
understanding. Historical transitions have also encouraged the emergence of a narrow 
focus on two-parent families, with restricted roles for mothers in particular, despite much 
more expansive historical precedents. This raises the question as to whether biological 
kinship, or the willingness to construct kinship ties based on children’s needs, is the more 
fundamental Christian ideal. Much in historical Christian practice, modern magisterial 
teaching, and contemporary Catholic theological writing, seems to suggest the priority of 
biological kinship. However, functional ways of approaching caregiving based on the 
needs of families, children, and social conditions also arise and underlie the institutional 
care practices of women religious, the phenomenon of orphan trains, and the extended 
networks of kinship utilized by African Americans mentioned above. These examples 
stand as counter-arguments against assuming the fundamental decisiveness of biological 
relatedness within the Christian tradition’s interpretations of kinship. Instead, Christian 
kinship, whether arising from biology, baptism, communal identity, or social 
commitment, is always a theologically interpreted reality. While the fact of biological 
relatedness has often held precedence in these interpretations, at times convictions more 
central to the heart of the Christian message have provided the fundamental realities from 
which caregiving practices are explained. The following chapter considers the potential 
of the social sciences to reshape Christian conceptions of parenthood in light of 
children’s needs and the always interpreted nature of Christian kinship.   
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Introduction 
 Previous chapters have argued that modern Catholic conceptions of parenthood 
are so closely tied to sexual ethics and biological kinship that they may undermine non-
biological forms of kinship which have traditionally been accepted and even praised. In 
modern magisterial teaching, conceptions of parenthood are supported by an essentialist 
theory of gender which shifts emphasis to family structure and gendered parental roles. 
Contemporary revisionist Catholic theologians generally refute this operative theory of 
gender, but similarly tend to allow sexual ethics to guide their approach towards 
parenthood. Yet the history of Christian thought and practice suggests more expansive 
possibilities than either of these propose. 
Despite the Catholic propensity for allowing sexual ethical norms to decisively 
influence conceptions of parenthood, clear explanations of how sexual ethics, marriage, 
family, and parenthood are actually connected can be elusive.1 In the magisterial 
framework, complementarity appears to bear the burden of connecting these concepts.2 
Revisionist theologians, often employ social-scientific data to argue that parental abilities 
can and do exist beyond the biological nuclear family, however, they tend to offer thin 
theological explanations. Frequently, this data is employed for the purpose of justifying 
moral judgments about adult sexual relationships. Though differing in their use of social 
scientific research for sexual ethical arguments, both perspectives tend rely upon sexual 
                                                 
1 Lisa Sowle Cahill, “Same-Sex Marriage and Catholicism in Inquiry, Thought, and Expression, 
vol. 2 of More than a Monologue: Sexual Diversity in the Roman Catholic Church, eds. J. Patrick 
Hornbeck II and Michael Norko (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014), 154. 
2 Cf. Todd A. Salzman and Michael G. Lawler, The Sexual Person: Toward a Renewed Catholic 
Anthropology (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 141. 
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ethics for their constructions of parenthood without sufficient attention to how the 
observations of the social sciences can contribute to a theological vision of parenthood 
itself.3 
This chapter engages research from the social sciences to assess the veracity of 
moral theological claims related to parenthood and child wellbeing. It contends that, 
although the ‘traditional’ family is linked to favorable child outcomes statistically, 
available data is nonetheless complex and problematizes universal claims. 
Acknowledging the statistical benefits of one particular family structure is distinct from 
claiming that other family forms are untenable or categorically inferior.4 Family forms 
must be evaluated individually as to their outcomes and with due attention to nuances in 
the research and the social contexts in which actual families are embedded. When the 
data is given this careful scrutiny, biological kinship, parental gender roles, and family 
structure, each fail to be categorically determinative for child wellbeing. Instead, external 
factors (such as social and economic forces), parental abilities, and family function 
emerge as significant. Because of this, a theological conception of parenthood that is 
centered on child wellbeing cannot prescind from a structural model of family alone, but 
must attend to the capabilities and function of adult caregivers themselves as well as the 
concrete realties that shape families’ social contexts. 
                                                 
3 The use of the ‘social sciences’ throughout this chapter relates primarily to sociology and 
psychology, while anthropology and history are also at times utilized. History is not always considered 
among the social sciences, yet often plays an essential role in the research of the other disciplines. It should 
also be noted that research on the family within the American context can be a politically charged reality. 
As such, I have attempted to select a balanced representation of available resources. 
4 Throughout this chapter, ‘form’ is used as a general term and refers to any specific type of family 
(nuclear, stable, wealthy, etc.), ‘structure’ refers to the make-up of a family in terms of its constituents 
(nuclear, biological, etc.), and function refers to the operations of a family (socially oriented, stable, etc.). 
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The methodological commitment of this chapter to evaluating parenthood based 
on function directs its engagement with social scientific data. At the same time, it 
attempts to respond the particular limitations identified in both magisterial and revisionist 
perspectives. This chapter presumes that authentic Catholic moral theology is rightly 
directed towards human flourishing, such that studies of human wellbeing have a 
legitimate role in verifying and challenging moral theological claims.5 This commitment 
to human flourishing founds the chapter’s use of social scientific research as a critical 
resource for moral theology, which is also common to revisionist theological methods.6 
The Catholic magisterium likewise acknowledges the value of these resources but the 
form of natural law reasoning it often employs tends to privilege certain modes of reason 
and established tradition. As such, magisterial teaching tends to make less explicit use of 
the social sciences, uses such data selectively in support of particular claims, and 
relegates direct application to matters of pastoral care.7 This chapter will take a 
fundamental conviction of natural law reasoning, that moral knowledge can be arrived at 
through engagement with the created order, as sufficient validation for utilizing 
experiential evidence substantively in moral theological analysis.8 It is through this 
                                                 
5 The relationships between the social sciences and moral theology have been explored by a 
number of authors. Among others see, Michael G. Lawler, What Is and What Ought to Be (New York: 
Continuum, 2005). and Don Browning, Christian Ethics and the Moral Psychologies (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2006). 
6 See, Todd A. Salzman, “What are they Saying about Catholic Ethical Method?” (New York: 
Paulist Press, 2003), 11. And Lawler, 20 – 23. 
7 Vatican II, Gaudium et spes, Vatican, (December 7, 1965) 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_ vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_cons_19651207_ 
gaudium-et-spes_en.html,  #62. For a critique of this use of social scientific information in Magisterial 
teaching see, Stephen Pope, “Scientific and Natural Law Analysis of Homosexuality: A Methodological 
Study,” The Journal of Religious Ethics 25, no. 1 (Spring, 1997): 89 – 126. 
8 Salzman and Lawler, 7. 
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methodological commitment that child wellbeing can be employed as a norm for 
theological conceptions of parenthood. 
Importantly, because child wellbeing comprises a norm for parenthood, parental 
forms and functions will be assessed in terms of their contribution to desirable child 
outcomes. From this perspective, it is not sufficient to claim the benefits of a particular 
conception of parenthood without identifying its functional relationship to child 
wellbeing.9 For example, some divisions of parental roles may be associated with 
particular desirable outcomes, but the fact of this association alone is insufficient for 
moral judgment. Instead, it must be asked why particular divisions of parental roles tend 
to yield desirable outcomes. By pressing this question, a greater understanding of the 
relationship between child wellbeing and parental function might be achieved. 
On the other hand, it must also be recognized that the concept of ‘child wellbeing’ 
itself proceeds largely from value judgments about desirable qualities for the human 
person. While some of these are basic (physical health, educational achievement, 
psychological adjustment, etc.),10 others are more closely bound to religious 
commitments (social altruism, moral development, development of an inner spiritual life, 
                                                 
9 This use of function should not be confused with ‘functionalism’ as used within psychological 
and sociological research, even as some overlap may exist. In both psychology and sociology, 
functionalism refers to perspectives that evaluate behavior based on psychological or sociological needs. 
Functionalism, in these disciplines lacks the teleological orientation of a theological approach in as much as 
they tend to view behavior as reactionary to existing needs rather than as seeking to attain theological 
goods. Within sociology, functionalism is further divided into two very distinct categories. Tallcott Parsons 
was influential in establishing a functionalist theory in which society depends on institutions to serve its 
essential needs whereas the functionalist theory of Bronislaw Malinowski argues that institutions grow out 
of social needs. See, Martin Albrow, Sociology; The Basics (New York: Routledge, 1999), 110 – 111. and 
Hillary Rodrigues and John Harding, Introduction to the Study of Religion (New York: Routledge, 2009), 
56 – 59. 
10 It is also important to acknowledge that some of the human goods associated with child 
wellbeing that appear basic have not always been so, and are not always valued cross culturally. Education 
for all children, not just males or the affluent is one such example. 
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etc.). The former includes goods that can often be expressed in terms of human rights, the 
latter in terms of values. This complexity in the notion of wellbeing calls attention to the 
reality that the Catholic vision of human flourishing, towards which moral theology is 
directed, is significantly broader than most social-scientific inquiries are designed to 
measure. Because the aim of this research is to explore bases for a Catholic theological 
account of parenthood based on child wellbeing, its notion of child wellbeing must 
include a theological vision of human flourishing and the value commitments this 
produces. That is, child wellbeing measured by basic social scientific standards of human 
wellbeing is something less than what a theological account of parenthood aims at 
achieving in as much as human flourishing is defined by the human person’s ultimate aim 
at communion with God. Here again, structural realities may be associated with certain 
desirable outcomes, but how they functionally contribute to these outcomes is the more 
significant concern.11 
 
Part I: The Case for the Traditional Family 
Concern over the statistical breakdown of intact biological nuclear families 
grounded in heterosexual marriage is rooted in arguments that the structure of the 
traditional family promotes children’s healthy development in ways other family forms 
cannot.12 Due caution must be observed to refrain from assuming particular conceptions 
                                                 
11 This use of structure should not to be confused with psychological and sociological uses of 
‘structuralism.’ Structuralism, in social scientific use, relates to theories that investigate human behavior in 
correlation with the structures of the mind that dictate how humans integrate information and utilize 
knowledge. Structuralism was promoted by the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss in the early and mid-
twentieth century but has since been criticized for its universalizing tendencies. Rodrigues and Harding, 62 
– 65. 
12 Cf. Pontifical Council for the Family, “Family, Marriage and ‘De Facto’ Unions,” Vatican, 
(November 9, 2000) 
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of children’s needs without attending to studies of actual children. This is particularly 
important given the reality that significant changes have occurred in cultural conceptions 
of children and childhood throughout Western history.13 The New Testament 
commitment to criticizing prevailing structures of social control when these do not serve 
the interests of those in need is therefore a critical guide in considering present realities.14 
As important as critical attention to cultural ideology is, social scientific evidence 
indicates that children who live in stable households with their married biological parents 
fare better with regard to health, educational, and economic outcomes. As such, a critical 
theological evaluation of parenthood must acknowledge that, on factors important to 
child wellbeing, commitments to the biological nuclear family based on marriage are well 
supported by social scientific research.15 
Summarizing research on the impacts of family structure for children’s wellbeing, 
Kristin Anderson Moore concludes that “a family headed by two biological parents in a 
low‐conflict marriage” is most conducive to child wellbeing when compared to “children 
in single‐parent families, children born to unmarried mothers, and children in 
stepfamilies or cohabiting relationships.”16 In a study which intentionally targeted a wide 
                                                 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/family/documents/rc_pc_family 
_doc_20001109_de-facto-unions_en.html, I.2. 
13 Philipe Ariès, Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life, trans. Robert Baldick 
(New York: Random House, 1962). and Hugh Cunningham, Children and Childhood in Western Society 
Since 1500, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005). 
14 Rosemary Radford Ruether, “Christianity and the Family: Ancient Challenge, Modern Crisis” 
The Conrad Grebel Review (March 9, 2001), 95. 
15 For a secular argument on the importance of traditional marriage related to childrearing, see, 
Sherif Giris, Robert P. George, and Ryan T. Anderson, “What is Marriage,” Harvard Journal of Law and 
Public Policy 34, no. 1 (winter, 2010): 245 – 287. 
16 Kristin Anderson Moore, et al., “Marriage from a Child’s Perspective: How Does Family 
Structure Affect Children, and What Can We Do About It?” Child Trends, (June 2002) 
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variety of family forms, Patrick M. Krueger and colleagues observe, “All non-married 
couple family structures are associated with some adverse outcomes among children, but 
the degree of disadvantage varies across family structures.”17 The disadvantages cited are 
based on measures of health and dental care, access to health care, and schools attendance 
and performance. The study advises that research methods be adapted to more adequately 
account for the increased diversity of family forms.18 For example, cohabitation is a 
recent and rapidly growing phenomenon and research has been slow to account for the 
changes it requires in the way studies must be conducted. Until recently, most assumed 
married or single parent households.19 It is estimated that about one in seven children 
reported to be in mother-only household are actually in a cohabitating household.20 
Moreover, research on race and poverty has tended to overlook alternative familial or 
childrearing arrangements beyond the nuclear family which may be employed at higher 
rates among non-white communities.21 
Research further indicates that children who live with biological married parents 
show the greatest emotional, behavioral, and psychological wellbeing, as well as 
                                                 
http://www.childtrends.org/?publications=marriage-from-a-childs-perspective-how-does-family-structure-
affect-children-and-what-can-we-do-about-it, 2. It is significant that this particular study does not consider 
same-sex or adoptive parenting. 
17 Patrick M Krueger, et al. “Family Structure and Multiple Domains of Child Well-being in the 
United States: a Cross-Sectional Study,” Population Health Metrics 13, no. 6 (2015): 1. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Aulette, 128. 
20 Ibid., 123. 
21 Ibid., 127. 
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educational and economic outcomes.22 One study comparing the effects of family 
structure on educational attainment in the US and Sweden yielded fascinating results. In 
both countries, children living in non-intact families do worse educationally such that 
each additional year a child spends with a single mother or stepparent reduces that child’s 
overall educational attainment by approximately one-half year.23  
Although factors such as financial resources must be accounted for, marriage 
itself appears to have a positive impact on children’s wellbeing.24 Stepfamilies, despite 
greater average financial resources, have educational outcomes for children resembling 
single-parent households more closely than biological married parent households.25 Even 
as social problems among young people have declined in recent decades, such as criminal 
activity, delinquency, and pregnancy, problems related to psychological health which are 
strongly associated with family structure have increased dramatically over a period of 
increased diversity in family structures.26  
Despite changing social trends, most nuclear families still largely follow 
traditional parental gender roles; with mothers contributing a much larger proportion of 
                                                 
22 Kristin Anderson Moore, et al. “Research Brief: What is ‘Healthy Marriage’? Defining the 
Concept.” Child Trends, (September 2004), 3, http://acf.gov/healthymarriage/pdf/Child_Trends-2004.pdf. 
Cf. footnote 19. 
23 Center for Marriage and Families. “Family Structure and Children’s Educational Outcomes.”  
Institute for American Values, (November 2005), 2, http://www.americanvalues.org/pdfs/ 
researchbrief1.pdf (accessed March 2012).  
24 Center for Marriage and Families, 2. Studies comparing the effects of family structure on 
educational attainment in the U.S. and Sweden yield fascinating results. In both countries, children living in 
non-intact families do worse educationally, such that each additional year a Swedish or an American child 
spends with a single mother or stepparent reduces that child’s overall educational attainment by 
approximately one-half year. 
25 Ibid., 5. 
26 Popenoe, 3. 
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their time to childcare and domestic labor than fathers. The type of time mothers and 
fathers spend with children is also generally divided by gender; with fathers having a 
greater share of weekend care, play, and leisure time and mothers a greater share of time 
spent on weekdays and in personal care activities. Mealtime remains both the most 
consistent and most commonly shared parental interaction with children.27 Over several 
decades, David Blankenhorn has argued for the importance of father involvement for 
children’s wellbeing, as well as the future of society. Blankenhorn contends that 
fatherhood is an important cultural construct that binds men to their families, which 
results in significant benefits to children’s wellbeing and assets as they move into 
adulthood.28 
Concerning the impact of the nuclear family on the spouses themselves, children 
tend to stress marriages but have a positive influence on individual parental wellbeing. 
Married parents receive the greatest overall benefits from having children.29 When 
compared to their childless peers, married couples with children are “less happy and 
satisfied… more worried, depressed and anxious.”30 But children also tend to have 
                                                 
27 Allison Sidle Fuligni and Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, “Measuring Mother and Father Shared 
Caregiving: An Analysis Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics – Child Development Supplement,” 
in Conceptualizing and Measuring Father Involvement, eds. Randal D. Day and Michael Lamb (Mahwah, 
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 2004), 355 – 356. 
28 See, David Blankenhorn, Fatherless America: Confronting our Most Urgent Social Problem 
(New York: Basic Books, 1995), 2 – 3. Blankenhorn’s arguments for the value of fatherhood have been 
published in the Wall Street Journal, Yew York Times and other media outlets. Having previously argued 
for California’s Proposition 8, in 2012 Blankenhorn announced publicly that he had changed his opinion 
and now favors legal recognition of same-sex marriage.  
29 W. Bradford Wilcox, ed. “The State of Our Unions; Marriage in America 2011.” University of 
Virginia National Marriage Project and Institute for American Values (December 2011) 
http://stateofourunions.org/2011/SOOU2011.pdf, x. 
30 Aulette, 356. 
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positive effects on their parent’s individual wellbeing. Children show empathy to parents, 
create responsibility and commitment, and allow greater emotional expression, especially 
through the opportunity to experience child-like play with social approval.31 Commitment 
to children also appears to be a significant factor in the long-term health of marriages.32 
Studies indicate that large families tend to reap significant benefits; particularly in 
the marital satisfaction of the spouses. However, these results appear largely due to 
selection effects. That is, “particular types of couples end up having large numbers of 
children, remain married to one another, and also enjoy cultural, social, and relational 
strengths that more than offset the challenges of parenting a large family.”33 Self-
selecting into large families may be driven by religious motivation. As such, religious 
mothers of four or more children are significantly more likely to report being ‘very 
happy’ with their marriage, non-religious mothers with large families show no significant 
difference compared to non-religious mothers with fewer children.34  
Consequently, selection effects should not be overlooked in assessing the benefits 
of the traditional family because socialized expectations play an important role in who 
marries, stays married, and how spouses structure their marriage. For example, spouses 
who report satisfaction with traditionally divided spousal gender roles are likely 
influenced by having brought those gender role expectations into their marriages. 
External factors also complicate the data. For example, fatherhood is correlated to 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 359. 
32 Kristin Anderson Moore, et al. “Healthy Marriage,” 1. 
33 Ibid., 53. 
34 Ibid., 55. 
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increased income, but this is only true of married fathers. Married men appear to benefit 
from the division of household labor as well as preferential treatment extended as a result 
of social recognition.35 As such, whether it is being married itself, or some factor related 
to marital status that is most responsible for certain benefits can be difficult to determine. 
 
Beyond general agreement on assets for child wellbeing, magisterial teaching and 
observations from the social sciences point to similar detrimental factors. Poverty, racial 
discrimination (present and historical), gender discrimination, and divorce or single-
parent families are interconnected realities which cumulatively have profound negative 
consequences for children.36 The only risk factor consistently identified in modern 
magisterial teaching that is not strongly supported by social scientific research on child 
wellbeing is same-sex parenthood. This discrepancy is indicative of the general 
relationship between magisterial teaching and social scientific research; broad agreement 
exists in general areas while specific claims are often more contested. For example, while 
magisterial support for the nuclear family is confirmed by research, the magisterium’s 
suggestion of a causal effect from traditional marriage to stability is less certain.37 Do 
                                                 
35 Rebecca Glauber, “Race and Gender in Families and at Work: The Fatherhood Wage Premium,” 
Gender and Society 22, no. 1 (Feb., 2008): 24. 
36 Cf. John Paul II, Familiaris consortio, Vatican, (November 22, 1981) 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/ john_paul_ii/apost_exhortations/ documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_19811122_ 
familiaris-consortio_en.html. John Paul II, Gratissimam sane (Letter to Families), Vatican, (February 2, 
1994) http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/ letters/documents/hf_jp-ii_let_ 02021994_families_ 
en.html. NCCB, “Economic Justice for All: Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. 
Economy” USCCB, (November, 1986) http://www.usccb.org/upload/ economic_justice_for_all.pdf. et al. 
37 “A committed, permanent, faithful relationship of husband and wife is the root of a family. It 
strengthens all the members, provides best for the needs of children, and causes the church of the home to 
be an effective sign of Christ in the world.” USCCB, Follow the Way of Love (Washington D.C.: United 
States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 1994) 
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children in nuclear families have better outcomes because a family based in marriage 
itself supports healthy development, or because couples who get and stay married tend to 
have greater resources, opportunities, social support, and parenting skills? Neither 
explanation alone fully accounts for the data.38 Consequently, attention to social, 
economic, educational, and other factors is warranted before such data can found 
substantive moral pronouncements.  
 
Stability 
From a functional perspective, stability39 appears to be the single most important 
factor for child wellbeing on which Catholic thought and contemporary social scientific 
research agree. Marriage is a considerably more stable institution than cohabitation in 
terms of the longevity of parental relationships and is associated with significant financial 
advantages over both cohabitation and single parenthood.40 In part this is due to 
cohabitating couples tending to be younger, less prepared for parenting, and in less stable 
long-term partnerships than married couples.41 Still, willingness to marry itself is a 
relatively weak predictor of long term relational stability when compared to more specific 
                                                 
38 Center for Marriage and Families, “Research Brief 1: Family Structure and Children’s 
Educational Outcomes,” Institute for American Values, (November 2005) 
http://www.americanvalues.org/catalog/pdfs/researchbrief1.pdf, 1-2. 
39 Stability generally refers to low-conflict families without divorce, separation, or other 
significant shifts that affect caregiving arrangements. When such disruptions occur, stability characterizes 
family systems that adapt readily and diminish secondary effects. 
40 See, Lisa Mincieli, et al. “The Relationship Context of Births Outside of Marriage: The Rise of 
Cohabitation,” Child Trends, (May 2007) http://www.childtrends.org/?publications=the-relationship-
context-of-births-outside-of-marriage-the-rise-of-cohabitation. 
41 Patrick M Krueger, et al. “Family Structure and Multiple Domains of Child Well-being in the 
United States: a Cross-Sectional Study,” Population Health Metrics 13, no. 6 (2015): 6. 
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factors. Income, education, age at marriage, and birth of the first child at least seven 
months after marriage are all considerably reduce the likelihood of divorce (30, 25, 24, 
and 24 points respectively). Intact families of origin and religious affiliation follow after 
these (14 points each).42 As such, a well-educated couple with incomes above the median 
who marry after age twenty-five has a significantly smaller likelihood of divorce than a 
less-educated younger couple with lower annual incomes. These more divorce-prone 
couples share many characteristics with couples who are likely to choose to cohabitation. 
These constitute significant selection factors that suggest that stability within a marriage 
is deeply tied to advantages already evident before marriage and that couples who would 
be prone to marital break-up tend to forgo marriage in favor of cohabitation at a higher 
rate than their more advantaged peers. 
Over recent decades, the percent of marriages that end in divorce has remained 
relatively stable. But, the overall number of both divorces and marriages has dropped as 
rates of cohabitation have risen significantly.43 Compared to marriage, cohabitation has a 
much reduced likelihood of a stable long-term parental relationship for children. Among 
all first marriages, the chance of spouses remaining married for ten years is around 66%, 
whereas only 16% of cohabitations will remain together for five years. The longevity of 
cohabitation is also connected to the probability of marriage. Couples who are engaged 
before cohabitating show no negative correlation in marital longevity. Of cohabitating 
couples, about 25% will marry within the first year and of those that last five years the 
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43 US Department of Health and Human Services, “Marriage and Cohabitation in the United 
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odds of marriage are about 65%.44 Yet, the fact of an association between instability and 
cohabitation is of less interest than the functional relation. In this regard it appears that 
couple’s expectations and understanding of the nature of their relationship has a decisive 
impact for long-term stability. Couples who understand their relationship as having a 
long-term future orientation have significantly greater prospects of relational longevity 
than those who do not.  
 
Part II: Biological Kinship 
While recognizing that long-term stable families are associated with traditional 
marriage, families formed by adoption also tend to have strong outcomes. In many 
instances, the spousal relationship is not procreative in the biological sense, yet adoptive 
parenting appears to function similarly with regard to healthy child outcomes. Care for 
non-biological children has a long history in Christianity and families formed through 
adoption are at times praised in modern magisterial teaching as true expressions of the 
meaning of parenthood.45 However, emphasis on biological kinship and narrow 
conceptions of procreation raise questions about the place of adoptive families in 
contemporary Catholic thought on parenthood. While Catholic magisterial teaching 
concerning the foundational importance of marriage-based families does not necessarily 
exclude adoptive families, magisterial defenses of the procreative end of marriage creates 
a bias towards biological parenthood. This is especially true after Humanae vitae. On the 
basis of sociological research, there is good reason to believe that adoptive parents are 
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45 John Paul II, Familiaris consortio, #14 
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often models of “the true meaning of parenthood”46 and therefore ought to play a more 
significant role in our theological conceptions of parenthood and the family. 
Outcomes among adopted children are similar to average outcomes for all 
American children despite the selection effects that adoption often presupposes.47 As in 
biological families, stability remains an important factor for adopted children and those in 
foster care as a predictor of long-term wellbeing. Unfortunately, over a quarter of all 
children in the foster system do not find stable placements. Those who do are “more 
likely to be young, have normal baseline behavior, have no prior history with child 
welfare, and have birth parents without mental health problems.” David Rubin and his 
colleagues argue that instability alone accounted for a 63% rise in behavioral problems 
among the foster children they studied.48  
For children who are permanently adopted, the negative impacts of factors that 
led to a their eligibility for adoption and/or time spent in foster care are largely 
compensated for by the advantages adoptive parents tend to have in income, education, 
and parenting skills.49 Adopted children have higher rates of conditions that impede 
educational performance than their peers, with those adopted from foster care facing even 
greater educational and emotional challenges. However, adopted children’s parental 
                                                 
46 Ibid. 
47 Matthew D. Bramlett, “The National Survey of Adoptive Parents: Benchmark Estimates for 
School Performance and Family Relationship Quality for Adopted Children,” U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services, (June 2011), 6, http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/09/ NSAP/Brief1/rb.pdf. 
48 David M. Rubin, Amanda L.R. O'Reilly, Xianqun Luan and A. Russell Localio, “The Impact of 
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336. 
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advantages compensate for these factors when child wellbeing is considered 
comprehensively. This helps explain why adopted children tend to form stronger 
relationships with their parents compared to their peers, but also fair worse 
educationally.50  
Beyond the generally good outcomes of adoptive parenthood, the process through 
which a child is adopted matters. On average, children adopted from foster care have 
greater educational and relational difficulties than their adopted peers who were not in 
foster care. Foster care children are also more likely to be adopted at older ages and to 
have suffered neglect or abuse. Moreover, the advantages of their adoptive parents are 
less significant as those who adopt from the foster care system are on average less 
educated and have lower household incomes than those who adopt by other means.51 In 
light of the expense of adopting through private agencies, this variance is not surprising.52 
Still, the majority of parents who adopt from foster care, 90%, would repeat their 
decision. Among these parents, almost three quarters believe their child was exposed to 
abuse prior to adoption.53 
Adoptive parents, particularly those who welcome challenging children, embody 
many attributes deemed admirable by Catholic teaching. Moreover, adoptive parents 
                                                 
50 Bramlett, 8. 
51 Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, 10. 
52 According to the US Department of Health and Human Services, more than half of adoptions 
from foster care cost no money, and only about 15% cost more than $5000. The cost of private adoptions 
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most expensive with 93% costing more than $10,000. Sharon Vandivere and Karen Malm, Adoption USA: 
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generally enjoy very good child outcomes. But further nuances within the data may also 
be observed. Of parents who adopt from foster care, the most common factor motivating 
the adoption is the desire to provide a permanent home to a child in need, though factors 
such as infertility, family expansion, and providing a sibling to an existing child are also 
common.54 One troubling reality is that the parents with the greatest income and 
educational assets do not tend to adopt the children with the greatest needs.  
Elizabeth Bartholet argues that present adoption practices are characterized by 
advantaging those with financial resources rather than serving children’s needs. 
Prospective parents with greater financial assets have greater opportunity to match 
themselves with younger, healthier children with fewer initial disadvantages.55 Although 
adoption functions because people desire to provide homes for children in need, adoption 
also fulfills adult desires and this complicates any moral appraisal. While individual 
motivations for adopting can be complex and diverse, the beneficial role adoption can 
play as well as the general success of adoptive parents should be acknowledged. 
Nonetheless, differences in parental motivations and real disparities within present 
systems ought to raise concern about how systematic disadvantages shape adoption and 
foster care.  
Racial disparities in treatment and opportunity, economic pressures on families, 
and systematic social disadvantages all are factors in the reality of American families. 
These factors create real distinctions in abilities to form and maintain stable family units, 
                                                 
54 Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, 11. 
55 Elizabeth Bartholet, Family Bonds: Adoption and the Politics of Parenting (Boston: Houghton 
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in how the adoption and the foster care system operate among different groups, and in 
available opportunities for family formation and resources of parental support. Attending 
to these realities complicates simplistic causal connections between family structure and 
child outcomes by calling more attention to the selection effects spurred on by social 
differences and disparities that influence the formation and fragmentation of family units. 
 
Race, Class, Economics, and the Traditional Family 
Within the US, marital status, race, and age are correlated to poverty even as the 
precise nature of the relationships among these factors is disputed.56 Among the poor, 
children constitute the largest single group,57 while 40% of the homeless are families.58 
The advantages of the powerful US economy do not often reach children raised in 
poverty who have a significantly higher probability of living in poverty as adults than 
their wealthier peers.59 In fact, the average American child is “poorer than the average 
child in 12 of the 14 most developed nations.”60 Although family structure and income 
are correlated, with families headed by married partners having the highest income on 
average, attending to only the causal linkages between marriage and increased income 
reduces a more complex reality.  
                                                 
56 Russel D. Crane and Tim B. Heaton, eds. Handbook of Families and Poverty (Los Angeles: 
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58 Ibid., 91. 
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Family structure itself is dependent on far more than individual choice and instead 
responds to economic pressures and social realities. That is, the family is much more than 
a natural, religious, or ideological reality; the family is, and has always been, a social and 
economic unit. This fact must not be forgotten when considering diversities in family 
structures and advantages. The advantages related to marriage for child wellbeing may 
largely be byproducts of socioeconomic factors which tend to accompany stable 
marriages. One study finds that socioeconomic status tempers the links between family 
structure and child wellbeing. “For every outcome examined, the relationship between 
family structure and children’s well-being was weakened, sometimes fully explained, and 
occasionally reversed once adjusting for family income, caregiver’s education and 
employment, and home ownership.”61 This finding suggests that differences among 
socioeconomic variables are at least as significant as family structure when viewing 
families from a functional perspective in relation to child wellbeing. 
Countering the ideological biases that idealize the traditional family and morally 
condemn family units that do not live up to this standard, Patricia Hill Collins argues that 
the ideology of the traditional family itself operates as tool of oppression within a 
network of systemic injustice that disadvantages women, African Americans, 
homosexuals, and other groups. Collins writes,  
Situated in the center of the family values debates is an imagined traditional family ideal. Formed 
through the combination of marital bonds and blood ties, ‘normal’ families should consist of 
heterosexual, racially homogenous couples who produce their own biological children. Such 
families should have a specific authority structure, namely, a father-head earning an adequate 
family wage, a stay-at-home wife and mother, and children… Defined as a natural or biological 
                                                 
61 Patrick M Krueger, et al. “Family Structure and Multiple Domains of Child Well-being in the 
United States: a Cross-Sectional Study,” Population Health Metrics 13, no. 6 (2015): 6. The study is based 
on self-reporting and some differences may exist in the way types of parents tend to report which would 
have an effect on the data. For example, single father’s and single mother’s may tend to have differing 
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arrangement based on heterosexual attraction, instead this monolithic family type is actually 
supported by government policy. It is organized not around a biological core, but a state-
sanctioned, heterosexual marriage that confers legitimacy not only on the family structure itself 
but on children born in this family.62 
 
Although criticism of simple hierarchies remains important, Collins’ work highlights the 
complexity of systemic injustices, employing the term ‘matrix of domination’ to describe 
a network of social oppression.63 Individuals of different circumstances and identities 
may find themselves at different locations within this matrix and therefore may be subject 
to differing social realities with different sets and proportions of social advantages and 
disadvantages. Collins uses the term ‘intersecting oppressions’ to explain how differing 
factors contribute to an individual’s relative disadvantage. She argues that the existence 
of intersecting oppressions is rooted in “interdependent concepts of binary thinking, 
oppositional difference, objectification, and social hierarchy.” Collins continues,  
With domination based on difference forming an essential underpinning for this entire system of 
thought, these concepts invariably imply relationships of superiority and inferiority, hierarchical 
bonds that mesh with political economies of race, gender, and class oppression.64 
 
Because social conditions and economic pressures have been shown to influence 
the function of family units so as to mitigate structural differences, it is important to 
clarify how different aspects of racial, economic, gendered, classists and heterosexists 
advantages create concrete challenges in the circumstances of families. To clarify the 
impact of intersecting oppressions on family functions, intersections of particular social 
disadvantages within the US will be briefly presented below with particular attention to 
non-biological nuclear family forms. 
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Income and Family Form 
Race, education, and marital status all correlate to poverty. The percent of blacks 
and Hispanics who live in poverty is roughly twice that among whites65 while individuals 
with lower levels of income and education cohabitate at higher rates.66 Considering 
marital status and poverty, only about 10.5% of children in two parent homes live in 
poverty compared to over 50% in mother-only homes.67 The relationship between 
cohabitation and income is also complex. While people with lower incomes are more 
likely to cohabitate, the instability and lack of future orientation among non-engaged 
cohabitating couples may also contribute to these lower household incomes.68 And 
marriage is related to educational advantages. Among college educated women, more 
than nine out of ten will be married before the birth of their first child compared to just 
43% of those who have never attended college.69 In light of these realties, W. Bradford 
Wilcox laments, “marriage is progressively becoming the preserve of the well-
educated.”70  
                                                 
65 See, United States Census Bureau, “Poverty,” US Department of Commerce, (2013) 
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Race is also a factor in the interconnected realities of marriage, income, and 
education. Sixty years ago, the majority of children in poverty lived with two married 
parents. By the turn of the century, “57% of poor children lived in female-headed 
families...”71 When household income of single mother households is expanded to 
include not only those below the poverty line, but also those categorized as “near poor” 
(less than 150% of the poverty line), nearly 70% fit this category.72 Collins contends that 
increased rates of African American single mother headed families in inner city 
neighborhood are the consequence of decreases in urban male employment opportunities 
and increasingly punitive social welfare policies that fail to adequately respond to these 
economic realities.73 She argues that welfare policies became more punitive just as 
African Americans won the right to be included in the formerly white system. Even at 
present, many single Black mothers struggle “to gain welfare benefits long available to 
white women.”74  
 
Race and Family Form 
Given these realities, divergence from the nuclear family form must be viewed 
within the context of these interlocking forces. Moreover, family forms have historically 
differed among different cultural groups. While Hispanic, Native American and other 
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groups show their own unique differences, presently high rates of single motherhood 
within the African American community may serve as an example.  
Historically, extended kin networks within African American families often 
shared responsibilities for child care and aspects of the social importance placed on these 
networks still persist. A 1993 study showed that 85% of African Americans have 
extended family living in the same city.75 Some have suggested that strong kin networks 
may explain why African American children show lower maltreatment rates compared to 
their white peers when adjusted for income, employment, and urbanization. These 
networks could function to provide direct caregiving support or by holding standards of 
treatment as communal expectations.76  
However, the social and economic shifts of the late twentieth century have 
yielded a social context which leaves many black families with fewer social supports than 
in previous generations. Increased unemployment, more punitive welfare and criminal 
justice policies, and increasingly fragmented communal and family networks have all 
contributed to this reality.77 Throughout the last half-century, while some African 
Americans moved up in economic status, once economically homogenous black 
communities became more stratified. Moreover, the increasing privatization of the 
American family, led by upper and middle class whites, has left most contemporary 
American families more insular and less communally supported than in previous 
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generations.78 Despite African Americans historically having recourse to extended kin 
networks of support, Collins writes, “for far too many African-American children, 
assuming that a grandmother or ‘fictive kin’ will care for them is no longer a reality.”79  
Even as recent generations have witnessed a decline in communal and kin 
supports, the traditional centrality of women within African American families has 
nonetheless remained strong. Motherhood remains an important and respected position 
within black communities and can define a young woman’s status as an adult.80 Collins 
argues that the centrality of women is not about the absence of men within the family, but 
historically finds its locus in “organized, resilient, women-centered networks of 
bloodmothers and othermothers.” 81 Furthermore, single motherhood is less stigmatized in 
black communities due to the recognized challenges of finding a stable partnership. Yet, 
she warns, many women may be overemphasizing the traditional centrality of the mother-
child bond in order to compensate for the absence of “steady, sexualized love 
relationships in their lives.”82  
In a 1997 article, Elaine Bell Kaplan argued that two common assumptions of 
sociological literature on black teenage motherhood no longer consistently held true. 
“First, that adult Black women are supportive of their daughter’s pregnancies and 
                                                 
78 Collins contends that this privatization directly correlates to objectification and 
commodification of children under the framework of a consumer asset. This produces and underlying 
concept of parents as owners of their children who are alone responsible for the care of their private 
property (children). See, Collins, 182. 
79 Ibid., 183. 
80 Ibid., 196. 
81 Ibid., 179. 
82 Ibid., 161. 
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encourage them to keep and raise the babies; and second, that this attitude is linked to the 
existence of an extended kin network.” 83 Instead, young black mothers commonly defied 
their own mother’s demand to terminate the pregnancy. After birth, conflicts between 
young mothers and grandmothers tended to escalate. 84 Many young women in Kaplan’s 
study reported feeling that they could not turn to their own families for support while the 
majority relied on their friends for support.85 Other research has shown that grandmothers 
are both the most frequent coparent for single African American mothers and that they 
tend to provide the greatest instrumental support in caregiving. But the tendency for high 
levels of conflict was also confirmed.86 In Kaplan’s Study, grandmothers reported great 
disappointment in their daughters. Those of lower income felt their daughters had failed 
them in their effort to provide them with a better life. Those of middle income felt that 
their daughters had thrown away the advantages they had worked hard to attain.87  
More recent studies clarify some of the dynamics faced in such inter-generational 
single mother households. Krueger and colleagues argue that the presence of a 
grandparent in the home does not generally mitigate the negative impacts of single 
parenthood or cohabitation on child outcomes. They surmise that this lack of impact may 
be due to residential grandparent of advanced age or ill health drawing upon the primary 
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caregiver’s resources to an extent that lessens the benefit of additional adults in the 
home.88 In the case of younger mothers and grandmothers high conflict relationships 
between mother and grandmother are a more likely culprit. Erin K. Shoulberg and 
colleagues argue that the positive influence of coparents for children’s wellbeing depends 
less upon the coparent’s relation to the child than it does upon the quality of their 
relationship with the child’s mother.89 
 
Race and Incarceration 
Incarceration rates among blacks and Hispanics are a significant factor in family 
fragmentation. Over recent decades, rates of incarceration in the US have increased 
dramatically and are now roughly seven times higher than they were two generations 
ago.90 This increase in the prison population has a racial dynamic, with the incarceration 
rate of African Americans nearly eight times greater than that among whites.91 In 
response to these trends, Angela Davis has described the modern criminal justice system 
as an ‘out of control punishment industry.’92 Between 1991 and 2007 the number of 
                                                 
88 The study did not focus on African American families and had respondents who roughly 
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American children with a parent in prison increased by 82%.93 With such significant 
increases in incarceration, especially among minority communities, families are clearly 
being impacted.  
Although more research is needed on the influence of incarceration on family 
health, it is clear that incarceration disrupts family life and makes finding employment 
more difficult.94 Dorothy Roberts has argued that the effects of incarceration on the 
family are particularly troubling given the fact that black women now account for the 
most rapidly growing group among the incarcerated.95 Most imprisoned women are 
mothers, a fact that has a particularly pernicious influence on the stability of their 
families under present circumstances. Women who were formerly primary caretakers of 
children are less likely to be visited by their family than incarcerated fathers. This 
disparity is likely due to many children being removed from their former home after a 
mother is imprisoned. Prisons are also often located in remote areas which makes 
visitation with children particularly challenging. A 1995 study showed that, on average, 
women in federal prison were 160 miles farther from family than male inmates.96 
Although children and families may benefit from removing the negative influence 
of criminal mothers, the injury to family stability and social networks appears under the 
                                                 
93 Dorothy E. Roberts, “Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment of Black Mothers,” 
UCLA Law Review 59 (2012): 1481. 
94 Crane and Heaton, 277. 
95 Roberts, 1480. 
96 Ibid., 1496. Roberts adds, “Even telephone calls to prison, which are typically saddled with 
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260 
 
present systems appear to outweigh the gains.97 High rates of imprisonment work to 
reproduce social disadvantage across generations.98 Not only does imprisonment of 
parents, particularly mothers, often result in foster care placement and ruptures in 
communication with children, high rates of imprisonment with local communities can 
significantly reduce capabilities for social support and organized response. Roberts 
writes, “Unlike the black urban ghetto, which ‘enabled African Americans to fully 
develop their own social and symbolic forms and thereby accumulate the group capacities 
needed to escalate the fight against continued caste subordination,’ prisons break down 
social networks and norms needed for political solidarity and activism.”99 
 
Race and Foster Care 
Comparison between the treatment of African American and Native American 
families and white families by the foster care system reveals troubling racial disparities. 
Tanya Asam Cooper argues that professionals within the foster care system “routinely 
contend that Native American and African American children are the most at-risk for 
child abuse and neglect” and apply this belief in their actions despite statistical evidence 
to the contrary.100 She writes,  
                                                 
97 Ibid., 1480. 
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99 Ibid., 1483. 
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Besides being reported, investigated, and removed from their homes more often for suspicions of 
abuse and neglect, these children are less likely to receive the mental health services they need in 
foster care; are more likely to have fewer visits with their parents and siblings; are less likely to 
receive services designed to reunify them with their family; are less likely to have contact with 
their foster care caseworkers; and are more likely to see their parents' rights to maintain a 
relationship with them terminated.101 
 
Cooper contends that whereas foster care functions as a means of last resort among white 
families, intervention leading to family break-up is practiced more aggressively with 
Native American and African American families.102  
One culprit in this racially disparate treatment is revealed in a 2008 study. 
Stephanie Rivaux and colleagues show that risk scores from family assessments are 
actually lower than among African American families than among whites when adjusted 
for circumstances. Given the evidence, they argue that, although the assessment of risk 
itself does not appear to show a racial bias, case workers apply lower standards for 
intervention when dealing with African American families.103  
Cooper contends that the present foster care system financially incentivizes 
keeping children in foster care while offering no financial reward for moving children out 
of the system or preventing their entry altogether. Cooper concludes that, despite the 
intentions claimed, the foster care system works primarily for self-perpetuation while 
operating as a “billion-dollar, publicly-funded bureaucracy” that sustains and fosters 
racial disparities.104 “Interestingly,” Cooper notes, “the family preservation strategies are 
generally considered cheaper than traditional foster care because the services are 
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provided to families at-risk without the additional costs of foster care—which can be up 
to seven-hundred dollars per month per child of taxpayer dollars.” And yet, “incentives 
exist to place children in government-subsidized foster care, instead of with these 
children’s families and friends who would care for their children for free.”105  
 
Sexuality, Income, and Adoption 
Same-sex partnerships cut across racial and economic demographics and have 
shown signs of transition as the US social climate has changed in recent decades, 
specifically in increased rates of marriage and adoption.106 Homosexual individuals and 
same-sex couples within the United States show some differences from heterosexual 
individuals and different-sex couples in a number of categories but these are not always 
consistent. For example, individuals in same-sex couples tend to be younger but with 
more education than different-sex couples and have similar incomes when both partners 
work but significantly lower incomes when one only partner works.107  
Fewer same-sex couples are raising children than their heterosexual counterparts, 
although this varies considerably by race and education. African-American, Hispanic, 
and Native American couples are more likely to be raising children than are whites, but 
the proportional difference among same-sex couples alone is much more dramatic. 
Compared to whites, same-sex couples in these groups are between 2.4 (African 
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American) and 1.5 (Native American) times more likely to be raising children.108 Same-
sex couples with lower education are also significantly more likely to be raising children 
with those having less than a high school degree at roughly 43%, a proportion very near 
their different-sex peers. Whereas childrearing remains relatively stable across 
educational attainment for different-sex couples (between 41 – 48%), it drops 
substantially for same sex-couples (10% for college educated). 109  Gary J. Gates writes, 
“Given the connections between parenting and education, it is perhaps not surprising that 
same-sex couples with children show evidence of economic disadvantage relative to their 
different-sex counterparts.”110  
Same-sex couples are also four times more likely to have adopted and six times 
more likely to be involved in foster care than different-sex couples.111 The general pattern 
of white well-educated couples having the highest rates of adoption is exacerbated among 
same-sex couples, which may account for a slight rise in childrearing among the most 
educated same-sex couples.112 
In a much more overt way than those located at other intersections of social 
disadvantage, homosexual individuals and same-sex couples find themselves faced with 
challenges that often take on explicitly religious justifications. This reality is particularly 
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poignant for same-sex couples with children or who seek to adopt children. Some 
advocates of same-sex adoptive parenthood have argued from the perspective of 
expanding the pool of potential adopters for children in need of stable homes.113 David 
Brodzinski writes, 
Long-term foster care is detrimental to children's emotional well-being and undermines their 
future opportunities. To better serve these children, we must do everything possible to increase the 
pool of available caring and capable adults who can make a lifelong family commitment to them 
and ensure that their medical, psychological, social, spiritual and educational needs are met.114 
 
However, from the Catholic magisterium’s perspective, the present plight of stable, long-
term marriage in Western society is linked to moral decay which is itself exemplified by 
the public acceptance of same-sex relationships. The USCCB’s 2009 pastoral letter 
“Marriage, Love and Life in the Divine Plan” acknowledges social factors as practical 
challenges to marriage, but defines the fundamental issues as morally insufficient ideas 
“directed at the very meaning and purposes of marriage,” including contraception, same-
sex unions, divorce, and cohabitation.115 These perspectives fundamentally disagree on 
the social impact of social acceptance of same-sex relationships. Consequently, they 
dispute whether same-sex adoptive parenthood might alleviate a social need, or would 
further contribute to factors that exacerbate that need. 
 
                                                 
113 David Brodzinski writes, “With over 100,000 children continuing to linger in foster care, 
despite being legally freed for adoption, every effort must be made to find timely and permanent 
placements for them, as well as for all the other children, in our country and abroad, who would benefit 
from adoption.” David M. Brodzinski and the Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute, “Expanding 
Resources for Children III: Research-Based Best Practices in Adoption by Gays and Lesbians,” Evan B. 
Donaldson Adoption Institute (October 2011): 5. 
114 Brodzinski, 47. 
115 USCCB, “Marriage, Love and Life in the Divine Plan,” USCCB, (November 17, 2009) 
www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/marriage-and-family/marriage/love-and-life, 17. 
265 
 
 Given the complexity and interconnections of the social and economic realities 
presented above, analyzing the contemporary state of the family by individual moral 
choice alone is inadequate. Factors that influence and give shape to present contexts for 
childrearing, including institutional racism, systematic economic disadvantages, and 
prejudice based on sexual orientation among others, must be addressed as contributing to 
individual circumstances. This viewpoint expands the moral horizon to systemic social 
issues while providing a more nuanced moral analysis of individuals who inhabit socially 
marginalized realities. In so doing, the idealized moral superiority of the nuclear family 
unit lessens as the economic, educational, and social factors that determine individual 
opportunities increases. Non-nuclear familial contexts for childrearing require a more 
careful appraisal based less upon idealizations of gender roles and sexual conduct, and 
more upon how parents function to serve children’s wellbeing in the face of complex and 
often challenging circumstances. 
 
Making Kinship 
Despite the emphasis on biological kinship within modern Catholic perspectives, 
historical resources suggest that Christian conceptions of kinship are not inherently tied 
to biological relatedness. Instead, Christians create kinship by recognizing some 
underlying reality (biological relation, baptism, need, etc.) then creating specific 
obligations based on that reality through theological interpretations of its significance. 
Interpretations of kin obligations based on realities other than biological relatedness are 
often described as ‘fictive kinship.’ This is an unfortunate and misleading term which 
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suggests that non-biological kinship is merely imagined. All kinship is interpreted, and 
therefore ‘fictive’ in a sense.  
Interpretations of kinship carry profound social and religious implications. For 
example, non-biological kinship plays an important role in Jesus’ explanation of his 
mission and in the self-identity of early Christians.116 The theological challenge at present 
lies in addressing the biases that have led to associating ‘real’ kinship with biological 
relatedness and have thus centralized the biological nuclear family as the ideal and truest 
form of the Christian family. A biological bias is historically disingenuous. It relegates 
other forms of kinship to mere metaphor with no real social import when, in fact, non-
biological kinship is central to Christian commitments. 
Kinship in the Christian tradition is based upon recognizing a fundamental mode 
of human relationship founded upon belief in God as creator and redeemer. This makes 
the facts of baptism and human existence itself foundational for interpretations of 
kinship. As such, it is imperative to recognize that ‘fictive kinship,’ is no less real or 
significant than biological kinship, but expresses deep Christian commitments. Christians 
have often accepted kinship obligations based upon interpretations of the significance of 
biological relatedness and, historically and cross-culturally, biological relatedness 
prevails as a powerful and central source of kin obligations. However, Christianity differs 
from a strict naturalism in its willingness to abrogate the kinship claims that are often 
culturally attached to biological relatedness and to construct obligations for the sake of a 
new kinship in Christ. Kinship in Christ is the fundamental mode of Christian kinship 
construction that centers all kin obligations. 
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Although Christian kinship is constructed it is neither fictional nor relativist, but 
simply recognizes that the realities of shared humanity and shared baptism run deeper 
than biological relatedness. From a theological perspective, God’s actions take 
precedence over human response. Consequently, the manner in which humans cooperate 
with God in biological procreation must be viewed from within the context of God’s 
grace in both creating and redeeming humankind. Biblical assertions of God’s fidelity as 
superior to biological ties, joined with commitment to the unity of all believers in Christ, 
substantiate the theological conviction that all human relationships are fundamentally 
based in communion with God and others.117 This underlying reality, not biological 
reproduction, holds priority of place in Christian interpretations of kinship. The two 
realities are not inherently conflictual even as they may at times come into conflict.  
Within the social scientific perspectives, some sociobiologists who base their 
research upon evolutionary theory have been prone to argue that care for biological kin is 
an evolutionary adaptation that informs concrete behavior. Some, who focus on the 
transmission of individual genes across generations, argue that protection of biological 
children, or closely related kin, is an extension of self-interest as it is, in a sense, the 
protection of one’s own genetic survival.118 Interestingly the argument parallels Aquinas’ 
argument for the rationality of paternal care for their offspring on the basis of Aristotle’s 
theory of fetal development, which portrays children as quite literally the seed of their 
fathers. This perspective raises a challenge for the view that kinship is predominantly a 
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socially constructed obligation. But this perspective can be challenged from a number of 
fronts beyond theological convictions alone. For example, the sociological perspective of 
David Blankenhorn, proceeds from a contrary opinion that men are evolutionarily 
adapted to produce the maximum number of offspring, which is contradictory to long 
term care of particular children. Therefore, from Blankenhorn’s perspective, men must be 
socially conditioned to attend to the long-term care of their own children.119 Moreover, 
within sociobiology itself opinion differs as to whether individual’s genes or social 
collectives are the more accurate center of interest in describing evolutionary adaptations. 
When the long term survival of collectives is prioritized over that of individuals, the 
evolutionary basis on altruistic extensions of kinship beyond near-biological kin alone 
becomes more obvious.120 
Differentiating conceptions of kinship from the fact of biological relatedness, 
while admitting a general pattern of correlation on the one hand and significant historical 
diversities on the other, constitutes an elusive but necessary challenge. Bernard Jussen, a 
historian who has explored historical Christian constructions of kinship in response to 
societal needs, writes, 
Like the majority of anthropologists, historians too have uncoupled the scholarly notion of kinship 
from biology and now restrict themselves to assuming that there is some kind of relationship 
between biological reproduction and kinship. This kind of relationship is, however, hard to define. 
The difficulty lies in the tightrope walk involved in retaining some connection between biology 
and kinship while conceiving of kinship as a mental system use to structure social relations of all 
kinds.121 
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As a mental system, kinship is an interpretation of the obligations owed to a particular 
relationship, and yet interpretations of kinship are not entirely unconstrained from the 
facts of biological relatedness. Even scholars who admit the necessity of differentiating 
biological relatedness from kinship nonetheless tend to allow cultural interpretations to 
dominate. Jussen writes, “It is not difficult to show that these scholarly conceptions of 
kinship are inconsistent. They are incompatible with the broadly accepted proposition 
that kinship is an instrument of conceiving of social relations, and that it has no clear-cut 
relationship to biological reproduction.”122  
Differentiating ‘fictive kinship’ from ‘biological kinship’ creates a false 
dichotomy because all kinship is a socially constructed interpretation of human 
relationships and obligations. Consequently, the kinship of Christians, as siblings united 
by baptism, is no more fictive than the biological kinship of siblings in the nuclear 
family. Both forms of kinship unite and give rise to collectively interpreted norms of 
relation. And yet, Christians have not been generally prone to explain the significance of 
the obligations owed to biological siblings through baptism, even while consistently 
conceiving of fellow baptized believers as sisters and brothers in Christ. 
In terms of non-biologically related families, this recognition of the nature of 
Christian kinship helps to explain why their kinship, though uniquely chosen, is as real 
and significant as any other. The presumption that ‘real’ kinship, and thus ‘real families’ 
only arise through biological procreation not only unfairly dismisses the social scientific 
evidence that adoptive families can function as well as biological families, but 
misinterprets Christian commitments. This disparity between presumption and reality 
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calls to attention how dangerous biological bias can be for more central Christian 
commitments. No modern magisterial teaching actually makes the explicit claim that 
biological kinship is central to ‘real’ Christian families, but the claim that the 
reproductive pair is central to family formation is related and has functioned in Catholic 
arguments. 
 
Part III: Parenthood? Or Motherhood and Fatherhood? 
Marriage has undergone significant transformation in recent decades and through 
this the spousal relationship has assumed increased importance as the center of emotional 
support, identity, fulfillment, and stability. Anthony Gittens writes, 
Part of the reason for the perceived crisis in the institutions of marriage and family seems to be the 
increased emphasis on the isolated individuation of the conjugal pair, and the privatization of 
marriage itself. This has largely replaced more traditional emphases both on the integration and 
socialization of the parties and on the social and moral sanctions intended to emphasize social 
responsibility rather than individual rights and choices.123 
 
This emphasis on the spousal pair is the not the result of ideology alone, but also 
long-term historical realities. Low mortality rates in developed societies make this 
emphasis possible. Historically the odds both parents would survive to see all their 
children reach adulthood were relatively slim. Now married couples can expect to spend 
a significant portion of their marriages together after their children have grown. In 
addition, the social context now makes increased demands on spouses’ time and 
attention; because of this, emphasis on the spousal relationship might be expected. 
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Post-Vatican II magisterial teaching on sex and marriage focuses on the spousal 
relationship and argues for the true nature of responsible parenthood in opposition to 
contraception, marital indissolubility in opposition to divorce trends, and 
complementarity against growing acceptance of same-sex relationships. These concerns 
have worked to reduce the scope of concern to matters of the spousal relationship which 
are further influenced by essentialist gender commitments. In this context, 
complementarity has arisen in recent decades as a central theological idea for 
considerations of parenthood.  
 
Parental Complementarity 
Since the mid-twentieth century, magisterial teaching has generally avoided 
describing the spousal relationship in terms of the earlier hierarchy of male over female 
while emphasis on the equality of spouses has grown.124 John Paul II was extremely 
influential in guiding the interpretation of spousal equality after Vatican II through his 
concept of complementarity and its insistence on the continuing importance of gender 
differentiation.125 Consequently, the use of ‘complementarity’ in Catholic writing has 
seen a meteoric rise in recent decades. Complementarity is now a key concept in the 
magisterium’s articulation of the centrality of the male-female sexual relationship for 
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founding marriage and family.126 Any criticism of the modern magisterial conception of 
parenthood requires addressing this relatively new but remarkably influential concept. 127 
 Within magisterial documents, uses of the word ‘complementarity’ suggest 
several related meanings. Todd Salzman and Michael Lawler argue that these 
applications fall into two basic categories, which they label ‘biological’ and ‘personal’ 
complementarity. They further subdivide each category; biological complementarity 
includes ‘heterogenital’ and ‘reproductive’ complementarity, while personal 
complementarity includes ‘communion’, ‘affective’, and ‘parental’ complementarity.128 
In their analysis, Salzman and Lawler detect a hierarchy among these conceptions and 
argue that heterogenital complementarity is ultimately determinative over the rest.129 
Their argument helps demonstrate how closely tied modern Catholic conceptions of 
parenthood are to sexual ethical norms and an essentialist theory of gender.  
The fact that parental complementarity is identified among the explicit forms of 
complementarity being employed is also significant. From a structural perspective, 
parental complementarity explains why male-female partnerships are essential for 
parenthood because it emphasizes the importance of male and female embodiedness. But 
from a functional perspective, parental complementarity must be judged as the extent to 
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which parents function together and utilize each other’s strengths and weaknesses to raise 
children well. Both the structural and functional conceptions conceive of parenthood as a 
cooperative act wherein each individual parent does not have to be capable of everything. 
But they disagree whether gender difference is determinative or even predictive of 
parental capabilities. 
Christine Gudorf attributes the present prominence of gendered parental roles to 
the rise of the ‘two-sex’ gender paradigm and its romanticized conceptions of the family 
which associated women with domestic roles and motherhood with love, warmth, and 
nurture.130 When the previously accepted understanding of male and female as the 
superior and inferior forms of the human person respectively became unacceptable, the 
distinction between male and female took on greater significance. In the earlier 
hierarchical structuring of the genders the humanity of each gender was never in 
question, only its relative degree of perfection. But in the present ‘two-sex’ paradigm, 
male and female must be described as distinct but equal ways of being human.  The 
manner in which the distinction between the genders came to be understood was in no 
small part shaped by sociologist Talcott Parsons’ suggestion that men and women have 
essentially separate and inescapable functions to fulfill in childrearing. Christie Neuger 
contends that throughout recent decades Catholic conceptions of the family have relied 
upon Parson’s functionalist sociological model which was shaped by the 1950s American 
context. 
Women, by nature, have the expressive roles. The family is their emotional domain and they are 
responsible for the nurturance and care of family members. Men, by nature, and the instrumental 
roles and they provide the structural support for the family and bridge the gap between the 
private/domestic world and the public world. According to Parsons, deviation from these natural 
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roles creates dysfunction and instability for families. Thus, it is important for all of society to 
support this role division for the sake of the greater good.131 
 
Contemporary magisterial teaching insists upon the importance of parental gender 
complementarity and posits at least some degree of essential functional difference in the 
capabilities of mothers and fathers.132 Yet it remains remarkably nonspecific in clarifying 
which capacities each gender offers that the other cannot. Fatherhood is often associated 
with financial provision, education, oversight, and support while motherhood is 
associated with nurture, care for young children, compassion, and love. None of these 
traits are clearly defined as foreign to the other gender. 
The claim that motherhood and fatherhood, each based essentially on gender, are 
both necessary for promoting child wellbeing requires careful scrutiny because of the 
patriarchal legacy such divisions can carry. Many feminist scholars regard the idea that 
strong differentiation can accompany gender equality with skepticism. 
The suspicion of historical and conceptual connections between insistence on 
gender roles and a patriarchal legacy is only strengthened by the reality that in modern 
history women’s role as mothers have elicited far greater moral and social concern than 
men’s role as fathers.133 The disproportionate concern for motherhood is largely a 
consequence of having centralized motherhood as the domestic role of nurture and 
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In Mutuality Matters: Family, Faith, and Just Love (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 
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133 The modern ideological struggle over the identification of women with motherhood has arisen 
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caregiving such that any alteration appears to have an immediate impact on children’s 
wellbeing. This centralization creates a restrictive and often idealistic definition of the 
good mother while largely neglecting to consider what makes a good father in relation to 
children. 
Changing conceptions of human gender as well as changing social realities and 
economic pressures challenge predetermined parental roles based on gender. In this 
perspective, ‘motherhood’ and ‘fatherhood’ are not explicitly correlated to either function 
or gender.134 This non-essentialist view tends to emphasize diversity and flexibility and is 
based upon research that exposes the “instability of difference and sameness” in human 
gender.135 Considering the implications of this view for lived reality, Susan Frank Parsons 
writes,  
[G]ender theory is questioning what has been taken to be a primary ground of ethics during 
modernism. To believe ethics is founded in our biology that those biological realities form a given 
human nature which expresses itself in differing social systems and makes itself powerfully 
manifest in the perilous life of the individual person, is part of our modern intellectual inheritance 
in the West.136 
 
Lisa Sowle Cahill adds, “neither empirical evidence nor the scriptural accounts of 
creation support the thesis that the exclusive role for which women, and women alone, 
are suited is a domestic one... Most human roles (as distinct from traits or capacities) can 
be fulfilled in a variety of styles.”137 
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Just Love, eds. Herbert Anderson, Edward Foley, Bonnie Miller-McLemore, and Robert Schreiter (New 
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Perspectives that view parenthood as essentially a single reality, rather than dual 
gender-based realities, tend also to promote negotiated parental roles that allow flexibility 
in arrangements for earning income and care of children. Feminist philosopher Sara 
Ruddick has been an influential advocate of non-gendered function-based conceptions of 
parenthood. She argues that ‘mothering’ is defined by a distinctive mode of 
thoughtfulness which gives rise to a unique discipline. That is, through the functional 
practice of mothering itself, individual behavior builds a habit of responding to the needs 
of others. It is this adaptive pattern of behavior that defines motherhood for Ruddick. As 
such, she does not define the functional role of mothering with essential attributes of the 
female gender. Instead she contends, “the work or practice of mothering is distinct from 
the identity of the mother. Mothering may be performed by anyone who commits him- or 
herself to the demands of maternal practice.”138 Bell hooks supports Ruddick’s vision of 
equal parental roles across genders but believes her approach is flawed in romanticizing 
the idea of the maternal. In response, she pushes for an expansion of the masculine 
parental identity to the point of sameness with mothering. Bell hooks is less inclined to 
believe that individuals will cross lines among gendered self-concepts and therefore 
contends that men will not self-identify with the maternal because the concept in 
inextricably linked to the feminine. She writes, 
Telling a boy acting out the role of a caring parent with his dolls that he is being maternal will not 
change the idea that women are better suited to parenting; it will reinforce it. Saying to a boy that 
he is behaving like a good father… would teach him a vision of effective parenting, of fatherhood, 
that is the same as motherhood.139  
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Though egalitarian visions of shared parenting have been influential, social 
acceptance has outpaced lived realties especially when measured by male involvement in 
the home. As Herbert Anderson observes, a “significant gap” persists “between rhetoric 
and reality.”140 Glenda Wall and Stephanie Arnold write, 
American fatherhood appears to have undergone more changes in culture than in conduct. For this 
reason, the general public may conceive of fathers as being more involved and nurturing than they 
truly are. Subsequent research has certainly borne out the fact that although the conduct of fathers 
has changed somewhat, it is still mothers who bear the vast majority of responsibility for young 
children…141 
 
In response, some argue that inequality is more enduring within the home because 
legislation does not directly affect the domestic sphere; others draw attention to social 
forces which inhibit mutuality in domestic work.”142 
Sociologist Andrea Doucet claims that, in practice, men are not as welcomed into 
non-traditional roles as social support appears to indicate. Rather, men are much more 
inhibited and viewed with greater suspicion in communal settings including children or 
when expressing interest in the children of others.143 Doucet finds that primary caregiver 
fathers tend to tell narratives that stress the fact that their families work despite 
nontraditional arrangements. She attributes this to the extraordinary efforts these fathers 
must make “in social environments that often assume men’s incompetence in 
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caregiving.”144 In a similar manner, Wall and Arnold reason that changes in fatherhood 
have been “undermined by images and text that position fathers as part-time, secondary, 
less competent parents with fewer parenting responsibilities and greater breadwinning 
responsibilities than mothers…”145 They conclude that magazines and other sources of 
parenting advice are so focused on mothers that they inhibit diversifying practice.146 Bell 
hooks surmises that as long as the mother-child relationship remains socially held to a 
unique and superior status childcare will be defined as women’s domain. She adds, “Even 
the childless woman is considered more suited to raise children than the male parent 
because she is seen as an inherently caring nurturer.”147 
Despite these social disincentives, research indicates that equitable sharing of 
domestic labor and childcare coincides with reduced behavioral distinctions between 
motherhood and fatherhood. Sociologist Michael Lamb argues that, functionally, 
maternal and paternal influences on children are more similar than distinctive.148 
Summarizing a similar conclusion by sociologist Scott L. Coltrane, Julie Hanlon Rubio 
writes, 
Coltrane found that the more parents shared childcare, the less distinguishable Mom and Dad 
became. Instead of mothering and fathering, he found parenting. Coltrane believes that as men and 
women continue to share the work of family life, the roles will continue to converge. The new 
father will truly emerge, and he will look an awful lot like the new mother, who will, in due 
course, have adjusted her parenting to reflect her new lifestyle.149 
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Studies also show similarities between the dispositions of single fathers and employed 
mothers.150 This suggests that the activity of parenting itself may shape personality 
expression and help fathers become more nurturing and build intimacy with their child.151 
Another study shows that the birth of a child triggers a drop in testosterone levels in 
fathers; a physiological change in response to behavior that could assist fathers in child 
care.152 Yet, Doucet’s extensive research on primary caregiver fathers reveals that these 
men tend to emphasize their own masculinity and do so according to traditional 
conceptions of gender. Despite fulfilling ‘mothering’ functions, the men appear 
determined “to distinguish themselves as men, as heterosexual males, and as fathers, not 
as mothers... they must actively work to dispel the idea that they might be gay, un-
masculine, or not men.”153 Although studies challenge differentiated gendered parenting 
roles social ideals about men and fatherhood clearly influence men’s behavior and self-
understanding as fathers. 
Women are similarly influenced by social perceptions in their parental 
experiences. Potentially as a result of dissonance between their own experiences and 
                                                 
150 Research on single father families is inconsistent with some studies showing similar impacts on 
children as single mother families while others show stronger child outcomes. Improved child outcomes 
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widespread social conceptions about motherhood, the majority of American mothers are 
ambivalent about motherhood. Only one in four report their experience has been mostly 
positive while one in five report that it has been mostly negative. Dissatisfied and 
ambivalent mothers also often report limited involvement by their husbands as a factor.154 
Although women retain the majority of domestic duties, roughly 71% of American 
mothers work outside the home. Most report doing so out of financial need but most also 
say they would continue their employment if money were not a factor.155 For women, 
work outside the home is associated with increased marital power and equitable division 
of household labor, which could enhance marital and parental satisfaction.156 
The effects of women’s employment also vary according to race. African 
American and Hispanic women have historically been employed fulltime at higher rates 
than whites and therefore have social histories of balancing work and motherhood.157 
Because of the types of employment traditionally available to women of color, African 
Americans and Hispanics may see work less as a vocation and more as a necessity, which 
in turn encourages more emotional investment in the home. That is, they may tend to 
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balance the toil of menial or demeaning work against seeking greater fulfillment in 
family interactions outside of working hours.158 These social realties appear to make a 
difference in working mother’s relationships with their children. For white mothers 
sensitivity tends to be reduced when early grade school children experience extensive 
time in childcare, whereas the sensitivity of African American and Hispanic mothers 
tends increase.159 For all mothers, both employed and not, greater time spent interacting 
with children during non-work time had positive effects on sensitivity.160 
Aside from present social pressures that influence parental behavior and self-
understanding, individual upbringing can also be significant. Rigidity in parental 
modeling of gender roles has been criticized for tending to limit the way children are 
socialized into their own human capacities. The negative consequences of rigid gender 
roles may have an especially profound impact on young boys and may result in 
restrictions in the development of male psyches.161 David James argues that child rearing 
practices which model narrow conceptions of masculinity “tend to foster a boy’s 
alienation from himself and from others.”162 Christine Gudorf contends that this leads to 
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limited male capacities in later life “for child nurturance or for the emotional self-
disclosure necessary for the close friendships and mutual, intimate marriages which 
become more necessary in modern society as more traditional forms of community and 
intimacy disintegrate under the influence of mobility and urban anonymity.”163 The 
consequences of these modes of socialization are significant. Clinical psychologist and 
Jesuit priest John Cicero writes, 
As adults, those men and women who grow up with rigid senses of masculinity and femininity 
according to established cultural norms are less likely to achieve a more adaptive sense of balance 
in the Jungian sense of the animus and anima. They are more likely, instead, to denying the 
opposite side of themselves, and in so doing to close themselves off to sexual maturity. Empirical 
studies with dependency styles, men are far less likely than women to endorse the need for 
emotional warmth, support, and nurturance on self-report measures; but on projective measures — 
where they don’t realize what they are endorsing — they are just as dependent.164 
 
Cicero further argues that men’s inability to recognize healthy dependency as a 
consequence of highly gendered socialization may impair “healthy spiritual awareness 
and practice.”165 As such, strong socialization for well-defined gender roles appears to 
have limited value within a Catholic theological framework inasmuch as it may suppress 
capacities for individuality, friendship, marital health, and religiosity. When parenthood 
is linked too tightly to narrow conceptions of gender, several challenges are presented in 
relation to achieving human flourishing. 
In sum, parenthood can be conceptualized as either a singular or a dual reality. 
From one perspective, motherhood and fatherhood appear distinct and complementary, 
such that even a child with two mothers or two fathers still lacks a full and authentic 
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experience of parenthood. From the other, parenthood is a foundational term that is 
labeled either motherhood or fatherhood depending upon which gender is being 
referenced. From the first perspective, the lack of a mother or a father constitutes an 
absence of complementarity and thereby a deficiency in a child’s parental resources. 
From the second, parental function is central, such that a child experiences deficiency in 
parental resources when the available caregivers cannot or do not adequately respond to 
the child’s needs. Both perspectives are, in reality, based on parental function. The 
gendered perspective that differentiates motherhood from fatherhood posits parenthood 
as a dual gendered reality in which particular parental functions are connected to either 
motherhood or fatherhood. This gendered perspective is, however, hesitant to name these 
gendered functions explicitly aside from vague references to the importance of male-
masculine and female-feminine parental role models. And even this claim to functional 
importance of role models is weak inasmuch as it depends upon on cultural assumptions 
of what constitutes femininity and masculinity and implies that parents alone constitute 
the only significant role models in a child’s life. 
Many households continue to divide labor along gendered lines despite 
increasingly egalitarian ideals of parental function. Does this reality imply that the 
genders are naturally fit for specific roles or that cultural conditioning simply makes 
assuming these traditional roles easier? Because behavior is influenced by both natural 
propensities, internalized cultural ideals, and external pressures (such as economic 
constraints) the answer to this question will always remain somewhat ambiguous. What is 
clear, however, it that an absolute principle of exclusion in parental function (i.e. women 
cannot fulfill certain tasks of fatherhood and vice versa), is not supported by available 
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evidence. Without this, the division of function based on gender is at best a guide, not a 
rule. 
 
Gender and Parenthood 
Appeals to complementarity, as an essential requirement of childrearing, surface 
with regularity in arguments against same-sex parenthood. In magisterial teaching, the 
need for parental complementarity is posited as a matter of basic justice.166 Echoing 
several years of statements by the US Catholic Bishops, Pope Francis explains,  
It is necessary to emphasize the right of children to grow up within a family, with a father and a 
mother able to create a suitable environment for their development and emotional maturity. 
Continuing to mature in the relationship, in the complementarity of the masculinity and femininity 
of a father and a mother, and thus preparing the way for emotional maturity.167 
 
Several revisionist theologians disagree strongly with such arguments and are 
quick to cite sociological and psychological evidence that children raised by same-sex 
parents have comparable outcomes to children of heterosexual parents. For example, in 
response to the CDF’s argument against same-sex parenthood in the 2003 document 
“Considerations Regarding Proposals to Give Legal Recognition to Unions Between 
Homosexual Persons”, Patricia Beattie Jung writes,  
[D]espite the Vatican’s assertion that claims to be based on experience, after more than twenty 
years of scrutiny not a single research study suggests that children raised by same-sex parents fail 
to flourish. As early as 1999, reviews of the relevant literature had given clear evidence to the 
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contrary.” In fact ample evidence suggests that normal development among children may be 
expected among same-sex parents at the same rate as their heterosexual peers.168 
 
In recent decades, several concerns have been raised in relation to the capabilities of 
homosexual persons in childrearing. These include worry that children will develop 
impaired sexual identities, abnormal conceptions of gender roles, or that they will 
themselves become homosexual. Beyond this, some express concern for children’s 
mental health, social adjustment, behavior, and ability to form social relationships while 
others feared that children in gay and lesbian households will be at higher risk for sexual 
abuse.169 After several decades of research, a consensus of evidence now contradicts the 
validity of these anxieties, even as societal stigma remains a factor with which gay and 
lesbian parents must contend. Social-scientific evidence shows that gay and lesbian 
parents are as capable as their heterosexual peers are in raising healthy children.170 
Moreover, children of gay and lesbian parents do not generally report that their parents’ 
sexuality has had any significant impact in their parenting capabilities. Findings do 
indicate that social stigma is a recognized challenge in these children’s upbringing.171 
Lesbian mothers have been shown to experience greater psychological wellbeing when 
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they can be open about their sexuality and are in stable partnerships.172 As in all families, 
psychological health and happiness among parents has a positive impact on children.173 
On the issue of parental complementarity, magisterial teaching is confronted with 
three difficult realities. First, even as clear parental gender roles may have benefits for 
some parents, they are not necessary for child wellbeing. Second, arguments for 
complementarity do not clearly specify which parental functions are the irreplaceable 
domain of one gender. This ambiguity makes empirical verification of the claim 
problematic. Without clarity, the general social scientific evidence suggesting that 
parental roles are adaptable even as they are influenced by societal expectation presents a 
clear challenge to this line of argument. Third, the argument for parental complementarity 
appears set upon a conception of the family as essentially private which and ignores the 
influence other adults may have on children. This third challenge is particularly 
intriguing because it suggests a privatized conception of the family which stands in 
tension with the more communal and socially engaged vision of the family that informs 
aspects of Catholic Social Teaching. At the same time, the private, nuclear conception of 
the family from which this argument stems neglects functional theories of parenthood 
that place much greater emphasis on the positive influence of non-parent adults in 
children’s lives.174 
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 Bell hooks, cites Elizabeth Janeway who contends that “the idea of an individual 
having sole responsibility for childrearing is the most unusual pattern of parenting in the 
world, one that has proved to be unsuccessful because it isolates children and parents 
from society.”175 Janeway continues,  
Such isolation means that the role of the family as the agent for socializing children is 
inadequately fulfilled at present whether or not mothers are at work outside the home. Children 
grow up without the benefit of a variety of adult role models of both sexes and in ignorance of the 
world of paid work. Returning women to a life centered in home and family would not solve the 
fundamental loss of connection between family and community.176  
 
In response, hooks argues that childcare must be a shared responsibility both among the 
parents as well as among the community.177  
 
Community and Parenthood 
Esther Goody’s functional framework of parenthood helps explain why focusing 
singly on parental partners fails to capture all pertinent factors in child wellbeing. For 
Goody, parenthood itself is the process of fulfilling the important tasks related to 
childrearing. As such, there are numerous ‘parental’ roles which may be assumed by 
various adults. Despite limitations in her framework, the premise is important: parents are 
rarely the only ones engaged in parenting.178  
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Goody’s conception challenges the notion that biological parents are the only 
‘real’ parents whose particular form of kin relationship with their children is 
differentiated in kind and superior to that of other adults. Her perspective also challenges 
privatized conceptions of the nuclear family as inaccurate and unhealthy. Biological 
parents may be central to the family, but their centrality is correlated to the functions they 
assume. Consequently, the dichotomy between the ‘real’ parenthood of biological parents 
and the participation of other caregivers is lessened, while the legitimate dependence of 
families on extended social support networks is brought to light. Goody’s insight on the 
importance of non-parent adults is supported by research showing children benefit from 
relationships with caring adults. These caring adults may be their parents, but others can 
fulfill the role. Children benefit most by having an additional caring adult outside their 
own household.179 
 Many resources within Catholic thought can be used to support Goody’s 
framework and counteract reductionist tendencies that center considerations of child 
wellbeing on the parental pair alone. Yet Catholicism’s commitment to community and 
social participation in considerations of the family is undermined internally by the sexual 
ethical and gender essentialist concerns that drive contemporary thinking on parenthood 
towards privatized conceptions of the nuclear family.180 While Catholic teaching 
rightfully defends the importance of parental rights and responsibilities in caring for their 
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children and directing family affairs, overemphasis biological reproduction and the role 
of parent’s as their children’s only significant role models and caregivers undermines a 
more expansive vision of the family’s legitimate Christian vocation in the world. 
Some Catholic theologians note the historical contingency of the nuclear family. 
Cahill argues, “the extended consanguineous family is more ancient and more universal 
in social importance than the modern so-called nuclear family, consisting of spouses and 
children and considered to have been formed through marriage.”181 Moreover, Jussen 
argues that non-biological kinship within the Christian tradition served precisely to create 
broad networks of support for the family. Since the early Middle Ages, both baptismal 
and confirmation sponsors have been used to extend kin networks. Through these means, 
early medieval Christian parents would often ally themselves with several sets of 
godparents and a few confirmation sponsors (on account of child mortality). Jussen 
concludes that through these kin-making practices, “a couple could easily acquire twenty 
to thirty spiritual cofathers and comothers.”182 
Importantly, magisterial and revisionist Catholic sources agree that the family 
does not operate for itself, but is an outwardly directed social institution aimed at 
benefiting the common good. Unfortunately, much of the traditional conceptual 
foundation for these commitments has been relegated to a secondary, fictional status as 
biological kinship has increasingly come to dominance as the normative mode of kinship 
itself. The magisterium has consistently asserted that the family is not an isolated, private 
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reality but should join in association with others for support and to promote the common 
good.183 The family has a legitimate role to play in advancing the common good, but this 
role is an underappreciated element of Catholic Social Teaching.184 The bias toward 
gender and sexual ethical concerns has played a significant role in this oversight as it has 
pulled conceptions of the family towards idealization of biological kinship and the private 
nuclear family while simultaneously feeding into reductionist cultural suppositions about 
the family’s sphere of concern. For families to recognize the legitimate social vocation 
set out for them by Catholic Social Teaching, commitments and influences outside the 
private nuclear family must be asserted more clearly. Yet emphasizing these 
commitments and influences necessarily diminishes the centrality that can be placed upon 
the parental pair alone. That is, one cannot uphold a vision of the family as a socially 
engaged and supported entity while simultaneously making the claim that parents are the 
only role models of masculinity and femininity with any meaningful impact on children. 
Relationships beyond the nuclear family are either significant or they are not. The present 
articulation of magisterial commitments is simply too selective in when and how such 
relationships beyond the nuclear family matter to provide a realistic account of the 
family’s essential structure and vocation. 
At a pastoral level, this ambiguity in Catholic thought has influenced inconsistent 
responses to the reality of same-sex parenting. In recent years, some homosexual 
individuals have been refused communion and fired from Catholic parishes and 
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schools.185 Some same-sex couples have also been denied baptism for their children and 
refused admittance into Catholic schools.186 These incidents raise serious concerns, since 
they constitute the refusal to offer communal support for these individuals, partners, and 
children on the grounds that presumed sexual behavior cannot be tolerated by these 
Catholic communities. If families are essentially privatized units that may influence, but 
are not essentially bound to one another, then removing immoral aberrations from the 
collective would be quite defensible. But the challenge is that this conception is not the 
full Catholic vision of the family as it is presented within the body of Catholic Social 
Teaching. If Catholic families are obligated to serve each other and the common good on 
the basis of shared baptism and shared humanity, the practice of isolating families headed 
by same-sex parents from the resources of the community becomes more challenging to 
defend. This is especially true when children are involved, as in baptism, parish 
membership, and enrollment in Catholic schools. If we admit that children’s relationships 
with adults other than their parents really do make a difference in children’s lives, and 
this is exactly what social scientific evidence suggests, then providing children of same-
sex couples with the opportunity to form significant and influential relationships with 
faithful adults through Catholic schools and parish life seems defensible. When this 
social scientific evidence is understood within the social vocation of the family as 
                                                 
185 Among others, see, Michael Paulson, “Gay Marriages Confront Catholic School Rules,” New 
York Times (January 22, 2014) http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/23/us/gay-marriages-confront-catholic-
school-rules.html?_r=0 and Michal Borestein, “D.C. Archdiocese: Denying Communion to Lesbian at 
Funeral was Against ‘Policy’,” Washington Post (February 29, 2009) 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-archdiocese-denying-communion-to-lesbian-at-funeral-was-
against-policy/2012/02/28/gIQAlIxVgR_story.html 
186 See, Anonymous, “Sins of Admission; Why Wouldn’t Gay Parents Pick a Catholic School?” 
Commonweal, April 23, 2010, 10 – 15. 
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presented by Catholic Social Teaching, the pastoral responses to same-sex headed 
families noted above appear all the more problematic. 
 
Part IV: Parenthood from a Functional Perspective 
As previous chapters showed, modern magisterial teaching, contemporary 
revisionist theologians, and Western Christian history include precedents for functional 
evaluations of parenthood. But these precedents are often paired with, and occasionally 
eclipsed by, commitments to family structures. Particularly within modern magisterial 
teaching, family structure has assumed a priority of place perhaps largely as a reaction to 
changing social gender roles, the break-down of traditional marriage in the West, and 
same-sex relationships. Two implications of this structural emphasis merit particular 
concern. First, centralization of family structure is associated with commitments to 
particular gender roles, sexual ethical norms, and biological reproduction. This has led 
anxiety over changes in gendered-parental behavior as well as understandings of 
biological kinship as ‘real’ kinship. Construing biological kinship as the normative form 
of kinship restricts Catholic appreciation of the bonds shared by families who are not 
biologically related. It also suggests that non-biological families are somehow unnatural, 
less desirable, or less truly families. Moreover, the structural association with gender 
roles prioritizes the male-female spousal pair as the locus of concern which allows 
commitments to sexual ethical norms, conceptions of marriage, and essentialist theories 
of gender to take the place of more concerted evaluations on parental capabilities. These 
biases present themselves as assertions of restrictive gender roles and a willingness to 
judge the full moral content of intimate relationships by the morality of the sexual acts 
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they may contain. Finally, the emphasis on structure retains vestiges of patriarchal gender 
hierarchies and physicalist sexual morality which remain problematic. For these reasons, 
evaluations of parental function offer a stronger resource for understanding parenthood 
apart for these assumptions and biases. 
Emphasizing parental function encourages a new approach to defining what 
constitutes a family. Anthony Gittins writes, “the US Catholic bishops offer that ‘a 
committed, permanent, faithful relationship of husband and wife is the root of a family’: 
but clearly it is not the root of every family, and increasingly, not even most.”187 Instead 
of starting with the extensional definition ‘the family is…’,” Gittins argues, “we could 
first specify common characteristics such as adequate structure; the support, protection, 
dignity, and fulfillment of members; the intention of stability and endurance; and the 
relation to the wider world.” By using an intensional approach, social arrangements 
which fit the definition generated could be regarded as forms of family; even as some 
may be judged preferable.188 The challenge, then, is to construct an adequate theological 
intensional definition of the family that can account for diversity in structure among 
domestic arrangements that function as families. Within this framework, the biological 
family may still offer an important natural paradigm, since it is through experience of 
functioning families that the common characteristics of families come to be known; and 
                                                 
187 Anthony J. Gittins, “In Search of Goodenough Families: Cultural and Religious Perspectives,” 
in Mutuality Matters: Family, Faith, and Just Love, eds. Herbert Anderson, Edward Foley, Bonnie Miller-
McLemore, and Robert Schreiter (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 178. 
188 Ibid. Gittins’ argument parallels the shift from structure to function suggested above. However, 
he does not offer a theological intensional definition of the family but repeats the revisionist tendency to 
articulate social and psychological norms of children’s wellbeing while remaining ambiguous on the 
theological norms. 
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biological families have offered many examples of well-functioning families. However, 
this approach does not allow structure alone to be determinative. 
Gittins’ perspective fits well with Goody’s functional definition of parenthood 
explained above. In fact, Goody’s articulation of parental tasks parallels the social duties 
of parenthood articulated in modern Catholic teaching. Namely, parents are primarily 
educators who have the task of preparing children for vocations as contributors to the 
common good. This description offers a fair start to an intensional account of parenthood. 
However, contemporary trends suggest that on the measure of socio-religious 
reproduction, contemporary Western Catholic parents are failing at an alarming rate; only 
one in three American children raised Catholic will remain Catholic into adulthood.189 
Catholic adults are leaving the Church as well. If ex-Catholics were their own 
denomination, they would be the third largest in America.190 The connection between 
Catholic departure from the Church and the significant demographic shifts in marriage 
we have explored remains somewhat unclear.  
Although the nuclear family, with a father in the labor force and a mother in the 
home with children, remains an influential ideal, it was only briefly the majority family 
structure among American families. Throughout the early twentieth century this family 
                                                 
189 Parental involvement, community support, and individual engagement in and before 
adolescence appear to influence religious attendance. The University of Notre Dame’s National Study of 
Youth and Religion directed by sociologist Christian Smith offers a wealth of information on the religious 
practices of American adolescents and young adults. The findings on continuation of religious attendance 
into young adulthood have recently been published as a book. See, Chris Smith, Kyle Longest, Jonathan 
Hill, and Kari Christoffersen, Young Catholic America: Emerging Adults In, Out of, and Gone from the 
Church, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
190 Thomas Reese, “The Hidden Exodus: Catholics becoming Protestants,” National Catholic 
Reporter (April 18, 2011) http://ncronline.org/news/faith-parish/hidden-exodus-catholics-becoming-
protestants. Cf. Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, U.S. Religious Landscape Survey: Religious 
Affiliation: Diverse and Dynamic (Washington D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2008). 
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type was on the rise until a peak in 1965 at about 55%. Since that time it has declined 
rapidly. Today about 22% of American children live in such households while dual-
earner and single-parent families account for three-quarters of the remainder.191 
Roughly half of all American children will experience divorce before age 
eighteen. Rates of divorce peaked in the 1980s while the divorce rate per capita has 
dropped significantly since. But this decline corresponds to dropping marriage rates, such 
that the proportion of divorce to marriages has held mostly steady over the past three 
decades. 192 The high divorce rate of the 1980s appears to have influenced a negative 
perception of marriage among that decade’s children. When they entered adulthood, rates 
of cohabitation increased dramatically, nearly doubling from 1990 to 2006.193  
Despite the importance of stability for children’s wellbeing, cultural skepticism in 
the possibility of permanent and healthy marriage did not prompt a significant re-
evaluation of parenthood. American’s are now inclined to believe that rewarding parental 
experiences can exist beyond a stable parental partnership, even as research shows that 
married parents have significant advantages in happiness and mental health.194 More 
Americans desire to become parents than are confident in the possibility of a stable 
                                                 
191 Aulette, 33. 
192 Alison Clarke-Stewart and Cornelia Brentano, Divorce: Causes and Consequences, (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 106. 
193 David Popenoe, “Research Brief No. 13: The American Family 1988 – 2028: Looking Back 
and Looking Forward,” Center for Marriage and Families, (August, 2008), 1. 
194 Wilcox, 4. “[T]he percentage of infants born to "never married" women who were relinquished 
for adoption has declined dramatically, from 8.7% prior to 1973 to approximately 1% between 1996 and 
2002.” David M. Brodzinski and the Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute, “Expanding Resources for 
Children III: Research-Based Best Practices in Adoption by Gays and Lesbians,” Evan B. Donaldson 
Adoption Institute, (October 2011) http://adoptioninstitute.org/publications/expanding-resources-for-
children-iii-research-based-best-practices-in-adoption-by-gays-and-lesbians/, 6. 
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marriage while over 40% of cohabitating couples have children.195 Among unwed 
mothers, 73% are in a romantic relationship with the biological father and about half are 
cohabitating with him. On average, child wellbeing in households with cohabiting parents 
resembles single-parent households more closely than married parent households.196 And 
relationships among cohabitating parents tend to be significantly less stable than those of 
married couples.197 Fully 95% of cohabitating couples with children consider marriage at 
least a 50/50 prospect for their future. However, only 9% will marry in the first year after 
a child is born while the great majority will end their relationship.198 About half of 
children in married households will experience divorce while the number of children of 
cohabitating parents who will experience the end of their parent’s relationship may be 
over 90%.199 
On the other hand, conditions have made single and non-married parenting easier 
socially. Not only has social stigma declined, but numerous human needs traditionally 
met by the family or extended family unit can now be fulfilled through the state or 
market.200 The negative effects of divorce on children are consistent, but are not large 
when compared to peers with married parents.201 Moreover, at least two-thirds of children 
                                                 
195 Crane and Heaton, 123. 
196 W. Bradford Wilcox, Linda Waite, and Alex Roberts, “Research Brief No. 4: Marriage and 
Mental Health in Adults and Children,” Center for Marriage and Families, (February, 2007), 3. 
197 Paula England & Kathryn Edin, eds. Unmarried Couples with Children (New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation, 2007), 139. 
198 Crane and Heaton, 457ff. 
199 Ibid., Cf, Clarke-Stewart & Brentano, 106. 
200 Popenoe, no 13, 4. 
201 Clarke-Stewart & Brentano, 107. 
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who experience divorce adjust successfully, while divorce can occasionally benefit 
children’s wellbeing.202 However, adult children of divorced parents do tend to have 
weaker commitments to lifelong marriage, less marital satisfaction, and reduced 
likelihood of being married.203 Fully one-fifth of children from divorced parents feel that 
they are destined to repeat their parent’s problems.204 
From a theological perspective, the purpose of raising children is aimed neither at 
social reproduction nor at achieving some baseline measure of wellbeing. Instead, 
Christian parenthood includes leading children towards human flourishing and which is 
found most fully in communion with God. Nonetheless, social reproduction and fostering 
child wellbeing are important functions of parenthood. The data on divorce and 
cohabitation suggest that some measure of social reproduction may be important for child 
well-being, yet the data do not speak to theological goods directly. As such, the 
concluding section of this chapter briefly considers more value-oriented functions of 
parenthood in order to consider how parenthood might be directed towards theological 
goods. This is not to suggest that human flourishing is only about proper values; but it is 
to acknowledge that a theological vision of the human telos goes beyond standard social-
scientific measures of wellbeing. 
  
Moral Formation 
                                                 
202 Ibid., 129. 
203 Ibid., 128. 
204 Ibid., 109. 
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Same-sex parenting is the issue on which social-scientific research and Catholic 
teaching diverge most significantly. Revisionist theologians often counter the 
magisterium’s assertions that same-sex parenthood is harmful to children by pointing to 
research which indicates the contrary. But this response does not go far enough as it often 
fails to develop a theological account of parenthood as such that can properly support its 
claim. Although the response has been insufficient, the Vatican’s argument sets itself up 
for just such a reply. The CDF’s 2003 argument against same-sex parenthood states,  
“As experience has shown, the absence of sexual complementarity in these unions creates 
obstacles in the normal development of children who would be placed in the care of such persons. 
They would be deprived of the experience of either fatherhood or motherhood. Allowing children 
to be adopted by persons living in such unions would actually mean doing violence to these 
children, in the sense that their condition of dependency would be used to place them in an 
environment that is not conducive to their full human development.”205 
 
Two points of this argument are particularly worthy of note. First, experience is 
used to support the claim that same-sex parenting is harmful to children. Second, the 
argument construes parenthood as leading children towards ‘full human development’ in 
other words, human flourishing. On the basis of social scientific data, the first claim, 
considered in terms of child wellbeing, is now quite easy to refute and many revisionist 
theologians have pointed this out.206 Yet, the second claim shows why social scientific 
data alone cannot serve as an adequate rebuttal to the argument the CDF is making. 
Measurements of child wellbeing are only part of the story. A full rebuttal requires a 
positive theological explanation of same-sex parenthood that shows how it could lead 
children towards human flourishing, theologically considered. This brings the disjunction 
                                                 
205 Considerations, #7. 
206 Cf. Margaret A. Farley, Just Love: A Framework for Christian Sexual Ethics. (New York: 
Continuum, 2010), 293., Todd A. Salzman and Michael Lawler, Sexual Ethics: A Theological Introduction, 
(Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 71. et al. 
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between what the magisterium claims and what social scientific research can measure 
into focus.  
While evidence does not support the claim that same-sex parenthood categorically 
harms children in terms of their physical, social, and emotional development, the 
question remains whether such relationships can lead children towards a theological 
vision of human flourishing. The CDF argues that, children must not be placed with 
same-sex caregivers lest they encounter “erroneous ideas about sexuality and 
marriage…”207 That is, if magisterial teaching on human sexuality, which since Vatican 
II has followed a personalist moral framework, is based on an accurate account of the 
human person, same-sex parenthood quite clearly contradicts that vision and would lead 
children away from an accurate conception of their goal. That is, when a vision of human 
flourishing is understood as bound to an accurate understanding of the moral teachings of 
the Catholic Church, the nature of the CDF’s concern for same-sex parenting becomes 
more evident. However, when the concern is understood in this way it becomes 
contextualized within much larger social factors. That is, the reproduction of commitment 
to Catholic moral teaching on human sexuality is failing at a much larger rate and over a 
longer course of time than same-sex parenting alone can possibly account for.  
Research indicates that the majority of American Catholics support same-sex 
marriage and that support is increasing substantially among younger Catholics.208 In 
addition, over half of self-identified American Catholics support capital punishment and 
                                                 
207 CDF, “Considerations Regarding Proposals to Give Legal Recognitions to Unions between 
Homosexual Persons,” Vatican, (June 3, 2003) 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20030731_homose
xual-unions_en.html, #7. 
208 Ibid. 
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just under half believe abortion should be legal in all or most cases.209 Finally, the vast 
majority of American Catholics disregard the prohibition of contraception.210 If 
magisterial disapproval of same-sex parenting is based specifically on the moral 
formation of children, the challenge being faced far exceeds same-sex parenthood itself. 
Given the generally good outcomes of children raised by same-sex couples, it 
seems very unlikely that these same children would tend to embrace Catholic moral 
teaching on homosexuality and same-sex parenthood. Studies show that children raised 
by same-sex couples are not prone to identify sexual orientation as an influence in their 
parents’ childrearing abilities.211 But, American Catholic children raised by heterosexual 
parents are also far more likely than previous generations to disagree with the official 
Catholic position on same-sex parenting.212 This suggests that arguments over the 
wellbeing of children raised by same-sex couples are less important from the point of 
view of moral formation than concern for Catholic children’s moral formation in general. 
                                                 
209 Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life. 
210 A 2011 study by the Guttmacher Institute claimed, with some controversy, that 98 percent of 
sexually experienced self-identified Catholic women aged 15 – 44 have used methods of contraception 
other than Natural Family Planning at least once; although 11 percent use no method at all. The statistic’s 
accuracy has not been questioned so much as the clarity of what it actually claims. More importantly, it is 
clear that a significant majority (around 68 percent) of self-identified Catholic women regularly use 
artificial contraception. Rachel K Jones & Joerg Dreweke, “Countering Conventional Wisdom: New 
Evidence on Religion and Contraceptive Use,” Guttmacher Institute, (April 2011) 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/Religion-and-Contraceptive-Use.pdf (accessed, April 2011). Cf. Anjani 
Chandra, et al. “Sexual Behavior, Sexual Attraction, and Sexual Identity in the United States: Data From 
the 2006–2008 National Survey of Family Growth,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
(March, 2011) http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr036.pdf. 
211 American Psychological Association, Lesbian and Gay Parenting (Washington D.C.: 
American Psychological Association, 2005), 14. Cf. Anna Fairtlough, “Growing Up with a Lesbian or Gay 
Parent: Young People’s Perspectives,” Health and Social Care in the Community 16, no. 5 (2008): 521–
528. 
212 Michael Lipka, “Young U.S. Catholics overwhelmingly accepting of homosexuality” Pew 
Research (October 16, 2014). 
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Mention of these realities is not to distract attention from the magisterium legitimate 
concern for the same-sex parenthood; it does suggest that any limitations perceived 
within same-sex parenting should not be held out as morally determinative while similar 
limitations among heterosexual parents are not given similar scrutiny. That is, if the 
moral development of children is what is at stake in the moral assessment of same-sex 
parenthood, then this should be evaluated in terms of the achievements of heterosexual 
peers rather than singularly subjected to an ideal would challenge others as well. 
The late 1990s witnessed a surge in interest in the moral development of children 
that continues to the present.213 The results show that parents are clearly powerful 
influences in their children’s moral development.214 But little research has been done on 
the specifically religious aspects of parenting and the moral development of children; 
even as research has suggested connections between parental religiosity and more general 
measures of child wellbeing.215 The effects of parental religiosity seem to depend on 
family structure to some extent, but the relationship and the causality between religious 
                                                 
213 Larry Tifft, John Sullivan, and Dennis Sullivan, “Discipline as Enthusiasm: An Entry into the 
Recent Discussion on the Moral Development of Children,” Contemporary Justice Review 11, no. 4 
(December 2008): 363. 
214 See, Melati Sumari, Zaharah Hussin, Saedah Siraj, “Factors Contributing to Academic 
Achievement and Moral Development: A Qualitative Study,” The International Journal of Research and 
Review 5, no. 2 (October 2010): 19. This study of high-achieving Muslim youth suggests that a connection 
between religiosity, moral development and educational achievement, though the sample size is small and 
based off testimony. 
215 See, Brenda L. Volling, Annette Mahoney, and Amy J. Rauer, “Sanctification of Parenting, 
Moral Socialization, and Young Children’s Conscience Development,” Psychology of Religion and 
Spirituality 1, no. 1 (2009): 53–68. 
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views and child behavior are less clear.216 Moreover, research on children’s moral 
development is presently limited by an almost exclusive focus on maternal influences.217 
One study argues that moral formation is highly dependent upon the mode of 
discipline utilized by parents and suggests that discipline which focuses on the 
consequences of behavior on others best supports the growth of moral reasoning. Unlike 
earlier research, which focused narrowly on religion’s relation to physical punishment, 
this study found that parental religiosity may have a significant influence on children’s 
moral development.218 It also found that the efficacy of disciplinary styles was dependent 
upon consistent use by both parents. This suggests consistency of discipline by both 
parents, which has been tied to religious beliefs, is a significant factor in children’s moral 
formation.219 
Despite the paucity of research, there are numerous reasons to believe that 
parental religiosity can create conditions that benefit children’s moral formation. The 
2011 State of Our Unions report shows that couples who identify God as the center of 
their relationship tend to have happier and more stable marriages.220 And marital 
                                                 
216 Richard J. Petts, “Parental Religiosity, Religious Homogamy, and Young Children’s Well-
Being,” Sociology of Religion 72, no. 4 (2011): 410. 
217 Tracy L. Spinrad, Nancy Eisenberg and Frank Bernt, “Introduction to the Special Issues on 
Moral Development: Part I,” The Journal of Genetic Psychology 168, no. 2 (2007): 104. Interestingly, this 
study suggests that parental practices do not lead to moral behavior consistently across children’s gender. 
That is, many studies indicate that girls are more consistent in their moral behavior, but boys and girls may 
tend to differ in their moral development as well. 
218 Volling, Mahoney, and Rauer, 65. It should be noted that by the author’s own admission the 
sample size of this study was small and should not be used to draw firm conclusions. However in the 
absence of other studies its insights remain valuable. 
219 Ibid., 64. 
220 Wilcox, 32. 
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spirituality supports generosity between spouses.221 Moreover, religiosity can support 
beliefs which predict marital success, such as valuing commitment.222 One report asserts, 
“Spouses who score above average in terms of commitment are at least 45 percentage 
points more likely to report being ‘very happy’ in their marriages, and 29 percentage 
points less likely to be prone to divorce. In other words, above-average commitment 
more than triples the odds of marital happiness for husbands and wives and reduces their 
divorce proneness sixfold.”223 Though this does not offer direct evidence of parenting 
abilities related the children’s moral formation, parents in happy, stable marriages seem 
more likely to be up to the task of assisting their children in moral development. 
Adding complexity to these findings, religious parents, like their secular 
counterparts, may profess values that do not correspond with their actions. A recent 
project through Harvard University shows that, while nearly all parents say they are 
committed to raising caring, ethical children, a large majority of American youth value 
personal achievement over concern for others. When asked to rank values, nearly 80% of 
young people choose high achievement or happiness as most significant while only about 
20% chose care for others. At the same time, roughly half of high school students 
reported cheating on a test and three-quarters had copied a peer’s work. While parents 
rank care for other’s high among the moral values they wish to impart to their children, 
around 80% of young people surveyed reported that “achievement and happiness” were 
                                                 
221 Ibid., 38. 
222 Ibid., 42. 
223 Ibid., 45. 
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their parent’s top concerns. A similar trend was found for educators.224 The study adds 
pointedly, “Americans tend to worry a great deal about the moral state of our country and 
about selfish and disrespectful children,” but “it’s not clear who, if anyone, believes 
they’re part of the problem.”225  
Far from simply failing to replicate specific moral commitments of the 
magisterium in young people, American parents are apparently failing to replicate their 
own commitments. This appears doubly damaging for children. Not only are the values 
that parents and educators want to prize not being communicated, but the emphasis on 
achievement and happiness actually reduces the likelihood of both.226  
Whereas the magisterium fears that the structural realities of same-sex parenthood 
will reduce children’s ability to understand marriage authentically, these studies suggest 
functional failures. As such, the magisterium’s concern may be misplaced even as the 
values that are not being communicated, kindness and commitment to others, correlate to 
characteristics of healthy, stable marriages.227  
Rather than assigning blame for these realities to simple moral failure, a number 
of scholars suggest larger social forces actively work against communicating these goods. 
Considering the impact of economics on family systems, Herbert Anderson writes,  
Perhaps the most disturbing observation about the tension between work time and family time has 
come from German sociologist Ulrich Beck. He has observed that a free market economic model 
                                                 
224 Making Caring Common Project, “Executive Summary,” Harvard Graduate School of 
Education (The Presidents and Fellows of Harvard College, 2014), 1. 
225 Ibid., 5. 
226 See, John M. Gottman and Janice L. Driver, “Dysfunctional Marital Conflict and Everyday 
Marital Interaction,” Journal of Divorce & Remarriage 43, no. 3/4 (2005): 63 – 77.  
227 Gottman and Levenson, 83 -97. Cf. Scott Stanley, The Heart of Commitment: Compelling 
Research that Reveals the Secrets of a Lifelong, Intimate Marriage (Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 
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presupposes a society without families or marriages.… A society that rewards people for 
selfishness should not be surprised that it faces a crisis in families. If both women and men are 
equally devoted to the marketplace and its demands, children will obviously suffer. But so will the 
marriage, even if there are no children.228 
 
The ideology behind this economic system is at odds with stable, two-parent households, 
making the latter difficult to sustain. 
 When the magisterium raises concern for the full human development of young 
people in the context of same-sex parenthood, it has identified a legitimate area of 
concern given the realities of modern society. Yet this concern goes well beyond same-
sex parenting and implicates both the majority of American parents, as well as the 
economic and social values of American Catholics as a whole. While Catholic teaching 
on marriage and sexuality does appear to justify the magisterium’s concern, it is unclear 
that same-sex parenting is the most significant and pressing aspect of this matter. These 
concerns would be better grounded in a clearer account of the theological nature of 
parenthood and stronger criticism of the cultural values beyond sexual ethics that actively 
work against parental efforts to instill moral commitments. 
In the absence of an adequate theological account of parenthood that can stand at 
some distance from sexual ethical concerns, same-sex parenthood is singled out as the 
instantiation of parenthood that most clearly departs from the sexual ethical and 
essentialist gendered norms. Consequently, same-sex parenthood is forced to bear the 
weight of much broader anxieties, while the more significant contributing factors receive 
far less scrutiny. Cultural trends suggest that American Catholic parents are really faced 
with significant challenges in their attempt to communicate values with their children. If 
this is truly the magisterium’s central source of concern in considerations of same-sex 
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parenthood, a much stronger response to the economic and social pressures that challenge 
heterosexual parents is also warranted. On this count, revisionist theologians who simply 
point to studies of child-wellbeing as justification for same sex parenthood are of little 
help when they to fail to consider implications for a theological account of parenthood 
broadly considered.  
Without a theologically based conception of Christian parenthood as a functional 
reality related to child wellbeing and children’s progress towards human flourishing, the 
real challenges Christian parenthood face in fulfilling their theological vocation will 
likely continue to receive too little attention. 
 
Conclusion 
 Catholicism’s emphasis on sexual ethics and gender related concerns limits its 
ability to offer a theology of parenthood based on parental function defined by child 
wellbeing. In the face of present research, extended arguments over the significance of 
gender difference and sexual ethical norms simply do not appear as significant features in 
capacities for parenthood based on children’s wellbeing. Moreover, idealization of the 
biological nuclear family and attendant gender roles can lead to moral analysis of diverse 
family forms without sufficient attention to the economic and social influences that 
influence individual realities. In this regard, greater attention to parental function in 
response to social pressures could lead to a more nuanced analysis on diverse family 
forms.  
Research is lacking on the moral development of children as related to specific 
religious convictions of their parents. Existing research does not suggest that Catholic 
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parents are on the whole successful at indoctrination nor that family structure and 
parental gender is solely determinative in child wellbeing. Stability is clearly a significant 
factor in child wellbeing. Yet, for all the benefits ‘traditional’ marriage offers, parental 
modeling of rigid gender roles can be detrimental to children’s development.  
A significant number of valuable principles within Catholic thought which are 
supported by social scientific studies remain underappreciated. Prominent among these is 
the concern for socially engaged families supported by expansive networks of relations. 
However, emphasis on social engagement and communal relationships beyond the 
nuclear family also raise challenges with the privatized vision of the family arguments for 
the importance of parental complementarity tends to assume. Acknowledges wider 
networks of adult influence in parenting limits the weight of concern parental partners 
themselves can bear. 
 Judging from evidence from the social sciences, the goals which the Catholic 
Church posits for the family appear to have a tighter correlation to dispositions and 
commitments of parents than to specific family structure and gender roles. With regard to 
parental responsibility for children’s moral development, present research suggests that 
while Americans are raising educated, emotionally adjusted children, basic values like 
kindness, community orientation, and even physical health often fail to be communicated. 
Christian parents ought to strive for stability in family life while fostering social 
commitment and moral development appears to be a commonly agreed upon aspect of 
this research. Biological kinship, family structure, parental gender and other factors 
appear to have some influence and may better support these objectives, but none of these 
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factors are definitive from the perspective of parental function.229 On the other hand, 
divorce and cohabitation, both associated with instability, are correlated to greater 
challenges in child wellbeing. 
  
                                                 
229 In an interesting reversal of the usual outcome of emphasis on biological parenthood, “Gay 
men more often reported they were specifically chosen by birthparents because of their sexual orientation 
than did lesbians (34.6% vs. 5.8%) in the majority of these cases, the men indicated the birthmother 
expressed a desire to be her child's ‘only mother.’” Brodzinski, 27. 
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Introduction 
Bonnie Miller McLemore writes that, while academic interest in children has 
grown significantly in some academic fields, “research on children has not exactly 
proliferated in either theology or women’s studies.”1 The lack of interest is likely 
connected to the historical realities within feminist thought that have shaped 
contemporary scholarly agendas. Bell hooks writes that the early women’s liberation 
movement reflected the ambitions of its white, educated, middle class participants. This 
included arguments that motherhood confined women to the home away from careers and 
public pursuits.2 Considering feminist theologians, McLemore argues, with so many 
other corrections to be made to traditional patriarchal perspectives, earlier feminists “may 
simply not have realized the extent to which redefining our position and value as women 
requires a redefinition of the lower status children.”3 In general, she writes, feminist 
theologians have been less oppositional concerning the individual claims of constituents 
within the family than their secular counterparts; a trend exemplified most clearly by 
feminist theologians of color who have shown that “the value of motherhood extends 
well beyond procreation to the survival and sustenance of the community. Biological and 
social motherhood empower women precisely through the flourishing of children and the 
extension of self through family.”4 This perspective also founds a more congenial view of 
                                                 
1 Bonnie J. Miller McLemore, “The Least and the Greatest: Children in the New Testament,” in 
The Child in Christian Thought, ed. Marcia J. Bunge (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001), 446. 
Motherhood has become a growing topic in feminist approaches as a consequence of shifts away from 
liberal feminism and towards deeper engagement with women’s experiences. Ibid., 449. 
2 bell hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1984), 133. 
3 Ibid., 451. 
4 Ibid., 454. 
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men’s role in the feminist project. That is, “while patriarchy presents severe challenges 
for women and children, men, particularly husbands and fathers, remain extremely 
significant partners in communal liberation and familial stability.”5 
 McLemore further observes a decisive trend to explore socially oriented 
considerations of childrearing; what she calls “nonparent-parenting.”6 “This concern has 
two components. Bearing and rearing children are not absolutely requisite for human 
fulfillment of Christian service and the responsibility of parenting includes and depends 
on wider circles of care that extend beyond the immediate biological parents.”7 In 
response to this trend, McLemore explains the importance of considering childbearing as 
a social practice and the need to renew traditional concepts of non-biological kinship; 
including adoption and God-parenting.8 This extends beyond family life to the church 
and the state, which each exercise influence on familial matters. From a theological 
perspective, much work needs to be done in reassessing our “amazingly adult-centered” 
theological conceptions. “Unfortunately,” she adds, “theological neglect coincides with 
the broader societal negligence. Theology played little or no role in calling societies to 
confront their attitudes and actions toward children.”9  
 It is to these social developments that this chapter now turns. While feminist 
theology has had its limitations in conceiving parenthood in light of children’s own moral 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., 467. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., 468. 
9 Ibid., 472. 
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standing, modern theology as a whole has likely been more limited. Meanwhile, a 
number of social developments in thinking of children, families, and parenthood have 
taken place within fields of philosophy and legal theory. 
This chapter will argue that significant resources for theological reflection on 
parenthood exist within the writings of feminist philosophical ethicists and legal scholars 
as these relate to issues including children’s and parental rights, gender, kinship, 
adoption, nontraditional households, and family law. Among these perspectives are 
arguments that stand in strong contrast to Catholic approaches and rest upon assumptions 
about the human person that are incomplete or problematic from a theological 
perspective. McLemore notes that feminist theologians have often criticized both liberals 
and conservatives for promoting special interests, individualism, and social ideology at 
the expense of the real needs of families.10 Ideological concerns are certainly at work in 
some of the sources this chapter will utilize, yet, they also advance a number of valuable 
insights in relation to rights, needs, and capabilities that are helpful in considering a 
theological anthropology of parenthood. Some within these fields have also been 
attentive to adoption in a way that theological sources have not. Consequently they have 
raised pertinent questions about the meaning and function of parents, kinship, and the 
family. 
This chapter’s argument will also be guided by a concern for child wellbeing as a 
central factor in considerations of parenthood and family which is advanced by clarifying 
the rights and obligations of children and adults. In consideration of parental obligations, 
                                                 
10 McLemore writes, “Children suffer from the same or related social cultural distortions of human 
rights and public policies that women have encountered for decades.” Ibid., 460.  
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it will draw upon a distinction between and ‘causal’ and a ‘voluntarist’ approach. The 
causal approach bases parental obligations on the fact of having participated in bringing a 
particular child into existence, whereas the voluntarist approach centers on the decision to 
parent a particular child. A strong version of the causal approach, prevalent in magisterial 
teaching and some legal perspectives, is found problematic, as are aspects of the 
voluntarist alternative. Consequently, this chapter advocates a blended approach to 
parental responsibilities that proceeds from a weak causal account but requires support 
from the voluntarist perspective. In so doing, parental responsibilities are grounded in a 
manner that protects important values associated with parenthood in the Christian 
tradition, while also correcting the excesses of modern Catholic thought inasmuch as it 
has relied upon sexual ethics to construct parenthood. This account of the foundations of 
parental responsibilities is not intended to constitute a complete philosophical defense, 
but only to suggest a resource for a broadened Catholic account of parenthood.   
The chapter then applies this theory of parental responsibilities to contemporary 
developments in children’s rights and the criticism of adoption law raised by Elizabeth 
Bartholet. It argues that grounding parental responsibilities in a mixed causal and 
voluntarist approach supports the uniqueness of parenthood apart from other relational 
commitments while protecting adoption as a positive instrument of family formation and 
testament to inclusive love. Finally, the chapter engages Martha Nussbaum’s 
development of the ‘Capabilities Approach’ as a resource for further developing a 
theological conception of parenthood. It argues that this approach offers distinct potential 
for correlating parental obligations with the unique needs of children, while proceeding 
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from and amending the human rights tradition which has found widespread support 
within modern Catholicism.11 
 
Part I: Parental Obligations 
 The questions of what exactly parents owe their children and from where these 
obligations arise have been subjects of recent philosophical discourse. At present, there 
are two dominant frameworks for the ground of parental obligations.12 The first is the 
‘causal’ approach which connects specific parental obligations to voluntarily undertaking 
actions which may foreseeably result in the creation of a new human life. David Archard 
and Bernard G. Prusak have each recently defended this approach, which presently 
remains the more influential of the two alternatives. The ‘voluntarist’ approach is 
dominant among the alternatives to the causal account and contends that parental 
obligations are based upon voluntary acceptance of parenthood. Elizabeth Brake is 
among the voluntarist approach’s most formidable defenders.  Prusak observes that while 
much conventional legal understanding supports the casual approach (e.g. child support), 
decisions regarding new reproductive technologies have begun to rely more heavily upon 
                                                 
11 Note on the various UN documents that Catholic Church has supported 
12 Archard lists four such approaches: gestational, genetic, causal, and Intentional (voluntarist). 
The gestational approach favor’s mother’s singular rights to parenthood by virtue of the gestational 
relationship with the child. The genetic has been used to explain parenthood in light of new reproductive 
technologies. Both of these can be seen as a species of either the causal or voluntarist depending on how 
they are defended. David Benatar and David Archard, eds., Procreation and Parenthood (Oxford, UK: 
Clarendon Press, 2011), 28. 
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the voluntarist approach (e.g. anonymity for gamete donors) which also appears to be 
gaining strength among moral and legal theorists.13 
While both Prusak and Archard adopt a more moderate view, a strong version of 
the causal account would argue that those who voluntarily undertake actions which may 
result in the birth of a child have a de facto obligation to parent that child. This 
perspective tends to hold biological, social, and legal parenthood closely together and to 
rely upon appeals to the natural.14 Proponents of strong causal accounts tend to be found 
among more traditional legal theorists while the view itself traces back at least to 
Aristotle and was enshrined in Roman law via the patria potestas. Due to this lineage, the 
causal approach has often been mixed with claims of rights of possession for parents over 
their children. John Locke recognized this challenge and attempted to differentiate a 
causal account of parental obligations from standard property rights, though his attempt 
has been criticized.15 McGill University legal scholar and medical ethicist Margaret 
Somerville is one contemporary proponent of the strong causal approach. She has argued 
forcefully against artificial reproductive technologies and same-sex marriage on the 
grounds that both create or encourage situations of parenthood that are severed from a 
                                                 
13 Bernard G Prusak, Parental Obligations and Bioethics: The Duties of a Creator (New York: 
Routledge, 2013), 3 – 4.  
14 As such, a strong casual account characterizes many of the positions held by the Catholic 
Church, such as the teaching of John Paul II that all children have a right to be raised by their own to 
biological parents and to know themselves to be the result of a specific loving sexual act between their 
parents. See, John Paul II, “Instruction for Respect of Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of  
Procreation; Replies to Certain Questions of the Day” (Donum vitae). Vatican, (February 22, 1987) 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/ rc_con_ 
cfaith_doc_19870222_respect-for-human-life_en.html, #8. 
15 Benatar and Archard, 109. 
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naturally reproductive marriage between a man and woman.16 Moreover, she argues that 
these amount to infringements upon children’s basic human rights on the basis that all 
children have a right to know and, if at all possible, be parented by their genetic parents.17 
Somerville’s argument helps to demonstrate some of the limitations of this perspective. 
She does not garner much evidence showing how this purported right serves child 
wellbeing or on what grounds such a right could be abrogated. She aligns same-sex 
marriage so closely with the ethical problems facing the use of artificial reproductive 
technologies that she fails to acknowledge that the industry owes its foundations to 
heterosexuals seeking genetic offspring, while use by married same-sex couples is a more 
recent phenomenon. And, in her insistence that marriage is essentially linked to 
biological and legal parenthood, Somerville neglects to explain how heterosexual 
adopters or the knowingly infertile fit within her framework. Consequently, Somerville 
rather thoroughly suggests present challenges in the strong causal account.18 Namely, it 
tends to offer limited convincing explanations of why biological parents should 
necessarily be considered the best while relying on ‘nature’ to defend the claim. This 
avoids the question of how biological parenthood itself generally assures superior 
capabilities for the task of parenting a particular child. In addition, it tends to hold such a 
high regard for biological kinship that it can undermine voluntary non-biological 
                                                 
16 See, Margaret Somerville, “Children’s Human Rights and Unlinking Child-Parent Biological 
Bonds with Adoption, Same-Sex Marriage and New Reproductive Technologies,” Journal of Family 
Studies 13, no. 2 (November, 2007): 179 – 201. 
17 Ibid., 199. 
18 Benator and Archard also provide a list of challenges facing the causal theory, but they are more 
concerned with questions raised by reproductive technologies. David Benatar and David Archard, eds., 
Procreation and Parenthood (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 2011), 28 – 29. 
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parenthood and while avoiding recognition of how it feeds into the desire of would-be 
parents to associate only biological children as truly ‘their own.’ Finally, it holds sexual 
ethics and parental ethics so closely together that the conditions for a moral sexual 
relationship are easily be conflated with capabilities to care for children. 
In opposition to the strong causal approach is the strong voluntarist approach, 
which is more characteristic of certain progressive strands within the liberal tradition. 
This view also faces significant challenges as it assigns care for children based solely 
upon an informed act of consent. Jacqueline Stevens has argued against “genetic 
privilege” within family law on the basis that this tends to differentiate and adversely 
affect adoptive families.19 Stevens objects to the causalist notion that genetic contribution 
alone should yield specific custody rights over children and raises concern about the 
increasing use of DNA testing in legal procedures, though the ‘best interests’ argument 
still prevails.20 She further objects to cultural associations of genetic kinship with ‘real’ 
parenthood on the grounds that these are influenced by new technology, inadequately 
represent the reality of parenthood in its various forms, and undermine the legitimacy of 
adoptive families.21 Against these trends, Stevens asserts the strong voluntarist position 
that all parenthood should be based on the choice to rear a child while genetic kinship 
alone should have no standing.22 In practice, Stevens suggests mothers be given a time 
                                                 
19 See, Jaqueline Stevens, “Methods of Adoption: Eliminating Genetic Privilege,” in Adoption 
Matters; Philosophical and Feminist Essays, eds. Sally Haslanger and Charlotte Witt (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2005), 68 – 94. 
20 Ibid., 69. To highlight the gap between genetic contribution and parenthood, Stevens compares 
awarding custody rights for conveying DNA to bestowing a Pulitzer Prize for delivering the newspaper. 
21 Ibid., 71. 
22 Stevens use of ‘genetic parenthood’ is primarily associated with genetic paternity, since the vast 
majority of genetic mothers also experience gestational maternity and therefore stand in a more complex 
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after birth to decide to care for a child or make arrangements for adoption to others. 
Consequently, legal adoption would be required for all children, regardless of if they are 
adopted by their biological parents or others.23 Stevens sees this approach as simply 
formalizing the practice that already dominates but passes unacknowledged. She writes, 
“Overtly or implicitly all families are adoptive, as all families depend on the legal 
institutionalization of rules that put children in relation to parents that the children 
themselves do not choose.”24 
Stevens’ insights are thought provoking and raise valuable questions about latent 
social assumptions imbedded in parenthood as characterized by the causal approach, yet 
her argument raises concerns as well. First, Stevens is too quick to discredit genetic 
kinship despite ample evidence that people tend to find meaning in these relationships 
and that it remains important for a significant number of adopted individuals as well. 
Second, Stevens appears to accept current diversities in childrearing, such as historically 
high rates of divorce and cohabitation, without contest, even when evidence suggests 
their adverse effects on children. Finally, her decentralization of genetic bonds comes off 
as disparaging of the family itself even as stable families appear to be among the most 
significant predictors of child wellbeing. Here again, Stevens arguments suggests some of 
                                                 
caregiving relation to the child. However, most notably through new reproductive technologies, women too 
may be related to a child through genetic parenthood alone. 
23 Ibid., 90. In practice, prima facie parental rights would belong to mothers on the basis of their 
voluntarist commitment to parenthood by having accepted gestational parenthood (e.g. by not having 
terminated the pregnancy). At birth, this does not bind the mother to further parental obligations, but put 
her alone in the position to arrange care for the child. While gestational parenthood appears to have causal 
implications for women in Steven’s theory, because of the permissibility of abortion, this too relies upon 
voluntarist reasons. Others have argued for a gestational approach to parenthood which is a further 
alternative to the causal and voluntarist perspectives. Benatar and Archard, 28. 
24 Stevens, 71 – 72.  
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the significant limitations of the voluntarist account more generally. Namely, it tends to 
take an individualist focus on the free choices of adults without adequate regard for 
children’s wellbeing, and it tends to disparage the lasting value of traditional social 
institutions in its willingness to correct their excesses. 
Having visited the strong forms of each view, the limitations as well as the 
contributions of each approach to a Catholic theology of parenthood can now be more 
clearly delineated. That is, the weaknesses of the strong voluntarist approach suggest that 
the ideological fight against ‘nature’ and social conventions in the name of individual 
freedom ought to have limits, especially when the interests of actual children are at stake. 
Conversely, the weaknesses of the strong causal approach warn against allowing 
convention and nature, or a specific interpretation of what is natural, to override evidence 
of what is possible or insights that may lead to better realities. It seems appropriate, 
therefore, to look for more solid philosophical footing among more moderate versions of 
these theories. Between the strong versions of each approach lie the causal approaches of 
Prusak and Archard and the voluntarist approach of Brake.  
Brake argues for a voluntarist account of parental obligations on the grounds that 
these obligations are expansive and fluid institutions, not static natural requirements.25 
She argues that parental obligations must be grounded in informed acceptance of parental 
duties by adults who are capable of fulfilling these for specific children who are eligible 
to be parented by them.26 Unlike Stevens, no contract is necessary for Brake because 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 163. 
26 This is how Blake distinguishes her view from the less precise voluntarist view advanced by 
Onora O’Neil. Ibid., 152. 
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simply acting as a parent implies acceptance of the parental role and therefore obligates a 
person to continue acting in this role.27 Brake distinguishes between ‘procreative costs’ 
and ‘parental obligations.’28 Procreative costs are those duties which are owed to a child 
by a person who voluntarily brought that child into existence. Parental obligations are 
those duties to which someone is bound when he or she assumes responsibility for a 
child. The general confusion of these two realities is a major reason behind her support of 
the voluntarist approach. This confusion is detrimental to full appreciation of parental 
obligations as well as their fluidity over time. Though procreators have a responsibility 
towards the child they create, Brake writes, “Obligations issuing from moral 
responsibility for causing a child’s neediness by bringing it into being are not equivalent 
to parental obligations.”29 Brake allows that her conception of the voluntarist approach 
could hold unwitting procreators accountable for procreative costs;30 yet this 
accountability is temporary and pales in comparison to the obligations of parenthood. 
Brake’s concept of procreative costs serves as a useful conceptual distinction between 
procreation and parenthood. On the other hand, the voluntarist approach in general rests 
on the idea that this distinction is more or less absolute; a position the causal account 
challenges. To support this view, Brake appears to mistake plurality for meaninglessness 
in historical and cultural understandings of parental obligations.31 Consequently, this 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 171. 
28 Ibid., 161. Cf. Prusak, 25. 
29 Ibid., 157. 
30 Ibid., 175. 
31 Ibid., 164. 
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leads her to assert procreative costs as compensatory obligations only, which suggests 
that human life, or specifically the condition of infancy, is a negative reality of having 
been harmed. 
Prusak finds Brake’s account to be the most formidable among voluntarist 
approaches. But his direct concern lies in the ways in which reproductive technologies 
could discourage unconditional parent-child love by encouraging children to be viewed 
as products. 32 From this angle, voluntarist parenthood starts to look similar to consumer 
choice. Prusak counters Brake by arguing that obligations do not arise in relation to 
parents, but out of the needs of the child.33 Among a child’s needs is that for an ongoing 
relationship that will provide “emotional support in the face of life’s burdens: more fully, 
the child’s needs to be fortified against, prepared for, and reconciled to life’s burdens and 
travails.”34 Because of this, Prusak contends that procreators are causally bound to 
parental obligations. Yet this is only a prima facie duty that can be overridden given other 
considerations.35 As such, he views placing children for adoption as an unfortunate but 
commendable choice when undertaken with due consideration for the capabilities of the 
biological parent or parents to fulfill their parental obligations. Notwithstanding the fact 
that adopted children are generally healthy and well adjusted, Prusak argues, because a 
                                                 
32 Bernard G Prusak, Parental Obligations and Bioethics: The Duties of a Creator (New York: 
Routledge, 2013), 4. 
33 For this same reason Prusak later argues that a man who has been misled as to his biological 
paternity of a child and so has formed a parental relationship with that child, is morally obligated not to cut 
ties with the child upon learning the truth because such an act would damage the child’s wellbeing. Ibid., 
59. 
34 Ibid., 36. Prusak goes on to explain that coming to terms with life’s travails goes beyond the 
basic necessities for physical health and education to include love, culture and perhaps spirituality. 
35 Ibid., 11. 
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significant number nonetheless seek out relationships with their biological parents, the 
child’s need for emotional support is most adequately met in relationships with their 
biological parents.36  
Prusak’s argument binds procreators to a prima facie duty to assume parental 
obligations which should only be abandoned for serious reasons. As such, Prusak leaves 
room for non-biological kinship arrangements but concedes that these are less desirable. 
Still, his approach appears to rank biological continuity rather high in relation to other 
considerations of parental capabilities and resources. Prusak acknowledges this challenge 
in his admittance that valuing the institution of the biological family necessarily creates 
conflicts between liberty and equality. Therefore, if the biological family is worth 
preserving, then society owes compensation to children in more challenging 
circumstances. He writes, “if we decide that the value of having our own children… is 
greater than the value of seeking to assure all children equal life chances, then we owe it 
to children in need to take measures to assure that they have at least good life chances, 
though there is no pretending that these will be the equal of children with better fortunes 
in life.”37 Whereas Brake may be criticized for underestimating continuity in valuations 
of biological kinship, Prusak may be criticized for his limited willingness to explore how 
social conventions shape the meaning attached to biological kinship. This becomes all the 
more problematic inasmuch as his causal approach centers on biological kinship having 
inherent value.  
                                                 
36 Ibid., 36. 
37 Ibid., 108. 
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Archard avoids Prusak’s challenge by offering a more restrictive version of the 
causal approach that is also more accommodating to Brake’s concerns. Archard argues 
for an adapted causal approach that holds that procreators are responsible for assuring a 
reasonably good upbringing, but need not themselves assume the parental duties 
generated by their actions. Archard makes this claim by distinguishing ‘parental 
responsibilities’ from ‘the parental obligation.’38 Parental responsibilities are those rights 
and duties that one must have to be a parent for a particular child. The parental obligation 
is the duty to ensure that a child one has caused to exist is provided for sufficiently; 
usually by the capable acceptance of parental responsibilities or arranging for other 
capable individuals to do so. As such, Archard’s parental obligation is very near Brake’s 
procreative costs, while his causal account of parenthood is significantly more truncated 
than Prusak’s. Unlike Brake’s, Archard’s approach remains grounded in specific actions. 
His intention is to refute the idea of a ‘parental package,’ that is, the idea that a set of 
rights and duties come as a package when a person stands in a particular relation to a 
child.39  
Against other causalists, Archard contends that obligations, rights, and 
responsibilities can be separated or held partially or incompletely.40 And he counters the 
voluntarist criticism that the causal account leads to an endless string of cause and effect 
by asserting that this conflates a metaphysical with a practical question. That is, 
determining who is most causally responsible for an event is a routine judgment in courts 
                                                 
38 Benatar and Archard, 104. 
39 Ibid., 108. 
40 Ibid., 106 – 109. 
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of law which need not lead into a philosophical abyss.41 Archard favors the causal 
approach because it clearly assigns obligations to parties who undertook inherently risky 
behavior regardless of their intent. In so doing, it better assures that a resulting child will 
not be harmed.42 To summarize his view, he writes, “if I cause a child to exist then I am 
under an obligation to ensure that this child is cared for but the obligation is discharged if 
the care is provided by someone who is willing to care for the child.”43 
To some extent, Archard’s labeling of his approach is misleading as it makes 
more limited claims than other causalists, such as Prusak, while treading very near 
Brake’s argument for procreative costs. In introducing the concept of ‘parental 
responsibilities’ Archard provides means for explaining, from a causalist perspective, 
how adoptive and biological parenthood can be equally valid forms of parenthood. 
Archard’s contribution is in arguing that the fundamental parental obligation to assure a 
child’s basic wellbeing can be come from a causal approach without requiring that the 
fullness of parental responsibilities must be assumed as well. The tension this raises with 
Prusak’s view concerns the relative importance of biological relatedness to parental 
responsibilities. However, Archard fairs far worse than Prusak in garnering real-life 
evidence to support his claims. Though the distinction he makes rests on the idea that 
transfer of responsibility away from biological parents is not itself unjust, he fails to 
show, or even consider, evidence from the experiences of actual children. 
                                                 
41 Ibid., 113. 
42 Ibid., 116. There is quite clearly a parallel between certain dispositions of the causalist and 
voluntarist approaches and views on abortion. However the relationship is complex as individual scholars 
each take nuanced views. As such that consideration will not be dealt with here. 
43 Ibid., 118. 
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Brake, Prusak, and Archard’s views offer a good deal of insight for a Catholic 
theology of parenthood. The voluntarist approach as a whole works well to explain why 
parents have special obligations for their children, because this is a freely chosen 
commitment which gives rise to important obligations.44 As such, the voluntarist 
approach takes the relational aspect of particular parents to particular children seriously 
and does not presume to assert that biological kinship alone can generate such a 
relationship. While Brake’s separation of procreation and parenthood may be concerning 
in its apparent individualism and acceptance recent social trends, she makes the 
distinction in order to emphasize the full breadth and import parental obligations. Yet 
Brakes view and that of the voluntarist approach more generally, distinguishes more 
sharply between parents and non-parents than may be countenanced from a theological 
perspective. That is, the legalistic foundations of the voluntarist approach stand in some 
tension to theological commitments to community belonging and altruistic concern 
beyond kin obligations. Certainly the commitment to a long-term stable relationship with 
a particular child is an important aspect of parenthood; however the legalism behind the 
voluntarist approach can center parenthood on one or two individuals without protecting 
or acknowledging the role of caring nonparent adults. The existence of coparents beyond 
the immediate parent or parents of a particular child is an important resource for adding 
stability and supporting healthy child wellbeing. 
The causal approach is less helpful in addressing the chosen nature of Christian 
kinship but rightly attempts to ground individual responsibility for others in the actions 
they have themselves taken. As such, it more accurately captures the duties owed in light 
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of unplanned, but not unforeseeable consequences. The causal approach also paints a 
more realistic picture of individual freedom and autonomy in light of the obligations their 
actions create. This is in part because it is more inclined to prescind from abstract 
theories of justice to engage the lived realities of actual children. On this score, however, 
the causal approach also exposes its own weakness in its presumption of the categorical 
benefits of biological parenthood for children. 
A weak causalist account of procreative costs and prima facie parental obligations 
joined to a voluntarist account of parental responsibilities most clearly captures the 
significant strands within the Catholic tradition by acknowledging both the obligations 
that result from actions as well as the chosen nature of parenthood. This combined 
approach is near to the argument offered by Archard, however it must place more 
emphasis on the actual needs of children. Moreover it requires the introduction of 
theological convictions that can both expand and interpret its framework. In sketching 
such an approach, it would seem that biological parents who accept their parental 
obligations ought to also bear a prima facie claim to parental responsibilities. But this 
prima facie claim could be abrogated in view of an individual’s actual capacity to raise a 
child well in light of their personal and communal resources. This is the case for three 
reasons. First, a presumption of fitness to parent cannot be drawn from the fact of the 
ability to procreate alone. Second, biological kinship cannot suggest ownership over a 
child, who is a gift from God endowed with full human dignity. And third, considerations 
of child rearing must be made primarily in light of children’s wellbeing. In instances 
were biological parents are not able to assume parental responsibility, other individuals 
may create bonds of kinship which and assume parental responsibilities which are no less 
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real or significant than those based on biological relatedness. This is because it is 
children’s fundamental identity as gifts from God and subject in their own right, not adult 
actions of decisions, the fundamentally grounds a Christian vision of parenthood. As 
such, Christian parenthood includes a variety of equally valid responses to children 
themselves. In the following pages, this sketch of parental obligations will be tested 
against and refined by contemporary arguments for children’s rights, adoption law, and 
social justice. 
 
Part II: Children’s Rights 
The conviction that children are endowed with full human dignity naturally 
supports the conclusion that children possess human rights. Within the Catholic tradition, 
discussion of distinct parental obligations towards children began to emerge within 
household and moral manuals of the sixteenth century.45 But it was not until the late-
eighteenth century, when the rising ideology of childhood as a time of carefree growth 
met the industrial revolution that the human rights of children began to be asserted in 
force.46 By the end of the nineteenth century, mounting social pressures gave rise to 
conceptions of rights specific to childhood. These assertions relied upon specific 
conceptions of childhood such that they were often formulated in opposition to the 
demands of adulthood and they tended to be directed against industrial employers, not 
families or parents. Christine Gudorf attributes the public orientation of children’s rights 
                                                 
45 Hugh Cunningham, Children and Childhood in Western Society Since 1500, 2nd ed. (Harlow, 
England: Pearson Longman, 2005), 55. 
46 Ibid., 143. 
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to the influence of the patriarchal household within the Judeo-Christian. She contends 
that this tradition encourages children’s obedience and assumes that all parents will 
protect and seek the best interests of their children. As such, it has tended to obscure 
recognition of children’s rights within the home.47 Yet, when children’s rights have been 
asserted within domestic situations, they have frequently failed to serve the interests of 
children. Many ‘child-saving’ efforts of previous times removed children from families 
only to place them in institutionalized care or stigmatize them as damaged.48 Thus growth 
in children’s rights has historically tended to advance state authority relative to family 
autonomy, but has a more complex relationship to children’s wellbeing and family 
stability.49 
The extension of human rights specifically to children was advanced in the 
twentieth century by a number of international agreements, most notably the United 
Nations’ “Convention on the Rights of the Child” of 1989.50 The Vatican has been a firm 
supporter of these developments51 and Christian scholars have worked to support, 
develop, and advance this agenda. Lisa Sowle Cahill and the late Jean Bethke Elshtain 
                                                 
47 Christine E. Gudorf, “Western Religion and the Patriarchal Family,” in Perspectives on 
Marriage: A Reader, eds. Kieran Scott and Michael Warren (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
301. 
48 Cunningham., 162. 
49 Ibid., 163. 
50 See, United Nations, “Convention on the Rights of the Child,” UNICEF, (November 20, 1989) 
http://www.unicef.org/UK/Documents/Publications-pdfs/UNCRC_PRESS200910web.pdf. 
51 Charles J. Reid Jr. offers and insightful review of how the ‘right to life’ language of Catholic 
opposition to abortion has expanded throughout recent decades to provide conceptual support for 
opposition to sanctions, access to health care, and other topics that impact the wellbeing of the vulnerable, 
particularly young children. See. Charles J. Reid Jr. “The Right to Life and Its Application to the Welfare 
of Children,” in The Best Love of the Child: Being Loved and Being Taught to Love as the First Human 
Right, Timothy P Jackson, ed, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011), 142 – 175. 
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are noteworthy among theologians who advocate for children’s rights out of the tradition 
of social justice. Both conclude that stable families are an important aspect of children’s 
needs, and therefore children’s rights, but they differ on the extent of familial diversity 
that this conclusion can accommodate. Cahill reacts against excessive privatization of the 
family and assumes a socially altruistic view of motherhood in which the aspiration to 
raise children and the extension of care to all children, “belong together as companion 
considerations.”52 She argues that childrearing requires institutionalization within stable 
and child-benefiting family forms, but does not clarify a precise structure. Elshtain argues 
that the adequate socialization of children requires “clear structures of external authority 
and limited freedom different from that practiced more widely in a civil society of 
democratic politics of equality among citizens.”53 She adds that children need specific 
adults to act as moral superiors in order develop their capacities for social relations. 
Elshtain is less willing to accommodate diversity in family forms and advocates for 
procreative heterosexual unions as the preeminent context for child-rearing. Elshtain, like 
Cahill, grounds children’s rights within the contexts of families and stands firmly against 
excesses in individualist and capitalists trends that have fractured family life. However, 
Elshtain has been criticized for her romanticism of pre-industrial family life and limited 
attention to social pressures and equality between marriage partners.54  
In contrast, Annelies van Heijst, has studied institutional care for children by 
women religious and concludes that, in the context of childrearing, the “ethics of justice” 
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should be replaced with the “ethics of care.” She explains, “The ethics of justice focuses 
on (legal) rights and justice, which are rational and general principles; while the ethics of 
care deals with relational and emotional commitment and situations that differ in the 
uniqueness and particularity.”55 Consequently, Heist argues that the “facility to care itself 
must be considered a kind of power” because it holds the capacity to shape the lives of 
children “who have no other choice than to subject themselves to the care of others.” 
Caring, is therefore, a power that influences the development and self-understanding of 
the care receiver through encouragement as well as discipline. The language of justice 
and rights cannot accommodate this power to influence the depths of another’s self-
understanding without their full knowledge and rational consent in the way that care 
does. Yet it is the vulnerability of the human condition itself that creates the need for 
“asymmetrical relations of dependency and allows exercise of the power to care.” The 
ethical exercise of the capacity to care creates power over another individual but is 
nonetheless a benefit to the care receiver. But this capacity is not immune to misuse and 
harm.56 
Heijst points in the direction of an increasing body of research by scholars who 
contend that paradigms of justice, specifically rights language, need to not only adapt to 
the specific requirements of children’s upbringing, but must also account for the 
uniqueness of children themselves. That is, children ought to be seen not simply as 
                                                 
55 Annelies van Heijst, Models of Charitable Care: Catholic Nuns and Children in Their Care in 
Amsterdam, 1852-2002 (Boston: Brill, 2008), 28. In addition to Heijst’s argument, Sara Ruddick’s 
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individuals who have specific forms of dependence on others, but as a unique form of 
individuals themselves. Timothy Jackson, for example, argues that, while traditional 
language of human rights can explain some of the essential human needs of children, it is 
inadequate to capture how children uniquely express their personhood because the 
language is formulated for adults. He writes, “[children] are not ‘persons’ in the technical 
sense of autonomous agents, self-aware across time. In addition, most children cannot 
form valid contracts and are not capable of achieved merit or demerit; thus they stand in 
an ambiguous relation to traditional procedural, distributive, and retributive justice.”57 
The Best Love of the Child, edited by Timothy Jackson, collects essays on a 
variety of topics which argue from the premise that the ‘best interest of the child’ 
rationale, which has proven foundational in modern legal discussions of children’s rights, 
requires compliment and correction by concern for children’s duties, needs, and stages of 
development. The collection further contends that the most fundamental right of the child 
is “the right to be loved and the right to learn to love others.”58 A preface by Stephen Post 
explains that because “love begets love,” the “best love of the child is one that begets 
love in the child over the course of a lifetime.”59 Jackson  argues, “the first right of the 
child is the right to be loved, even as the first duty of parents and the surrounding society 
is to give such love wisely and effectively. Every child, to live a fulfilling life, needs 
                                                 
57 Timothy P Jackson, ed, The Best Love of the Child: Being Loved and Being Taught to Love as 
the First Human Right (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011), 5. 
58 Ibid., x. 
59 Post adds, “The bottom line is that loved people love people, while hurt people hurt people, and 
this is all set in motion in the early years.” Ibid., xiii – xv. 
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loving care.”60 Jackson later clarifies that the essays are unified in the idea that “the right 
of a child to be loved is best fulfilled by teaching him or her, in turn, how to love others.” 
Rana Lehr-Lehnardt and T. Jeremy Gunn helpfully ground the context of the book itself 
by arguing that, despite present criticisms and limitations, the development of ‘the best 
interests of the child’ standard was clearly influenced by the concept of love.61 
Consequently, they argue, on the basis of psychological and sociological research on 
children’s need for love, that the role of love in the best interest standard ought to be 
more clearly acknowledged especially in its legal application.62 
Margaret F. Brinig and Steven L. Nock begin with the premise that children must 
learn to love unconditionally, primarily through experience of others doing so, and argue 
in favor of legal strategies that could help promote the development of this capacity.63 
They propose that the most likely role models of unconditional love are the love of 
parents for children, the love of spouses for each other, and the love of God for 
humankind.64 Based on their psychological research, they argue that there is compelling 
legal interest in promoting permanent and stabile homes for children’s upbringing. While 
adults may adapt relatively easily to changing domestic situations, the impacts of such 
                                                 
60 Jackson later laments, “The positive right of progeny to acquire a certain character is typically 
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61 Ibid., 277. 
62 Ibid., 279. Tanya Asim Cooper contends that the ‘best interest’ legal standard is so vague that it 
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changes on children are far more pronounced. For this reason they oppose legal 
recognition of cohabitation as equivalent to marriage.65 The authors argue that legal 
support of stabile and permanent caregiving arrangements is warranted and can be 
promoted by formal and recognized structures of kinship or guardianship.66 
 In a concluding chapter, the late Don S. Browning suggests that the ‘more 
classical integrational model of love’ may be in a process of being lost in favor of “a 
relatively one-dimensional psychological or affectional interpersonal and intersubjective 
relationship.”67 He notes that ‘best love’, ‘best care’, and ‘best interests’ of the child are 
all related concerns that inform social practices; yet the legal interpretations of these 
concepts contain significant diversity and have been used to support divergent 
applications. Browning favors the multi-dimensional approach that is encouraged by 
these differing concepts, which he labels the ‘integrational view,’ but argues that its 
application should communicate “through affect and deeds the respect for the emerging 
personhood of the child” while also striving to meet “the child’s developmental needs 
throughout the life cycle.”68 Browning clarifies that to love a child requires meeting his 
or her needs as they emerge throughout the process of development. As such, meeting 
earlier needs is foundational for continual nurturance while decisions of what needs are 
most significant at a given stage must be guided by practical wisdom and cultural 
                                                 
65 Ibid., 343. 
66 Ibid., 345. 
67 Ibid., 348. 
68 Ibid., 348. 
343 
 
awareness.69 Because child development takes place within the context of specific 
societies, the best love of the child should critically appropriate cultural resources in view 
of their significance for a child’s “emerging capacity and identity.”70 Although parents 
and guardians are significant in these matters, they are not the sole arbiters of a child’s 
resources. Browning writes, “At best they are the key mediators of influences, logics, 
symbols, and narrative traditions that also make massive contributions to the growth and 
well-being of the child.”71 After further clarification and expansion, Browning offers a 
summary of his position: 
The best love of the child is a set of parental and institutional practices that (1) communicates 
respect for the child’s emerging self while meeting needs and actualizing potentials, (2) guides the 
child to grow and live by a principle that respects the self and meets the needs of others, (3) 
enriches the child with a vision or narrative of life that both supports and justifies this ethics, and 
(4) does this in ways that realistically confront the opportunities and limits of various social and 
natural contexts.72 
 
From this perspective, Browning argues that among influential scholarship, the work of 
Margaret Brinig most adequately demonstrates how the law can encourage and protect 
these goals.73 This is because Brinig uniquely balances concerns for family dissolution 
with family formation and informs her legal theory with empirical research and 
recognition of children’s changing needs overtime.74  
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 Another resource for understanding contemporary developments in children’s 
right is the ‘childist’ method developed by Jon Wall in his work Ethics in Light of 
Childhood. Here Wall contends that children must no longer be viewed as mere objects 
of ethical reflection but ought to “fundamentally transform how morality is understood 
and practiced.”75 As such, he seeks to construct a method of ethical discourse that 
corrects for historical bias in a manner akin to feminism, womanism, and other critical 
theories. Wall labels this approach ‘childism’ which he describes as an “ethical poetics” 
that builds upon earlier models of childhood while seeking to critically challenge and 
overcome their limitations.76 This second step is augmented with insights drawn from 
phenomenology and childhood studies. Wall believes that childism can significantly alter 
conceptions of philosophical anthropology, the goals of individuals and society, and 
obligations owed one another. In the final part of his book, Wall demonstrates how 
childism can broaden and enhance considerations of human rights, the family, and ethical 
thinking. Wall’s work proves an insightful look at the challenges created when children 
are taken seriously as unique moral agents. Yet two concerns arise from Wall’s argument. 
First, he tends to prioritize quantity over quality in human relationship and as such may 
undervalue the importance of specific loves.77 That is, his anthropological framework 
may not be sufficiently attentive to contingency and limitations within human experience 
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that give rise to the need prioritize certain specific relationships over others. Second, the 
orientation Wall gives his childist approach is not far removed from a more conventional 
developmental conception of childhood. This raises concern as to how a non-child could 
speak on behalf of the perspective of children without appropriating a conceptual 
framework of childhood that is, at least in some respects, inauthentic, incomplete, and 
limiting. Unlike feminism, childism does not and will never have fully capable advocates 
to speak on behalf of their own experience. But this limitation in Wall’s approach only 
further affirms the challenges of applying rights language, a system created for adults, to 
children as was observed by Jackson. 
 
Summary 
The summary formula of parental obligations asserted above holds that children’s 
full human dignity as gifts from God needs to be recognized in conceptions of 
parenthood. Catholic conceptions of parenthood generally acknowledge children’s rights 
on the basis of respect for their humanity dignity. Moreover, understanding children as 
gifts from God has been used to mitigate over-assertions of parental authority or even 
ownership. This can take the form of acknowledging the family as a “‘holding 
environment’ where that gift is nurtured and brought to maturity so that it may be given 
over to others. The baptism of the child reminds parents that the child, entrusted for a 
time to their care, must in God’s design be sent forth.”78 Nonetheless, it needs 
acknowledged that advocacy for children’s rights necessarily requires some authoritative 
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body to enforce rights claims. Consequently, children’s rights advocacy has been accused 
of over exerting state control into the affairs of families. This challenge appears to require 
some a prudent balance between the privacy required for a family to function well and 
the legitimate concerns of the state to protect the rights of all citizens. 
Some have used rights language to apply justice concerns to children, however 
they have disagreed on what model of the family, and even what model of justice these 
claims might yield. Moreover, the adequacy of rights language itself has been questioned 
in the context of childhood. At the very least, it requires adaptation to more adequately 
explain the unique needs of children, such as stability and love. But some have argued 
that it must go further to accommodate a much fuller account of childhood, as in the 
proposal offered by Don Browning. As such, the sketch of parental obligations offered 
above does help to suggest the applicability of rights language for children by 
acknowledging their dignity and asserting their identity as gifts from God. At the same 
time, however, these considerations of the peculiarities of applying rights language to 
children contribute to a more complete understanding of how the human dignity of 
children must be respected through approaches to justice that are uniquely adapted to the 
conditions of childhood. 
 
Part III: Adoption 
Hugh Cunningham observes that although all societies have had to establish some 
system of transferring children to non-biological parent caregivers, the predominant basis 
of such exchanges historically has been economic. In the West, adoption changed 
significantly in the twentieth century as potential caregivers became increasingly willing 
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to pay to adopt children who would not themselves directly compensate for this economic 
loss.79 This transition was encouraged by an increasingly sentimental cultural conception 
of children, but individual motivations remained complex. Some were motivated to save 
children from harmful situations, but the preference for children with particular features 
suggests that many adults were also invested in satisfying their own desires.80 The 
secrecy, and even shame, that has been culturally associated with adoption has 
significantly lessened throughout the past century. Yet differing motivations and 
experiences persist as do significant inequalities in which sorts of children will be placed 
with which caregivers. These differences have their roots in a number of factors, 
including the history of the adoption system and conceptions of the family as well as 
racial and financial disparities. As such, it is important to work through contemporary 
arguments concerning various facets of adoption in order to come to a more adequate 
understanding of how these shape and are shaped by conceptions of parenthood. 
Moreover, inasmuch as the causal approach to parenthood tends to diminish appreciation 
of adoption as a positive family form, it is important to consider how the mixed approach 
to parental obligations suggested above might be augmented by present ethical 
discussions on adoption.  
A healthy scholarly discourse is presently underway on multiple topics related to 
ethical and legal aspects of adoption.81 Harvard Law School professor Elizabeth Bartholet 
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represents one perspective and is a leading advocate for reforming adoptive rights in 
order to expedite placements. Her book, Family Bonds, is based on her own experience of 
completing two international adoptions. It exposes many significant assumptions that 
underlie the present adoption system. She notes that standard practices in adoption would 
amount to discrimination in other areas of the legal system while financial resources play 
a significant role in the ability to acquire “desirable” children.82 Despite her robust 
criticisms of adoption processes, Bartholet sees adoption itself as an important good and 
argues that the social stigmas attached to adoptive families need to be redressed.  She 
maintains that because society defines “personhood and parenthood in terms of 
procreation” it fails to see adoption as a “positive alternative to the blood-based family 
form.”83 Bartholet is highly suspicious of the role biological kinship plays in decisions 
regarding children’s family context. She argues that children ought to be placed with the 
parent or parents who can best assure their wellbeing and questions the extent of the 
rights to privacy and autonomy traditionally associated with biological kinship.84 In an 
insightful criticism that implicates the causal approach, she asks, “Why do we think of it 
as extraordinary and not ordinary to love as ‘our own’ children born to others?”85  
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are rarely returned to their home countries.” Marie A. Failinger, “Co-Creating Adoption Law: A Lutheran 
Perspective,” Dialog: A Journal of Theology 51, no. 4 (Winter 2012): 274. 
82 Within the adoption process, race, religion, marital status, age, handicap, and sexual orientation 
may all be used as indicators of desirability for placement. Elizabeth Bartholet, Family Bonds: Adoption 
and the Politics of Parenting (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993), xx. 
83 Ibid., xxv. 
84 Ibid., 46. 
85 Ibid., 47. 
349 
 
While Bartholet concedes that the desire for biological children may be natural in 
itself, she adds that social influences make any evaluation of this natural impulse 
uncertain.86 Moreover, present cultural pressures often manipulate in socially harmful 
ways whatever natural impulse does exist. ‘Biological bias,’ joined by free market 
medical technology and financial incentives, encourages people to try infertility 
treatments while adoption agencies remain under-promoted.87 And, because women’s 
self-understanding is deeply influenced by their capacity to be biological mothers, the 
ability to see adoption as a legitimate form of parenthood is limited while the trauma of 
infertility is increased.88 At the same time, adoption procedures themselves are set-up to 
mimic biological parenthood as closely as possible so that parents and children will look 
like they could be biologically related. 
In Bartholet’s estimation, the consequences of these realities are disastrous. 
People are sold on infertility treatments despite relatively low chances of successful 
pregnancy, given no clear exit from treatment, and offered little or no alternatives by the 
doctors and counselors.89 Often it is only after these medical infertility treatments are 
abandoned as unsuccessful that adoption is seriously considered, after many years and 
tens of thousands of dollars. By this point, energy and resources have been sapped while 
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many would-be parents have aged-out of strong candidacy for adoption placement. 
Bartholet laments,  
It makes no sense for a society that thinks of itself as sane and humane to be driving people in the 
direction of child production rather than adoption. It makes no sense for the children out there – 
those who have already been born and who will grow up without homes unless they are adopted. 
A sane and humane society should encourage people to provide for these existing children rather 
than bring more children into the world.90 
 
In addition, Bartholet criticizes the adoptions system’s parental screening 
practices for failing to serve either the best interests of children or prospective parents. 
Despite adoption ethics upholding the principle that children may not be treated as 
commodities, Bartholet contends that the system functions to make children into property 
and allows adults to assert ownership in various ways.91 Moreover, no comparable 
screening is required for future parents in either prenatal care or fertility treatment.92 She 
writes, “Those who procreate live in a world of near-absolute rights with respect to 
parenting. Those who would adopt have not rights. They must beg for the privilege of 
parenting…”93 This inequality, she claims, is based on a high valuation of the right to 
procreate while the relational aspects of parenting are neglected. As such, the system is 
based on procreative rights more than concern for children’s wellbeing.94  
Engrained biases against adoption have colored the social scientific research 
which tends to focus on the negative aspects of adoptive families and hide many positive 
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aspects. Moreover, this research often lacks nuance or allows certain inevitable minority 
populations of adopted children disproportionate representation.95 Nonetheless, studies 
show that children in adoptive homes have better outcomes than those who are raised in 
institutional care, foster care, those returned from foster care to birth families, or those 
raised by birth mothers who once considered adoption but decided against it. Bartholet 
states emphatically, “These studies fail to confirm the negative claims made in the great 
body of adoption literature. They reveal no significant disadvantages of adoptive as 
opposed to biologic parenting, and some significant advantages.”96 Bartholet concludes 
that adoption is not the same as biological parenting, and that biological parenting may 
hold certain advantages. Yet adoption must be recognized as another positive form of 
family that can teach about the value of families themselves and their connections to 
larger human communities.97 She writes, “there may be some inborn need to procreate, 
but there are also inborn needs to nurture.”98 This nurturing instinct ought to be 
encouraged as it is the means by which the needs of existing children can be met. 
Bartholet’s perspective provides a thorough critique of the excesses of the causal 
approach to parental responsibility when it attaches too much significance to the fact of 
biological relatedness alone. In contrast, her insistence that adoption be understood as a 
positive form of the family claims similar values to the strengths identified in the 
voluntarist account. That is, it acknowledges the virtue of responding to the needs of 
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particular children and the importance free choice in parental obligations. The book, 
Adoption Matters, edited by Sally Haslanger and Charlotte Witt, advances and challenges 
some of Bartholet’s arguments while providing further considerations for adoption’s role 
in clarifying the nature of parental responsibilities.  
In this collection, Drucilla Cornell criticizes the “language of war” that 
characterizes discussions of adoption and functions to set birth mothers in opposition to 
adoptive mothers.99 Like Bartholet, Cornell criticizes the priority adoption practices tend 
to place on heterosexuality and traditional gender roles as opposed to nondiscrimination. 
But Cornell is considerably more sympathetic towards birth mothers and adopted 
children’s loss of genetic and cultural ties. As such, Cornell advocates for open or 
cooperative forms of adoption. Cornell’s commitment to nondiscrimination is joined to 
concern for the freedom to construct one’s own sexual identity. While Cornell’s 
argument helpfully advances some of the heterosexist concerns which are raised, but not 
centralized, in Bartholet’s argument, it is also highly individualistic and optimistic about 
deconstructing family systems. As a consequence, Cornell’s attempt to disassociate 
families from the sexual unit tends to lose sight of the stability that more expansive 
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family units can support.100 Despite advancing a concern of Bartholet’s, Cornell’s 
argument differs significantly in being centrally concerned with ensuring adult rights and 
individual freedom to form partnerships without consistent concern for intermediary 
family structures that may also support children’s wellbeing. 
Anita L. Allen rejects the idea that adoptive children need to know their 
genealogical and cultural roots for healthy personal development.101 Many biological 
parents do not know or care much about these, and thereby place children in a similar 
state without significant alarm.102 Allen contends that the “social continuity argument” 
against many forms of adoption is “based on the pervasive but mistaken view that 
children are born with a certain thickly constituted social identities that ought to be re-
inscribed by an upbringing among or in the ways of their social similars.”103 On these 
grounds, she argues for the rights of adoptive parents to control how the relationship to a 
child’s birth parents is structured and maintained. 
Chapters by Janet Farrell Smith, Charlotte Witt, and Shelly Park each advance 
Bartholet’s criticism of the role of biological kinship in conceptions of parenthood. Smith 
takes aim at the influence of the natural property tradition in Western law that has made 
claims to possession over children on the basis of biological parenthood. To avoid 
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associating children with property (she admits some necessary similarities), Smith 
proposes commitment and responsibility as the legal foundations for parenthood.104 
Smith argues, “rather than postulate a moral exceptionalism for adoptive parenting, we 
should… provide a uniform moral foundation for both biological and adoptive parent’s 
moral responsibility to children.”105 Different avenues to parenthood should be treated 
equally because the moral obligations parents owe to their children remain essentially the 
same regardless of how the relationship was formed. Smith augments Bartholet’s concern 
that the genetic aspects of parenthood are given greater standing than the relational. 
However, Smith’s does quite little to explore motivations for becoming a parent or the 
capabilities that the obligations of parenthood might require.  
Witt criticizes ‘genetic essentialism’ which presumes that a person’s self-
understanding is determined by biological factors and leads to the assumption that 
adopted persons necessarily have a fractured identity.106 She writes that present adoption 
literature is undergirded by two assumptions. First, “personal identity is determined in a 
substantial way by one’s genes.” Second “one’s self-understanding requires a relationship 
with the source of one’s genetic endowment, the birth family.”107 Witt counters that 
family resemblances are primarily social behaviors based on biological myths. The idea 
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that a child has a biological relation’s attributes (personality, eyes, etc.) has some genetic 
basis but is more importantly a way of creating meaning within a family.108 This implies 
that adopted children will have certain challenges in developing their self-understanding 
within a family, but these are not insurmountable or necessarily detrimental. 
Park argues that traditional conceptions of motherhood have assumed that genetic, 
gestational, and social mothering, are indivisible and that motherhood is a stable 
institution. And that this conception ignores the historical realities of genetic families 
divided by poverty, war, and slavery. It is also challenged by families created by 
adoption, divorce and remarriage while new reproductive technologies complicate the 
matter further.109 Park argues that a new conception of family in general and motherhood 
in particular that can account for such diversities is required. She concludes that children 
will benefit from maintaining as many parental bonds with diverse adults as there are 
adults willing to foster such relationships. That is, parental relationships should not be 
“arbitrarily foreclosed” to match some constructed notion of parenthood.110 She writes, 
“A real mother for a child is someone whose child has acquired the skills of loving 
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perception and thus who can see her as real.”111 Thus, motherhood is an existential 
process not an essential state. 
In each of these essays concern for adoption develops the way parenthood is 
understood and each consistently raises pointed criticisms related to the influence of 
biological kinship in conceptions of parenthood. Considered collectively, these make a 
strong case against many presumptions identified by Bartholet and carried by the causal 
account of parental responsibilities, such as Prusak’s suggestion that the frequent desire 
of adopted children to seek relationships with their biological parents suggests a natural 
prominence of biological kinship. 
However, these perspectives tend to represent only one side of a more complex 
debate. Whereas Bartholet privileges the immediate needs of children and the right of 
capable adults to parent children, Dorothy Roberts emphasizes the unjust social 
circumstances that sustain adoption and the challenges race and poverty create for family 
stability. Roberts is particularly concerned with the systemic injustices that underlie 
social disparities and correspond to disparities within the foster care system. Roberts 
takes particular aim at foster care and laments that the entire system appears built upon 
the assumption that whites will only show concern for black children if these children 
live in white homes as their own.112 She writes, “The continuing supply of adoptable 
children for middle-class women depends on the persistence of deplorable social 
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conditions and requires severing the ties among the most vulnerable mothers and 
children.”113 She continues, 
But the current campaign to increase adoptions makes devaluation of foster children’s families and 
the rejection of family preservation efforts its central components. Adoption is no longer presented 
as a remedy for a minority of unsalvageable families but as a viable option – indeed, the preferred 
option – for all children in foster care. Black mother’s bonds with their children, in particular, are 
portrayed as a barrier to adoption, and extinguishing them seen as a critical first step in the 
adoption process… Terminating parental rights faster and abolishing race-matching policies were 
linked as a strategy for increasing adoptions of Black children by white families. Supporting this 
strategy is a myth that the foster care problem can be solved by moving more Black children from 
their families into white adoptive homes.114 
 
In a separate essay Roberts argues that Bartholet’s campaign to increase adoptions 
centers on the devaluation of relationships within black families. Rather than respecting 
the relationship between black mothers and their children, these are characterized as the 
first barrier to a more efficient adoption system. Roberts adds, “Supporting this strategy 
is the myth that moving more black children from their families into white adoptive 
homes can solve the foster care problem.”115 
Roberts calls attention to the increasingly aggressive fashion with which state 
agencies have tended to treat cases of maltreatment in black homes and contends that the 
barriers women face in keeping their children, especially when they are poor, ought to be 
given greater attention. Rather than increasing the speed with which children move from 
foster care to adoption, Roberts argues for increased support for struggling families to 
keep children out of foster care and avoid family break-up.116 However, she laments, 
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policy decisions in recent decades have worked in the opposite direction by simplifying 
the termination of parental rights.117 
Tanya Asim Cooper’s essay on disparities between the treatment of whites and 
that of African and Native Americans in the foster care system asserts on the basis of 
history that “Unconscious racism is embedded in our civic institutions; and the foster care 
system is vulnerable as one such institution controlled and influenced by those in 
power.”118 Cooper argues that this embedded racial bias shapes the operation of the foster 
care system, which in turn mimics other racially disparate social realities. “Known as the 
racial geography of foster care, those neighborhoods with poor African American and 
Native American families and the greatest involvement and concentration of foster care 
system surveillance are a perfect match.”119 Cooper acknowledges that most people agree 
the foster care system is flawed, but disagree on whether it helps, or takes advantage of, 
the most marginalized. She adds, 
“What researchers do know, definitively, is that although designed in theory to protect children, 
the foster care system actually harms many children… Although intended to provide temporary 
care to children and their families, in fact many children stay in foster care for years. Once in 
foster care, the system often moves these children from placement to placement, with many 
experiencing three or more moves.120 
 
In a similar manner, Roberts argues that similarities between the demographics of the US 
prison system and the foster care system, two of the most racially segregated institutions 
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118 Tanya Asim Cooper, “Racial Bias in American Foster Care: The National Debate,” Marquette 
Law Review 97, no. 2 (winter 2013): 233. 
119 Ibid., 238. 
120 Cooper, 240. 
359 
 
in the nation, are too significant to ignore and reveal systemic cooperation in punishing 
black mothers and sustaining racial, gendered, and classist social divides. 121 Roberts 
furthers the connections she draws to the prison system by calling attention to the 
secondary harms that foster care brings about. She writes, “Many have warned that foster 
care leads to prison, and more recently, a literature has developed on the risk that children 
with incarcerated parents will end up in foster care.”122 The correlation between foster 
care and prison is only one connection that may be drawn. Roberts laments that the full 
harm being caused by aggressive child welfare policies within black communities may 
yet be unimagined.123 
 
Roberts raises important challenges to Bartholet’s argument by questioning her 
presumptions and scope of concern. Bartholet does provide a strong argument against 
race-based adoption management, which she characterizes as an unfair assertion of 
ownership over children that disrespects their wellbeing by prolonging stays in foster care 
and thereby lowering their chances at placement.124 Bartholet’s further contends that 
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transracial adoption may produce children who are more sensitive to racism and capable 
of operating within two distinct worlds. She allows a weak racial preference as 
potentially legitimate but sees stress factors related to race as insignificant when 
compared to prolonged stays in foster care or other unfavorable living conditions.125 Yet, 
Bartholet’s arguments are much weaker in accounting for systematic biases that produce 
disparities within the adoption system. Bell hooks points to the danger in arguments for 
motherhood advanced by “white bourgeois women with successful careers who are now 
choosing to bear children. They seem to be saying to masses of women that careers or 
work can never be as important, as satisfying, as bearing children.”126 This reveals a 
tension in Bartholet’s argument. If motherhood is about responding to the immediate 
needs of children, not a lifestyle choice for adults seeking fulfillment, then why would the 
immediate response to children in challenging family circumstances not be to support and 
sustain children’s families of birth, rather than rapidly processing children through the 
child welfare system? Indeed, some families of origin may be beyond recovery and some 
children may be placed for adoption by individuals who sincerely do not desire or are 
incapable of raising them. However, Roberts brings to light systematic prejudices in the 
present function of the foster care system which Bartholet does not adequately address.  
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Roberts’ arguments also reveal particular weaknesses in the voluntarist approach 
more generally. In her concern to forefront the needs of children and criticize the way 
adult concerns interfere in having these met Bartholet is quite inattentive to structural 
injustices. The biological bias and the will to own that Bartholet criticizes do not fully 
account for the complexity of family separation within a system that functions differently 
among different racial groups. This also implies that a voluntary decision to parent a 
child may be done in response to a child’s needs, but also carries implications of 
particular adult desires which may influence one’s perspective.  
Roberts’ argument also has its limitations. Roberts is much more concerned with 
the foster care system itself apart from other forms of adoption, and while she utilizes 
social scientific data to show disparities in racial treatment, she hardly acknowledges the 
generally good outcomes adopted children tend to have or the outcomes of children 
returned to families after time in the foster care system. In many cases Roberts appears to 
presume an adversarial relationship between biological families and the child welfare 
system, even as the system as a whole has shifted more recently towards kin placements 
which provide less disruption in children’s connections to their communities and 
extended family.127 
   
Summary 
The influence of the causal approach to parenthood provides one reason why 
perspectives on adoption vary. The causal approach tends to emphasize the importance of 
                                                 
127 See, Ann Schwartz, “Connective Complexity: African American Adolescents and the 
Relational Context of Kinship Foster Care,” Child Welfare 87, no. 2 (2008). 
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biological kinship and thereby diminishes the positive aspects of adoption. This can lead 
to the ‘language of war’ noted by Cornell, or more subtle suspicions of adoptive 
parenthood. Because the approach to parental responsibilities arrived at above attempts to 
retain and balance both the causal and voluntarist approach, it is important to examine 
how well this mixed approach can account for adoption as a positive family form. Several 
tensions that arise among legitimate concerns are worth noting. 
Perhaps the most obvious tension is between focusing on children’s immediate 
wellbeing and focusing on structural injustices which cause conditions within families of 
origin that are detrimental to children’s wellbeing; represented by Bartholet and Roberts 
respectively. Bartholet’s concern for biological bias needs to more adequately account for 
the significant ways in which race, social, and economic power have shaped and continue 
to influence practices within the adoption and foster care systems. Within the US unequal 
racial treatment has a long legacy and such historical influence is not easily broken. 
Roberts rightly points to injustices in intervention policies that correlate to race and 
poverty, support unequal treatment, and devalue the integrity of black family’s relational 
bonds. However, opposition to transracial adoption as such appears to go too far and 
needs balanced by Bartholet’s concern for how implementation of these policies has 
worked against children’s wellbeing. 
The causal account of parenthood needs to be restricted by children’s wellbeing, 
such that biological kinship alone does not stand as a reasonable defense for keeping 
children in harmful situations. At the same time, the voluntarist approach must be 
balanced by recognition that race and socioeconomic status are influential factors in how 
social structures operate among different groups. Conditions that effectively force family 
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break-up must be addressed and corrected as well as conditions that feed unequal 
treatment among different families. Supporting and facilitating just social systems is 
equally a means of caring for children’s wellbeing.  
Matters are also complicated by the deep personal investments people have in 
relation to parenthood as it relates to individual self-understanding. Some of the cultural 
resources for this self-understanding are socially constructed and affected by 
interpretations of fertility, biological kinship, and parenthood. Here the voluntarist 
approach’s strength is most pronounced as it shows how legitimate parents can be made, 
and are in fact always made, by the decision to form a parent-child relationship. This is a 
helpful correction within a culture that appears willing to drive people into new 
technologies that promise biological offspring, while existing children remain in need. 
On the other hand, a legitimate right to procreate is worth defending and the voluntarist 
perspective may be prone to underestimate the self-serving needs and desires of potential 
parents. As such, the will to parent alone is not a viable foundation for parenthood but 
needs to be balanced against actual capabilities to fulfill parental functions.  
Attention to communal networks of support sheds light on how many of the 
arguments advanced above narrowly define parenthood as related exclusively to certain 
domestic arrangements involving specific adults rather than parental functioning. Here 
Parks’ concern that parenthood not be artificially restricted is important, as is her 
explanation of how parents are created by the children they nurture. Throughout history 
many children have been ‘parented’ by grandparents, siblings, relatives, and other caring 
individuals who stepped in to meet their needs and formed a particular relationship. To 
deny that these relationships are legitimate expressions of parenthood is to deny validity 
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to the experiences of such children. On the other hand, parenthood cannot be ascribed to 
any adult who shows concern for a particular child, certain limited adults must 
necessarily retain legal responsibility for children, and familial privacy has its value. As 
such, there is a legitimate tension between communal support and family autonomy 
which at either extreme leads to dismissing the family as a valid institution or 
encouraging families that are closed in upon themselves.128 As such a prudent balance 
needs struck between these concerns that can recognize both the family as well as more 
expansive conceptions of parenthood. 
Here an additional trend in the arguments above also needs mentioned. Several 
authors tend to presume that only individual and state-level concerns are pertinent. This 
appears to operate off an underdeveloped anthropology that underestimates the 
importance of relational realities. Intermediary groups including the family, 
neighborhoods, and ethnic communities require attention as well. These should not be 
allowed to exert excessive control or operate with presumption of ‘genetic essentialism’ 
which tie individual destiny too closely to genes, but they do have legitimate standing in 
light of children’s needs for structural stability and extra-familial support. 
To conclude, consideration of how discussions on adoption challenge different 
conceptions of parenthood reveals a number of important tensions that help balance an 
approach to parenthood. Neither the causal nor the voluntarist approach alones appears 
sufficient to account for these various challenges. Instead a mixed approach that remains 
centered on children’s needs without an absolute presumption in favor of adoption or 
                                                 
128 Prusak explains, “to call one’s child one’s own, like calling one’s spouse one’s own, is 
typically to indicate a special, intimate relationship, and what’s more a relationship that requires a 
significant measure of privacy and autonomy in order to be what it is.” Prusak, 101. 
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biological kinship seems best able to account for these tensions. But parenthood itself 
also requires conceptual expansion in light of children’s needs rather than adult claims. 
This allows for a greater appreciation of diversity in children’s own experiences of 
parenthood. 
 
Part IV: Parenthood and Capabilities Approach 
 Having considered children’s rights and adoption in regard to their connection to 
parental responsibilities, a final consideration of the relationship between parental 
responsibilities and social justice is in order. Each of the sections above concluded that an 
adequate conception of parental responsibilities needs to take a moderated approach if it 
is to avoid the excesses of certain perspectives. Here, it seems political philosopher 
Martha Nussbaum’s work in developing the ‘Capabilities Approach’ to social justice 
provides a valuable resource for articulating just how these balanced judgments may be 
made. Nussbaum categorizes her development of the Capabilities Approach as a species 
of human rights, though it attempts to be a corrective to some human rights theories and 
more comprehensive than most. She explains “The common ground between the 
Capabilities Approach and human rights approaches lies in the idea that all people have 
some core entitlements just by virtue of their humanity, and that it is a basic duty of 
society to respect and support these entitlements.”129 Because the Vatican has been a 
                                                 
129 Martha C. Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 62. John M Alexander provides a helpful explanation of how 
Nussbaum and Sen differ in relation to human rights as where the capabilities approach fits within other 
human rights approaches. He labels Nussabum’s view as “an ethical theory of ‘deontological 
eudemonism’” that is based upon an inviolable list of capabilities yet permits consequentialist judgments in 
cases of conflict among these. See, John M. Alexander, “Capabilities, Human Rights and Moral Pluralism,” 
The International Journal of Human Rights 8, no. 4 (December 2004): 451 – 469. 
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strong supporter of the international human rights movement, seeing in it a resource to 
protect human dignity, there is good reason to believe that Nussbaum’s philosophical 
approach may hold useful insights for a theological conception of parenthood, based on 
human capabilities, that aligns with Catholic commitments. It may be noted, however, 
that while Catholic teaching on social ethics and sexual ethics are rooted in natural law 
arguments, they assume different points of emphasis. Catholic Social Teaching often 
speaks in terms of principles which must be upheld while leaving room for discretion in 
particular applications, whereas Catholic moral teaching proposes numerous absolute 
negative moral norms related to human sexuality that are always binding regardless of 
circumstance or intention. To employ Nussbaum’s argument within a consideration of 
parenthood does in some ways transverse these distinctive approaches in a way that 
official Catholic teaching has been hesitant to embrace. 
Utilizing Amartya Sen, the pioneer and partner with Nussbaum in developing 
Capabilities Theory, Nussbaum explains that capabilities as those things which a person 
is able to do and to be. “‘Capability is thus a kind of freedom: the substantive freedom to 
achieve alternative functioning combinations.’ In other words, they are not just abilities 
residing inside a person but also freedoms or opportunities created by a combination of 
personal abilities and political, social, and economic environment.”130 These capabilities 
come in two forms; ‘internal’ and ‘combined.’ Internal capabilities are those traits and 
abilities which are developed through the interaction of innate human potential with the 
external environment. As such they are not static attributes of the human person but are 
                                                 
130 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 20. 
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dynamic realities that arise through engagement with the opportunities in one’s life.131 
Education is perhaps the simplest, albeit very general, example of an internal capability; 
it combines the human ability to learn with an external resource for learning (e.g. a book, 
teacher, or educational system). Combined capabilities denote the means of expressing 
internal capabilities made possible by a social context. Combined capabilities help clarify 
the tasks of a just society as not just providing space for people to develop internal 
capabilities, but also to protect the expression of those capabilities. In the example 
provided by Nussbaum, a society may help people develop the internal capability of 
critical thought on political matters, but also has the obligation to protect the combined 
capability of expressing that thought through the protection of free speech.132 Thus, 
internal capabilities are primary and relate more closely to innate human potential, while 
combined capabilities are secondary and relate to the real-world application of developed 
potentials. Conversely, assaults to human dignity are essentially directed at limiting or 
damaging capabilities. Limitations of combined capabilities, such as imprisonment or 
restrictions on the freedom of speech, are conceivably justified in a just society. 
Limitations of internal capabilities are much more serious as this infringes upon human 
dignity itself. In all cases, Nussbaum argues, human dignity and fundamental equality are 
essentially retained, yet some infringements are more damaging than others.133 
Nussbaum sees her approach as drawn from a variety of sources, but grounded 
most clearly in particular strands of the Western philosophical tradition which emphasize 
                                                 
131 Ibid., 21. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid., 31. 
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human flourishing or self-realization. As such, the approach tends to focus on how 
human potential is shaped and expressed. It does, however, take into account inborn traits 
that make such development possible. Nussbaum labels these propensities ‘basic 
capabilities.’ She explains, “Basic capabilities are the innate faculties of the person that 
make later development and training possible.”134 When basic capabilities are realized 
they become internal capabilities which can be expressed as combined capabilities; when 
this happens, a person experiences ‘functioning.’ Functioning is related to the concept of 
human flourishing and simply denotes the enjoyment or enrichment experienced when 
one’s capabilities are adequately developed and expressed. Functioning incorporates a 
wide range of human experiences, from a musician’s mastery of an instrument to simply 
enjoying good health.135 Not all capabilities must lead to functionings and individuals 
should be permitted the freedom to select which capabilities to develop in order to reach 
their desired functionings.136 This ability to select is itself a capability and must remain 
open to fluidity in order to account for ‘adaptive preferences.’137 That is, desires are 
shaped by experiences and possibilities such that new experiences and possibilities will 
likely result in changing desires.138 In her explanation of ‘functionings’, Nussbaum 
                                                 
134 The distinction between basic propensities or faculties and developing capabilities is somewhat 
artificial as Nussbaum suggests that life itself makes the former into the latter. That is, as soon as the 
human creature engages with the external world, which happens prenatally, capabilities are in development. 
Yet the distinction has value in explaining how some capabilities may be damaged at the most basic level. 
Ibid., 24. 
135 Ibid., 25. 
136 Prusak provides a cogent argument for why prenatal genetic enhancement is not legitimated on 
the basis of seeking to secure an open future for a child. See Prusak, Chapter 5. 
137 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 25. 
138 Ibid., 56. 
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upholds the principle that all individuals are free to select their own vision of the good 
life, but she concedes that this freedom is not universal. Nussbaum excludes children who 
may be required to pursue “certain sorts of functioning… (as in compulsory education)… 
as a necessary prelude to adult capability.”139 
Nussbaum is clear that the Capabilities Approach is not an attempt to define 
human nature nor does it extract ethical norms uncritically from an idea of human 
nature.140  
Instead, it is evaluative and ethical from the start: it asks, among the many things that human 
beings might develop the capacity to do, which ones are the really valuable ones, which are the 
ones that a minimally just society will endeavor to nurture and support? An account of human 
nature tells us what resources and possibilities we have and what our difficulties may be. It does 
not tell us what to value.141  
 
Maintaining a foundation in moral pluralism is important for the Capabilities Approach, 
however, it does rest upon assertions of fundamental and universal human dignity, 
freedom in respect to that dignity, and a claim that humans inherently strive to develop 
certain faculties.142 Moreover, Nussbaum adopts Kant’s dictum to ‘treat all people as an 
end’ as a basic guideline143 and argues that some freedoms promote human dignity while 
others do not.144 As such, her philosophy, though denying it is an account of human 
                                                 
139 Ibid., 26. 
140 Alexander explains that for Nussbaum, “Human rights are misunderstood… if they are believed 
to contain some fundamental values that people belonging to different cultures, religions and societies 
could endorse in the same way.” Alexander, 461. 
141 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 28.  
142 Ibid., 31. Cf. Alexander, 462. 
143 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 35. 
144 “In short, no society that pursues equality or even an ample social minimum can avoid 
curtailing freedom in very many ways, and what it ought to say is: those freedoms are not good, they are 
not part of a core group of entitlements required by the notion of social justice, and in many ways, indeed, 
they subvert those core entitlements.” Ibid., 73. 
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nature, rests quite clearly on a very basic anthropological conception. This basic 
anthropology is drawn most clearly from Aristotle and the Stoics. Aristotle offers a vision 
of the human person that includes both a teleological orientation towards flourishing and 
a deep understanding of human limitation. The Stoics offer a commitment to human 
equality as well as natural law.145 Furthermore, Adam Smith’s insistence that the failure 
to develop certain human abilities amounts to an infringement upon human dignity 
provides an important foundation for the Capabilities Approach.146 
Relying upon these foundational commitments, Nussbaum asserts ten ‘central 
capabilities’ that arise as the most significant among the numerous possibilities a person 
may pursue. These are (1) life, (2) bodily health, (3) bodily integrity, (4) senses, 
imagination, and thought, (5) emotions, (6) practical reason, (7) affiliation (in two forms), 
(8) other species, (9) play, and (10) control over one’s environment. Nussbaum 
distinguishes ‘affiliation’ and ‘practical reason’ as the two most prominent capabilities as 
they tend to influence and ground the others.147 
 
Nussbaum and Theology of Parenthood. 
Several aspects of Nussbaum’s development of the Capabilities Approach suggest 
that it may serve as a useful resource for a broader theological conception of parenthood. 
There are a numerous basic similarities in commitments and methods. First, Nussbaum, 
like the Catholic tradition, upholds human dignity and human flourishing as central 
                                                 
145 Ibid., 125 – 131. 
146 Ibid., 137. 
147 Ibid., 33 – 34. 
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commitments. Second, both draw widely upon the resources of the Western philosophical 
tradition. Third, both rely to varying degrees on a fundamental conception of the human 
person. And fourth, both tend towards a basically teleological or developmental 
orientation. 
Concerning human flourishing, both the Catholic tradition and the Capabilities 
Approach champion education as a powerful resource for advancing the human good. 
Nussbaum defines education broadly and writes that it, “forms people’s existing 
capacities and develops internal capabilities of many kinds.”148 As such, education holds 
intrinsic value and contributes to lasting personal satisfaction. Education is also an area in 
which freedom of choice is limited due to its close association with children. Because 
education contributes to growth in capabilities, “making it compulsory in childhood is 
justified by the dramatic expansion of capabilities in later life.”149 Nussbaum’s 
commitment to moral pluralism raises some tensions as it contrasts with Catholic 
theology’s claim that humanity’s ultimate good is found in God. Yet, Catholic theology is 
itself a vision of ultimate meaning, not a political philosophy for pluralistic societies, and 
the limited assertions Nussbaum does make do not appear contradictory to Catholic 
thought.150 Nussbaum’s political philosophy attempts to limit its scope in ways that the 
                                                 
148 Ibid., 152. 
149 Ibid., 156. 
150 Nussbaum argues that her approach can be accommodated by most major religious and secular 
comprehensive doctrines. As an example, she writes, “Roman Catholic social doctrine squares quite well 
with the global and domestic demands of the Capabilities Approach, but no orthodox Roman Catholic can 
be a cosmopolitan, since cosmopolitanism asserts that my first duty is to all humanity rather than to God or 
my religion.… The point that is relevant here is that Capabilities Approach is a political doctrine only, and 
one that aspires to be the object of an Overlapping Consensus. As such, it should not recommend any 
comprehensive ethical doctrine or be built upon one.” Ibid., 93. 
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Catholic moral vision does not because of the fundamental difference in their willingness 
to define the good. Whereas the Catholic tradition is fundamentally based in the divine-
human relationship; commentary on the existence of God is beyond the intent of 
Nussbaum’s system, let alone drawing upon implications from this belief to shape 
practice. 
Both the Capabilities Approach and the Catholic tradition draw from several 
major branches of ethical reasoning and attempt to balance how these are utilized. The 
Capabilities Approach rests upon a few basic deontological convictions, especially in 
relation to human dignity, but also permits consequentialist, though not utilitarian, moral 
judgment based on outcomes as it seeks to protect functionings.151 In Nussbaum’s 
formulation, the Capabilities Approach also requires altruistic behavior and, therefore, 
must encourage its development.152 Consequently, Nussbaum may be viewed as 
borrowing from virtue ethics in her argument for creating structures that motivate 
individuals to develop socially beneficial behavior.153 Though there are significant points 
of disagreement, this attempt to blend ethical methods into a consistent theory is also 
characteristic of Catholic thought and has been exemplified in recent times most notably 
by John Paul II’s encyclical Veritatis splendor.154 
                                                 
151 Nussbaum writes, “It thus might be called an outcome-oriented view, by contrast of 
proceduralist views are often preferred by deontologists.” Ibid., 95. Alexander explains, “The moral 
pluralism that underpins the capability approach makes us realise that the diffusion of human rights will be 
much more effective if it advocates a pluralistic approach that is sensitive to both deontological and 
consequential concerns.” Alexander, 462. 
152 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 181. 
153 Ibid., 97. 
154 The manner of John Paul II’s synthesis is the subject of debate, most notably in the precedence 
he appears to grant deontology. Nonetheless, the encyclical attempts to cogently combine these major 
ethical approaches. 
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Both approaches also operate on the basis of a fundamental anthropological 
conception. Nussbaum’s account is much more restricted and amounts to little more than 
a few assertions that must be accepted as reasonable for the system to work. But the more 
significant tension is in the essentially individualistic nature of Nussbaum’s approach155 
which is developed in part as a consequence of rejecting certain Utilitarian tendencies.156 
This squares quite well with human rights theory but raises certain challenges from a 
Catholic theological standpoint. Communally oriented conceptions of the human person 
are a mark of the Catholic tradition and Catholic leaders have frequently criticized the 
growth of individualism in recent times.157 Still, Nussbaum’s intent in centering 
commitment on the individual is to provide a means for protecting each and every 
individual’s dignity regardless of communal claims. This intent in itself fits well with the 
Catholic commitments to safeguard human dignity. 
Perhaps the most important point of continuity lies in Capabilities Approach’s 
fundamental orientation towards expanding concern beyond negative freedoms (i.e. 
noninterference or restriction on rights of others) as is common in constraint views of 
                                                 
155 “Capabilities belong first and foremost individual persons, and only derivatively two groups... 
It stipulates that the goal is to produce capabilities for each and every person, and not to some people as a 
means to the capabilities of others or of the whole… This normative focus on the individual cannot be 
dislodged by pointing to the obvious fact that people at times identify themselves with larger collectivities, 
such as ethnic group, the states, or the nation, and take pride in the achievement of the group.” Ibid., 35. 
156 “One of its most important historical antecedents is Kant, and it holds that the social welfare 
should never be pursued in a way that violates people’s fundamental entitlements. Indeed, it agrees with 
Kantians in saying that utilitarianism does not attach the right sort of salience to each person and to the idea 
of respect for persons.” Ibid., 95. 
157 Cynthia Willet contends that Nussbaum is too reserved in her critique of Rawls’ liberalism and 
argues that Nussbaum’s continued centralization of autonomous adults and reliance upon altruism is 
insufficient to develop an adequate account of human relationality. Cynthia Willet, “Collective 
Responsibility for Children in an Age of Orphans,” in The Best Love of the Child: Being Loved and Being 
Taught to Love as the First Human Right, ed., Timothy P. Jackson (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011), 
189. 
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human rights.158 That is, without articulating the good that is to be pursued, Nussbaum 
attempts to protect the positive freedoms involved in pursuing goods. This gives the 
approach something of a teleological orientation; even as it allows individuals to define 
their own telos. Moreover, she sets some limits on what might reasonably be considered 
goods and what desires are harmful in themselves. Here again, Nussbaum’s approach 
articulates only basic commitments and these do not appear to seriously conflict with the 
intents of Catholic theology. For this reason, Nussbaum’s list of central capabilities 
seems a useful starting point from which to build a more comprehensive theological 
reflection on the nature and function of parenthood. 
Of the central capabilities, affiliation is most clearly related to parenthood, though 
others may account for experiences within parenthood as well. Nussbaum gives 
affiliation two definitions. The first is the ability “to live with and toward others, to 
recognize and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social 
interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another.” The second is “having the 
social basis of self-respect and nonhumiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified 
being whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails provisions of nondiscrimination 
on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin.”159  
Nussbaum’s concern for nondiscrimination extends to the social continuation of 
gender roles as this serves to disadvantage women, particularly in educational 
opportunities. She argues that society ought to strive for greater reciprocity in male-
                                                 
158 Alexander, 454. 
159 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 33 - 34. Nussbaum distinguished affiliation and practical 
reason as the two most influential capabilities on this list. 
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female relationships and adds, “society needs new conceptions of masculinity that do not 
deem unmanly such acts as washing the body of an aged mother or father.”160 While 
these concerns relate to those of Catholic Social Teaching, Nussbaum’s application goes 
further in challenging conventional gender roles. Moreover, Nussbaum does not believe 
that heterosexual marriage is the normative foundation of the family. Instead, she argues 
that the same principles of equality and nondiscrimination apply to considerations of the 
family as a consideration of basic justice. Nussbaum expresses particular concern for the 
ways in which, “discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation expresses stigma and 
reinforces a view that some people are not fully equal.”161 She argues that restrictions on 
same-sex marriage are similar to laws against miscegenation and the creation of civil 
unions rather than access to marriage amounts to a continuation of the stigma of 
inferiority for same-sex couples.162 
 
Summary 
Nussbaum’s version of Capabilities Theory helps to advance considerations of 
parenthood particularly through naming and defining ‘affiliation’ as a central capability. 
Affiliation calls attention to the capacity to build intimate relationships and locate oneself 
meaningfully within the social world. Affiliation goes beyond simply forming 
relationships to include the development of personal and interpersonal attributes that 
make meaningful relationships possible; such as care and empathy. Affiliation also 
                                                 
160 Ibid., 152. 
161 Ibid., 149. 
162 Ibid., 149. 
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concerns a person’s relationship to society and thereby requires societies to respect 
individuals’ capabilities and to work against various forms of discrimination. Because it 
is an internal capability, failure to protect affiliation amounts to an infringement upon 
human dignity.  
From this perspective, affiliation is the internal capability out of which the 
combined capability of parenthood stems. Parenthood is just one particular form 
affiliation might take and is a combined, not internal, capability because it relies upon an 
external factor; i.e. the existence of a child who can be parented. Part of the Capabilities 
Approach’s value for considering parenthood is its recognition that capabilities are 
dynamic. This helps account for parenthood as reality that changes over time as the 
parent-child relationship develops and parent’s desires for their relationships shift. As 
such, the Capabilities Approach helps differentiate parenthood as a lived reality from the 
basic human potentials it may require as a foundation. When a potentially capable person 
willingly accepts the responsibilities of parenthood, they are simultaneously accepting the 
task of developing their own capacity for affiliation in particular ways; ways which could 
not be developed apart from this particular relationship. 
In addition, Nussbaum’s description of affiliation helps to explain parenthood as 
an inter-personal as well as a social reality.163 Social constructions of kinship and the 
family are significant factors in how individuals come to understand parenthood and even 
                                                 
163 We might admit that a child’s perception of his or her parent, an adult’s perception of 
themselves as a parent, and social perceptions of a particular person as parent to a particular child, may 
well differ or even conflict. While such considerations are important in considering the complexity of 
parenthood as a phenomenon they go further than is needed in developing a basic theological foundation 
for parenthood. As such, these epistemological matters will not be explored here. 
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their own individual worth.164 Concerns of ‘pronatalist’, ‘biologic’, and ‘genetic 
essentialist’ presumptions within contemporary society point to influences that stigmatize 
certain forms of affiliation, such as childless marriage or adoptive parenthood. But these 
ought to be valued as specific functionings.165 Moreover, a society fixated on biological 
procreation is less likely to recognize that people may realize parental functionings in 
specific ways even when they do not have biological children. Nor will it foster 
appreciation of adoptive parenthood as a pathway towards positive functionings related to 
parenthood. For those who are incapable of the particular demands of parenting, perhaps 
due to limited resources or capacities, exercising the capability of affiliation nonetheless 
remains important for their dignity. Not being able to realize functionings specific to 
parenthood does not infringe upon a person’s dignity but may be a reality caused by the 
conditions of a person’s existence. This explanation provides a valuable conceptual 
framework for considering parenthood from functional perspective while attending to 
both biological and non-biological modes of kinship. 
Nussbaum’s approach prizes equality and avoids absolute distinctions based on 
gender. Consequently, she does not suggest that human relationships are conditioned in 
any essential way by human gender. This is not to say that gender will not influence how 
the basic capability of affiliation will come to be realized as a combined capability.166 
Gender often will influence the specific forms relationships might take, but it is not 
                                                 
164 See the argument above for fertility being tied to self-worth 
165 Pronatalist, Biologic is from Bartholet, Genetic Essentialism is above. 
166 Nussbaum is in fact very concerned with how gender functions on a number of levels; but she 
does not posit gender as a difference that is essential to the existence of certain potentials. Cf. Martha 
Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000). 
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essential to forming a relationship as such. Instead, relationality is a basic human 
potential that comes to be developed according to individual abilities and external 
realities. Therefore, limiting the formation of particular types of human relationships 
without clear reason acts unjustly against an individual’s freedom to develop their 
internal capabilities and may be an affront to their human dignity. However, combined 
capabilities, which include specific forms of relationships, may be limited justly if they 
are reasonably seen to be detrimental to the human good. That is, Nussbaum’s conviction 
that individuals are free to construct their own vision of the good, does not lead her to 
conclude that societies are obligated to accept as good all the possible forms this pursuit 
may take.  
Here the tension with the Catholic magisterium’s opposition to same-sex 
parenthood becomes clear. Whereas Nussbaum sees her approach as defending same-sex 
marriage, and presumably same-sex parenthood for similar reasons, the magisterium has 
argued against these and done so largely within the conditions set by Nussbaum. For 
example, the magisterium does not teach that homosexual persons lack dignity or cannot 
form loving relationships; it has defended both of these.167 However, the magisterium 
does limit the socially allowable types of relationships, including marriage and 
parenthood, which same-sex persons may pursue.168 Thus, these teachings amount to 
                                                 
167 Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Some Considerations Concerning the 
Response to Legislative Proposals on the Non-Discrimination of Homosexual Persons,” Vatican, (July 22, 
1992) 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19920724_homose
xual-persons_en.html, #12. It is notable, however, that John Paul II’s approach to sexual ethics quite clearly 
implicates all sexual same-sex relationships as inherently selfish because they cannot properly express 
human sexuality as total self-gift. 
168 Cf. Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Considerations Regarding Proposals to 
Give Legal Recognition to Unions between Homosexual Persons,” Vatican, (July 31, 2003) 
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restrictions of combined capabilities which may be justly permitted for good reason. In 
Nussbaum’s view, these concerns evidently do not legitimate such a limitation, and in 
fact are tied to conditions that impact the individual’s social recognition. As such, these 
restrictions flow from discrimination, limit the basic capability of affiliations, and amount 
to an affront to human dignity. Conversely, the Magisterium argues that certain same-sex 
relationships do not serve the common good or individual wellbeing. Nor can they serve 
as a foundation for the family or promote children’s wellbeing. As such, the magisterial 
argument operates within Nussbaum’s framework in articulating certain forms of same-
sex relationships as the type of pursuits that simply should not be recognized as good. But 
Nussbaum’s framework raises two particular challenges to this argument. First, the 
argument for limitation would need to carry the burden of proof in showing that it really 
is based upon reasonable and serious potential for individual and social harm, not simply 
discrimination. Second, the argument would also have to show how this limitation avoids 
restricting individual standing within the community to such an extent that it acts against 
the basic capability of affiliation. 
The Capabilities Approach also helps to show how the subject of adoption is 
complicated by the fact that children have limitations on their freedom to select which 
functionings to pursue and thereby rely on adults to make these decisions for them. In 
biological families, parents assume this responsibility for overseeing their children’s 
developing capacities from birth. But in situations where children do not have capable 
parents, the question of which functionings to pursue must be turned towards potential 
                                                 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20030731_homose
xual-unions_en.html. 
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parents as well. Some have offered arguments that suggest children are harmed when 
specific functionings related to their genetic, racial, and cultural identity are removed as 
viable options. For example, the specific good of coming to understand one’s self within 
the context of one’s own racial community may be removed as a potential functioning in 
instances of transracial adoption. But Capabilities Approach also shows how adoptive 
families themselves offer distinctive potential functionings. For example, the distinctive 
good of developing a bi-racial or bi-cultural identity could not be had in a more 
homogenous home environment. As such, the Capabilities Approach helps to explain the 
positive specific content of adoptive families while limiting over-assertions of racial, 
cultural, or biological identity. Restricting a specific combined capability is not the same 
as restricting an internal capability and does not challenge human dignity when done with 
good reason. When adoption is necessary for a child’s wellbeing the new family that 
results from that adoption ought to be understood as a positive reality. 
This also raises the question of if any collective can really be said to love. If 
collectives cannot fulfill this need of children, how can they have a right to dictate 
children’s future? If children were considered objects of ownership, collectives could 
claim rights over them. But because they obligate human relationships that only 
individuals can provide, the claims of the collective are weakened substantially. Thus a 
group could not claim to retain responsibility over a child if individuals within that group 
cannot also provide for the care obligated. On the other hand, it remains important to 
recognize that existing relationships and identities should not be fractured without 
compelling reasons. Adoption may allow a child to pursue unique functionings but 
existing potentials must also be taken into account. As such, the age of the child seems to 
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be an important factor. Conversely, instability in domestic arrangements works against 
the internal capability of affiliation and ought to be a very serious concern. That is, if 
human dignity itself calls for developing capabilities and desired functionings change 
with personal and social conditions, it is then very important to ensure stable home 
environments for children so that they can aim for and achieve functionings throughout 
their development with some sense of security. Transient child-care arrangements, such 
as foster care, may be necessary in certain situations, but moving children into stable 
homes as quickly as possible is not simply about fulfilling the desires of adult adopters, 
but is a concern raised by the child’s own dignity.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter began by pointing to the limited attention feminist theology has often 
afforded children and suggested that theology as a whole has not fared better. It then 
proposed that present discussions in philosophy and legal theory may prove insightful for 
advancing the theological discourse. Throughout, the chapter has called attention to 
aspects of arguments that may prove useful for a Catholic theological approach to 
parenthood. But it has also attended to tensions or limitations where these exist. On the 
whole, these sources have added important perspectives that ought to be considered 
seriously. These include reflections on how parental responsibilities arise, the strengths, 
challenges, and limitations of children rights, complex issues in adoption, and 
considerations of parental relationships from a social justice perspective. Below, these 
contributions will be reviewed and utilized to further progress towards foundations for a 
theological conception of parenthood. 
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Present Catholic teaching on parenthood appears to rely heavily upon the strong 
causal approach and also shares its limitations. Namely, Catholic perspectives tend to 
attach great significance to biological kinship without recognizing how kinship itself is an 
interpreted reality. This gives rise to a tendency to destabilize the value of adoption and 
other chosen forms of kinship or characterize these as abnormal or undesirable. Overtly 
the magisterium has praised adoption, but the operative theory of parenthood appears to 
undermine these assertions. Lastly, this approach is prone to speaking for children’s 
natural need to be reared by their biological parents without thorough consideration of the 
contextual complexities that can make this undesirable or impossible for certain children. 
As such, it can cast suspicion on non-biological family forms without thorough analysis 
of where these fit in meeting children’s needs given the realities of their contexts. For 
example, the assertion that all children have a right to be raised by their biological parents 
carries very little value within discussions of care for foster children as this option is 
already void in most instances. Nonetheless it has been employed in this context in 
arguments against same-sex parenthood.169  
The voluntarist approach calls more attention to the uniqueness and value of 
specific relationships and better appreciates the constructed nature of kinship which has a 
legitimate place in the Christian tradition. However the voluntarist account can place too 
much emphasis on chosen relations and tend to undermine unchosen relationships, 
communal identity, and traditional family forms. On this score, the causal account 
appears to be more realistic about the complexity and limitations of human relationships.  
                                                 
169 Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Instruction for Respect of Human Life in 
Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation; Replies to Certain Questions of the Day” (Donum vitae), 
Vatican, (February 22, 1987), II.A.1. 
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Because of these factors, the first section concluded by suggesting that a mixed 
approach that blends a presumption for a weak causal account with a recognition of the 
voluntary acceptance of parental responsibilities best accounts for Christian claims. 
Moreover, this approach needs conditioned by adult capabilities and children’s needs. 
This was not to suggest that all historical Christian perspectives on parenthood are so 
easily reconcilable, but simply to provide a modest working definition of the origins of 
parental responsibilities that can help build a foundation for a theological account of 
parenthood. 
The following section considered this theory of parental obligations in light of 
contemporary developments in children’s rights and introduced the need for the human 
dignity of children to be central to a conception of parenthood. It also suggested that 
respecting the human dignity of children entails different considerations than adults 
which limits the applicability of rights language. Some have argued that rights language 
cannot simply be modified to account for the unique needs of children, but needs 
fundamental revision to account for its basis in adult experience. These approaches help 
to explain why procreative costs and parental obligations are owed by those who brought 
children into existence to these children on account of their own needs and dignity. 
The third section presented Bartholet’s claim that families formed by adoption 
must be seen as a positive form of the family and adoption practices need to be more 
adequately guided by children’s wellbeing. Both expansions on Bartholet’s argument and 
some serious limitations were considered. Repeatedly, the influence of differing 
commitments to the causal or voluntarist theory of parenthood emerged. This section also 
raised very serious concerns about the role of race and socioeconomic status in adoption 
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practices. These concerns for structural injustice bring to light the complexity of 
discussions of adoption and mark out some legitimate boundaries of voluntarist accounts 
of parenthood. Social injustice works against children’s wellbeing while simply 
proposing adoption as the solution ignores the structural problems. Claims to rightfully 
possess children are problematic whether asserted by communities of birth or zealous 
prospective parents. Although many individuals may desire to be parents to particular 
children, the decision of who should parent needs to be made on the basis of children’s 
own wellbeing. On this count, racial and cultural identity may provide some claim but not 
one that particularly strong in light of other possible concerns. This raises the concern 
that neither the causal approach be allowed to justify keeping children in harmful 
situations nor the voluntarist approach be used to justify ‘rescuing’ children from harm 
without attending to the factors that contribute to the situation. As such, this section 
brought to light the importance of parenthood being grounded in right intentions and 
sufficient capabilities. Moreover the term parenthood itself needs sufficient expansion to 
account for communal investments in childrearing as well as non-parent adults who 
function in parental ways within the lives of specific children.170 
The final section took a somewhat different approach in considering how 
Nussbaum’s development of the ‘Capabilities Approach’ might be employed as a 
resource for a more comprehensive theological conception of parenthood. The basic 
capability of affiliation became most pertinent in this investigation as it helped to show 
                                                 
170 One perspective that appears to begin to address this challenge is offered by Cynthia Willet 
who argues that collective responsibility for children is needed nationally and globally, yet humans rights 
language tends to fracture associations and makes orphans out of all people. See, Cynthia Willet, 
“Collective Responsibility for Children in an Age of Orphans,” in The Best Love of the Child; Being Loved 
and Being Taught to Love as the First Human Right, ed., Timothy P Jackson (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2011), 179 – 196. 
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how capabilities relate to specific human relationships in various ways. This gave a name 
to the deeper human reality in which parenthood is grounded while also conceptualizing 
the capability of parenthood in a dynamic way that helps account for both child 
development and the changing nature of parenthood through the course of a lifetime. 
Moreover, parenthood is a somewhat unique human relationship that encompasses both 
the inter-personal and social dimensions of the central capability of affiliation. This had 
two notable implications for considering a Catholic theological account of parenthood. 
First it accepted the objective validity of particular lines of argument against same-sex 
parenthood, but also brought this opposition into suspicion as potentially unfounded by 
evidence and acting against the dignity of potential same-sex parents. Second, it 
articulated more clearly why adoption might be considered a positive form of family 
while casting doubt on some arguments opposing transracial and international adoption. 
Throughout these arguments, certain themes have also emerged consistently. 
Among these are the concern to identify parenthood in light of children’s wellbeing, the 
recognition that ‘parenthood’ is itself a complex term which encompasses a variety of 
meanings, and the persistence of tensions between individual and communal 
commitments. Perhaps the two most significant insights this chapter yields for a 
theological conception of parenthood is that parenthood is both a largely voluntary and a 
dynamic reality. That is, parenthood must be recognized as a capability that a parent 
determines to develop in initiating a relationship with a particular child. As such, 
parenthood itself is a process of developing certain potentials, or even virtues, which 
themselves direct a person towards human flourishing.171 This development is ongoing as 
                                                 
171 McLemore, 464. 
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the parental relationship grows and changes over the course of time. As such, parenthood 
is less of a static reality than an ongoing vocation. Nonetheless, parenthood requires 
certain internal capacities and external factors. It is not required for human flourishing, 
but it is probably undertaken in more diverse forms than we are presently prone to 
recognize.  
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Introduction 
This concluding chapter reviews the arguments made in previous chapters and 
initiates a constructive theological account of parenthood. It then returns to the case study 
shared in the Introduction and considers how this account of parenthood being developed 
parenthood might help address present dilemmas regarding Catholic participation in 
adoption services under laws that prohibit discrimination between marriage and legally 
recognized same-sex partnerships. This chapter argues that rigorous concern for the best 
interests of children in need of stable, permanent families is essential and that the 
importance of the Catholic Church’s involvement in adoption services for its own identity 
should not be ignored. Catholic responses to non-discrimination legislation for same-sex 
adopters are evaluated in terms of this account of parenthood which attempts to be both 
mindful of children’s rights and needs, as well as the magisterium’s present objections 
and concerns. This evaluation is based upon considering the caregiving potential of same-
sex partnerships in distinction from moral judgments of homogenital sexual acts. The 
final section of this chapter outlines potential trajectories for future research that would 
continue this project’s line of inquiry. The chapter calls for moral reflection on the 
relationship between conceptions of parenthood and gender, the relationship between 
sacramental marriage and other intimate human partnerships, and the development of 
moral theologies that take children seriously.  
 
Part I: Review of Arguments 
Before considering how the observations and arguments presented in this research 
might inform a theological account of parenthood, the arguments of the preceding 
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chapters will each be briefly reviewed in turn. The Introduction addressed differing social 
and religious conceptions of parenthood that American Catholic adoption agencies face 
in light of the reality of same-sex parenting. These tensions are caused by both shifting 
social understandings as well as developments within Catholic teaching. It maintained 
that further investigation into the theological nature of the conflict was warranted because 
orphan care is a central Christian practice that should not be easily abandoned.  Decisions 
to end adoption services in response to non-discrimination legislation for same-sex 
adopters reflect a limited theological account of parenthood. This conception of 
parenthood is indebted to an essentialist theory of gender and related system of sexual 
ethical reasoning. It offers a clear vision of gendered parental roles but very little 
reflection on the human capabilities that may be required to parent well. Furthermore, 
this conception of parenthood relies heavily upon a post-Victorian social context and 
privileges the biological nuclear family to such a degree that it effectively undermines 
Catholic participation in, and theological reflection on, adoption more generally. As such, 
the Introduction asserted that the operative perspective on parenthood within official 
Catholic teaching insufficiently engages a long and diverse history of orphan care and 
does little to integrate contemporary studies of child wellbeing. 
 
Chapter 1 identified particular biases within modern magisterial teaching. The 
biases concern the role of normative sexual ethical judgments, especially as these are tied 
to an essentialist theory of gender, bear on conceptions of parenthood. By construing 
sexual ethics almost exclusively as an ethics of marriage magisterial teaching narrowly 
construes parenthood as centered on sexual reproduction and biological kinship, a trend 
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that only increased following the publication of Humanae vitae. Contemporary 
magisterial teaching retains the conviction that spiritual education expresses Christian 
parenthood in its fullness yet undermines this very conviction through its repeated 
emphasis on biological procreation. This emphasis on biological procreation has diverted 
considerations of parenthood towards defenses of the moral condemnation of 
contraception and assertions of gendered parental roles. To explore these shifting 
concerns more closely, the first chapter focused on developments within certain key 
themes: gender, sexual ethics, family structure, and family function.  
An essentialist theory of gender, which conceives of male and female as discrete 
and differentiated categories, characterizes magisterial teaching from the papacy of Leo 
XIII through Benedict XVI. Magisterial perspectives pay little attention to social or 
individual constructions of gender identities and ideologies when these agree with. Yet, 
the magisterium does express concern over gender theories that view the relationship 
between embodiment and gender identity as more fluid. Modern magisterial documents 
also consistently conceptually separate the male-public and female-domestic spheres 
even as they express commitment to women’s dignity and their right to equitable social 
participation. In the writings of John Paul II, the concept of complementarity largely 
captures these commitments. Complementarity allows for universal claims about the 
normative dispositions of the sexes while avoiding complex considerations of the 
formation of gender identity and cultural ideology. 
Two major concerns were raised in response to these developments. First, gender 
essentialism can obscure individual diversity, human adaptability, and cultural capacities 
for change. Second, the complexity of human sexuality as understood today is simply too 
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great to fit neatly within dichotomous categories. Although Catholic teaching 
acknowledges physical, psychological, social, and spiritual aspects of human sexuality, it 
does little to address potential conflicts that may arise among these various dimensions. 
Moreover, it retains a tendency to make normative claims on the basis of generalist 
categories, as well as utilizing language suggestive of female subordination to male 
prerogative. 
Humanae vitae is also significance as the first post-conciliar document to operate 
on the basis of a personalist moral framework. Some saw its approach as rightfully 
linking the physical and metaphysical realities of the human person while bringing these 
to bear in its moral teaching. Others saw an importation of outdated physicalist 
methodology under the cloak of personalist language, with moral conclusions ultimately 
based on the physical structure of the act. With John Paul II, the debate over Humanae 
vitae grew in complexity and importance as his central concern for truth, particularly “the 
truth about man”, provided human sexual differentiation with metaphysical significance. 
John Paul II clarified that both marriage and parenthood were essentially misunderstood 
by those who enacted the lie of contraception which speaks at a fundamental level against 
the dignity of love, marriage, and the sexual act. The most significant concern in these 
developments is the extent to which the defense of Humanae vitae displaced earlier 
prioritizations of spiritual education as the primary task of Christian parenthood. This 
commitment was not lost, but became overshadowed by concerns related to the morality 
of marital sexual expression. 
Concerning family structure, commitments to gender essentialism and sexual 
ethical norms contributed to an idealization of the biological nuclear family. Until the 
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mid-twentieth century, the ideal family structure also explicitly included male headship, 
but a more egalitarian vision arose with Vatican II. Adoption is rarely mentioned since 
Vatican II and is generally offered as an alternative to abortion or as an option for 
infertile spouses in preference to artificial reproductive technologies. However, under 
John Paul II, the family was consistently encouraged to open itself outwardly in support 
of social needs and to cooperate and find support in other families and organizations. 
Although many aspects of this vision of the family are indebted to certain cultural ideals, 
its basic resonance with broad historical patterns is also significant. Stable heterosexual 
partnerships, biological procreation, and the social structures that support childrearing are 
common human experiences which have import within natural law moral systems. 
However, Catholic natural law moral theology is not solely based on nature alone, but 
interprets this through a vision of supernatural realities.172 Although the Catholic tradition 
posits the natural and supernatural as complementary rather than conflictual the potential 
to prioritize one disproportionately in moral reasoning remains. The present approach to 
parenthood through the natural order biological procreation has detracted attention from 
adoption which is traditionally defended on the basis of spiritual goods. In light of this, 
the relationship between adoptive parenthood and the procreative end of sex and marriage 
raises a particularly challenging concern. If adoption is an alternative way to realize this 
end, families formed by adoption are based in marriage and complementarity like those 
formed through biological procreation. Yet acknowledging adoption as a kind of 
procreation could lend support to arguments that question the judgment of Humanae vitae 
                                                 
172 See, Eugene F. Rogers, Sexuality and the Christian Body: Their Way into the Triune God 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999). 
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or support diverse family forms. Without a close connection between the end of 
procreation and biological reproduction the tightly knit concepts of complementarity, 
reproduction, and parenthood would admit to greater exceptions than present teaching 
allows. 
 Finally, conceptions of family function are fruitful resources in contemporary 
magisterial teaching for both internal critique and as foundations for a theology of 
parenthood. Contemporary magisterial teaching reclaims the idea of the family as the 
“domestic church,” such that within the family all members exercise their baptismal 
priesthood in a special way.173 Parents have a special task of evangelizing and leading 
their children to maturity, salvation, and holiness. As such, the family is described as a 
learning and evangelizing community, a “school of virtue” and a “school of deeper 
humanity.”174 These functional descriptions suggest possibilities for challenging accounts 
of the family based primarily upon structure. Magisterial focus on family structure has 
much to do with the particular form of personalism adapted by Paul VI and developed by 
John Paul II. In John Paul II’s moral theology, physical and meta-physical are closely 
connected. While utilizing personalist arguments John Paul II also tended to route 
supernatural goods through the natural order in way that downplayed potential conflicts 
or exceptions and occasioned accusations of physicalism. Closer attention to the role of 
                                                 
173 Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1655 – 1666. 
174 John Paul II, Familiaris consortio, Vatican, (November 22, 1981) 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/ apost_exhortations/documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_19811122_ 
familiaris-consortio_en.html, #21, 51 – 55. Cf. John Paul II, “Letter to Families,” Vatican, (February 2, 
1994) http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/letters/documents/ hf_jp-
ii_let_02021994_families_en.html. 
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cultural assumptions in presumed natural constructions of gender may have inspired more 
careful scrutiny of this relationship. 
Such an approach also elevates the significance of functional assessments of the 
family over family structure. That is, if a community functions like a family and appears 
to enjoy the spiritual benefits of a family, theological resources ought to exist for 
claiming it as a family or acknowledging similarities. This perspective finds support in 
repeated magisterial affirmations that the true meaning of parenthood goes well beyond 
biological procreation to spiritual education and service to the common good. Moreover, 
when the family is normatively envisioned as a learning and evangelizing community 
then moral evaluations of the family rightly consider function because structural 
assessments alone are inadequate for evaluating any particular community’ ability to 
learn and evangelize. 
 
Chapter 2 argues that revisionist Catholic theologians, who generally disagree 
with the magisterium on a number of sexual ethical judgments, also consistently access 
concepts of parenthood through prior accounts of sexual ethics and thereby replicate, to 
an extent, the biological bias of magisterial thought. That is, revisionist moral theologians 
also commonly assume a linear progression from human sexuality, to sexual ethics, to 
theology of marriage, to theology of parenthood. This approach similarly results in a 
tendency to treat adoption as a peripheral, rather than integral, consideration of the 
meaning of Christian parenthood.175 The revisionist authors engaged express general 
                                                 
175 Stephen Post suggests that changing Western cultural assumptions over the last century have 
led to an “increasingly dominant genealogical essentialism.” As such, the similarities in theological method 
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concern that magisterial teaching on the family is too tightly linked to the nuclear family 
and gendered parental roles, and that it is too idealistic to address adequately the 
complexities of lived realities. But, their responses to these concerns are limited by the 
tendency to replicate certain lines of thought in the writings they criticize. For example, 
the authors surveyed agree that openness to adoption is a positive expression of Christian 
parenthood, yet theological explanations of why this is so and how adoptive parenthood 
relates to biological parenthood and marriage are consistently under-developed. 
Additionally, several revisionist authors defend same-sex parenthood on the basis of 
sociological evidence, but offer limited theological support based on the nature of 
parenthood itself. 
Still, revisionist theologians make valuable contributions to theological reflection 
on parenthood given their commitments to experience as a moral guide, to a historically 
conscious worldview, and to broadened anthropological frameworks with nuanced 
conceptions of human gender. Moreover, revisionists also provide expanded definitions 
of ‘procreation’, commitment to justice as a norm for human relationships, and gestures 
towards the significance of human capacities are also significant. Lisa Sowle Cahill and 
Julie Hanlon Rubio explicitly clarify that the Christian family’s call to discipleship is 
rooted in the vocation of the family, not a family’s structure. Both also advocate for more 
socially supported and socially engaged families.176 Richard Gaillardetz offers the 
Eastern Christian notion of ‘generativity’ as a more promising concept than the duty-
                                                 
may be related to broader cultural shifts. See, Stephen G. Post, “Adoption Theologically Considered,” 
Journal of Religious Ethics 25, no. 1 (1997): 149 – 168.  
176 See, Lisa Sowle Cahill, Family: A Christian Social Perspective (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
2000) and Julie Hanlon Rubio, A Christian Theology of Marriage and Family (New York: Paulist Press, 
2003). 
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laden term ‘procreation’ because the former can connect reproduction and social 
commitment via a theological conception of the nature of human love.177 The second 
chapter concludes that disagreements between magisterial and revisionist conceptions of 
parenthood and the family are primarily methodological. They are most pronounced in 
matters of sexual ethics but diminish as considerations move toward family function; 
specifically the Christian family’s role in society. As such, a more firm and 
comprehensive vision of parenthood, that is allowed a degree of distinction from sexual 
ethics, has the potential to unite insights from these often disparate Catholic sources 
while also coherently addressing present realities. 
 
Chapter 3 argues that Western Christian history witnesses to myriad ways of 
providing care for children while conceptions of children and childhood have continually 
shifted. Caregiving practices have included forms of kin guardianship, non-maternally 
centered domestic caregiving, spiritual interpretations of ‘true’ motherhood, and diverse 
adoption practices. Modern conceptions of the family are largely indebted to cultural 
conceptions of childhood which encouraged emphasis on gendered parental roles and 
associate caregiving capabilities with the nature of womanhood.178 
Throughout Christian history, biological kinship if often central but faith-based 
interpretations of kinship serve as a powerful resources for supporting non-biological 
caregiving. Whether biological kinship or the willingness to construct kinship based on 
                                                 
177 See, Richard R. Gaillardetz, A Daring Promise: A Spirituality of Christian Marriage (New 
York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2002). 
178 See, Ann Taylor Allen, Feminism and Motherhood in Western Europe, 1890 – 1970 (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillon, 2005). 
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other’s needs is the more fundamental Christian ideal remains an open question. The 
priority of biological kinship is often suggested throughout Western Christian history 
however biology relatedness alone has never been singly determinative of kinship. 
Christian kinship is also a theologically interpreted reality. At times, basic Christian 
commitments to responding to the needs of others provided bases for constructing kinship 
and explaining caregiving practices. 
 
Chapter 4 began an exploration of non-theological contemporary resources by 
engaging sociological and psychological studies of family function and child wellbeing. 
A major challenge of assessing this research involves acknowledging both the 
measureable benefits of ‘traditional’ families for children while carefully parsing the 
complexities of familial diversity. Available social scientific evidence strongly indicates 
that stable nuclear families based in marriage promote child wellbeing. However, 
drawing broad and exclusionary conclusions from this data masks important 
complexities. For example, the emphasis placed on parental gender complementarity 
within Catholic teaching is an aspect of the traditional family yet this does not 
significantly impact measures of children’s wellbeing in comparisons of children raised 
by homosexual and heterosexual partners. Of course, social-science research concerns 
basic measures of health while the magisterial view of the family emphasizes children’s 
moral and spiritual growth.  
The most significant point of common ground between the two perspectives is the 
importance of stability for child wellbeing. The general agreement between revisionist 
and magisterial sources on commitment to open and socially engaged families with 
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extended networks of support appears to be one viable means to encourage this stability. 
Moreover, present social emphases on achievement and personal happiness have a 
negative effect on actually attaining both, while the Catholic vision of the purposes and 
function of the family may provide a valuable corrective. Yet such suggestions need to be 
expressed against the reality of social conditions, including, for example, economic 
systems that are often at odds with the creation of stable and socially engaged families. 
 
Chapter 5 acknowledged the limited attention children receive as subjects of 
theological discourse in their own right then explored philosophical and legal resources 
that may aid in correcting this limitation. The chapter presented philosophical 
disagreements on the basis of parental responsibilities. The causal approach is dominant 
in contemporary Catholic teaching and shares similar limitations but the voluntarist 
approach can be individualistic and lacks appreciation of the importance of communal 
relationships. Therefore, a mixed approach provides a more adequate representation of 
traditional Christian commitments.  
In light of contemporary developments in children’s rights a need exists for 
making the human dignity of children a central aspect of any conception of parenthood. 
This requires, at least, significant revisions to aspects of rights language which is 
indebted to adult experience. However, the human rights tradition does help to explain 
why parental responsibility is not merely a matter of choice, but is owed to children on 
account of their needs and dignity. 
The mixed approach to parental responsibilities is further clarified by insisting 
that adoptive families are a ‘positive’ form of family. First, although many individuals 
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may desire to be parents to particular children, the decision of who should parent needs to 
be made on the basis of children’s own wellbeing. Second, research on adoptive families 
calls attention to the importance of grounding parenthood in right intentions and 
sufficient capabilities. Third, the term ‘parenthood’ itself needs sufficient expansion to 
account for communal investments in childrearing as well as non-parent adults who 
function in parental ways within the lives of specific children. 
Chapter 5 also considered the ‘Capabilities Approach’ developed by Martha 
Nussbaum as a resource for a more comprehensive theological conception of parenthood. 
The ‘basic capability’ of ‘affiliation’ is most pertinent as it most directly concerns 
interpersonal relationships. Affiliation names the basic human reality that grounds 
parenthood and assists in conceiving of parenthood as a dynamic capability. The 
capability of affiliation can account for both child development and the changing nature 
of parenthood through the course of a lifetime. Where Catholic teaching has been 
criticized for emphasizing procreation over the actual rearing of children, affiliation 
offers a more developmental foundation for conceiving of parenthood as an ongoing 
personal relationship. Parenthood is both largely voluntary and dynamic. As such, 
parenthood itself is a process of developing certain human potentials. This development 
is ongoing as the parental relationship grows and changes with time. Nonetheless, 
parenthood requires certain internal capacities and external factors. 
Utilizing Nussbaum’s approach has two notable implications for a Catholic 
theological account of parenthood. First, it can accept the objective validity of particular 
lines of argument against same-sex parenthood, but would also evaluate such claims 
against evidence and with concern for the dignity of potential same-sex parents. Second, 
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Capabilities Approach aids in articulating why adoption is considered a positive form of 
family while also casting doubt on arguments opposing transracial and international 
adoption.  
 
Part II: Basis for a Child-Centered and Functional Account of Parenthood 
This project criticized contemporary modes of Catholic discourse on parenthood 
and explored resources that help substantiate a more adequate contemporary theological 
approach. Throughout, it consistently claimed that any such contemporary theology of 
parenthood should be based on considerations of children’s wellbeing as well as the 
capabilities of adult caregivers. It draws from natural law tradition and modern 
personalist moral theology the belief than any moral prohibition must be based on what is 
truly contrary to the human person. Consequently, the dissertation draws insights from 
history, the social sciences, and the humanities to give depth to this preliminary reflection 
on the moral-theological foundations of parenthood. A number of observations about the 
nature of parenthood followed. 
Throughout the modern era and particularly after Humanae vitae, sexual ethics 
has played an increasingly important role in Catholic conceptions of parenthood. Since 
this encyclical, magisterial teaching has repeated asserted sexual ethical norms, 
particularly the prohibition of contraception, while parenthood has been largely defined 
by biological procreation. Although this is a distinctive trend, it is based in tendencies 
rather than an explicit theological turn. Aspects of the tradition contrary to this trend were 
retained, asserted, and even recovered during this period. Examples include the 
convictions that adoptive parenthood is a paradigmatic expression of the nature of 
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Christian parenthood, that the most important function of the Christian parent is the 
spiritual education of children, that families are versatile and open social units which 
function over time, and that all people have nurturing and caregiving capacities. Yet these 
are not the dominant themes of contemporary magisterial discourse on parenthood. While 
biological kinship, marriage-based family structure, and moral means of procreation 
remain important to Catholic reflections on parenthood, their recent dominance has 
overshadowed other significant ideals. 
An account of Christian parenthood centered in child wellbeing and adult 
capabilities should rest most centrally on a commitment to care for the spiritual 
development of particular children to the best of one’s abilities. This conception implies 
care for the physical, emotional, and educational needs of children when it is guided by 
the moral pursuit of authentic human flourishing and understands children fundamentally 
as gifts from God.179 Christian parents, most importantly, help their children find 
friendship with God and therefore Christian parenthood is a form of evangelization.180 
Promoting the spiritual development of children is the central task of Christian 
parenthood from the simple fact the Christianity proposes relationship with God as the 
highest good and ultimate goal of all people. However, spiritual development is reliant 
upon physical care, emotional development, and educational advancement to reach its 
                                                 
179 The understanding of the moral life as a pursuit of human flourishing is central to the Catholic 
moral tradition, while the conception of children as gifts dates to early Christianity and has appeared 
repeatedly in magisterial writing on the family since Casti connubii. See, Pius XI, Casti connubii, Vatican, 
(December 31, 1930) http://www.vatican.va/ holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/ documents/hf_p-
xi_enc_31121930_casti-connubii_en.html, #15 and 53. 
180 Paul VI, Evangelii nuntiandi, Vatican, (December 8, 1975) http://w2.vatican.va/content/paul-
vi/en/ apost_exhortations/documents/hf_p-vi_exh_19751208_evangelii-nuntiandi.html, #71. 
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fullest human extent.181 This teleological perspective on human life also may be why the 
developmental model of childhood has remained persuasive throughout the Christian 
tradition.182 
Consideration of the theological nature of Christian parenthood presumes that 
Christian parenthood is to some extent unique from ‘natural’ parenthood or from other 
cultural and religious conceptions. Early Christian testimonies show that Christians 
within the Roman empire were, in fact, differentiated from the broader culture by the 
fluidity with which they constructed (and at times deconstructed) kin obligations.183 
Christians both disavowed families of birth and named fellow Christians their sisters and 
brothers. Early Christians also valued the dignity of each individual human life and felt 
called to care for orphans. Upon gaining political power, Christian emperors created new 
sanctions against infanticide184 although the practice of exposure continued for some 
time.185 Reproductive morality was also clearly a factor in early Christian perspectives on 
parenthood, though this was bound with body-rejecting dispositions acquired largely 
from mixing strands of Greek philosophy with eschatological religious expectations. 
Belief in the distinctiveness of Christian parenthood is confirmed by this historical 
evidence. It is quite clear that early Christian conceptions of parenthood were formed in a 
                                                 
181 While John Paul II’s and Paul VI’s use of personalism was critiqued earlier for its apparent 
prioritization of physical acts, the clear connection John Paul II repeatedly makes between spiritual and 
physical remains important. 
182 Cf. Cristina L. H. Traina, “A Person in the Making; Thomas Aquinas on Children and 
Childhood,” in The Child in Christian Thought, 129 – 132. 
183 See, Cahill, Family, 18. Cf. Rubio, 48. 
184 Hugh Cunningham, Children and Childhood in Western Society Since 1500, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Routledge, 2005), 25. 
185 Suzanne Dixon, The Roman Mother (London: Croom Helm, 1988), 20. 
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dialogue with the surrounding culture, sometimes accepting and sometimes rejecting its 
ideals. But Christians also firmly asserted their commitment to the fundamental dignity of 
the child, care for those in need, willfully constructing of kinship, and moral regulation of 
sexuality and reproduction. 
In light of this history, it is important to add to the foundation of Christian 
parenthood the observation that all kinship is interpreted kinship, and that different times 
and places have tended to make different interpretations of the same underlying realities. 
Biological maternity and paternity have generally formed the basis of conceptions of the 
family and parenthood. But this general consistency in interpretation does not prove 
inherent meaning, which is particularly important to acknowledge when identifying the 
distinctiveness of Christian kinship in its willingness to interpret kinship “against 
nature.”186  
Christian willingness to make kinship beyond biological relatedness is distinctive 
for going beyond what is ‘natural.’ This idea of acting in excess of nature is itself based 
on the Pauline conception of God’s work of salvation for the Gentiles. Paul writes, “For 
if [the Gentiles] were cut from what is by nature a wild olive tree, and grafted, contrary 
to nature, into a cultivated one, how much more will [the Jews] who belong to it by 
nature be grafted back into their own olive tree.”187 To lose sight of the excess of God’s 
plan of salvation beyond what is ‘natural’ is to lose sight of the eschatological edge of the 
Christian tradition that proclaims God’s grace in a yet-unfinished world. For this reason, 
                                                 
186 As Eugene Rogers points out, Paul at times uses the term ‘against nature’ to call attention to 
significant religious goods that are go beyond nature. Paul points to circumcision as a command of God 
that goes ‘against nature’ (Romans, 2:27), as well as his Christian outreach to the Gentiles, which 
unnaturally grafts them as branches onto the pure tree of Israel (Romans, 11:24). Rogers, 64 – 65. 
187 Romans, 11:24, NASBRE. 
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a Christian conception of parenthood must be able to accept a certain natural ordering of 
kinship and the family, while also remaining willing to transcend biological kinship. This 
transcendence is a hallmark of early Christian attitudes towards kinship, in contrast to the 
surrounding Jewish culture. 
For this reason, the voluntarist account of parenthood, which asserts that 
parenthood is based upon a decision to parent, has a certain fitness for the Christian 
perspective on parenthood. On the other hand, the Catholic tradition’s belief in the 
essential cooperation of the natural and supernatural orders (nature and grace) should not 
be discounted as this relates to human kinship. This complimentary relationship 
theologically warrants a positive evaluation of biological kinship. What is naturally the 
case (e.g. that biological kinship tends to form the foundation for interpretations of kin 
obligation) should not be disparaged even as it may be legitimately critiqued and 
expanded in light of Christian convictions. 
Consequently, Christian parenthood is best represented by a mix of the voluntarist 
and causal approaches. The strength of the causal approach is the centrality it gives to 
children’s needs and the respect it affords the human dignity of the child. Yet, the causal 
account can presume too much about parental fitness based on the mere fact or biological 
procreation and can lose sight of the importance of decisive commitments made in 
response to the needs of a particular child. A blended approach admits that non-biological 
kin may embody Christian parenthood in its fullness, even as biological procreation is 
generally the basis for Christian parenthood. In either instance, a decision to parent is 
made in response to a particular child’s needs. 
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This approach to Christian parenthood stands in basic agreement with that of 
Stephen Post, who is likewise concerned to argue for the theological good of adoptive 
parenthood. Post writes, 
Adoption does not exist side by side with the requirement that biological parents rear their 
offspring, as though birth parents might select one option of the other under ordinary 
circumstances. There are, however, limited ranges of circumstances under which prima facie 
duties may be set aside… While adoption is, then, a secondary option, Christianity nevertheless 
solemnizes it and ensconces it theologically as the right response to the child in need.188 
 
The decision to parent a child is itself a decision to care for that child. This does not make 
all caregivers parents, but does imply that all who nurture children participate to some 
extent in the reality of parenthood. In the Christian context, this is particularly true of all 
who voluntarily commit to nurturing a child’s spiritual growth. That is, many who 
‘parent’ are not ‘a parent’ to a specific child.  
That Christian parenthood is in fact a reality in which people participate in 
different forms is suggested in a number of ways. First, Christian tradition and Western 
culture include naming variations of parenthood, most notably ‘grandparent’ and 
‘godparent,’ which suggest that these forms of kinship somehow participate in the reality 
of parenthood itself. Second, while the Catholic tradition has long valued education and 
associated it with the primary duty of parenthood, it has also established schools which 
move this responsibility beyond immediate parental supervision. Consequently, while the 
duty to educate well remains vested in parenthood, others may participate in its 
accomplishment.189 And third, Catholicism’s long association with orphan care 
                                                 
188 Post, 154. 
189 Vatican II, Gravissimum educationis, Vatican, (October 28, 1965) 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/ hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_decl_19651028_gravissimum-educationis_en.html, #5. For a defense of the value and need for ‘non-
parent parenting’ see, See, Cynthia Willet, “Collective Responsibility for Children in an Age of Orphans,” 
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demonstrates that fitness to provide ‘parental’ care for children has not historically been 
associated with biological relatedness alone or with adult marital status. At times, 
prospective women religious have even been recruited with the promise of making use of 
their ‘motherly’ instincts in the operation of orphan asylums.190 Frequently, orphan care 
has been provided not because no living relative existed, but because the ones who did 
were considered, by themselves or others, unfit for the care of small children. As such, 
the daily obligations for care that parenthood involves have often been transferred to 
those with a greater ability to provide adequate care for a child. Therefore, the Christian 
tradition itself relativizes kinship obligations based on biological relatedness by 
acknowledging the parental nature of some non-parent adults, not compelling parents to 
meet all their children’s needs personally, and by creating institutions of care giving not 
based on biological kinship.  
Conceiving of parenthood as a reality that can be participated in by degrees rather 
than an all-or-nothing institution helps to explain why Christian parenthood finds its basis 
in children’s needs and adult capabilities. Following Kant’s moral dictum “ought implies 
can,” a person cannot morally assent to an obligation which they cannot fulfill; either 
because they are incapable or do not reasonably have the means of becoming capable.191 
That is, one cannot assume the capability of a particular biological nuclear family to 
                                                 
in The Best Love of the Child: Being Loved and Being Taught to Love as the First Human Right, ed., 
Timothy P Jackson (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011), 179 – 196. 
190 Annelies van Heijst, Models of Charitable Care: Catholic Nuns and Children in their Care in 
Amsterdam, 1852-2002 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2008), 55. It is notable that the advertisement what set in 
the context of offering a possibility for the young woman to use the motherly skills with which they are 
naturally endowed “and yet keep her entire heart free for God.” 
191 Cf. Post, 154. 
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parent a child any more than a particular single mother without knowledge of the family 
unit’s particular circumstances and resources. The need for capability is particularly 
important when considering parenthood; an obligation of supervision for the spiritual 
development of a gift from God, and all that this entails. Although biological parents hold 
a prima facia duty to parent, this can be set aside for serious reasons. On the other hand, 
the human capacity for growth and adaptation in capabilities must also be taken seriously.  
Parents frequently feel overwhelmed at the challenges of the task that faces them. 
A functional account of parenthood could exacerbate these anxieties. But parents also 
develop skills adapted to the specific challenges they encounter, skills they likely would 
not have developed without their experience of parenting particular children. In addition, 
circumstances can change significantly over the course of a child’s development; 
therefore assessment of parental capability must attend to reasonably foreseeable 
developments and adaptations in parental abilities.192 On the other hand, the dignity and 
wellbeing of the child is also a central factor for considerations of parenthood. That is, 
parenthood exists because children need adult relationships which will provide them care 
and protect their best interests. The Vatican has rightly asserted that the adult desire to 
parent can never itself be claimed as a positive right.193 Conversely, care for children in 
need may well be asserted as a duty for anyone who is able. 
                                                 
192 The fact that human needs, desires, and abilities change over time is central to Nussbaum’s 
approach to Capabilities Theory and founds her concern for ‘adaptive preferences.” Martha C. Nussbaum, 
Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2011), 25. 
193 Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. “Instruction for Respect of Human Life in 
Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation; Replies to Certain Questions of the Day” (Donum vitae), 
Vatican, (February 22, 1987), #8. 
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Not to be overlooked in this consideration of capabilities and obligations to care 
are those who reasonably and in light of circumstance surrender parental duties out of 
concern for a child’s best interest. Tragic circumstances may lead to this decision, but 
such a parent fulfills the obligations of parenthood in their choice. In fact, in recognizing 
that biological kinship does not itself bind parenthood, biological parents who place their 
children in the care of others, in light of the child’s needs and their capabilities, truly 
respond to the Christian vision of parenthood.194 Thus, an authentic understanding of 
Christian parenthood may lead to family dissolution as well as family formation; even as 
the circumstances for the former may be more tragic than joyous.  
The central role of marriage and the biological family in providing the context for 
Christian parenthood throughout history must also be noted. However absolutism about 
the biological nuclear family as the normative context for parenthood is limited by two 
important realities. First, the family has not been immune to change throughout history, 
but in fact has consistently adapted to social, economic and other pressures. Second, 
Christians have freely and consistently chosen to care for children without the ties of 
biological kinship and beyond the bounds of the nuclear family. As such, while this 
conception of parenthood is related to it cannot be subsumed by conceptions of the 
family. 
The shared nature of parental obligations within the nuclear family is also 
important to acknowledge. Present arguments that gender complementarity is an essential 
                                                 
194 Post, 160 – 161. While conceiving of birth mothers who choose to relinquish parental claims as 
paradigms of responsible parenthood may seem odd, cultural pressures that label such women as failed 
motherhood, and de facto failed woman, are the cause of great harm to both women and children. 
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aspect of the family consider this particular mode of sharing parenthood normative.195 
However, the veracity of this claim can be questioned in light of both social scientific 
evidence and historical realities. Historically, the functions of parenthood have rarely 
belonged to one or two individuals alone. Grandparents, godparents, relatives, neighbors, 
and siblings have all fulfilled parental duties to various extents for countless children 
throughout history. Moreover, only recently has Catholicism come to understand 
parenthood as a partnership of equals. Western history has tended to associate the 
executive functions of parenthood singly with fathers, who in Catholic theology were 
held to be the divinely appointed head of the household.196 Because of this, mothers have 
not had equal share in determining how parental obligations are fulfilled. The Romantic 
Movement influenced a decisive shift towards viewing women as the centers of true 
parenthood, defined in terms of nurture, but simultaneously questioned the long held 
presumption of women’s fitness to educate.197 Due to these realities, to take for granted 
equitable sharing of parental obligations is far too simplistic given the influence of these 
historical patterns. Therefore, in contrast to the complementarian ideal, it is evident that 
parental functions have not generally rested on spouses alone, while cultural theories of 
gender influence how parental labor is divided between the spouses.  
Even as parenting exceeds domestic life alone, because it is primarily a social 
function, individual family units remain the central context for Christian parenthood. All 
                                                 
195 John Paul II, Familiaris consortio, #19. 
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Christians have an obligation to participate in parenting in accordance with their 
capabilities and the needs of children, but not all must be parents of particular children, in 
the sense of heading a family unit. At the same time, structural definitions of the family 
ought to remain elusive if they are to include all the variations in which the functioning of 
parenting might take place. Minimally, family, conceived as a basic social unit in which 
Christian parenting exists, i.e. the domestic church, must include intimate caregiving 
relationships and a shared striving to towards friendship with God. As caregiving 
relationships some individuals fulfill a parenting function in light of the needs of others. 
However, greater reciprocity between caregivers and care receivers may be 
acknowledged in facilitating friendship with God. Thought this is a very loose definition 
of the family, it seems the only structural definition that does not unnecessarily exclude 
functional families. Parenthood can be exercised well beyond traditional family structures 
and domestic arrangements. Because of this families in the sense of domestic churches 
are created whenever and wherever the tasks of Christian parenthood are embraced 
within an intimate context in light of the needs of children. Beyond this, authentic 
parental functions exist for similar reasons beyond the domestic sphere and stand in an 
intimate relationship with these domestic churches. At times, the circumstances for 
particular arrangements may be lamentable, but the acceptance of parental obligations for 
particular children in need remains an authentically Christian task. 
 
Part III: Prudential Suggestions 
How do these commitments to a Christian theological account of parenthood bear 
on the case study shared in the Introduction? This section does not make definitive 
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recommendations for the US Bishops and Catholic adoption agencies to pursue. Rather, it 
attempts to articulate goods that are at stake in these arguments which require more 
considered attention. 
To review briefly, in recent years Catholic adoption agencies in several US 
localities have encountered new legislation that no longer permits discriminating between 
married applicants and those in legally recognized same-sex unions or marriages. In 
Illinois, this legislation was passed with assurances of an exception for private-religious 
organizations that were not honored later. Previously, Catholic agencies had willingly 
placed children with same-sex couples, but this was done only after other placement 
options had been exhausted. In 2008, Cardinal Levada, Prefect of the Congregation for 
the Doctrine of the Faith, clarified that any placements by Catholic adoption agencies 
with same-sex couples are morally prohibited by Catholic teaching. The anti-
discrimination laws forced the question whether Catholic affiliated private adoption 
agencies could continue their partnerships with the public sector given the newly clarified 
teaching that these placements were no longer acceptable under any circumstance. In the 
ensuing discourse surrounding the legal dispute, Catholic leaders consistently pointed to 
religious freedom and the right of every child to a family founded on heterosexual 
marriage.198 Little was said about the actual human capacities needed to raise children 
well. This project has investigated the presumptions of this discourse, particularly its 
emphasis on gender and sexual ethical norms, and has upheld two basic commitments. 
First, like all moral evaluations of parenthood, consideration of adoption placement must 
center on the best interests of the child and children’s need for stable, permanent families. 
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Second, the Catholic Church’s involvement in adoption services is more than a public 
and humanitarian service, but functions as a testimony to Church’s own identity. 
An initial suggestion is that representatives of the Catholic Church make public 
pronouncements regarding same-sex parenthood or other changes in family life with due 
care in light of practical considerations as well as persistent biases. Catholic responses to 
changes in legislation are based in deep concern for changing patterns of American 
family life and social standards, some of which have significant negative repercussions 
on child wellbeing.199 Family formation by same-sex adopters clearly departs from 
conceptions of the family found in magisterial teaching, yet until very recently, adoptions 
by same sex couples were permitted by Catholic agencies, albeit only when particularly 
difficult circumstances were thought to warrant such placements. Moreover, the influence 
of same-sex adoption on society as a whole is limited due to the relatively small number 
of families it affects.200 The loud and public response given to this phenomenon, which 
directly impacts only a small percentage of the already small percentage of children who 
are in public adoption programs, suggests the issue is driven by more than concern for 
children’s wellbeing. The argument that public recognition of same-sex relationships and 
                                                 
199 Rising rates of cohabitation in particular have had a profound increase on stability of many 
children’s families. See, David Popenoe, “Research Brief No. 13: The American Family 1988 – 2028: 
Looking Back and Looking Forward,” Center for Marriage and Families, (August, 2008). 
200 Michael John Perry writing about same-sex unions as an exclusion policy against the liberty of 
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families headed by same-sex partners contributes to a breakdown in cultural 
understanding of the reality of marriage has often been raised, but meets certain 
challenges. First, it can suggest the cultural conceptions of marriage and family take 
precedence over actual children’s need to find stable loving parents. Second, the actual 
negative implications of same-sex parenting on either children or society are difficult to 
justify given present social scientific research. Third, this argument can feed cultural 
perceptions that the Catholic Church’s leadership is primarily a vanguard of outdated 
social sexual conventions. Concerns about sexual ethics and gender do over-determine 
Catholic responses to same-sex parenthood and this weakens the likelihood that Catholic 
commitments to the nature of parenthood apart from these factors will be taken seriously.  
Attending too closely to sexual ethical matters in objections to same-sex 
parenthood risks suggesting that the Catholic Church’s real motive in the argument is not 
children’s wellbeing but the assertion of standards of sexual ethical behavior for society 
at large.201 Catholic public responses to the phenomenon of same-sex parenting, should 
speak first and foremost to this reality as parenting rather than as a disordered sexual 
relationships that claims more social rights than they deserve. The tendency to speak 
more directly to sexual ethical concerns than to actual parental capabilities significantly 
weakens possibility of effectively communicating concerns for child wellbeing. As 
Bonnie Miller-McLemore observes, religions are often prone to equate the survival of 
particular gender-roles and familial hierarchies with the survival of the faith community 
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itself.202 This way of thinking was clearly a factor in the Catholic Church’s negative 
response to the changing public roles of women throughout the early twentieth century. 
Papal arguments purportedly concerned with defending the dignity of women were 
revised significantly by subsequent pontiffs in response to new perceptions of cultural 
realities.203 Avoid the perception that the Church is once again standing on the wrong 
side of history in order to defend an outdated gender ideology requires an argument with 
more careful distinctions and a more nuanced engagement of social scientific data. 
Moreover, evaluating parental fitness on the basis of presumed sexual acts within 
a relationship suggests an unfair double standard. While Catholic leaders have had much 
to say about the moral problems of contraception, the objective moral evaluation of 
contraceptive heterosexual sexual acts has never been used to implicate the couples who 
practice contraception as categorically unfit for parenthood. Rejecting same-sex 
parenthood on the basis of presumed sexual activity easily suggests simplistic moral 
dichotomies that fail to recognize the complex aspects of the situation. This is especially 
true when considering relatively stable, committed, and monogamous same-sex 
relationships which appear to share more in common with their heterosexual married 
peers than Catholic leaders have been prone to recognize, especially when considered 
from a relational perspective.204 In other words, the greatest challenge to the 
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magisterium’s argument against social acceptance of same-sex couples is not an ideology 
of sexual freedom, but the apparent existence of happy and socially responsible same-sex 
couples. Straw man arguments that fail to engage actual experience are unlikely to 
prevail. Moreover, the line of argument suggests a flawed conception of the complexity 
of human relationships. While immoral sexual practices may at be significant enough 
outweigh the moral goods of a particular relationship, admitting this is different than 
declaring that nothing good exists in these relationships on account of the sexual 
immorality.205 This follows from the Catholic understanding that sexuality is more than a 
drive towards sexual activity itself, but is a factor in the human drive towards 
relationships as such.206 If sexuality drives towards a greater relationship, sexual 
immorality alone cannot determine the entire moral content of a relationship.  
In addition to acknowledging the complexity of same-sex relationships, it is also 
important to acknowledge the complex relationships some same-sex couples have with 
regard to Christian faith and the Catholic Church. Statements that suggest that such 
couples act only out of a desire to possess children, are active participants of an 
international ideological agenda, or that they are somehow stealing children away from 
heterosexual homes must be dropped. Because parenthood is rooted in basic human 
capacities and because the Christian tradition views responding to the needs of children 
as praiseworthy, hostility towards same-sex couples who seek to offer homes to children 
                                                 
205 This recognition is implicit in Persona humana’s objection to same-sex relationships, but has 
been rarely acknowledged since. See, Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Persona humana, 
Vatican, (December 29, 1975) 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19751229 
_persona-humana_en.html, #8. 
206 Fran Ferder, F.S.P.A. and John Heagle, “Tender Fires: The Spiritual Promise of Sexuality” in 
Human Sexuality in the Catholic Tradition (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 20. 
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in need should be replaced with a more generous attitude. Recent magisterial teaching 
clearly opposes same-sex parenthood but does not argue that same-sex couples are 
categorically incapable of raising Christian children. Present realities witness to many 
same-sex couples who do, in fact, desire to raise their children within the Catholic 
Church. 
Suggestions that same-sex partners are categorically morally corrupt and that their 
children are exposed to this corruption must also be avoided more carefully. Inasmuch as 
couples tend to keep their sexual lives private from their children, this moral objection is 
overly presumptive. The full lives of parents are not known to their children, while it is 
evidentially possible for individuals behave immorally in certain areas of their lives while 
managing others more appropriately. Social recognitions of partners as parents, in 
marriage or same-sex unions, does constitute a presumption of the sexual nature of this 
relationship, but children are not generally aware of how that is enacted in particular 
sexual acts. For Catholic teaching, the gender and marital status of partners is enough to 
categorically judge the sexual acts of unmarried or same-sex partners. Numerous Catholic 
theologians have taken issues with this method and conclusions. For example, Margaret 
Farley judges that same-sex relationships can meet basic requirements of justice 
considered holistically and not on sexual ethical matters alone.207 Considering the mode 
of relationship parents tend to have with their children, the basic justice exemplified 
within the spousal relationship of same-sex partners seems important even if the sexual 
aspect of the relationship is judged morally unacceptable. 
                                                 
207 Margaret A. Farley, Just Love; A Framework for Christian Sexual Ethics (New York: 
Continuum, 2010), 444. 
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In addition to these concerns, if arguments against same-sex parenthood on the 
basis of gender complementarity are to be taken seriously as arguments about parenthood 
in its own right, they require greater conceptual distancing from sexual ethical arguments. 
Shifting arguments for parental complementarity aware from sexual ethical judgements 
necessitates nuancing these arguments more carefully to account for other situations of 
caregiving which are morally permitted yet lack married, heterosexual parents. Children 
in some forms of institutional care or in the care of single parents do not experience 
parental gender complementarity. Moreover, children in the foster care system also lack 
the stability that a permanent placement might offer. Without recourse to the specifically 
sexual nature of a same-sex adopting couple’s relationship, it is challenging to explain 
why placement with a same-sex couple necessarily worsens a child’s situation. Non-
discrimination legislation does place same-sex adopters on equal footing with their 
heterosexual married peers. If reliable evidence could show categorically better wellbeing 
among children of heterosexual adopters, the argument based on parental 
complementarity would be strengthened significantly. For example, if legally recognized 
same-sex relationships can be shown to replicate the behavior of their cohabitating rather 
than married heterosexual peers, and argument in favor of the general stability of 
heterosexual marriage over same-sex unions could be upheld more forcefully. 
The argument for parental complementarity is also challenged by the fact that 
Catholic teaching has not substantively accounted for present changes in parental gender 
roles. There is very little suggestion that men can nurture children directly, despite the 
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existence of primary caregiver fathers as a small but historically significant reality.208 
Considering John Paul II’s letter to families Cahill observes “strikingly… the fatherhood 
of men is interpreted precisely in relation to by virtue of the maternal role of women.”209 
Male success in fatherhood is counted as involvement “in the motherhood of his wife.”210 
As many men now partake in more egalitarian parental experiences, such gendered 
characterizations unfortunately dismiss human adaptability as well as the developmental 
nature of parenthood itself. Interestingly, John Paul II contends that motherly nurture 
grows out of women’s experience of bearing children and thereby suggests that parental 
traits are to some extent learned through experience. On this basis, it seems greater 
attention to human adaptability in fulfilling parental roles is warranted and could 
facilitate more nuanced responses to cultural developments. 
 To conclude, Catholic reactions to non-discrimination legislation on adoption 
have appropriately raised concerns that parenthood is not a positive right, that moral 
regulation of sexual activity is a traditional aspect of Christian thought on parenthood, 
and that the family based in marriage and gender complementarity carries weight in 
considerations of parenthood. However, the manner of expressing these convictions 
becomes problematic if they are not carefully nuanced and balanced by other legitimate 
                                                 
208 A conception of direct male-nurture cannot be entirely ruled out because it could be implied in 
the relatively brief considerations of single-parenthood and is present in statements by the US Catholic 
Bishops. 
209 Cahill, Family, 94. 
210 John Paul II, Letter to Families, #16. 
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concerns.211 Moreover, practical concerns about perceptions of certain lines of argument 
warrant greater caution. 
 
Part IV: Looking Forward 
 This project does not construct a full theological account of parenthood; instead, it 
raises particular concerns in response to prevailing Catholic conceptions of parenthood 
and explores resources for their reconsideration. In particular, it calls attention to the 
dominance of sexual ethics and conceptions of gender which restrict present discourse 
concerning the nature of parenthood, particularly as articulated in responses to same-sex 
adoption. It also identifies a variety of sources that can fruitfully inform Catholic 
conceptions of parenthood. I have argued that renewed contemporary Catholic 
conceptions of parenthood could overcome present biases by critically correlating 
traditional insights, aspects of contemporary Catholic teaching and theological 
scholarship, observations of the social sciences, and arguments from the humanities. The 
preceding project endeavored to lay the groundwork for this reconsideration, yet a full 
contemporary theological account of parenthood in this manner will require additional 
efforts. 
First, the research presented here requires testing against diverse opinions both 
within and beyond Catholic theology. Second, relationships among the observations and 
arguments here presented may well require greater clarification and support. Third, 
several topics related to the ideas here presented require further scholarly development. 
                                                 
211 Cf. Stephen J. Pope, “The Magisterium’s Arguments against ‘Same-Sex Marriage’: An Ethical 
Analysis and Critique.” Theological Studies 65 (2004): 530 – 565. 
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These include: first, how the anthropological foundations of parenthood relate to specific 
human capabilities and the correlation of these capabilities to human gender; second, how 
the Catholic understanding of sacramental marriage relates to other forms of intimate 
human relationships from friendship and fraternity, to cohabitation and same-sex 
partnerships; and third, how children might be considered moral agents and subjects of 
moral analysis in their own right. There are certainly additional research questions 
implied in my line of inquiry, but by way of conclusion I will briefly address several 
tensions concerning these three questions just enumerated. 
 
Parenthood and the Problematic of Gender 
One significant tension throughout this project concerns the relationship between 
the human person and the human capability for caregiving, as well as the implications of 
human gender for how that capability is developed and expressed. By employing Martha 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and observing historical Christian practices of 
caregiving, this project suggested that a basic human capability grounds the capacities 
necessary for parenthood. This basic capacity for caregiving is shared, at least in its 
essence, by all well-functioning individuals. Nussbaum’s internal capability of 
“affiliation” has been identified specifically as an attempt to name and describe this 
human potential for parenthood. This is because parenthood requires certain specific 
skills, such as responsibility, nurture, empathy, altruism, et al. that appear to stem from 
this internal capability.212 Because the capacity to parent springs from a basic capability 
                                                 
212 See, Nussbaum, 33 – 34. 
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for forming relationships it is fitting to name parenthood both as an obligation owed to 
children in need as well as a function in which multiple non-parents participate. 
However, significant disagreement exists on the extent to which specific parental 
skills, dispositions, and attributes are grounded in and reliably shaped by human gender. 
Reductionist assertions about the relationship of human gender to the human person 
operate at each pole of this discourse.213 The view that parental capabilities and specific 
duties of parenthood are essentially governed by gender and the view that parental 
capabilities and proclivity for parental behaviors are unshaped by gender both 
shortchange the complexities of reality. An adequate approach must attend to the fact that 
human gender really does shape dispositions and propensities while maintaining that 
fundamental human capabilities are essentially shared by all. Adequate moral 
consideration of parenthood should be informed by inherent human capacities and 
propensities as well as the malleability of human abilities and the general adaptability of 
human persons. 
Staking out this middle ground requires attending to certain guidelines. From the 
perspective of theological anthropology it must be maintained that certain capabilities are 
simply too important to the human person to be the sole domain of a single gender. 
Failure to recognize this constitutes a failure to recognize the essential unity of the human 
experience and raises significant soteriological concerns.214 Therefore, when a capability 
                                                 
213 Parsons observes that John Paul II and some strong versions of feminism find common ground 
on the importance of sexual difference as a mode of mediating divine presence, but deeply diverge in their 
critiques of patriarchy. Susan Frank Parsons, The Ethics of Gender (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 
2002), 144. 
214 This is based on the Patristic dictum, “what has not been assumed has not been saved.” 
Feminist theologians have rightly raised concern about explanations of gender that appear to affect basic 
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appears to constitute an essential aspect of personhood, as do Nussbaum’s central 
capabilities of practical reason and affiliation, the theological conversation must shift to 
how gender shapes its expression, not its existence. From the teleological perspective, the 
value of the human capacity for adaptation and development must also be respected. This 
attention to change and growth is based in both the observable natural capacity of human 
persons to learn and develop in their skills as well as a theological commitment that 
understands the Christian life in terms of the process of sanctification or theosis.215 John 
Paul II’s suggestions that women develop certain parental capacities associated with 
motherhood out of their experience of gestation and infant care and that men too learn to 
parent by observing maternal nurture and participating in caregiving provides a 
magisterial resource for this line of argument.216 Attention to development and adaptation 
is also found among theologians. Commenting on Bonnie Miller-McLemore, Cahill 
writes “the fact that women get pregnant and the fact that women nurse babies matter. 
These experiences teach women something about self-giving the father simply do not 
know naturally.” But Cahill adds, caregiving is not inaccessible to those who do not have 
these experiences; it is not “privileged knowledge” but knowledge meant to be shared.217  
                                                 
personhood. Cf. Rosemary Radford Reuther, Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1993), 93 – 138. 
215 Again this is founded on a Patristic dictum; “God became human that humanity might become 
god.” Taking seriously the concept of divinization suggests great confidence in the human ability to 
transform oneself in response to mere earthly challenges, in as much as God is already affecting a far great 
transformation within us. 
216 John Paul II, Mulieris dignitatem, Vatican, (August 15, 1988) 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/apost_letters/1988/documents/hf_jp-
ii_apl_19880815_mulieris-dignitatem.html, #18. It is notable that John Paul II quite clearly sees the 
capabilities that grow out of these experiences as related to an innate human disposition towards 
motherhood within women. Nonetheless they come to expression in response to human experience. 
217 Rubio, 96. 
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Framing parenthood within commitments to the unity of the human experience 
and the human potential for development does not settle the problematic of gender but 
does mark out important parameters. If the ability of parental functioning relies on both 
common human capabilities and the development of these through experience, it is 
difficult to imagine motherhood and fatherhood as essentially dichotomous realities 
without excluding non-biological mothers from authentic motherhood. Moreover, 
because single parenthood, adoptive parenthood, and care for children by vowed religious 
have all been accepted without protest on the grounds of parental capabilities, the human 
capacity for caregiving does not appear to be essentially related to gender 
complementarity among caregivers. But parenthood is also an embodied activity and 
therefore gender differentiation cannot be entirely ignored. Cahill notes that embodied 
human gender difference is a relatively stable component of the human experience and 
consequently shapes numerous social institutions. As such, she suggests a dual approach 
that takes “a critical and normative stance” toward human embodiedness. Cahill argues 
that gendered difference is a “moral project” that represents “more opportunity than 
limit.”218 For these reasons, contemporary discussions of parenthood rest on an 
anthropological tension between the observable realities of human embodiedness and 
human potential. Each of these requires sustained attention. 
 
The Relationship between Marriage and other Human Relationships 
Contemporary Catholic teaching views legal recognition of same-sex unions as a 
direct threat to healthy families because it constitutes public recognition of these unions 
                                                 
218 Parsons, 125. 
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as equal, or at least similar, to marriage when they cannot “even in an analogous or 
remote sense” fulfill the meaning of marriage.219 This line of argument raises two specific 
concerns. First, the argument does not rule out the possibility that same-sex relationships 
can possess and exhibit various goods. Instead the argument construes same-sex 
relationships as morally distinct, in a total sense, from marriage. Perhaps by attending to 
the values same-sex partners identify in their own relationships, and avoiding sweeping 
condemnations, the Catholic magisterium could place itself in a stronger position to 
explain the virtues of sacramental marriage. Shifting attention away from the immorality 
of same-sex relationships and towards comparing perceived goods in light of the good of 
marriage could also help overcome the challenge of speaking to experiential observations 
of apparent virtues within same-sex partnerships, such as love, commitment, stability, 
and mutual support. However, this shift in perspective would necessitate returning to the 
recognition of potential interpersonal benefits of same-sex partnerships tacitly admitted in 
Persona humana. It would also require a more nuanced analysis of potential relational 
                                                 
219 Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. “Some Considerations Concerning the 
Response to Legislative Proposals on the Non-Discrimination of Homosexual Persons,” Vatican, (July 24, 
1992) 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19920724_homose
xual-persons_en.html, #4. The recent Extraordinary Synod on the Family produced interesting suggestions 
about the natural of marriage and other human relationships, although this state was ultimately reasserted. 
The level of nuance with which this synod has approached natural marriage, civil marriage, and 
cohabitation, is remarkable. The interim report suggested modeling a new framework for the Church’s 
pastoral approach to marriage off of the shift from ecumenical exclusivism to inclusivism that was initiated 
by Vatican II. In this framework, the Catholic Church remains central but other Christians and religions are 
envisions to stand, not in opposition, but in relation to the Catholic Church. Adopting this vision for 
marriage allows it to remain central to God’s plan for human relationships, but also allows us to recognize 
good in relationships that realize marriage’s goods in partial ways. The central motivation for this 
approach, a stated discomfort with “all or nothing” frameworks, did remain in the final report. Cf. Eleventh 
General Assembly, “‘Relatio Synodi’ of the III Extraordinary General Assembly of the Synod of Bishops,” 
Vatican, (October 18, 2014) http://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/bollettino/pubblico/ 
2014/10/18/0770/03044.html, #22, 41 – 56. And, Eleventh General Assembly: “‘Relatio Post 
Disceptationem’ of the General Rapporteur, Cardinal Péter Erdő,” Vatican. (October 13, 2014) 
http://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/bollettino/pubblico/2014/10/13/0751/03037.html, #17, 36 – 
52. 
428 
 
goods in relation to the moral judgment about the sexual nature of these relationships.220 
Second, a blanket assertion regarding the absence of analogy between heterosexual and 
same sex relationships raises serious questions about marriage’s relation to other forms of 
human relationships, specifically in its sacramental quality. Michael Himes argues that 
the Catholic sacramental tradition is based upon specific recognition and celebration of 
the universal and ever-present reality of grace.221 In certain times and places humans 
recognize this presence of grace acutely. The seven sacraments represent a communal 
naming of particular events as representative of God’s way of acting in relation to 
creation. In light of this perspective, Himes describes the marriage’s sacramental nature 
by marriage’s paradigmatic expression of the universal mode of loving human 
relationships.222 Sacramental marriage is not unique because it is unlike other forms of 
relationship but is sacramental precisely in its relationship to other human relationships as 
a recognizable expression of a universal reality. From this perspective, it is seemingly 
incomprehensible to assert that any relationship that fosters love, commitment, self-
sacrifice, or other goods associated with marriage is not be in some way analogous to 
marriage.  
Yet, from the moral perspective, some contend that no true virtues are found 
without conformity in intention to objective moral truth. Just as brave actions in criminal 
activity are not true bravery, love and commitment within disordered sexual partnerships 
                                                 
220 Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Persona humana, #8. 
221 Michael Himes, The Mystery of Faith: An Introduction to Catholicism (Cincinnati: Saint 
Anthony Messenger Press, 2004), 12. 
222 Ibid., 74 – 78. 
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are not true love and commitment.223 As such there appears to be a basic tension between 
the sacramental understanding of marriage in relation to other human relationships and 
the moral understanding of marriage in relation to other human relationships. From the 
moral perspective, objections to comparisons between same-sex relationships and 
marriage often have recourse to the assertion that same-sex couples lack sexual 
complementarity which is requisite for truly human sexual expression and marital love.224 
This perspective is then dependent on an assertion of objective truth about the nature of 
human sexual difference to which all virtuous sexual acts must conform. Sacramentally 
considered, however, marriage is intrinsically connected to the human capacity for loving 
relationships, and is sacramental specifically by that fact. From this perspective, it 
appears that all human relationships are at least in some measure analogies to marriage. 
Further exploration of this tension in the context of a more nuanced approach to the full 
relational realities of same-sex partnerships appears to be an important task.  
The less privatized vision of the family advocated by Cahill and Rubio among 
others on the basis of Catholic Social Teaching only increases the challenge of explaining 
marriage in light of other human relationships.225 Centering concern on the family’s 
                                                 
223 See, William C. Mattison III, Introducing Moral Theology: True Happiness and the Virtues 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2002), Chapter 7. This is also the reasoning John Paul II employs when 
suggesting that both same-sex relationships and contraceptive sexual intercourse are selfish acts in their 
essence apart from subject intentions and apparent experience. Cf. John Paul II, Familiaris consortio, #30. 
224 Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Considerations Regarding Proposals to 
Give Legal Recognition to Unions between Homosexual Persons,” Vatican, (July 31, 2003) 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20030731_homose
xual-unions_en.html, #4. Cf. United States Catholic Bishops. “Between Man and Woman; Questions and 
Answers about Marriage and Same-Sex Unions,” USCCB, (November, 2003) http://www.usccb.org/issues-
and-action/marriage-and-family/marriage/ promotion-and-defense-of-marriage/questions-and-answers-
about-marriage-and-same-sex-unions.cfm, #4. 
225 Cahill, Family, xii., Julie Hanlon Rubio, Family Ethics: Practices for Christians (Washington 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2010), 39. 
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social vocation decentralizes procreation as the essential task of Christian families and 
suggests greater comparison between socially engaged Christian families and other 
human communities that work to advance the common good.226 Accepting the notion of 
non-parent parenting further relativizes the absolute necessity of parental gender 
complementarity as it points to the reality that multiple adults should rightfully influence 
children’s lives.227 As such, the complementarian logic that excludes consideration of 
same-sex partnerships as a basis for parenthood requires more thoughtful examination in 
relation to its reliance upon a privatized conception of the family that stands in some 
tension with the Catholic Social Teaching and the broader tradition. 
 
A Catholic Ethics of Childhood 
 Christian tradition includes a significant amount of theological reflection on 
children and the nature of childhood that requires greater attention and is only recently 
being rediscovered. This relative lack of theological and moral attention to children as 
legitimate subjects of concern in their own right shows itself in variety ways. Examples 
of this lacuna range from theological writings based in male experience which largely 
ignore the topics of children and childcare as well feminist theological writings that 
                                                 
226 Lisa Sowle Cahill, “Same-Sex Marriage and Catholicism,” in Inquiry, Thought, and 
Expression, vol. 2 of More than a Monologue: Sexual Diversity in the Roman Catholic Church, eds. J. 
Patrick Hornbeck II and Michael Norko (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014) 154. 
227 This comports with social scientific data that shows statistically good outcomes for children of 
same sex parents. In fact, the veracity of Catholic Social Teaching is firmly supported by the experience of 
same-sex headed families who, often having fractured relationships to their biological and/or religious 
communities of origin, have sought to open their family outwardly to build networks of support and in so 
doing found their families strengthened. Cf. Amy B. Becker, “What’s Marriage (and Family) Got to Do 
with It? Support for Same-Sex Marriage, Legal Unions, and Gay and Lesbian Couples Raising Children,” 
Social Science Quarterly 93, no. 4 (December 2012): 1007 – 1029. 
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presume children to be wrapped up in the concerns of women. Thankfully, many scholars 
now recognize these limitations and are working towards their redress. In magisterial 
writings, similar biases have influenced three distinct trends in addressing children. The 
first, as in much modern theology, simply places the topic of children under the concerns 
of the family. Care for the child is often divided among gendered lines with nurture, 
especially centered on young children, coming from the mother and provision and 
education coming from the father. This approach consistently suggests that we simply 
know what children are without actually offering a conception of children or 
childhood.228 Such an approach is liable to assume cultural ideals in the place of 
thoughtful theological commitments. 
The second trend is evident in the strong ‘natalist’ bent of modern teaching. Todd 
David Whitmore writes, that this natalism “tends to focus on the gift of creation 
expressed in procreation at the expense of how it manifests itself at other stages of 
life.”229 As evidence of this point, moral concerns over procreation, reproductive 
technologies, and protection of the unborn dominate contemporary Catholic teaching 
related to childhood. An adequate contemporary account of parenthood demands a more 
significant and sustained attention to theological reflection on the nature of childhood and 
children throughout their development. Within the American context, the lack of direct 
attention to childhood is further exacerbated by biases within the reception of magisterial 
teaching. Rubio argues that none of the dominant American patterns of interpreting 
                                                 
228 Todd David Whitmore with Tobias Winright, “Children; An Undeveloped Theme in Catholic 
Teaching” in The Challenge of Global Stewardship: Roman Catholic Responses, eds. Maura A. Ryan and 
Todd David Whitmore (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 161. 
229 Ibid., 177. 
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Catholic Social Teaching pay due attention to the place of the family within the corpus of 
these teachings.230 She advocates for a social ethics “of everyday life” that can move 
beyond social analysis to engage the realities; presumably including the realities of caring 
for children throughout their developmental process.231 
The final trend has been a tendency to translate concern for children’s wellbeing 
quickly into rights claims. There are significant reasons to question the application of 
rights language to children in as much as rational free adults are the original subjects of 
this perspective. Additionally, rights language has been widely criticized as a rather 
sparse tool for asserting ethical claims which respect the full dignity and complexity of 
the human person. Without more sustained attention to theological reflections on children 
and childhood, rights claims remain one of the few available tools for expressing 
legitimate concern for children even as it does so imperfectly. 
Among the various concerns raised by this project, ongoing pursuit of this line of 
research points towards the needs to advance the scholarly conversations on the 
relationship of gender and parenthood, the relationship of marriage to other human 
relationships, and children as legitimate subjects of moral reflection.  
  
                                                 
230 “Neoconservatives argue for freedom in the private sphere and then seem to leave everyone to 
fend for themselves. They fail to challenge individuals to heed the call of solidarity beyond the boundaries 
of family. Liberals work out applications of solidarity in the public realm through analyses of war, 
economics, and human rights but have little to say about the social ethics of families or communities. 
Radicals have the most to say about alternate ways of living but frequently leave nuanced analysis behind 
in order to idealize heroes and saints.” Rubio, 59. 
231 Ibid. 
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